共同犯罪原則中預見犯罪的責任認定？上訴駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：HKSAR v CHAN KAM SHING (陳錦成) - 法院：終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA) - 法官：馬道立首席法官、列顯倫常任法官、鄧楨常任法官、霍兆剛常任法官、賀輔明非常任法官 - 判決日期：2016年12月16日 ### 案情摘要 上訴人陳錦成因謀殺罪被定罪，該罪涉及郭顯青的死亡。上訴人是屯門新義安三合會成員，與其他幫派成員奉其三合會頭目命令「斬」敵對派系成員。他們攜帶刀具、水管和電筒，分乘兩輛車尋找敵對者。當上訴人車上的人得知其他成員已找到目標並開始襲擊時，他們立即駕車前往現場協助。死者被四五人持刀襲擊，並被車輛輾過兩次。上訴人到達現場時，死者已倒地。上訴人及其同夥協助其幫派成員離開現場。沒有證據表明上訴人直接參與襲擊或造成死者傷亡，其定罪是基於他積極參與共同犯罪計劃（joint criminal enterprise），意圖對敵對派系成員造成嚴重身體傷害。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案的核心法律爭議在於香港的共同犯罪原則（doctrine of joint enterprise）是否應繼續適用，特別是考慮到英國最高法院在 R v Jogee and R v Ruddock 一案中對 Chan Wing Siu v R 判決的不認同。上訴方認為應採納 Jogee 案的原則，即共同犯罪的次要參與者（secondary party）必須有協助或教唆主要罪行（principal offence）的意圖，而預見（foresight）僅為證據。答辯方則主張香港應維持 Chan Wing Siu 案所確立的原則，即預見犯罪發生的可能性足以構成共同犯罪的刑事責任。 ### 判決理由 終審法院裁定，香港應繼續適用 Chan Wing Siu 案所確立的共同犯罪原則，而非採納 Jogee 案的原則。法院認為，共同犯罪原則與傳統的從犯責任原則（accessorial liability principles）不同，其責任並非衍生性的，而是基於各被告參與共同犯罪計劃的獨立責任。法院強調，預見犯罪行為作為共同犯罪計劃可能發生的事件，足以構成刑事責任，這是一種默示授權（implied authorisation）。法院認為 Jogee 案的「有條件意圖」（conditional intent）概念存在問題，且其廢除共同犯罪原則將導致法律出現重大漏洞，難以處理涉及證據和情境不確定性的案件。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案主要引用並確認了 Chan Wing Siu v R [1985] 1 AC 168 和 Sze Kwan Lung v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 475 所確立的共同犯罪原則。同時，法院審視了英國最高法院 R v Jogee and R v Ruddock [2016] 2 WLR 681 及其後續案例，以及澳洲高等法院 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 的相關判決，但最終決定不採納 Jogee 案的觀點。 ### 裁決與命令 終審法院一致駁回上訴人的上訴。法院確認共同犯罪原則在香港繼續適用，上訴人因積極參與共同犯罪計劃，意圖對敵對派系成員造成嚴重身體傷害，故其謀殺罪定罪維持。 ### 判決啟示 本判決明確指出香港法律不採納英國最高法院在 Jogee 案中對共同犯罪原則的修改，維持了 Chan Wing Siu 案所確立的「預見可能性」作為共同犯罪責任基礎的原則。這對香港刑事法律中涉及多方參與犯罪的案件具有重要指導意義，確保了在處理證據和情境不確定性時法律的靈活性和有效性。判決強調共同犯罪責任的獨立性，而非衍生性。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: HKSAR v CHAN KAM SHING (陳錦成) - Court: Court of Final Appeal (CFA) - Judge: Chief Justice Ma, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Tang PJ, Mr Justice Fok PJ and Lord Hoffmann NPJ - Date of Judgment: 16 December 2016 ### Factual Background The appellant, Chan Kam Shing, was convicted of murder in connection with the death of Kwok Hin Ching. The appellant, a member of the Sun Yee On triad society, received an order from his triad boss, along with fellow gang members, to "chop" members of a rival faction. They armed themselves with knives, water-pipes, and torches, and went in two cars to search for their rivals. When those in the appellant's car heard that the others had found the intended victims and had begun attacking them, they immediately drove to the scene to help. The deceased was attacked by four or five persons with knives and was run over twice by a vehicle. The appellant arrived at the scene when the deceased was already on the ground. The appellant and his party helped their fellow gang members leave the scene. There was no evidence that the appellant was directly present during the attack or that he himself caused any injury or death to the deceased. His murder conviction was based on his active participation in a joint criminal enterprise with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm to members of the rival faction. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal question in this appeal was whether the doctrine of joint enterprise in Hong Kong should continue to be applied, particularly in light of the UK Supreme Court's decision in R v Jogee and R v Ruddock, which disapproved of Chan Wing Siu v R. The appellant argued for the adoption of the Jogee principles, where a secondary party's liability in a joint enterprise requires an intention to assist or encourage the principal offence, with foresight merely serving as evidence. The respondent contended that Hong Kong should maintain the principles established in Chan Wing Siu, where foresight of a possible criminal act is sufficient for joint enterprise liability. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Final Appeal ruled that Hong Kong should continue to apply the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as established in Chan Wing Siu, rather than adopting the principles from Jogee. The Court held that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is distinct from traditional accessorial liability principles, and liability under it is not derivative but arises independently from each defendant's participation in the joint criminal enterprise. The Court emphasized that foresight of a criminal act as a possible incident of the joint enterprise is sufficient for criminal culpability, amounting to an implied authorization. The Court found Jogee's concept of "conditional intent" problematic and believed that abolishing the joint criminal enterprise doctrine would create a significant gap in the law, making it ill-adapted to address cases involving evidential and situational uncertainties. ### Key Precedents & Statutes This case primarily cited and affirmed the principles of joint criminal enterprise established in Chan Wing Siu v R [1985] 1 AC 168 and Sze Kwan Lung v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 475. The Court also considered the UK Supreme Court's R v Jogee and R v Ruddock [2016] 2 WLR 681 and subsequent cases, as well as the Australian High Court's Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, but ultimately decided against adopting the Jogee approach. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Final Appeal unanimously dismissed the appellant's appeal. The Court affirmed that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise continues to apply in Hong Kong, and the appellant's murder conviction was upheld due to his active participation in a joint criminal enterprise with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm to rival faction members. ### Key Takeaways This judgment clarifies that Hong Kong law does not adopt the modifications to the joint criminal enterprise doctrine made by the UK Supreme Court in Jogee. It maintains the "foresight of possibility" principle as the basis for joint criminal enterprise liability, as established in Chan Wing Siu. This has significant implications for criminal cases involving multiple offenders in Hong Kong, ensuring flexibility and effectiveness in addressing evidential and situational uncertainties. The ruling underscores the independent, rather than derivative, nature of joint criminal enterprise liability. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.