上訴撤銷判決程序與許可標準？申請駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：Zafar Muazam - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：林文瀚副庭長、朱珮瑩上訴法官、黃健棠原訟法庭法官 - 判決日期：2018年5月11日 ### 案情摘要 申請人Zafar Muazam就其司法覆核許可申請被拒，向上訴法庭提出上訴，但上訴被駁回。其後，申請人向上訴法庭提交一份「動議通知書」(Notice of Motion)，要求終審法院頒令撤銷上訴法庭的判決。該動議通知書是在高等法院提交，而非終審法院。申請人亦提交了書面陳詞以支持其動議。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案主要法律爭議為：申請人向上訴法庭提交要求終審法院撤銷上訴法庭判決的「動議通知書」是否具備法律基礎。其次，若該動議被視為向上訴法庭申請上訴至終審法院的許可，則申請人提出的理據（關於新證據的接納及法律代表的觀察）是否構成具重大普遍重要性的法律問題，足以獲准上訴許可。 ### 判決理由 法庭裁定，申請人的「動議通知書」有程序上的缺陷，因其向終審法院尋求濟助卻提交至高等法院。此外，上訴法庭無權撤銷其自身的判決。即使將該動議視為申請上訴至終審法院的許可，法庭認為申請人提出的理據（關於新證據的接納和法律代表的觀察）均屬事實爭議，不涉及具重大普遍重要性的法律問題。關於新證據的接納，法庭重申了《Ladd v. Marshall》的原則，並指出申請人未能證明新證據無法在原審時合理地取得，且新證據不會影響原審法官的結論。因此，不符合上訴至終審法院的許可標準。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了《Ladd v. Marshall [1954] EWCA Civ 1, 1 WLR 1489》一案，重申了上訴法庭接納新證據的原則。該原則要求新證據必須在原審時無法合理地取得，且其對案件結果可能產生決定性影響。此外，亦引用了《Hounkpedji Messanh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board CACV 164/2017, [2018] HKCA 152》一案，說明《Ladd v. Marshall》原則在酷刑聲請案件中的應用。這些案例確立了接納新證據的嚴格標準，並指導了法庭對申請人理據的分析。 ### 裁決與命令 法庭駁回了申請人的「動議通知書」。由於該動議在程序上存在缺陷，且即使被視為申請上訴至終審法院的許可，其理據亦不符合《終審法院條例》(Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484) 第22(1)(c)條所規定的「具重大普遍重要性」的標準。 ### 判決啟示 本案強調了上訴程序中嚴格遵守程序規則的重要性，特別是關於向正確的法院提交申請。同時，它重申了申請上訴至終審法院許可的門檻，即必須涉及具重大普遍重要性的法律問題，而非僅僅是對事實裁斷或既定法律原則應用的不滿。對於新證據的接納，法庭再次確認了《Ladd v. Marshall》原則的嚴格性。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: Zafar Muazam - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Hon Lam VP, Chu JA and L Wong J - Date of Judgment: 11 May 2018 ### Factual Background The applicant, Zafar Muazam, had his appeal against the refusal of leave for judicial review dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion in the Court of Appeal, seeking an order from the Court of Final Appeal to set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment. The Notice of Motion was filed in the High Court, not the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant also submitted written submissions in support of his motion. ### Key Legal Issues The primary legal issue was whether the applicant's Notice of Motion, seeking an order from the Court of Final Appeal to set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment, had a proper legal basis. Secondly, if the motion were construed as an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, whether the grounds raised by the applicant (concerning the admission of new evidence and observations on legal representation) involved a question of great general or public importance warranting leave to appeal. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court found the applicant's Notice of Motion to be procedurally defective, as it sought relief from the Court of Final Appeal but was filed in the High Court. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has no power to set aside its own judgment. Even if the motion were treated as an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, the Court held that the applicant's grounds (regarding the admission of new evidence and observations on legal representation) were fact-specific and did not involve a question of great general or public importance. Regarding new evidence, the Court reiterated the principles from Ladd v. Marshall, noting the applicant failed to show the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use before the original judge, and that the new evidence would not have affected the judge's conclusion. Thus, the criteria for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal were not met. ### Key Precedents & Statutes The case cited Ladd v. Marshall [1954] EWCA Civ 1, 1 WLR 1489, reaffirming the principles for admitting new evidence on appeal. These principles require that new evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial and would likely have a decisive impact on the outcome. Hounkpedji Messanh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board CACV 164/2017, [2018] HKCA 152 was also cited, illustrating the application of the Ladd v. Marshall principles in torture claimant cases. These precedents established strict standards for admitting new evidence and guided the Court's analysis of the applicant's grounds. ### Decision & Orders The Court dismissed the applicant's Notice of Motion. This was due to the procedural defects of the motion and, even if construed as an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, its grounds did not meet the 'great general or public importance' standard under section 22(1)(c) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484. ### Key Takeaways This case highlights the importance of strict adherence to procedural rules in appellate proceedings, particularly concerning filing applications with the correct court. It also reiterates the high threshold for obtaining leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, which requires a question of great general or public importance, not merely dissatisfaction with factual findings or the application of settled legal principles. The Court reaffirmed the strictness of the Ladd v. Marshall principles for admitting new evidence. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.