非法集結與暴動，共同目的與共同犯罪？？上訴駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：HKSAR v LEUNG TIN KEI (梁天琦) and LO KIN MAN (盧建民); SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v TONG WAI HUNG (湯偉雄) and TO ELAINE (杜依蘭) and LEE YUEN YUI, NATALIE - 法院：香港終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA) - 法官：張舉能首席法官、Ribeiro常任法官、Fok常任法官、林文瀚常任法官、Lord Sumption非常任法官 - 判決日期：2021年11月4日 ### 案情摘要 本案涉及兩宗上訴，均關乎《公安條例》(Public Order Ordinance, POO) 第18條非法集結罪及第19條暴動罪。首宗上訴（「盧案」）中，盧建民因2016年2月8日至9日在旺角發生的暴動被裁定暴動罪成，其上訴被駁回後獲終審法院批准上訴。第二宗上訴（「湯案」）中，湯偉雄因2019年7月28日在德輔道西發生的暴動被控非法集結及暴動罪，經審訊後獲判無罪。律政司就此向高等法院上訴法庭呈述兩項法律問題，上訴法庭提供意見後，湯偉雄獲終審法院批准上訴。兩宗案件因涉及重疊的法律問題而合併審理。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案主要法律爭議點包括：(一) 非法集結及暴動罪是否需要證明被告與其他集結人士之間存在「共同目的」(common purpose)；(二) 「共同犯罪」(joint enterprise) 原則是否適用於該兩項罪行，以及該原則是否允許在被告不在場的情況下確立法律責任；(三) 被告是否僅憑「在場鼓勵」(encouragement through presence) 而無具體行為，即可被裁定暴動罪成。盧建民一方主張需證明「外在共同目的」，而控方則認為只需證明「參與意圖」。 ### 判決理由 終審法院裁定，《公安條例》第18及19條的非法集結及暴動罪是「參與性罪行」(participatory offences)，被告必須證明其「參與意圖」(participatory intent)，即有意圖與其他集結人士一同參與或促成違法行為。條例旨在取代普通法，並明確排除證明「外在共同目的」的要求。法院進一步裁定，「共同犯罪」的基本形式不適用於此兩項罪行，因其與條例中「參與」的行為要件不符，且會造成重複和混淆。然而，「共同犯罪」的擴展形式在特定情況下可能適用於更嚴重的罪行。被告作為主犯必須在場，但不在場者仍可因教唆、協助或串謀等次要或未完成罪行而負上法律責任。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了多宗案例，包括 HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus [2021] HKCFA 24，以闡釋非法集結罪的構成要素。此外，法院亦參考了 The Governor and Company of the Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107，強調在解釋編纂性條例時應以條文本身為依歸。在討論「共同目的」時，引用了 R v Graham and Burns (1888) 16 Cox CC 420 及 Field and Others v The Receiver of Metropolitan Police [1907] 2 KB 853 等普通法案例。對於「共同犯罪」原則，則引用了 HKSAR v Chan Kam Shing (2016) 19 HKCFAR 640 及 Sze Kwan Lung v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 475。在「破壞社會安寧」的定義上，則引用了 R v Howell [1982] QB 416。 ### 裁決與命令 終審法院駁回盧建民的上訴，維持其暴動罪的定罪。對於湯偉雄案，法院就律政司呈述的法律問題作出裁決，確認「共同犯罪」的基本形式不適用於非法集結及暴動罪，但擴展形式在特定情況下可能適用。法院亦澄清了「在場鼓勵」及「破壞社會安寧」的定義。由於湯偉雄已被判無罪，故無需作出任何後續命令。 ### 判決啟示 本判決澄清了《公安條例》下非法集結及暴動罪的關鍵法律要素，特別是排除了「外在共同目的」的要求，並明確了「共同犯罪」原則基本形式的不適用性。判決強調了這些罪行的「參與性」本質，要求被告必須在場並有「參與意圖」。同時，判決也重申了不在場者仍可透過次要或未完成罪行承擔法律責任，並對「破壞社會安寧」的定義作出了更廣泛的解釋，以應對現代社會秩序混亂的複雜情況。判決亦處理了起訴書中未提及「身份不明人士」的程序性問題，並在盧案中應用了但書條款。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: HKSAR v LEUNG TIN KEI (梁天琦) and LO KIN MAN (盧建民); SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v TONG WAI HUNG (湯偉雄) and TO ELAINE (杜依蘭) and LEE YUEN YUI, NATALIE - Court: Court of Final Appeal (CFA) - Judge: Chief Justice Cheung, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Fok PJ, Mr Justice Lam PJ and Lord Sumption NPJ - Date of Judgment: 4 November 2021 ### Factual Background This case involves two appeals concerning the offences of unlawful assembly and riot under sections 18 and 19 of the Public Order Ordinance (POO). In the first appeal (the "Lo Case"), Lo Kin Man was convicted of riot for an incident in Portland Street, Mongkok, on 8 and 9 February 2016. His appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal to the CFA was granted. In the second appeal (the "Tong Case"), Tong Wai Hung was acquitted of unlawful assembly and riot charges related to a riot on 28 July 2019 in Des Voeux Road West. The Secretary for Justice referred two questions of law to the Court of Appeal, and subsequently, Tong was granted leave to appeal to the CFA. The two appeals were heard together due to overlapping legal issues. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal questions in dispute included: (1) whether proof of a "common purpose" shared by the defendant and other assembled persons is required for unlawful assembly and riot offences; (2) the applicability of the "joint enterprise" doctrine to these statutory offences, and whether it allows for liability without the defendant's presence at the scene; and (3) whether a defendant can be found guilty based merely on "encouragement through presence" without specific prohibited acts. Lo's side argued for an "extraneous common purpose," while the prosecution contended that only a "participatory intent" was necessary. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Final Appeal ruled that unlawful assembly and riot under POO sections 18 and 19 are "participatory offences," requiring proof of a "participatory intent" from the defendant, meaning an intention to participate with other assembled persons in or in furtherance of the prohibited conduct. The Ordinance, being a codifying statute, explicitly eliminates the requirement for an "extraneous common purpose." The Court further held that the basic form of the "joint enterprise" doctrine is inapplicable to these offences, as it is inconsistent with the statutory requirement of "taking part" and would lead to duplication and confusion. However, the extended form of joint enterprise may apply in certain circumstances for more serious offences. A principal offender must be present, but absent individuals can still incur liability through secondary or inchoate offences like incitement, aiding, or conspiracy. ### Key Precedents & Statutes The judgment cited several cases, including HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus [2021] HKCFA 24, to elaborate on the elements of unlawful assembly. The Court also referred to The Governor and Company of the Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107 on statutory interpretation for codifying ordinances. Common law cases like R v Graham and Burns (1888) 16 Cox CC 420 and Field and Others v The Receiver of Metropolitan Police [1907] 2 KB 853 were discussed regarding "common purpose." For the "joint enterprise" doctrine, HKSAR v Chan Kam Shing (2016) 19 HKCFAR 640 and Sze Kwan Lung v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 475 were cited. The definition of "breach of the peace" referenced R v Howell [1982] QB 416. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Final Appeal dismissed Lo Kin Man's appeal, upholding his conviction for riot. For the Tong case, the Court ruled on the questions of law referred by the Secretary for Justice, confirming that the basic form of joint enterprise is inapplicable to unlawful assembly and riot, but the extended form may apply in specific situations. The Court also clarified the definitions of "encouragement through presence" and "breach of the peace." As Tong Wai Hung had been acquitted, no consequential orders were made. ### Key Takeaways This judgment clarifies key legal elements of unlawful assembly and riot under the Public Order Ordinance, specifically excluding the requirement of an "extraneous common purpose" and ruling out the applicability of the basic form of the "joint enterprise" doctrine. It emphasizes the "participatory" nature of these offences, requiring the defendant's presence and "participatory intent." The ruling also reiterates that absent individuals can still be held liable through secondary or inchoate offences and provides a broader interpretation of "breach of the peace" to address complex public disorder situations. The judgment also addressed procedural issues regarding the omission of "persons unknown" in indictments and applied the proviso in the Lo case. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.