案件基本資料
- 案件名稱:HKSAR v LEUNG TIN KEI (梁天琦) and Others
- 法院:高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA)
- 法官:潘兆初首席法官、朱芬齡上訴法庭法官、彭偉昌上訴法庭法官
- 判決日期:2020年4月29日
案情摘要
本案源於2016年農曆新年期間在旺角發生的衝突事件。第一申請人梁天琦承認一項襲警罪,但否認煽動暴動及暴動罪。第二申請人盧建民否認暴動罪。第三申請人黃家駒在審訊前承認一項暴動罪。經審訊後,陪審團裁定梁天琦一項暴動罪成立,盧建民一項暴動罪成立。黃家駒因認罪,未參與審訊。三名申請人均就定罪或判刑申請上訴許可。
核心法律爭議
第二申請人盧建民就定罪上訴,主要爭議點是原審法官在引導陪審團時,錯誤地解釋了非法集結(unlawful assembly)罪中「共同目的」(common purpose)的法律要求。他認為共同目的不應僅限於以擾亂秩序等方式行事,而必須有其他目的。控方則認為,共同目的的法律要求已在《公安條例》(Public Order Ordinance)中保留,但其涵義應理解為集結者行為的「共同性質」(corporate nature),即行為之間有足夠關聯性。
判決理由
上訴法庭認為,原審法官對非法集結罪中「共同目的」的引導並無法律錯誤。法庭指出,《公安條例》第18(1)條保留了普通法中共同目的的要求,但該共同目的不一定需要是擾亂秩序以外的其他目的。即使集結者的共同目的僅為以條例所指明的方式行事(例如擾亂秩序),也足以滿足共同目的的要求。法庭強調,共同目的的認定需視乎案件的實際事實情況。因此,第二申請人就定罪的上訴理據不成立。
引用案例與條文
本案主要引用了以下案例來闡述非法集結和暴動罪的法律原則及判刑考量:
- Secretary for Justice v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556:闡述了非法集結罪的構成要素及「共同目的」的涵義。
- R v John McKinsie Jones & Others (1974) 59 Cr App R 120:說明了非法集結罪的行為要素(actus reus)和犯罪意圖(mens rea)。
- Tse Chung v R [1967] HKLR 452:解釋了普通法下共同目的不一定需要有其他非法目的。
- R v Caird & Others (1970) 54 Cr App R 499:強調暴動罪的嚴重性源於集結者以人數優勢達成共同目的。
- HKSAR v Yeung Ka Lun [2018] HKCA 146:涉及旺角暴動案的判刑原則。
- HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin [2019] 3 HKLRD 502:涉及旺角暴動案的判刑原則。
裁決與命令
上訴法庭駁回第二申請人盧建民就定罪及判刑的上訴許可申請。第一申請人梁天琦就判刑的上訴許可申請獲准並視為正式上訴,但最終上訴被駁回。第三申請人黃家駒就判刑的上訴許可申請被駁回。
判決啟示
本案重申了非法集結及暴動罪中「共同目的」的法律原則,明確指出共同目的不一定需要是擾亂秩序以外的其他目的。判詞強調,即使集結者僅以條例所指明的方式行事,也足以構成共同目的。此外,判詞亦重申了暴動罪判刑的懲罰性及阻嚇性原則,並指出被告的政治理念或動機並非減刑因素。
免責聲明
本摘要由人工智能自動生成,內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏,僅供參考,不構成法律意見。如需法律建議,請諮詢合資格律師。
### 案件基本資料
- 案件名稱:HKSAR v LEUNG TIN KEI (梁天琦) and Others
- 法院:高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA)
- 法官:潘兆初首席法官、朱芬齡上訴法庭法官、彭偉昌上訴法庭法官
- 判決日期:2020年4月29日
### 案情摘要
本案源於2016年農曆新年期間在旺角發生的衝突事件。第一申請人梁天琦承認一項襲警罪,但否認煽動暴動及暴動罪。第二申請人盧建民否認暴動罪。第三申請人黃家駒在審訊前承認一項暴動罪。經審訊後,陪審團裁定梁天琦一項暴動罪成立,盧建民一項暴動罪成立。黃家駒因認罪,未參與審訊。三名申請人均就定罪或判刑申請上訴許可。
### 核心法律爭議
第二申請人盧建民就定罪上訴,主要爭議點是原審法官在引導陪審團時,錯誤地解釋了非法集結(unlawful assembly)罪中「共同目的」(common purpose)的法律要求。他認為共同目的不應僅限於以擾亂秩序等方式行事,而必須有其他目的。控方則認為,共同目的的法律要求已在《公安條例》(Public Order Ordinance)中保留,但其涵義應理解為集結者行為的「共同性質」(corporate nature),即行為之間有足夠關聯性。
### 判決理由
上訴法庭認為,原審法官對非法集結罪中「共同目的」的引導並無法律錯誤。法庭指出,《公安條例》第18(1)條保留了普通法中共同目的的要求,但該共同目的不一定需要是擾亂秩序以外的其他目的。即使集結者的共同目的僅為以條例所指明的方式行事(例如擾亂秩序),也足以滿足共同目的的要求。法庭強調,共同目的的認定需視乎案件的實際事實情況。因此,第二申請人就定罪的上訴理據不成立。
### 引用案例與條文
本案主要引用了以下案例來闡述非法集結和暴動罪的法律原則及判刑考量:
- Secretary for Justice v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556:闡述了非法集結罪的構成要素及「共同目的」的涵義。
- R v John McKinsie Jones & Others (1974) 59 Cr App R 120:說明了非法集結罪的行為要素(actus reus)和犯罪意圖(mens rea)。
- Tse Chung v R [1967] HKLR 452:解釋了普通法下共同目的不一定需要有其他非法目的。
- R v Caird & Others (1970) 54 Cr App R 499:強調暴動罪的嚴重性源於集結者以人數優勢達成共同目的。
- HKSAR v Yeung Ka Lun [2018] HKCA 146:涉及旺角暴動案的判刑原則。
- HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin [2019] 3 HKLRD 502:涉及旺角暴動案的判刑原則。
### 裁決與命令
上訴法庭駁回第二申請人盧建民就定罪及判刑的上訴許可申請。第一申請人梁天琦就判刑的上訴許可申請獲准並視為正式上訴,但最終上訴被駁回。第三申請人黃家駒就判刑的上訴許可申請被駁回。
### 判決啟示
本案重申了非法集結及暴動罪中「共同目的」的法律原則,明確指出共同目的不一定需要是擾亂秩序以外的其他目的。判詞強調,即使集結者僅以條例所指明的方式行事,也足以構成共同目的。此外,判詞亦重申了暴動罪判刑的懲罰性及阻嚇性原則,並指出被告的政治理念或動機並非減刑因素。
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### 免責聲明
本摘要由人工智能自動生成,內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏,僅供參考,不構成法律意見。如需法律建議,請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details
- Case Name: HKSAR v LEUNG TIN KEI (梁天琦) and Others
- Court: Court of Appeal (CA)
- Judge: Poon CJHC, Chu JA, Pang JA
- Date of Judgment: 29 April 2020
### Factual Background
This case arose from clashes in Mongkok during the Lunar New Year in 2016. The 1st applicant, Leung Tin Kei, pleaded guilty to assaulting a police officer but not guilty to incitement to riot and riot charges. The 2nd applicant, Lo Kin Man, pleaded not guilty to riot. The 3rd applicant, Wong Ka Kui, pleaded guilty to one count of riot before trial. After trial, the jury found Leung Tin Kei guilty of one riot charge and Lo Kin Man guilty of one riot charge. Wong Ka Kui did not participate in the trial due to his guilty plea. All three applicants sought leave to appeal against conviction or sentence.
### Key Legal Issues
The 2nd applicant, Lo Kin Man, appealed against conviction, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in her directions to the jury regarding the legal requirement of "common purpose" in the offence of unlawful assembly. He contended that the common purpose must be for an objective other than merely acting in a disorderly manner. The prosecution argued that while the common law requirement of common purpose is preserved under the Public Order Ordinance, its meaning should be understood as the "corporate nature" of the assembled persons' conduct, implying sufficient nexus between their actions.
### Ratio Decidendi
The Court of Appeal found no error of law in the trial judge's directions on "common purpose" for unlawful assembly. The Court stated that Section 18(1) of the Public Order Ordinance preserves the common law requirement of common purpose, but this purpose does not necessarily need to be distinct from acting in a disorderly manner. Even if the common purpose of the assembled persons is solely to conduct themselves in the manner prescribed by the ordinance (e.g., disorderly conduct), it is sufficient to satisfy the common purpose requirement. The Court emphasized that the determination of common purpose depends on the specific facts of each case. Therefore, the 2nd applicant's grounds of appeal against conviction failed.
### Key Precedents & Statutes
This case primarily cited the following precedents to elaborate on the legal principles and sentencing considerations for unlawful assembly and riot offences:
- Secretary for Justice v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556: Discussed the elements of unlawful assembly and the meaning of "common purpose."
- R v John McKinsie Jones & Others (1974) 59 Cr App R 120: Explained the actus reus and mens rea of unlawful assembly.
- Tse Chung v R [1967] HKLR 452: Clarified that under common law, common purpose does not necessarily require another unlawful objective.
- R v Caird & Others (1970) 54 Cr App R 499: Emphasized the gravity of riot stemming from participants using their numbers to achieve a common purpose.
- HKSAR v Yeung Ka Lun [2018] HKCA 146: Pertaining to sentencing principles in the Mongkok riot cases.
- HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin [2019] 3 HKLRD 502: Pertaining to sentencing principles in the Mongkok riot cases.
### Decision & Orders
The Court of Appeal refused the 2nd applicant Lo Kin Man's application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The 1st applicant Leung Tin Kei's application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted and treated as the appeal proper, but the appeal was ultimately dismissed. The 3rd applicant Wong Ka Kui's application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
### Key Takeaways
This judgment reaffirmed the legal principles of "common purpose" in unlawful assembly and riot offences, clarifying that it does not necessarily require an objective beyond acting in a disorderly manner. The ruling emphasized that even if the assembled persons' common purpose is merely to conduct themselves in the prescribed manner, it suffices. Furthermore, the judgment reiterated the punitive and deterrent sentencing principles for riot offences, stating that a defendant's political beliefs or motives are not mitigating factors.
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### Disclaimer
This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.