偽造罪中「虛假文書」的定義？撤銷定罪

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：香港特別行政區 訴 陳鑑清 - 法院：終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA) - 法官：終審法院首席法官張舉能、終審法院常任法官李義、終審法院常任法官霍兆剛、終審法院常任法官林文瀚、終審法院非常任法官范理申勳爵 - 判決日期：2022年4月14日 ### 案情摘要 上訴人陳鑑清是一名律師，涉及其客戶就屯門一物業的交易，該交易與政府的小型屋宇政策（丁權）有關。物業最初由蘇和劉購入，並以陳偉文（一名「丁」）的名義登記。陳偉文隨後授權蘇處理物業事宜。五年轉讓限制期滿後，陳偉文授權沈建榮處置物業，沈和黎綺琴（沈的「事實上的妻子」）決定籌集按揭貸款，並將業權轉移至黎的名下。上訴人律師行擬備了物業買賣協議和轉讓契，其中載有虛假陳述，指黎以300萬元購入物業並已支付150萬元。這些文件被用於向通用金融申請按揭貸款及向土地註冊處註冊。上訴人被控使用虛假文書罪及使用虛假文書的副本罪。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案核心法律爭議在於《刑事罪行條例》第69(a)(vii)條所指的「虛假文書」的構成要件。具體而言，一份文書是否僅因其內容就外在事實（例如根本交易）撒謊而構成「虛假」，還是必須「就其自身撒謊」（即關於文書的製造或更改情況撒謊）。控方主張廣義詮釋，認為文書內容的虛假陳述足以構成虛假文書。上訴人則主張「自身謊言方式」，認為虛假必須關乎文書本身的製造或更改情況。另一個爭議點是，在撤銷原有定罪後，是否應以串謀詐騙罪或《盜竊罪條例》第16A條下的欺詐罪取代。 ### 判決理由 終審法院採納「自身謊言方式」詮釋《刑事罪行條例》第69(a)(vii)條。法院認為，該條文的立法目的和文意要求「虛假」必須關乎文書本身的製造或更改情況，而非其內容就外在事實的虛假陳述。偽造罪旨在針對使用具有偽冒性質的文書，即文書就其自身撒謊，例如製造者身份、權限、製造日期或地點等。本案中，物業買賣協議和轉讓契雖然就買賣代價和支付方式撒謊，但並未確定這些文件就其製造情況撒謊。因此，上訴人使用虛假文書的定罪被撤銷。法院亦拒絕以串謀詐騙罪或欺詐罪取代，因原有控罪的指控不構成或不隱含地包括這些交替罪行的要素，且《盜竊罪條例》第16A條下的欺詐罪不要求證明「不誠實」作為獨立元素。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用並分析了多個英國及香港案例，包括R v Donnelly (1984) 79 Cr App R 76、Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 2000) [2001] 1 Cr App R 218、Secretary for Justice v Yeung Hon Keung Larry [2007] 4 HKC 397（廣義詮釋的案例），以及R v More [1987] 1 WLR 1578、Warneford and Gibbs 1994 WL 1061976、HKSAR v Huynh Bat Muoi [2001] 4 HKC 643（支持「自身謊言方式」的案例）。法院最終採納了後者，並認為Ho Ka Keung [2009] 1 HKC 61對《盜竊罪條例》第16A條的詮釋（要求證明「不誠實」）是錯誤的。 ### 裁決與命令 終審法院一致判上訴得直，撤銷上訴人根據《刑事罪行條例》第73條和第74條所作的定罪。法院拒絕以串謀詐騙罪或《盜竊罪條例》第16A條下的欺詐罪取代原有定罪。 ### 判決啟示 本判決澄清了香港偽造罪中「虛假文書」的定義，確立了「自身謊言方式」的詮釋，即文書必須就其製造或更改的情況撒謊，而非僅就其內容所涉的外在事實撒謊。這對未來涉及偽造罪的檢控具有重要指導意義，限制了偽造罪的適用範圍。此外，判決明確指出《盜竊罪條例》第16A條下的欺詐罪不要求證明「不誠實」作為獨立元素，糾正了此前上訴法庭的錯誤詮釋。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching - Court: Court of Final Appeal (CFA) - Judge: Chief Justice Cheung Chun-yee, Permanent Judge Ribeiro PJ, Permanent Judge Fok PJ, Permanent Judge Lam PJ, Non-Permanent Judge Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers - Date of Judgment: 14 April 2022 ### Factual Background The appellant, Chan Kam Ching, a solicitor, was involved in property transactions for his clients concerning a Tuen Mun property, related to the government's Small House Policy (Ding Rights). The property was initially acquired by So and Lau, registered in the name of Chan Wai Man (a 'Ding'). Chan Wai Man later authorized So to handle property matters. After the five-year restriction period on alienation expired, Chan Wai Man authorized Shum Kin Wing to dispose of the property. Shum and Lai Yee Kam (Shum's 'de facto wife') decided to raise a mortgage loan and transfer the title to Lai. The appellant's firm prepared a sale and purchase agreement and an assignment, which contained false representations that Lai purchased the property for HK$3 million and had paid HK$1.5 million. These documents were used to apply for a mortgage from GE Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd and for registration with the Land Registry. The appellant was charged with using a false instrument and using a copy of a false instrument. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal issue in this case concerned the definition of 'false' for the purposes of forgery-related offences under section 69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance. Specifically, whether an instrument is 'false' merely because its contents lie about extrinsic facts (e.g., the underlying transaction), or if it must 'lie about itself' (i.e., about the circumstances of its making or alteration). The prosecution argued for a broad interpretation, while the appellant contended for the 'lie about itself' approach. A secondary issue was whether, upon quashing the original convictions, they should be substituted with convictions for conspiracy to defraud or fraud under section 16A of the Theft Ordinance. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Final Appeal adopted the 'lie about itself' approach to interpreting section 69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance. The Court held that the legislative purpose and context of the provision require 'falsity' to relate to the circumstances of the instrument's making or alteration, not merely to false statements about extrinsic facts contained within it. Forgery targets instruments that are counterfeit in nature, meaning they lie about their own provenance, such as the identity or authority of the maker, or the date or place of making. In this case, while the sale and purchase agreement and assignment lied about the consideration and payment method, it was not established that they lied about the circumstances of their making. Therefore, the appellant's convictions for using false instruments were quashed. The Court also declined to substitute convictions for conspiracy to defraud or fraud, as the original charges did not constitute or implicitly include the elements of these alternative offences, and fraud under section 16A of the Theft Ordinance does not require proof of 'dishonesty' as a separate element. ### Key Precedents & Statutes The judgment cited and analyzed several English and Hong Kong cases, including R v Donnelly (1984) 79 Cr App R 76, Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 2000) [2001] 1 Cr App R 218, and Secretary for Justice v Yeung Hon Keung Larry [2007] 4 HKC 397 (cases supporting the broad interpretation), as well as R v More [1987] 1 WLR 1578, Warneford and Gibbs 1994 WL 1061976, and HKSAR v Huynh Bat Muoi [2001] 4 HKC 643 (cases supporting the 'lie about itself' approach). The Court ultimately adopted the latter, and found the interpretation in Ho Ka Keung [2009] 1 HKC 61 (requiring 'dishonesty' for section 16A of the Theft Ordinance) to be erroneous. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Final Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and quashed the appellant's convictions under sections 73 and 74 of the Crimes Ordinance. The Court also refused to substitute the original convictions with convictions for conspiracy to defraud or fraud under section 16A of the Theft Ordinance. ### Key Takeaways This judgment clarifies the definition of 'false instrument' in Hong Kong forgery law, establishing the 'lie about itself' interpretation. This means an instrument must lie about the circumstances of its making or alteration, not merely about extrinsic facts contained within its content. This has significant implications for future forgery prosecutions, limiting the scope of the offence. Furthermore, the judgment explicitly states that fraud under section 16A of the Theft Ordinance does not require proof of 'dishonesty' as a separate element, correcting a previous erroneous interpretation by the Court of Appeal. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.