偽造罪中虛假文書的定義？撤銷定罪

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching (陳鑑清) - 法院：香港終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA) - 法官：張舉能首席法官、Ribeiro常任法官、Fok常任法官、Lam常任法官及Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers非常任法官 - 判決日期：2022年4月14日 ### 案情摘要 上訴人陳鑑清是一名律師，他與客戶涉及一宗屯門物業的交易，該交易與政府的小型屋宇政策（丁屋政策）有關。陳鑑清被指控使用虛假文書及虛假文書副本，意圖誘使通用電氣資本（香港）有限公司（GE）及土地註冊處接受該等文書為真確，並因此作出或不作出某些行為，導致其自身或他人受損害。涉案文書包括一份2007年6月4日的買賣協議（SPA）及其副本，以及一份2007年6月21日的物業轉讓契。控方指控這些文書在物業代價支付的事實和方式上作出了虛假陳述。原審法官裁定上訴人罪名成立，但上訴法庭則以不同的理由，即認為相關交易為虛假交易（sham transaction），維持了定罪。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案的核心法律爭議在於《刑事罪行條例》（Crimes Ordinance, CO）第69(a)(vii)條中「虛假文書」（false instrument）的定義，特別是「在並非實際製作或更改該文書的情況下製作或更改」的含義。上訴人認為，該條文應採納「文書自述虛假原則」（automendacity principle），即文書必須就其本身的製作或更改情況說謊，而非其內容所涉及的外來事實。控方則主張廣義解釋，認為文書內容中關於外來事實的虛假陳述亦可構成虛假文書。 ### 判決理由 終審法院採納了「文書自述虛假原則」（automendacity principle），認為《刑事罪行條例》第69(a)(vii)條應作目的性及語境性解釋。該條文旨在針對使用具有虛假真實性（spurious authenticity）的文書進行欺詐的行為，即文書本身就其製作或更改情況說謊。法院指出，條文中的「在並非實際製作或更改該文書的情況下製作或更改」應與同條文中的「日期」和「地點」作同類解釋（ejusdem generis），均指文書製作或更改的實際情況，而非文書內容所涉及的外來事實。因此，僅文書內容包含關於基礎交易或其他外來事實的虛假陳述，不足以使其成為虛假文書。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案主要引用了以下案例來闡述和支持「文書自述虛假原則」： - R v More [1987] 1 WLR 1578：確立了「文書自述虛假原則」適用於《刑事罪行條例》第69(a)條的所有子段。 - Warneford and Gibbs 1994 WL 1061976：對《刑事罪行條例》第69(a)(vii)條進行了詳細分析，強調虛假性必須與文書製作的實際情況相關。 - HKSAR v Huynh Bat Muoi [2001] 4 HKC 643：香港上訴法庭採納了「文書自述虛假原則」。 法院亦討論了R v Donnelly (1984) 79 Cr App R 76、R v Jeraj [1994] Crim L R 595及Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 2000) [2001] 1 Cr App R 218等案例所採納的廣義解釋，但最終予以拒絕。此外，法院還審視了《盜竊罪條例》（Theft Ordinance）第16A條的欺詐罪，並指出HKSAR v Ho Ka Keung [2009] 1 HKC 61 (CA)中關於欺詐罪必須證明不誠實（dishonesty）的觀點不應被採納。 ### 裁決與命令 終審法院一致裁定上訴人上訴得直，撤銷其在《刑事罪行條例》第73條和第74條下的定罪。法院亦拒絕根據《刑事訴訟程序條例》第83A條以其他罪名替代定罪。這意味著上訴人被判無罪。 ### 判決啟示 本判決澄清了香港偽造罪行中「虛假文書」的定義，明確採納了「文書自述虛假原則」，即文書的虛假性必須關乎其本身的製作或更改情況，而非其內容所涉及的外來事實。這對未來處理涉及文書內容虛假陳述的案件具有重要指導意義，強調控方在指控偽造罪時需證明文書本身的「虛假真實性」。此外，判決還指出《盜竊罪條例》第16A條的欺詐罪不要求證明獨立的「不誠實」元素，糾正了此前上訴法庭的錯誤觀點。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching (陳鑑清) - Court: Court of Final Appeal (CFA) - Judge: Chief Justice Cheung, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Fok PJ, Mr Justice Lam PJ and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers NPJ - Date of Judgment: 14 April 2022 ### Factual Background The appellant, Chan Kam Ching, a solicitor, was involved with clients in property dealings in Tuen Mun related to the Government's Small House Policy. He was accused of using a false instrument and a copy of a false instrument, intending to induce GE Capital (Hong Kong) Limited (GE) and the Land Registry to accept them as genuine, thereby causing prejudice. The instruments included a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated 4 June 2007 and its copy, and an Assignment of property dated 21 June 2007. The prosecution alleged these documents contained false representations regarding the fact and manner of payment of the property consideration. The trial judge convicted the appellant, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction on a different basis, finding the underlying transaction to be a sham. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal question in dispute was the meaning of "false instrument" under section 69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance (CO), specifically the phrase "made or altered... in circumstances in which it was not in fact made or altered." The appellant argued for the "automendacity principle," where an instrument must tell a lie about its own making or alteration, not about extraneous facts in its content. The prosecution contended for a wider interpretation, suggesting that false statements about extraneous facts within the document's content could also constitute a false instrument. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Final Appeal adopted the "automendacity principle," holding that CO section 69(a)(vii) must be construed purposively and contextually. The statutory purpose is to target frauds involving instruments of spurious authenticity, meaning documents that tell lies about themselves. The phrase "made or altered... in circumstances in which it was not in fact made or altered" should be construed ejusdem generis with "date" and "place" in the same provision, referring to the actual circumstances of the instrument's making or alteration, not extraneous facts mentioned in its content. Therefore, mere false statements about an underlying transaction or other extraneous matters in a document's content are insufficient to render it a false instrument. ### Key Precedents & Statutes This case primarily cited the following precedents to elaborate and support the "automendacity principle": - R v More [1987] 1 WLR 1578: Established that the automendacity principle applies to all sub-paragraphs of CO section 69(a). - Warneford and Gibbs 1994 WL 1061976: Provided a detailed analysis of CO section 69(a)(vii), emphasizing that falsity must relate to the actual circumstances of the document's making. - HKSAR v Huynh Bat Muoi [2001] 4 HKC 643: The Hong Kong Court of Appeal adopted the automendacity approach. The Court also discussed and ultimately rejected the broader interpretations adopted in R v Donnelly (1984) 79 Cr App R 76, R v Jeraj [1994] Crim L R 595, and Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 2000) [2001] 1 Cr App R 218. Furthermore, the judgment examined the offence of fraud under section 16A of the Theft Ordinance and stated that the view in HKSAR v Ho Ka Keung [2009] 1 HKC 61 (CA) that dishonesty must be proved for fraud should not be followed. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Final Appeal unanimously allowed the appellant's appeal and quashed his convictions under sections 73 and 74 of the Crimes Ordinance. The Court also declined to substitute alternative convictions under section 83A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. This means the appellant was acquitted. ### Key Takeaways This judgment clarifies the definition of "false instrument" in Hong Kong's forgery offences, explicitly adopting the "automendacity principle." Falsity must relate to the instrument's own making or alteration, not to extraneous facts in its content. This provides crucial guidance for future cases involving false statements in document content, emphasizing that the prosecution must prove the document's "spurious authenticity." Additionally, the judgment corrects a previous Court of Appeal view, stating that the offence of fraud under section 16A of the Theft Ordinance does not require proof of a separate element of "dishonesty." --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.