子女案件訟費命令的原則與酌情權？上訴得直

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：TPL v WYY (formerly known as WYY) - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：張澤平、袁家寧、朱芬齡上訴法庭法官 - 判決日期：2014年12月15日 ### 案情摘要 本案涉及兩宗關於子女的訟費上訴。母親（呈請人）與父親（答辯人）育有一子一女。母親在2010年11月提出離婚訴訟（第一宗訴訟），要求獨自管養及照顧子女。父親反對。2011年9月，法院批准母親基於分居一年並獲同意而提出新的離婚訴訟（第二宗訴訟），第一宗訴訟的訟費則予以保留。在第二宗訴訟中，母親再次要求獨自管養及照顧子女，父親則要求共同管養及照顧子女。在管養權聆訊中，父親未有披露其女友懷孕並將與其嬰兒一同入住婚姻居所的事實，法官對此表示嚴厲批評。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案主要法律爭議在於原審法官在處理子女事宜的訟費命令時，是否錯誤地考慮了母親獲法律援助的事實，以及是否錯誤地應用了處理子女案件訟費命令的一般原則。父親一方認為，原審法官不應考慮母親獲法律援助，且未有正確應用子女案件中通常不作訟費命令的原則。母親一方則認為，原審法官的訟費命令是合理的，特別是考慮到父親在訴訟中的不合理行為及未有披露重要事實。 ### 判決理由 上訴法庭裁定，原審法官在行使酌情權作出訟費命令時，錯誤地考慮了母親獲得法律援助這一不相關因素，這與處理訟費命令的一般原則相悖。因此，原審法官的訟費命令必須撤銷。上訴法庭重申，在子女案件中，一般原則是不作訟費命令，除非存在特殊情況，例如一方行為應受譴責或其立場超出合理範圍。儘管父親申請共同管養是合理的，但其未有披露女友懷孕及將與其嬰兒一同入住婚姻居所的事實，構成應受譴責的行為。然而，為顧及子女的最佳利益，偏離一般原則的訟費命令應僅限於反映特殊情況所需的程度。因此，上訴法庭決定，父親應支付聆訊訟費的一半，以反映其未有披露重要事實的行為。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了多宗英國案例，確立了在子女案件中訟費命令的原則： - London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) No.2 [1994] 2 FLR 569：確立了在子女案件中一般不作訟費命令的原則，但這並非一項僵硬的規則。 - R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95：強調訟費命令可能加劇父母間的緊張關係，不利於子女的最佳利益。 - Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250：指出「絕望的申請」與「不合理行為」之間存在區別，尤其對沒有法律代表的訴訟人應給予一定程度的寬容。 - Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015, vol.1, p.1133, para.62/2/9：重申一方或雙方獲法律援助的事實不應改變法院處理訟費的普通原則。 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭批准父親就兩宗訴訟的訟費命令提出的上訴。對於第二宗訴訟（CACV47/2014），原審法官的訟費命令被撤銷，並代之以命令，即除聆訊訟費的一半須由父親支付外，不作其他訟費命令。對於第一宗訴訟（CACV61/2014），原審法官的訟費命令亦被撤銷，並代之以不作訟費命令。兩宗上訴的訟費均不作命令。 ### 判決啟示 本判決重申了在處理子女事宜時，法院在訟費命令方面的酌情權應以子女的最佳利益為首要考慮。儘管一般原則是不作訟費命令，但若一方行為應受譴責或在訴訟中行為不合理，法院仍可作出訟費命令。然而，此類命令應僅限於反映特殊情況所需的程度，以避免加劇父母間的緊張關係。判決亦強調，訴訟人有持續披露相關資訊的責任，特別是在家庭案件中。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: TPL v WYY (formerly known as WYY) - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Hon Cheung, Yuen and Chu JJA - Date of Judgment: 15 December 2014 ### Factual Background This case involves two appeals concerning costs orders made in children proceedings. The Mother (Petitioner) and Father (Respondent) have a son and a daughter. In November 2010, the Mother commenced divorce proceedings (the 1st Proceedings) seeking sole custody and care and control of the children, which the Father opposed. In September 2011, the court granted leave for the Mother to issue fresh divorce proceedings based on one year's separation with consent (the 2nd Proceedings), reserving costs for the 1st Proceedings. In the 2nd Proceedings, the Mother again sought sole custody and care and control, while the Father sought joint custody and care and control. During the custody hearing, the Father failed to disclose that his girlfriend was pregnant and would be living with him and their baby in the matrimonial home, a failure heavily criticized by the judge. ### Key Legal Issues The primary legal issues were whether the trial judge erred in considering the Mother's legal aid status when making costs orders in children's matters, and whether the judge misapplied the general practice regarding costs orders in such cases. The Father argued that the judge should not have considered the Mother's legal aid and failed to correctly apply the principle of no costs order in children cases. The Mother contended that the judge's costs order was justified, especially given the Father's unreasonable conduct and non-disclosure of material facts during the litigation. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred by taking into account the Mother's legally aided status, an irrelevant consideration, when exercising discretion over costs orders, thus necessitating the setting aside of the original costs order. The Court reiterated the general practice of making no costs order in children cases, unless exceptional circumstances, such as reprehensible conduct or an unreasonable stance, exist. While the Father's application for joint custody was reasonable, his failure to disclose his pregnant girlfriend and their baby moving into the matrimonial home constituted reprehensible conduct. However, to serve the children's best interests, any deviation from the general practice should be limited to what is necessary to reflect the exceptional circumstances. Consequently, the Court decided the Father should pay half of the hearing costs to reflect his non-disclosure. ### Key Precedents & Statutes This case cited several English precedents establishing principles for costs orders in children cases: - London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) No.2 [1994] 2 FLR 569: Established the general practice of no costs order in children cases, but noted it's not a rigid rule. - R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95: Emphasized that costs orders can exacerbate parental tensions, which is not in the children's best interests. - Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250: Distinguished between a 'hopeless application' and 'unreasonable conduct,' suggesting more generosity towards litigants in person. - Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015, vol.1, p.1133, para.62/2/9: Reaffirmed that legal aid status should not alter ordinary principles for costs. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal allowed the Father's appeals against the costs orders in both proceedings. For the 2nd Proceedings (CACV47/2014), the original costs order was set aside and substituted with an order that there be no order as to costs, save that the Father pay half of the hearing costs. For the 1st Proceedings (CACV61/2014), the original costs order was also set aside and substituted with an order of no costs. There was no order as to the costs of the appeals. ### Key Takeaways This judgment reaffirms that the court's discretion in making costs orders in children matters must prioritize the children's best interests. While the general rule is no costs order, a court may order costs in exceptional circumstances, such as reprehensible conduct or unreasonable litigation behavior. However, such orders should be limited to what is necessary to reflect the exceptional circumstances, avoiding exacerbation of parental tensions. The judgment also underscores litigants' continuing duty of disclosure, particularly in family cases. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.