洗錢罪中「合理理由相信」的客觀標準？上訴駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：香港特別行政區 訴 HARJANI HARESH MURLIDHAR - 法院：香港終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA) - 法官：終審法院首席法官馬道立、終審法院常任法官霍兆剛、終審法院常任法官張舉能、終審法院非常任法官司徒敬、終審法院非常任法官范理申勳爵 - 判決日期：2019年12月5日 ### 案情摘要 上訴人Harjani Haresh Murlidhar被控串謀處理從可公訴罪行得益的財產。案情指，買賣雙方Dohigh Trading Limited及Dragon Asia Fertilizer Limited的電郵遭駭客入侵，導致Dragon Asia將一筆539,375美元的訂金錯誤轉入上訴人與另一人Brian共同擁有的公司Sino Investment and Trading Limited (SIAT)在State Bank of India的賬戶。上訴人隨後從該賬戶提取部分現金。原審法官裁定上訴人對明顯的違法標記視而不見，有合理理由相信該財產有問題，儘管他不知道該財產代表犯罪得益。上訴法庭駁回上訴，但認為原審法官對「有合理理由相信」的處理方式錯誤，但仍維持定罪，因原審法官已裁定上訴人沒有誠實的信念。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案主要爭議點包括：《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》(Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance)第25(1)條中「有合理理由相信」的含義；被告人真實信念在判斷是否符合法定驗證標準時的相關性；「故意視而不見」(wilful blindness)在判斷是否符合法定驗證標準時的相關性；以及根據《刑事罪行條行》(Crimes Ordinance)第159A條，是否存在「串謀處理財產並有合理理由相信該財產代表從可公訴罪行得益」的罪行，以及在何種情況下構成此串謀罪。 ### 判決理由 終審法院澄清了「有合理理由相信」的驗證標準，強調其為客觀標準，即任何得知被告人所知事實的明理人士，是否必然會相信有關財產是有問題的。法院指出，被告人的主觀信念或觀感僅在其基於合理理由時才相關。對於「故意視而不見」，法院認為其可作為推斷確實知悉的基礎，但在有「合理理由相信」的替代定罪基礎下，通常無須應用。法院進一步裁定，串謀處理有問題財產的罪行是存在的，且《刑事罪行條例》第159A(2)條不適用於《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第25(1)條「合理理由」一環，因為「有問題財產」並非該罪行所需的「特定事實或情況」。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案主要引用並澄清了HKSAR v Pang Hung Fai (2014) 17 HKCFAR 778及HKSAR v Yeung Ka Sing Carson (2016) 19 HKCFAR 279兩案中關於「有合理理由相信」的驗證標準。此外，還引用了Seng Yuet Fong v HKSAR [1999] 2 HKC 833確立的驗證標準，並參考了英國最高法院在R v Lane [2018] UKSC 36一案中對類似用語「合理因由懷疑」的詮釋，以及R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18對串謀罪精神元素的分析。 ### 裁決與命令 終審法院駁回上訴人的上訴。法院裁定原審法官對「有合理理由相信」的驗證標準應用正確，且有充分證據支持上訴人對可疑情況視而不見，並有合理理由相信涉案資金來自可公訴罪行得益。因此，上訴人被裁定串謀處理從可公訴罪行得益的財產罪名成立。 ### 判決啟示 本判決重申並澄清了香港洗錢罪中「有合理理由相信」的客觀驗證標準，強調即使被告人聲稱不相信，若客觀情況足以令明理人相信財產有問題，仍可定罪。同時，明確了串謀處理有問題財產罪行的構成要件，指出《刑事罪行條例》第159A(2)條不適用於此類串謀罪的「合理理由」環節。這對未來處理類似洗錢及串謀案件具有指導意義。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: HKSAR v HARJANI HARESH MURLIDHAR - Court: Court of Final Appeal (CFA) - Judge: Ma CJ, Fok PJ, Cheung PJ, Ribeiro NPJ, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers NPJ - Date of Judgment: 5 December 2019 ### Factual Background The appellant, Harjani Haresh Murlidhar, was charged with conspiracy to deal with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence. The case involved a scam where hackers intercepted emails, leading Dragon Asia Fertilizer Limited to mistakenly transfer a deposit of US$539,375 into an account of Sino Investment and Trading Limited (SIAT), a company jointly owned by the appellant and Brian. The appellant subsequently withdrew part of this cash. The trial judge found that the appellant had turned a blind eye to obvious red flags and had reasonable grounds to believe the property was tainted, even though he did not know it represented criminal proceeds. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in his approach to "reasonable grounds to believe," the conviction was upheld because the judge had found the appellant lacked an honest belief. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal issues included: the meaning of "reasonable grounds to believe" under section 25(1) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance; the relevance of a defendant's actual belief in determining whether the statutory test is met; the relevance of "wilful blindness" in meeting the statutory test; and whether, under section 159A of the Crimes Ordinance, there is an offence of "conspiracy to deal with property... having reasonable grounds to believe that the property represents proceeds of an indictable offence," and under what circumstances such a conspiracy is committed. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Final Appeal clarified the "reasonable grounds to believe" test as an objective one: would any reasonable person, with the facts known to the defendant, necessarily believe the property was tainted? The Court emphasized that a defendant's subjective belief is only relevant if based on reasonable grounds. Regarding "wilful blindness," the Court stated it could be a basis for inferring actual knowledge but is generally unnecessary when an alternative basis of "reasonable grounds to believe" exists. The Court further ruled that conspiracy to deal with tainted property is possible, and section 159A(2) of the Crimes Ordinance does not apply to the "reasonable grounds" limb of section 25(1) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, as the tainted nature of the property is not a "particular fact or circumstance" required for the offence. ### Key Precedents & Statutes This case primarily cited and clarified HKSAR v Pang Hung Fai (2014) 17 HKCFAR 778 and HKSAR v Yeung Ka Sing Carson (2016) 19 HKCFAR 279 regarding the "reasonable grounds to believe" test. It also affirmed the test from Seng Yuet Fong v HKSAR [1999] 2 HKC 833. Reference was made to the UK Supreme Court's interpretation of "reasonable cause to suspect" in R v Lane [2018] UKSC 36 and the analysis of mens rea in conspiracy from R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Final Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal. The Court found that the trial judge had correctly applied the "reasonable grounds to believe" test and that there was ample evidence to support the finding that the appellant had turned a blind eye to suspicious circumstances and had reasonable grounds to believe the funds were proceeds of an indictable offence. Consequently, the appellant's conviction for conspiracy to deal with proceeds of an indictable offence was upheld. ### Key Takeaways This judgment reaffirms and clarifies the objective test for "reasonable grounds to believe" in money laundering offences in Hong Kong. It emphasizes that even if a defendant claims not to believe, conviction can follow if objective circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe the property is tainted. It also clarifies the elements of conspiracy to deal with tainted property, stating that section 159A(2) of the Crimes Ordinance does not apply to the "reasonable grounds" limb of such conspiracy. This provides important guidance for future money laundering and conspiracy cases. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.