A A
B B
DCCC 1506/2024
C [2026] HKDC 90 C
D D
香港特別行政區
E 區域法院 E
刑事案件 2024 年第 1506 號
F F
G G
---------------------------------
H 香港特別行政區 H
訴
I I
蔡信能
J J
---------------------------------
K K
主審法官： 區域法院法官謝沈智慧
L L
日期： 2026 年 1 月 13 日
M 出席人士： 謝祿英女士，為外聘大律師，代表香港特別行政區 M
N
趙振寰先生，由法律援助署委派的廖陳林律師事務所延 N
聘，代表被告人
O O
控罪： 企圖搶劫罪（Attempted robbery）
P P
--------------------------
Q Q
判刑理由書
R R
--------------------------
S S
T T
U U
V V
-2-
A A
B B
1. 被告人承認一項「企圖搶劫」罪，違反香港法例第 210 章
C 《盜竊罪條例》第 10 條和第 200 章《刑事罪行條例》第 159G 及 159J C
條。
D D
E E
案情撮要
F F
2. 被告人承認的案情撮要內容如下：
G G
H (1) 2024 年 5 月 3 日約 0200 時，曹樂怡女士（控方第 H
I
一證人）在一間 24 小時營業的健身中心健身後步 I
行回家。當她途經新界屯門鄉事會路與新和里交界
J J
時，發現有人從後行近，對方與她相距約一米。控
K 方第一證人回頭觀望，看見赤裸上身，穿着黑色長 K
L 褲和戴著深色手套的被告人在她身後步行。 L
M M
(2) 控方第一證人擔心自身安全，決定行向新和里方
N 向。被告人繼續尾隨控方第一證人，並突然在新和 N
O 里 AD0980 號燈柱附近大叫及用一把長 15 厘米的 O
灰白色𠝹刀指着控方第一證人，說了三次：「拎晒
P P
啲錢俾我」。控方第一證人回答說沒有帶銀包。被
Q Q
告人看似放棄打劫控方第一證人。控方第一證人於
R 是逃到附近的 7-11 便利店向警方報案。 R
S S
T T
U U
V V
-3-
A A
B B
(3) 警方翻看閉路電視片段後，發現被告人在案發後帶
C 着單車於新墟一帶遊蕩。2024 年 5 月 6 日 1607 時， C
被告人在其寓所被捕。警方在該住所檢獲被告人的
D D
衣物（包括一件黑色短袖 T 裇、一條黑色長褲、一
E E
對深色手套及一對白色鞋）。此外，警方在被告人
F 住所內檢獲一些物品，當中包括兩把𠝹刀（灰白色 F
及黑色），警方還拍下被告人黑色單車的相片。
G G
H H
(4) 初次警誡下，被告人保持緘默。其後的錄影會面中，
I 被告人於警誡下同意一些事情，當中包括他在 2024 I
年 5 月 2 日約 2230 時，身穿黑色 T 裇離開住所，在
J J
其住所檢獲的兩把𠝹刀及單車屬於他本人所有。
K K
L (5) 2024 年 5 月 7 日，控方第一證人出席列隊認人手 L
續，明確地認出被告人是試圖搶劫她的人。同日，
M M
控方第一證人認出案中檢獲的灰白色𠝹刀是被告
N N
人在案發期間所使用的𠝹刀。
O O
(6) 被告人住所及屯門一帶的閉路電視片段拍攝到以
P P
下情況：
Q Q
R (i) 2024 年 5 月 2 日 2230 時，被告人帶着單車離 R
開住所；
S S
T T
U U
V V
-4-
A A
B B
(ii) 2024 年 5 月 3 日 0134 時，一名上身赤裸的男
C 子及一名女子站在新和里；及 C
D D
(iii) 2024 年 5 月 3 日 0210 時至 0211 時，被告人
E E
（上身赤裸）帶着單車離開新和里，其後在新
F 墟一帶徘徊。 F
G G
量刑原則
H H
I
3. 行劫是極嚴重的控罪，最高刑期為終身監禁；企圖行劫的 I
刑期相同。案發時，被告人手持𠝹刀。辯方大律師承認一般持械行劫
J J
的案件中，適當的量刑基準為 5 年監禁。
K K
4. 於 Mo Kwang Sang v R [1981] HKLR 610 一案中：
L L
M M
(1) 被告人與另一名男子闖入兩名女子的住所。當時只
N 有一名女子在住所內。被告人和同黨用刀恐嚇住所 N
內的女子，並將她捆綁起來。之後被告人與同黨於
O O
住所內搜掠並盜取現金及其他財物。警方於住所內
P P
的珠寶箱找到被告人的手指模，因而作出拘捕。案
Q 發時被告人 22 歲，初犯； Q
R R
(2) 原審法官判處被告人 4 年 6 個月監禁。被告人不服
S S
判刑，提出上訴許可申請。
T T
U U
V V
-5-
A A
B B
(3) 上訴法庭指：
C C
“This is the first of five cases which are listed before us
D today and tomorrow in which convicted persons have D
applied for leave to appeal against sentences imposed on
them for robbery.
E E
In one of these cases two or more men were armed with
F knives, with which they threatened their victims before F
robbing them and, in most cases, tying them up.
G Armed robbery of this nature, which must cause terror to G
the victims as well as a loss of their possessions, has
become increasingly common.
H H
We think that it will be of assistance to District Judges if
I we indicate the level of sentence for armed robbery with I
which we would not interfere.
J J
By the word "armed" in this judgment, we are referring
to knives and other dangerous weapons, but not to
K firearms for which severer sentences are normally K
imposed.
L As this court has said on a number of other occasions, L
little account can be given to the previously clear record
M of anyone who takes part in an "armed robbery". M
We suggest that, in future, the appropriate sentence in an
N ordinary case of armed robbery, where the accused was N
carrying a knife or other dangerous weapon which he
displayed to his victim should normally be five years.
O O
If such a robbery also involves an invasion of private
P premises (which includes domestic and business P
premises and the common parts of premises such as lifts
and staircases) we suggest that a sentence of six years
Q would be appropriate. Q
R If any physical violence, which includes tying them up, R
is used on any of the victims, we suggest that a sentence
of seven years should be considered.
S S
These suggested sentences should be increased if there
are other aggravating factors. Among these, though the
T T
list is not exhaustive, are invasion of domestic premises
during the night; the presence of more than one person
U U
V V
-6-
A A
B in the group of robbers; threats made to victims; ill- B
treatment of elderly persons and children; and a
C multiplicity of offences of a similar kind. C
These guidelines are intended to apply to those who are
D convicted after a trial. Thus the suggested sentences D
should be reduced by such amount as the court may think
E
appropriate for a plea of guilty. E
Nothing which we say, of course, should be construed as
F inhibiting a court from adjusting these sentences to F
accord with the record, age or other personal
circumstances of the accused or from taking account of
G G
the particular facts of the case before it.”
H H
(4) 上訴法院認為該案適當的量刑基準為 7 至 8 年監禁，
I 判刑已過輕。因此拒絕批准上訴申請。 I
J J
5. 辯方承認本案涉及持械企圖行劫，適當的量刑基準是 5 年
K K
監禁（即 60 個月）。
L L
被告人的背景
M M
N N
6. 被告人現年 52 歲，曾接受中三程度教育、未婚。他過往
O 有 6 個刑事定罪紀錄，涉及 7 項控罪，其中一項與盜竊有關。 O
P P
7. 於其經歷供詞中，被告人向警方聲稱沒有長期病患。大律
Q 師指這說法並不準確。2015 年被告人被診斷患有精神病。大律師向法 Q
R 庭提供一份青山醫院精神科駐院醫生（顏醫生）在 2025 年 4 月 15 日 R
的醫療報告。報告指：
S S
T T
U U
V V
-7-
A A
B “2. Psychiatric history: Mr. Choi was first known to the B
mental health service upon his first and only psychiatric
C admission to CPH from 26 October 2015 until 4 February 2016. C
He presented with at least 4 months history of elated mood
associated with grandiosity, overspending with accumulation of
D debt, increased unrealistic plans, and irritability with an act of D
kicking his girlfriend’s leg. Then he also reported history of
E
cannabis and amphetamine use since teenage. He was diagnosed E
with mania with psychotic symptoms. He was discharged with
a combination of Epilim chrono 1400 mg nocte (mood
F stabilizer), olanzapine 25 mg nocte (antipsychotic), aripiprazole F
10 mg (antipsychotic), benzhexol 2 mg twice per day
(anticholinergic for alleviating side effects), as well as
G G
lorazepam 0.5 mg twice per day as needed (benzodiazepine).
H 3. He continued to be kept on follow up at our unit in the H
subsequent years with no evidence of reinstatement into
substance use. His mood was reported to be stable with regular
I follow up in TMMHC at four-month intervals and regular blood I
taking. His Epilim level was in the therapeutic range in May
J 2018, was slightly decreased in February 2019, but became J
undetectable by January 2023. However, throughout 2023, he
continued to report having stable mood and continued to cope
K with work as a night shift taxi driver with preserved sleep and K
appetite.
L L
4. He was seen at our unit on 16 January 2024 before due,
he came alone and reported to have increased stress due to
M leakages at home and unemployment. He reported to have M
increased spending, buying repair tools and kitchen utensils
costing $50,000 in total, and cited increased plans of buying
N items for resale and going for trips in Taiwan. He also broke up N
with his girlfriend for 10 years, and had significantly more
O exercise with loss of weight. He did not report any abnormal O
perceptions or beliefs. He did not appear overtly elated and his
speech was coherent and relevant, though the tempo was slightly
P faster than usual. He was impressed to be in relapse with P
hypomanic symptoms. He admitted to having poor drug
Q
compliance, and after psychoeducation, he agreed to resume Q
medications on trial of a lower dose of medications as negotiated.
He was prescribed with Epilim chrono 800 mg nocte and
R olanzapine 10 mg nocte. Aripiprazoke was taken off. R
5. He was seen three weeks later on 6 February 2024,
S S
whereupon he reported to have improved adherence and
tolerated the medications well, though his Epilim level on 30
T January 2024 was still undetectable. However, he reported to T
have more stable mood with maintained sleep, with no more
mentions of increased spending or plans, and denied other
U U
V V
-8-
A A
B hypomanic or manic symptoms. He was arranged with a follow B
up appointment in 8 weeks with the same regimen.
C C
6. He subsequently defaulted the scheduled follow up, and
he was next seen on 17 May 2024 when he was already under
D the supervision of Correctional Services Department (CSD). He D
had good medication adherence under supervision and reported
E
stable mood. In view of him previously tolerating a higher dose E
and for maintenance and relapse prevention, he agreed for
slightly increasing olanzapine back to 15 mg nocte. He was then
F seen in June, September and December 2024 similarly under F
CSD supervision and reported stable mental condition.
G G
7. Progress: He was last seen at our unit on 8 April 2025 by
the undersigned with CSD staff via telehealth. He similarly
H reported stable mood, preserved sleep and appetite, with H
adequate energy in the daytime. He tolerated the medications
well. He denied features of hypomanic or manic relapse, and
I denied any abnormal perceptions or beliefs. He was able to I
understand his legal proceedings, the difference between
J pleading guilty and not guilty, and the potential consequences J
thereof.
K 8. Summary: Mr Choi was known to MHS upon his first K
and only psychiatric admission in 2015. He was diagnosed with
manic episode with psychotic symptoms. He was kept on
L L
following up at our unit but had a relapse in early 2024, likely
secondary to poor drug compliance.
M M
9. Recommendations:
N (a) Recently upon last seen by the undersigned, he is N
impressed to be in remission vis-a-vis his mental
O illness. However, regular and adequate dosage O
of maintenance medications is required to
maintain remission, and hence;
P P
(b) He needs to continue taking his psychiatric
Q
medications for the maintenance of his mood Q
condition;
R (c) If he does not take the medications provided, R
there is a high probability that he will suffer from
a relapse after a certain period of time especially
S S
under stress. The relapse may likely come in the
form of a hypomanic or manic episode, which
T was the case witnessed in early 2024. A mixed T
or depressive episode is also possible though he
has no previous history thereof …”
U U
V V
-9-
A A
B B
C 討論 C
D D
案發背景
E E
8. 大律師指被告人有一名交往十年的女友；兩人並同居至
F F
2024 年 1 月。雙方多番爭執至女友遷離，而且關係有起伏。大律師
G G
指，2016 年 2 月 4 日，被告人出院後一直於屯門精神健康中心門診接
H 受定期跟進及治療，情況亦似趨於穩定。2024 年 1 月 16 日，被告人 H
I
提前覆診。報告指他因家中漏水、失業、增加花費及與女友分手而精 I
神壓力大增。醫生認為被告人有輕度躁狂症狀復發的跡象；被告人亦
J J
承認沒按醫生指示服藥。
K K
9. 大律師指被告人自行修理家中的漏水問題才決定暫停的
L L
士司機的工作。他花費共約 5 萬元作維修，與女友的關係亦處於低潮，
M M
令他感到困擾；他希望暫時停止工作，稍作休息。他從 2016 年從青
N 山醫院出院，他的積蓄足以支持生活一段時間；被告人的銀行戶口現 N
O 仍有數萬元結餘。2024 年 1 月，女友與被告人和好，但兩人沒有再一 O
同居住。2024 年 2 月 6 日被告人的情況有所改善，他又再次停止服
P P
藥。
Q Q
R
10. 大律師指 2024 年 5 月 2 日晚上，被告人與女友相約見面 R
喝酒。被告人踏單車外出與女友會合後喝了約 12 瓶啤酒。案發當日
S S
（2024 年 5 月 3 日）凌晨約 2 時，被告人與女友發生爭執。被告人在
T 酒精和爭執的影響下，情緒極度激動，於是推著單車四處走動，意圖 T
U U
V V
- 10 -
A A
B B
平靜心情。後來他看見本案的受害人，開始向受害人說話；受害人沒
C 有理會他，令他怒火加劇，於是尾隨受害人，並在一時判斷失誤下拿 C
出身上的鎅刀指向受害人，大喊要受害人交出所有金錢。當受害人表
D D
示沒有帶銀包後，被告人便立刻放棄及離開。
E E
F 11. 大律師向法庭提供受害人的證人供詞，指被告人的說法與 F
受害人供詞第 2 段脗合：
G G
H 「3. 於同日凌晨 2 時左右，當時我行到屯門鄉事會路與新 H
和里交界時，發現我背後有個影子同我好近，約一米內，於
I 是我望向後邊，發現有一名男子（年約 30 至 40 歲、約 1.8 I
米高、肥材、無著上身衫、大肚腩，著黑色長褲、戴住黑色
J
手套、無紋身，下稱 WP）同我好接近，之後 WP 見到我望 J
住佢，佢就不停同我傾偈，但當時因為我戴住耳機，我聽唔
到 WP 講乜嘢。同時，我因為好驚，於是我就企停喺上址扮
K K
打電話，而 WP 亦企停喺度。當我得知 WP 跟踪我後，我就
選擇行去新和里方向，並行去新和里道路中間，因為嗰度多
L 啲燈光，而 WP 繼續跟住我。期間，我係新和里近燈柱 L
AD0980 時，WP 突然係我後面大聲叫，之後我就望後面，
M 我見到 WP 右手手持住一把灰白色鎅刀（約 15cm）指住我。 M
WP 就同我講咗 3 次：「拎晒啲錢俾我」。我就回答 WP 講：
「我無帶銀包。」當 WP 聽到我回答後，WP 疑似放棄搶劫
N N
我，我就繼續行去譚美麗芬中學方向。同時我見到有途人經
過，我就立即行去途人（資料不詳）求助，要求途人陪我行
O 去屯門井財街青菱徑 7-11 便利店。途人陪我行去青菱徑途 O
中，我因為好驚無回頭望 WP。之後，當我係青菱徑 7-11 便
P 利店後，我就立即報警求助。」 P
Q Q
12. 大律師指被告人承認企圖搶劫受害人。可是，被告人並非
R 因缺乏金錢而犯案；當時被告人煩躁不安，將挫折感發洩在受害人身 R
上；因受害人無視他的說話而感到嬲怒，因此才愚蠢地作出打劫的行
S S
為；一旦受害人指沒有帶銀包，被告人便從激動的情緒清醒過來，停
T T
止進一步行動。
U U
V V
- 11 -
A A
B B
C 13. 本席不同意大律師的說法。首先，被告人的說法與受害人 C
的供詞並不脗合。被告人明顯是跟蹤受害人一段路後才作出搶劫的行
D D
為：
E E
F
(i) 受害人從沒提及被告人推著單車； F
G G
(ii) 受害人指被告人是跟蹤了她一段路，而且十分貼
H 近； H
I I
(iii) 受害人轉身望着被告人後，被告人才開始向她說
J J
話；
K K
(iv) 受害人因戴著耳機，沒有聽見被告人的說話；
L L
M M
(v) 受害人十分驚慌，停下腳步假裝打電話，被告人亦
N 停下，但被告人並沒亮刀； N
O O
(vi) 受害人繼續步向新和里，被告人繼續尾隨一段路
P 程； P
Q Q
(vii) 受害人到達燈柱時被告人才突然亮刀，要求受害人
R R
交出所有金錢。
S S
T T
U U
V V
- 12 -
A A
B B
14. 大律師指案發時，被告人是因為騎單車才戴上手套。他續
C 解釋被告人所騎的單車是摺疊單車，摺疊時需要用塑料索帶固定摺疊 C
部份，以便將單車推行；每次被告人騎單車外出都會帶備用作企圖行
D D
劫的鎅刀，用作切割索帶。案發時，被告人只是一時衝動拿出鎅刀指
E E
嚇受害人，犯罪行為並非有預謀。
F F
15. 本席亦不接受大律師的說法。首先，涉案的手套並非單單
G G
手套，而是勞工手套。從閉路電視截圖可見，被告人外出時已打開單
H H
車，單車在他的跨下，但被告人並未佩戴手套（辯方附件一）。同樣
I 地，被告人回家時同樣是沒有佩戴手套（辯方附件二）。大律師指案 I
發前，被告人因情緒問題，推著單車四圍走動，意圖冷靜下來。換言
J J
之，當時被告人並非在騎單車，亦沒需要戴上手套。本席亦看不到任
K K
何原因需要先摺疊單車才推行。辯方向法庭提供的相片顯示涉案單車
L 設有儲存物件的位置；如被告人每次踏單車時均須使用涉案鎅刀，該 L
M
鎅刀應放在單車的儲存位置內。沒有爭議的是被告人被捕時，單車上 M
沒有索帶，而涉案鎅刀則在被告人的住所內。另外，涉案的鎅刀是伸
N N
縮式的；換言之，案發時被告人不但拿出鎅刀，還將刀片伸出作案。
O O
16. 無論如何，Mo Kwong Sang 案所述的量刑指引是初步量刑
P P
基準；如有加刑因素，法庭可將量刑基準上調。就算被告人並無預謀
Q Q
犯案，這只顯示沒有加刑因素。雖然本席不接受辯方的說法，本席亦
R 不打算將量刑基準上調。雖然被告人有一次盜竊的刑事定罪紀錄，但 R
S 已是 2002 年的事，而且被告人並非慣犯，本席不予以考慮。 S
T T
U U
V V
- 13 -
A A
B B
酒精影響
C C
17. 大律師指，本案罪行沒有預謀。被告人是在個人感情問題
D D
和酒精影響下作案。眾所周知，在酒精影響下犯案並非減刑因素。
E E
Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
F F
“[30-38] The policy of the law is not to give an accused a
G sentencing reduction on the basis that he was drunk when he G
committed the offence: R v Rosenberger ex p Attorney General
(1994) 76 Crim R 1. He must instead expect to receive the
H sentence his offence merits: R v Paton [1982] Crim LR 58. In H
HKSAR v Chiu Wai-kan Vicken (No. 2) [2011] HKC 519 …
I Stock VP explained that ‘where an accused has become addicted I
to alcohol or drugs he must, generally, be treated as carrying
responsibility for that state of affairs, especially when he has
J sought no assistance to take himself out of the cycle.’ J
[30-39] In R v Liu Ping-kin [1993] 2 HKC 192, 195,
K K
Pennington JA said the accused ‘apparently has a problem with
alcohol, but we do not consider that as a mitigating factor’. In R
L v Grossi (2008) 183 A Crim R 15, 32… Redtich JA observed L
that ‘drug or alcohol induced conditions have not as a general
rule required any significant moderation of [these] sentencing
M considerations’ … M
N [30-41] When alcohol has contributed to the commission of N
the offence, an accused cannot expect to turn to his advantage,
self-induced intoxication: Attorney General v Lee Kui-man
O [1997] 1 HKLRD 576, 579… Quite the contrary, as O
demonstrated in HKSAR v Gambold Chinzorig (HCMA
P
126/2016, 15 June 2016, unreported), it was said of a pickpocket P
who had taken drink before committing the offence that he ‘must
have known that he put himself in the way of temptation’ and
Q his sentence was enhanced in consequence …’ Q
R 被告人的精神狀況 R
S S
18. 大律師指法庭可考慮在還押期間透過定期和充足藥物，被
T T
告人的精神狀況已有所緩解。雖然醫生報告沒有明確地指出案發時被
U U
V V
- 14 -
A A
B B
告人的精神狀況，但報告指被告人於 2024 年 2 月後不久便未再服藥，
C 導致罪行發生的怒火爆發與病情復發的情況相符。辯方認為被告人和 C
女友的爭執及酒精的影響很大可能是一併造成本案「悲劇」的主因。
D D
E E
19. Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
F F
“[30-225] A mental disability, if causative of or materially
G contributing to the offending, is ‘capable of reducing moral G
culpability as distinguished from legal responsibility, and
thereby affecting the punishment that is just in all
H circumstances’: Henry v R [2019] NZCA 407, [43]. It may, that H
is, ‘be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance, relevant
I to the offender’ (rather than the offending): Shailer v R [2017] 2 I
NZKR 629 … However, the extent to which a mental disorder
affects the accused’s moral culpability ‘depends upon the nature,
J effect and severity of the condition and its symptoms’: Western J
Australia v Malone [2015] WASCA 188, [74]. If the mental
impairment has contributed to the offending, this may, moreover,
K K
‘affect the significance of general deterrence as a sentencing
consideration’: Cluett v R [2019] WASCA 111, [63]. There
L must, however, be a causal link between his illness and his L
criminal conduct, and, in HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin [2020] 1 HKC
475 … a rioter, who suffered from Attention
M Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), was told that his M
condition could not ‘conceivably amount to a reason, let alone
N an excuse, for his involvement in such a serious offence. Those N
who suffer from such conditions must equally be deterred from
voluntarily involving themselves in mob violence.’ [35]
O O
[30-226] If an accused suffered from a mental disorder this
P
may be of relevance in two ways. First, it affects the assessment P
of the extent of the objective criminality, and second, it
influences the question of whether the case requires a deterrent
Q sentence: R v George (2004) 149 A Crim R 38, 45 …, HKSAR v Q
Chan Wai-hung [2009] 3 HKLRD 127 … Such a person may
lack effective powers of reasoning or control. As Spigelman CJ
R R
noted in R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255, to the extent that
mental illness explains the offence, an offender’s inability:
S S
T T
U U
V V
- 15 -
A A
B … to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or B
to make reasonable judgments, or to control his or
C her faculties and emotions, will impact on the level C
of culpability of the offender, even where the illness
does not amount to an excuse at law.
D D
[30-227] A custodial sentence will weigh more heavily on a
E
mentally ill person: R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398, 400. If, E
however, the accused has decided to forego treatment for his
condition, this may blunt as possible impact as mitigation:
F HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin … F
[30-228] In R v Grossi (2008) 183 A Crim R 15, 33 … it was
G G
said that the question of whether a particular mental condition
should reduce moral culpability or general deterrence and the
H extent to which it should do so would usually depend upon: H
(1) the nature and severity of the symptoms;
I I
(2) Its effect on the mental capacity of the
J offender at the time of the offence or at the J
time of sentence. There must be some
connection between the condition and the
K commission of an offence. The nexus may be K
established by showing that it affected the
offender’s ability to exercise an appropriate
L L
judgment in one or more of the ways stated in
Verdins’ and
M M
(3) the nature and seriousness of the offence.
N [30-229] In R v Wright [2001] 3 NZLR 22, 26, the relevance N
of mental disorder to a sentencing court was described thus:
O O
it is a factor which will inform a just sentence having
regard to the character of the disorder and the weight
P it ought to carry when balancing sentencing P
objectives. Its character may indicate a lesser degree
Q
of moral culpability or a greater subjective impact of Q
penalty. It may suggest a more or a less risk of a
repetition of offending, so as to direct particular
R attention to issues of personal deterrence or public R
protection. And these considerations must be
synthesized with the sentencing elements of the
S S
denouncing the fact of violence in our society and
acknowledging grievous effects on victims.
T T
U U
V V
- 16 -
A A
B [30-230] If the accused suffers from a mental disorder, this B
may render him an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence:
C Kennedy v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 185, 197 … The retributive C
and denunciatory aspect of the sentence that is appropriate for
someone of ordinary capacity ‘will often be inappropriate to the
D situation of a mentally retarded offender and to the needs of the D
community’: Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120 … As Wood
E
CJ explained in R v Henry (1999) 106 A Crim R 149, 254 …: E
The community will readily understand that the
F offender who suffers from a mental disorder or F
abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive
facilities or emotional restraints, and in some
G G
instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or
ordered judgments. Almost invariably there is a
H limited appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act, H
or of its morral culpability, which, although falling
short of avoiding criminal responsibility does justify
I special consideration upon sentencing. Moreover, I
such a condition is inherent and its presence does not
J depend upon any element of choice. J
[30-231] However, it is not right for a court to disregard
K general deterrence in sentencing simply because the accused has K
a personality disorder: Secretary for Justice v Yan Shen [2012]
3 HKC 557, 570 … In HKSAR v Chan Sau-lan, Becky [2018] 2
L L
HKC 548 … the accused had ‘obvious mental problems’ which
justified ‘a more individualized sentence falling outside the
M established guidelines’, but a sentence of five years’ M
imprisonment (as opposed to eight), was nonetheless still
appropriate for a serious robbery offence. In a case of armed
N robbery, the paramount considerations are condign punishment N
and deterrence, and notwithstanding an accused’s mental
O condition ‘we cannot ignore these public policy considerations’: O
HKSAR v Chan Sau-lan, Becky …
P [30-233] Emotional stress may not mitigate extreme conduct P
in any substantial way: HKSAR v Liu Man-kuen [2000] 4 HKC
Q
197, 403 …. But if the stress is so great that an accused act Q
wholly out of character this may be irrelevant: R v Ng Ka-ling
[1988] HKC 310 … Account was taken in R v Huthart [2002]
R 4 HKC 692, 698, of the ‘deplorable state of physical and mental R
health’ of the accused when he committed the offence. The
severity of the disorder should always be assessed, as this will
S S
determine the extent of its relevance to each case. In R v Wiskich
(2000) 207 LSJS 431, 457, Martin J said:
T T
U U
V V
- 17 -
A A
B A sentencing court must determine the impact of B
disorder upon both the offender’s thought processes
C and the capacity of the offender to appreciate the C
gravity and significance of the criminal conduct … if
an offender acts with knowledge of what is being
D done and with knowledge of the gravity of the D
criminal conduct, the importance of the element of
E
general deterrence otherwise appropriate in the E
particular circumstances is not greatly affected. The
gravity of the criminal conduct is also an important
F consideration … In some circumstances, however, F
the mental disorder may not be serious or causally
related to the commission of the crime, and the
G G
circumstances of the crime so grave, that very little
weight in mitigation can be given to the existence of
H the mental disorder and full weight must be afforded H
to the element of general deterrence. In between
those extremes, an infinite variety of circumstances
I will arise in which competing considerations must be I
balanced.
J J
[30-234] If an accused possesses a below average intelligence,
this may affect sentence … Such a person might realize that
K something is wrong, but not just how wrong it is; just as ‘a child K
may understand that something is wrong without understanding
that it is very wicked’ … Always to be factored into the
L L
calculation of sentence is the need to ensure that the public are
protected: R v Stabler (1984) 6 Cr App R(S) 129, 131. However,
M a court should beware of giving undue weight to a psychiatric M
condition that falls short of permanent affliction: Secretary for
Justice v Tang King Wa [2023] 4 HKC 289, 309 …” (my
N emphasis) N
O O
20. 於本案中，就算被告人的病情復發，本席也認為並非減刑
P 因素： P
Q Q
(i) 如上文所述，酒精影響並非減刑因素；
R R
S (ii) 被告人與女友爭執的感情壓力不足以作為持械行 S
劫的藉口；
T T
U U
V V
- 18 -
A A
B B
(iii) 根據辯方提供的醫療報告，被告人精神狀況最嚴重
C 之時（即 2015 年 10 月入住青山精神病院之時）， C
他 的 症 狀 包 括 過 度 興 奮 及 自 大 （ elated mood
D D
associated with grandiosity）、過度使費引致欠債及
E E
不實際計劃（over spending with accumulation of debt,
F increased unrealistic plans）和容易發怒引致腳踢女 F
友（irritability with an act of kicking his girlfriend’s
G G
leg）。報告指 2024 年 1 月，被告人並沒不正常的
H H
感知（perceptions）或想法（beliefs），說話有條理
I （coherent, and relevant）；被告人亦並沒過度興奮 I
J
（overly elated），只是語速比正常稍快（tempo was J
slightly faster than usual）。醫生認為被告人有輕躁
K K
狂症復發（in relapse with hypomanic symptoms）。
L L
可是被告人的情況明顯不嚴重；這從醫生沒有要求
M 被告人入院可見一斑。2024 年 2 月，雖然被告人似 M
乎仍沒有服藥，但稱上述症狀已消失，情況穩定；
N N
醫生亦認為被告人適合繼續以門診治療，顯示情況
O O
並不嚴重；醫生從沒指被告人的精神狀況導致犯案
P 行為；他只是指被告人不服藥，引致 2024 年初病情 P
復發的症狀。況且，被告人的症狀亦與持械行劫全
Q Q
無關係。因此，沒有任何資料顯示被告人犯案與他
R R
的精神狀況有任何關係（causal link or contribution）;
S S
(iv) 就算被告人病情復發，根據他之前的症狀，最多也
T T
只是暴躁（irritable），與持械行劫無關；
U U
V V
- 19 -
A A
B B
C (v) 被告人的精神病徵明顯是可治療的，而非永久性 C
（permanent disability ）。就算被告人病情復發也是
D D
因他自己不服藥；
E E
F
(vi) 醫生從沒指被告人的精神狀況令被告人無法意識 F
到控罪的嚴重性；及
G G
H (vii) 本案涉及「持械行劫」，性質極嚴重；法庭需考慮 H
I
保護社會大眾的安全及利益。 I
J J
家人及女友的支持/判刑對家人的影響
K K
21. 大律師指被告人的母親和女友均支持被告人。雖然母親居
L L
於養老院，但被告人經常照顧母親，希望盡快與母親重聚。眾所周知，
M M
這些均非減刑因素：見 Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 第 [30-130]
N 至 [30-142] 段。 N
O O
認罪折扣
P P
Q 22. 被告人適時認罪，可獲三份一的扣減（即由 60 個月監禁 Q
減為 40 個月監禁）。於 HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231, 上
R R
訴法庭已指出，認罪折扣已是減刑的最高分水線（High watermark），
S S
涵蓋悔意及其他求情因素；除非有極特殊的求情因素，法庭不應予以
T 額外減刑。本案中，除了適時認罪外，根本沒有其他減刑因素。 T
U U
V V
- 20 -
A A
B B
23. 因此，本席判處被告人 40 個月監禁。
C C
D D
E （ 謝沈智慧 ） E
區域法院法官
F F
G G
H H
I I
J J
K K
L L
M M
N N
O O
P P
Q Q
R R
S S
T T
U U
V V
A A
B B
DCCC 1506/2024
C [2026] HKDC 90 C
D D
香港特別行政區
E 區域法院 E
刑事案件 2024 年第 1506 號
F F
G G
---------------------------------
H 香港特別行政區 H
訴
I I
蔡信能
J J
---------------------------------
K K
主審法官： 區域法院法官謝沈智慧
L L
日期： 2026 年 1 月 13 日
M 出席人士： 謝祿英女士，為外聘大律師，代表香港特別行政區 M
N
趙振寰先生，由法律援助署委派的廖陳林律師事務所延 N
聘，代表被告人
O O
控罪： 企圖搶劫罪（Attempted robbery）
P P
--------------------------
Q Q
判刑理由書
R R
--------------------------
S S
T T
U U
V V
-2-
A A
B B
1. 被告人承認一項「企圖搶劫」罪，違反香港法例第 210 章
C 《盜竊罪條例》第 10 條和第 200 章《刑事罪行條例》第 159G 及 159J C
條。
D D
E E
案情撮要
F F
2. 被告人承認的案情撮要內容如下：
G G
H (1) 2024 年 5 月 3 日約 0200 時，曹樂怡女士（控方第 H
I
一證人）在一間 24 小時營業的健身中心健身後步 I
行回家。當她途經新界屯門鄉事會路與新和里交界
J J
時，發現有人從後行近，對方與她相距約一米。控
K 方第一證人回頭觀望，看見赤裸上身，穿着黑色長 K
L 褲和戴著深色手套的被告人在她身後步行。 L
M M
(2) 控方第一證人擔心自身安全，決定行向新和里方
N 向。被告人繼續尾隨控方第一證人，並突然在新和 N
O 里 AD0980 號燈柱附近大叫及用一把長 15 厘米的 O
灰白色𠝹刀指着控方第一證人，說了三次：「拎晒
P P
啲錢俾我」。控方第一證人回答說沒有帶銀包。被
Q Q
告人看似放棄打劫控方第一證人。控方第一證人於
R 是逃到附近的 7-11 便利店向警方報案。 R
S S
T T
U U
V V
-3-
A A
B B
(3) 警方翻看閉路電視片段後，發現被告人在案發後帶
C 着單車於新墟一帶遊蕩。2024 年 5 月 6 日 1607 時， C
被告人在其寓所被捕。警方在該住所檢獲被告人的
D D
衣物（包括一件黑色短袖 T 裇、一條黑色長褲、一
E E
對深色手套及一對白色鞋）。此外，警方在被告人
F 住所內檢獲一些物品，當中包括兩把𠝹刀（灰白色 F
及黑色），警方還拍下被告人黑色單車的相片。
G G
H H
(4) 初次警誡下，被告人保持緘默。其後的錄影會面中，
I 被告人於警誡下同意一些事情，當中包括他在 2024 I
年 5 月 2 日約 2230 時，身穿黑色 T 裇離開住所，在
J J
其住所檢獲的兩把𠝹刀及單車屬於他本人所有。
K K
L (5) 2024 年 5 月 7 日，控方第一證人出席列隊認人手 L
續，明確地認出被告人是試圖搶劫她的人。同日，
M M
控方第一證人認出案中檢獲的灰白色𠝹刀是被告
N N
人在案發期間所使用的𠝹刀。
O O
(6) 被告人住所及屯門一帶的閉路電視片段拍攝到以
P P
下情況：
Q Q
R (i) 2024 年 5 月 2 日 2230 時，被告人帶着單車離 R
開住所；
S S
T T
U U
V V
-4-
A A
B B
(ii) 2024 年 5 月 3 日 0134 時，一名上身赤裸的男
C 子及一名女子站在新和里；及 C
D D
(iii) 2024 年 5 月 3 日 0210 時至 0211 時，被告人
E E
（上身赤裸）帶着單車離開新和里，其後在新
F 墟一帶徘徊。 F
G G
量刑原則
H H
I
3. 行劫是極嚴重的控罪，最高刑期為終身監禁；企圖行劫的 I
刑期相同。案發時，被告人手持𠝹刀。辯方大律師承認一般持械行劫
J J
的案件中，適當的量刑基準為 5 年監禁。
K K
4. 於 Mo Kwang Sang v R [1981] HKLR 610 一案中：
L L
M M
(1) 被告人與另一名男子闖入兩名女子的住所。當時只
N 有一名女子在住所內。被告人和同黨用刀恐嚇住所 N
內的女子，並將她捆綁起來。之後被告人與同黨於
O O
住所內搜掠並盜取現金及其他財物。警方於住所內
P P
的珠寶箱找到被告人的手指模，因而作出拘捕。案
Q 發時被告人 22 歲，初犯； Q
R R
(2) 原審法官判處被告人 4 年 6 個月監禁。被告人不服
S S
判刑，提出上訴許可申請。
T T
U U
V V
-5-
A A
B B
(3) 上訴法庭指：
C C
“This is the first of five cases which are listed before us
D today and tomorrow in which convicted persons have D
applied for leave to appeal against sentences imposed on
them for robbery.
E E
In one of these cases two or more men were armed with
F knives, with which they threatened their victims before F
robbing them and, in most cases, tying them up.
G Armed robbery of this nature, which must cause terror to G
the victims as well as a loss of their possessions, has
become increasingly common.
H H
We think that it will be of assistance to District Judges if
I we indicate the level of sentence for armed robbery with I
which we would not interfere.
J J
By the word "armed" in this judgment, we are referring
to knives and other dangerous weapons, but not to
K firearms for which severer sentences are normally K
imposed.
L As this court has said on a number of other occasions, L
little account can be given to the previously clear record
M of anyone who takes part in an "armed robbery". M
We suggest that, in future, the appropriate sentence in an
N ordinary case of armed robbery, where the accused was N
carrying a knife or other dangerous weapon which he
displayed to his victim should normally be five years.
O O
If such a robbery also involves an invasion of private
P premises (which includes domestic and business P
premises and the common parts of premises such as lifts
and staircases) we suggest that a sentence of six years
Q would be appropriate. Q
R If any physical violence, which includes tying them up, R
is used on any of the victims, we suggest that a sentence
of seven years should be considered.
S S
These suggested sentences should be increased if there
are other aggravating factors. Among these, though the
T T
list is not exhaustive, are invasion of domestic premises
during the night; the presence of more than one person
U U
V V
-6-
A A
B in the group of robbers; threats made to victims; ill- B
treatment of elderly persons and children; and a
C multiplicity of offences of a similar kind. C
These guidelines are intended to apply to those who are
D convicted after a trial. Thus the suggested sentences D
should be reduced by such amount as the court may think
E
appropriate for a plea of guilty. E
Nothing which we say, of course, should be construed as
F inhibiting a court from adjusting these sentences to F
accord with the record, age or other personal
circumstances of the accused or from taking account of
G G
the particular facts of the case before it.”
H H
(4) 上訴法院認為該案適當的量刑基準為 7 至 8 年監禁，
I 判刑已過輕。因此拒絕批准上訴申請。 I
J J
5. 辯方承認本案涉及持械企圖行劫，適當的量刑基準是 5 年
K K
監禁（即 60 個月）。
L L
被告人的背景
M M
N N
6. 被告人現年 52 歲，曾接受中三程度教育、未婚。他過往
O 有 6 個刑事定罪紀錄，涉及 7 項控罪，其中一項與盜竊有關。 O
P P
7. 於其經歷供詞中，被告人向警方聲稱沒有長期病患。大律
Q 師指這說法並不準確。2015 年被告人被診斷患有精神病。大律師向法 Q
R 庭提供一份青山醫院精神科駐院醫生（顏醫生）在 2025 年 4 月 15 日 R
的醫療報告。報告指：
S S
T T
U U
V V
-7-
A A
B “2. Psychiatric history: Mr. Choi was first known to the B
mental health service upon his first and only psychiatric
C admission to CPH from 26 October 2015 until 4 February 2016. C
He presented with at least 4 months history of elated mood
associated with grandiosity, overspending with accumulation of
D debt, increased unrealistic plans, and irritability with an act of D
kicking his girlfriend’s leg. Then he also reported history of
E
cannabis and amphetamine use since teenage. He was diagnosed E
with mania with psychotic symptoms. He was discharged with
a combination of Epilim chrono 1400 mg nocte (mood
F stabilizer), olanzapine 25 mg nocte (antipsychotic), aripiprazole F
10 mg (antipsychotic), benzhexol 2 mg twice per day
(anticholinergic for alleviating side effects), as well as
G G
lorazepam 0.5 mg twice per day as needed (benzodiazepine).
H 3. He continued to be kept on follow up at our unit in the H
subsequent years with no evidence of reinstatement into
substance use. His mood was reported to be stable with regular
I follow up in TMMHC at four-month intervals and regular blood I
taking. His Epilim level was in the therapeutic range in May
J 2018, was slightly decreased in February 2019, but became J
undetectable by January 2023. However, throughout 2023, he
continued to report having stable mood and continued to cope
K with work as a night shift taxi driver with preserved sleep and K
appetite.
L L
4. He was seen at our unit on 16 January 2024 before due,
he came alone and reported to have increased stress due to
M leakages at home and unemployment. He reported to have M
increased spending, buying repair tools and kitchen utensils
costing $50,000 in total, and cited increased plans of buying
N items for resale and going for trips in Taiwan. He also broke up N
with his girlfriend for 10 years, and had significantly more
O exercise with loss of weight. He did not report any abnormal O
perceptions or beliefs. He did not appear overtly elated and his
speech was coherent and relevant, though the tempo was slightly
P faster than usual. He was impressed to be in relapse with P
hypomanic symptoms. He admitted to having poor drug
Q
compliance, and after psychoeducation, he agreed to resume Q
medications on trial of a lower dose of medications as negotiated.
He was prescribed with Epilim chrono 800 mg nocte and
R olanzapine 10 mg nocte. Aripiprazoke was taken off. R
5. He was seen three weeks later on 6 February 2024,
S S
whereupon he reported to have improved adherence and
tolerated the medications well, though his Epilim level on 30
T January 2024 was still undetectable. However, he reported to T
have more stable mood with maintained sleep, with no more
mentions of increased spending or plans, and denied other
U U
V V
-8-
A A
B hypomanic or manic symptoms. He was arranged with a follow B
up appointment in 8 weeks with the same regimen.
C C
6. He subsequently defaulted the scheduled follow up, and
he was next seen on 17 May 2024 when he was already under
D the supervision of Correctional Services Department (CSD). He D
had good medication adherence under supervision and reported
E
stable mood. In view of him previously tolerating a higher dose E
and for maintenance and relapse prevention, he agreed for
slightly increasing olanzapine back to 15 mg nocte. He was then
F seen in June, September and December 2024 similarly under F
CSD supervision and reported stable mental condition.
G G
7. Progress: He was last seen at our unit on 8 April 2025 by
the undersigned with CSD staff via telehealth. He similarly
H reported stable mood, preserved sleep and appetite, with H
adequate energy in the daytime. He tolerated the medications
well. He denied features of hypomanic or manic relapse, and
I denied any abnormal perceptions or beliefs. He was able to I
understand his legal proceedings, the difference between
J pleading guilty and not guilty, and the potential consequences J
thereof.
K 8. Summary: Mr Choi was known to MHS upon his first K
and only psychiatric admission in 2015. He was diagnosed with
manic episode with psychotic symptoms. He was kept on
L L
following up at our unit but had a relapse in early 2024, likely
secondary to poor drug compliance.
M M
9. Recommendations:
N (a) Recently upon last seen by the undersigned, he is N
impressed to be in remission vis-a-vis his mental
O illness. However, regular and adequate dosage O
of maintenance medications is required to
maintain remission, and hence;
P P
(b) He needs to continue taking his psychiatric
Q
medications for the maintenance of his mood Q
condition;
R (c) If he does not take the medications provided, R
there is a high probability that he will suffer from
a relapse after a certain period of time especially
S S
under stress. The relapse may likely come in the
form of a hypomanic or manic episode, which
T was the case witnessed in early 2024. A mixed T
or depressive episode is also possible though he
has no previous history thereof …”
U U
V V
-9-
A A
B B
C 討論 C
D D
案發背景
E E
8. 大律師指被告人有一名交往十年的女友；兩人並同居至
F F
2024 年 1 月。雙方多番爭執至女友遷離，而且關係有起伏。大律師
G G
指，2016 年 2 月 4 日，被告人出院後一直於屯門精神健康中心門診接
H 受定期跟進及治療，情況亦似趨於穩定。2024 年 1 月 16 日，被告人 H
I
提前覆診。報告指他因家中漏水、失業、增加花費及與女友分手而精 I
神壓力大增。醫生認為被告人有輕度躁狂症狀復發的跡象；被告人亦
J J
承認沒按醫生指示服藥。
K K
9. 大律師指被告人自行修理家中的漏水問題才決定暫停的
L L
士司機的工作。他花費共約 5 萬元作維修，與女友的關係亦處於低潮，
M M
令他感到困擾；他希望暫時停止工作，稍作休息。他從 2016 年從青
N 山醫院出院，他的積蓄足以支持生活一段時間；被告人的銀行戶口現 N
O 仍有數萬元結餘。2024 年 1 月，女友與被告人和好，但兩人沒有再一 O
同居住。2024 年 2 月 6 日被告人的情況有所改善，他又再次停止服
P P
藥。
Q Q
R
10. 大律師指 2024 年 5 月 2 日晚上，被告人與女友相約見面 R
喝酒。被告人踏單車外出與女友會合後喝了約 12 瓶啤酒。案發當日
S S
（2024 年 5 月 3 日）凌晨約 2 時，被告人與女友發生爭執。被告人在
T 酒精和爭執的影響下，情緒極度激動，於是推著單車四處走動，意圖 T
U U
V V
- 10 -
A A
B B
平靜心情。後來他看見本案的受害人，開始向受害人說話；受害人沒
C 有理會他，令他怒火加劇，於是尾隨受害人，並在一時判斷失誤下拿 C
出身上的鎅刀指向受害人，大喊要受害人交出所有金錢。當受害人表
D D
示沒有帶銀包後，被告人便立刻放棄及離開。
E E
F 11. 大律師向法庭提供受害人的證人供詞，指被告人的說法與 F
受害人供詞第 2 段脗合：
G G
H 「3. 於同日凌晨 2 時左右，當時我行到屯門鄉事會路與新 H
和里交界時，發現我背後有個影子同我好近，約一米內，於
I 是我望向後邊，發現有一名男子（年約 30 至 40 歲、約 1.8 I
米高、肥材、無著上身衫、大肚腩，著黑色長褲、戴住黑色
J
手套、無紋身，下稱 WP）同我好接近，之後 WP 見到我望 J
住佢，佢就不停同我傾偈，但當時因為我戴住耳機，我聽唔
到 WP 講乜嘢。同時，我因為好驚，於是我就企停喺上址扮
K K
打電話，而 WP 亦企停喺度。當我得知 WP 跟踪我後，我就
選擇行去新和里方向，並行去新和里道路中間，因為嗰度多
L 啲燈光，而 WP 繼續跟住我。期間，我係新和里近燈柱 L
AD0980 時，WP 突然係我後面大聲叫，之後我就望後面，
M 我見到 WP 右手手持住一把灰白色鎅刀（約 15cm）指住我。 M
WP 就同我講咗 3 次：「拎晒啲錢俾我」。我就回答 WP 講：
「我無帶銀包。」當 WP 聽到我回答後，WP 疑似放棄搶劫
N N
我，我就繼續行去譚美麗芬中學方向。同時我見到有途人經
過，我就立即行去途人（資料不詳）求助，要求途人陪我行
O 去屯門井財街青菱徑 7-11 便利店。途人陪我行去青菱徑途 O
中，我因為好驚無回頭望 WP。之後，當我係青菱徑 7-11 便
P 利店後，我就立即報警求助。」 P
Q Q
12. 大律師指被告人承認企圖搶劫受害人。可是，被告人並非
R 因缺乏金錢而犯案；當時被告人煩躁不安，將挫折感發洩在受害人身 R
上；因受害人無視他的說話而感到嬲怒，因此才愚蠢地作出打劫的行
S S
為；一旦受害人指沒有帶銀包，被告人便從激動的情緒清醒過來，停
T T
止進一步行動。
U U
V V
- 11 -
A A
B B
C 13. 本席不同意大律師的說法。首先，被告人的說法與受害人 C
的供詞並不脗合。被告人明顯是跟蹤受害人一段路後才作出搶劫的行
D D
為：
E E
F
(i) 受害人從沒提及被告人推著單車； F
G G
(ii) 受害人指被告人是跟蹤了她一段路，而且十分貼
H 近； H
I I
(iii) 受害人轉身望着被告人後，被告人才開始向她說
J J
話；
K K
(iv) 受害人因戴著耳機，沒有聽見被告人的說話；
L L
M M
(v) 受害人十分驚慌，停下腳步假裝打電話，被告人亦
N 停下，但被告人並沒亮刀； N
O O
(vi) 受害人繼續步向新和里，被告人繼續尾隨一段路
P 程； P
Q Q
(vii) 受害人到達燈柱時被告人才突然亮刀，要求受害人
R R
交出所有金錢。
S S
T T
U U
V V
- 12 -
A A
B B
14. 大律師指案發時，被告人是因為騎單車才戴上手套。他續
C 解釋被告人所騎的單車是摺疊單車，摺疊時需要用塑料索帶固定摺疊 C
部份，以便將單車推行；每次被告人騎單車外出都會帶備用作企圖行
D D
劫的鎅刀，用作切割索帶。案發時，被告人只是一時衝動拿出鎅刀指
E E
嚇受害人，犯罪行為並非有預謀。
F F
15. 本席亦不接受大律師的說法。首先，涉案的手套並非單單
G G
手套，而是勞工手套。從閉路電視截圖可見，被告人外出時已打開單
H H
車，單車在他的跨下，但被告人並未佩戴手套（辯方附件一）。同樣
I 地，被告人回家時同樣是沒有佩戴手套（辯方附件二）。大律師指案 I
發前，被告人因情緒問題，推著單車四圍走動，意圖冷靜下來。換言
J J
之，當時被告人並非在騎單車，亦沒需要戴上手套。本席亦看不到任
K K
何原因需要先摺疊單車才推行。辯方向法庭提供的相片顯示涉案單車
L 設有儲存物件的位置；如被告人每次踏單車時均須使用涉案鎅刀，該 L
M
鎅刀應放在單車的儲存位置內。沒有爭議的是被告人被捕時，單車上 M
沒有索帶，而涉案鎅刀則在被告人的住所內。另外，涉案的鎅刀是伸
N N
縮式的；換言之，案發時被告人不但拿出鎅刀，還將刀片伸出作案。
O O
16. 無論如何，Mo Kwong Sang 案所述的量刑指引是初步量刑
P P
基準；如有加刑因素，法庭可將量刑基準上調。就算被告人並無預謀
Q Q
犯案，這只顯示沒有加刑因素。雖然本席不接受辯方的說法，本席亦
R 不打算將量刑基準上調。雖然被告人有一次盜竊的刑事定罪紀錄，但 R
S 已是 2002 年的事，而且被告人並非慣犯，本席不予以考慮。 S
T T
U U
V V
- 13 -
A A
B B
酒精影響
C C
17. 大律師指，本案罪行沒有預謀。被告人是在個人感情問題
D D
和酒精影響下作案。眾所周知，在酒精影響下犯案並非減刑因素。
E E
Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
F F
“[30-38] The policy of the law is not to give an accused a
G sentencing reduction on the basis that he was drunk when he G
committed the offence: R v Rosenberger ex p Attorney General
(1994) 76 Crim R 1. He must instead expect to receive the
H sentence his offence merits: R v Paton [1982] Crim LR 58. In H
HKSAR v Chiu Wai-kan Vicken (No. 2) [2011] HKC 519 …
I Stock VP explained that ‘where an accused has become addicted I
to alcohol or drugs he must, generally, be treated as carrying
responsibility for that state of affairs, especially when he has
J sought no assistance to take himself out of the cycle.’ J
[30-39] In R v Liu Ping-kin [1993] 2 HKC 192, 195,
K K
Pennington JA said the accused ‘apparently has a problem with
alcohol, but we do not consider that as a mitigating factor’. In R
L v Grossi (2008) 183 A Crim R 15, 32… Redtich JA observed L
that ‘drug or alcohol induced conditions have not as a general
rule required any significant moderation of [these] sentencing
M considerations’ … M
N [30-41] When alcohol has contributed to the commission of N
the offence, an accused cannot expect to turn to his advantage,
self-induced intoxication: Attorney General v Lee Kui-man
O [1997] 1 HKLRD 576, 579… Quite the contrary, as O
demonstrated in HKSAR v Gambold Chinzorig (HCMA
P
126/2016, 15 June 2016, unreported), it was said of a pickpocket P
who had taken drink before committing the offence that he ‘must
have known that he put himself in the way of temptation’ and
Q his sentence was enhanced in consequence …’ Q
R 被告人的精神狀況 R
S S
18. 大律師指法庭可考慮在還押期間透過定期和充足藥物，被
T T
告人的精神狀況已有所緩解。雖然醫生報告沒有明確地指出案發時被
U U
V V
- 14 -
A A
B B
告人的精神狀況，但報告指被告人於 2024 年 2 月後不久便未再服藥，
C 導致罪行發生的怒火爆發與病情復發的情況相符。辯方認為被告人和 C
女友的爭執及酒精的影響很大可能是一併造成本案「悲劇」的主因。
D D
E E
19. Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
F F
“[30-225] A mental disability, if causative of or materially
G contributing to the offending, is ‘capable of reducing moral G
culpability as distinguished from legal responsibility, and
thereby affecting the punishment that is just in all
H circumstances’: Henry v R [2019] NZCA 407, [43]. It may, that H
is, ‘be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance, relevant
I to the offender’ (rather than the offending): Shailer v R [2017] 2 I
NZKR 629 … However, the extent to which a mental disorder
affects the accused’s moral culpability ‘depends upon the nature,
J effect and severity of the condition and its symptoms’: Western J
Australia v Malone [2015] WASCA 188, [74]. If the mental
impairment has contributed to the offending, this may, moreover,
K K
‘affect the significance of general deterrence as a sentencing
consideration’: Cluett v R [2019] WASCA 111, [63]. There
L must, however, be a causal link between his illness and his L
criminal conduct, and, in HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin [2020] 1 HKC
475 … a rioter, who suffered from Attention
M Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), was told that his M
condition could not ‘conceivably amount to a reason, let alone
N an excuse, for his involvement in such a serious offence. Those N
who suffer from such conditions must equally be deterred from
voluntarily involving themselves in mob violence.’ [35]
O O
[30-226] If an accused suffered from a mental disorder this
P
may be of relevance in two ways. First, it affects the assessment P
of the extent of the objective criminality, and second, it
influences the question of whether the case requires a deterrent
Q sentence: R v George (2004) 149 A Crim R 38, 45 …, HKSAR v Q
Chan Wai-hung [2009] 3 HKLRD 127 … Such a person may
lack effective powers of reasoning or control. As Spigelman CJ
R R
noted in R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255, to the extent that
mental illness explains the offence, an offender’s inability:
S S
T T
U U
V V
- 15 -
A A
B … to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or B
to make reasonable judgments, or to control his or
C her faculties and emotions, will impact on the level C
of culpability of the offender, even where the illness
does not amount to an excuse at law.
D D
[30-227] A custodial sentence will weigh more heavily on a
E
mentally ill person: R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398, 400. If, E
however, the accused has decided to forego treatment for his
condition, this may blunt as possible impact as mitigation:
F HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin … F
[30-228] In R v Grossi (2008) 183 A Crim R 15, 33 … it was
G G
said that the question of whether a particular mental condition
should reduce moral culpability or general deterrence and the
H extent to which it should do so would usually depend upon: H
(1) the nature and severity of the symptoms;
I I
(2) Its effect on the mental capacity of the
J offender at the time of the offence or at the J
time of sentence. There must be some
connection between the condition and the
K commission of an offence. The nexus may be K
established by showing that it affected the
offender’s ability to exercise an appropriate
L L
judgment in one or more of the ways stated in
Verdins’ and
M M
(3) the nature and seriousness of the offence.
N [30-229] In R v Wright [2001] 3 NZLR 22, 26, the relevance N
of mental disorder to a sentencing court was described thus:
O O
it is a factor which will inform a just sentence having
regard to the character of the disorder and the weight
P it ought to carry when balancing sentencing P
objectives. Its character may indicate a lesser degree
Q
of moral culpability or a greater subjective impact of Q
penalty. It may suggest a more or a less risk of a
repetition of offending, so as to direct particular
R attention to issues of personal deterrence or public R
protection. And these considerations must be
synthesized with the sentencing elements of the
S S
denouncing the fact of violence in our society and
acknowledging grievous effects on victims.
T T
U U
V V
- 16 -
A A
B [30-230] If the accused suffers from a mental disorder, this B
may render him an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence:
C Kennedy v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 185, 197 … The retributive C
and denunciatory aspect of the sentence that is appropriate for
someone of ordinary capacity ‘will often be inappropriate to the
D situation of a mentally retarded offender and to the needs of the D
community’: Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120 … As Wood
E
CJ explained in R v Henry (1999) 106 A Crim R 149, 254 …: E
The community will readily understand that the
F offender who suffers from a mental disorder or F
abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive
facilities or emotional restraints, and in some
G G
instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or
ordered judgments. Almost invariably there is a
H limited appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act, H
or of its morral culpability, which, although falling
short of avoiding criminal responsibility does justify
I special consideration upon sentencing. Moreover, I
such a condition is inherent and its presence does not
J depend upon any element of choice. J
[30-231] However, it is not right for a court to disregard
K general deterrence in sentencing simply because the accused has K
a personality disorder: Secretary for Justice v Yan Shen [2012]
3 HKC 557, 570 … In HKSAR v Chan Sau-lan, Becky [2018] 2
L L
HKC 548 … the accused had ‘obvious mental problems’ which
justified ‘a more individualized sentence falling outside the
M established guidelines’, but a sentence of five years’ M
imprisonment (as opposed to eight), was nonetheless still
appropriate for a serious robbery offence. In a case of armed
N robbery, the paramount considerations are condign punishment N
and deterrence, and notwithstanding an accused’s mental
O condition ‘we cannot ignore these public policy considerations’: O
HKSAR v Chan Sau-lan, Becky …
P [30-233] Emotional stress may not mitigate extreme conduct P
in any substantial way: HKSAR v Liu Man-kuen [2000] 4 HKC
Q
197, 403 …. But if the stress is so great that an accused act Q
wholly out of character this may be irrelevant: R v Ng Ka-ling
[1988] HKC 310 … Account was taken in R v Huthart [2002]
R 4 HKC 692, 698, of the ‘deplorable state of physical and mental R
health’ of the accused when he committed the offence. The
severity of the disorder should always be assessed, as this will
S S
determine the extent of its relevance to each case. In R v Wiskich
(2000) 207 LSJS 431, 457, Martin J said:
T T
U U
V V
- 17 -
A A
B A sentencing court must determine the impact of B
disorder upon both the offender’s thought processes
C and the capacity of the offender to appreciate the C
gravity and significance of the criminal conduct … if
an offender acts with knowledge of what is being
D done and with knowledge of the gravity of the D
criminal conduct, the importance of the element of
E
general deterrence otherwise appropriate in the E
particular circumstances is not greatly affected. The
gravity of the criminal conduct is also an important
F consideration … In some circumstances, however, F
the mental disorder may not be serious or causally
related to the commission of the crime, and the
G G
circumstances of the crime so grave, that very little
weight in mitigation can be given to the existence of
H the mental disorder and full weight must be afforded H
to the element of general deterrence. In between
those extremes, an infinite variety of circumstances
I will arise in which competing considerations must be I
balanced.
J J
[30-234] If an accused possesses a below average intelligence,
this may affect sentence … Such a person might realize that
K something is wrong, but not just how wrong it is; just as ‘a child K
may understand that something is wrong without understanding
that it is very wicked’ … Always to be factored into the
L L
calculation of sentence is the need to ensure that the public are
protected: R v Stabler (1984) 6 Cr App R(S) 129, 131. However,
M a court should beware of giving undue weight to a psychiatric M
condition that falls short of permanent affliction: Secretary for
Justice v Tang King Wa [2023] 4 HKC 289, 309 …” (my
N emphasis) N
O O
20. 於本案中，就算被告人的病情復發，本席也認為並非減刑
P 因素： P
Q Q
(i) 如上文所述，酒精影響並非減刑因素；
R R
S (ii) 被告人與女友爭執的感情壓力不足以作為持械行 S
劫的藉口；
T T
U U
V V
- 18 -
A A
B B
(iii) 根據辯方提供的醫療報告，被告人精神狀況最嚴重
C 之時（即 2015 年 10 月入住青山精神病院之時）， C
他 的 症 狀 包 括 過 度 興 奮 及 自 大 （ elated mood
D D
associated with grandiosity）、過度使費引致欠債及
E E
不實際計劃（over spending with accumulation of debt,
F increased unrealistic plans）和容易發怒引致腳踢女 F
友（irritability with an act of kicking his girlfriend’s
G G
leg）。報告指 2024 年 1 月，被告人並沒不正常的
H H
感知（perceptions）或想法（beliefs），說話有條理
I （coherent, and relevant）；被告人亦並沒過度興奮 I
J
（overly elated），只是語速比正常稍快（tempo was J
slightly faster than usual）。醫生認為被告人有輕躁
K K
狂症復發（in relapse with hypomanic symptoms）。
L L
可是被告人的情況明顯不嚴重；這從醫生沒有要求
M 被告人入院可見一斑。2024 年 2 月，雖然被告人似 M
乎仍沒有服藥，但稱上述症狀已消失，情況穩定；
N N
醫生亦認為被告人適合繼續以門診治療，顯示情況
O O
並不嚴重；醫生從沒指被告人的精神狀況導致犯案
P 行為；他只是指被告人不服藥，引致 2024 年初病情 P
復發的症狀。況且，被告人的症狀亦與持械行劫全
Q Q
無關係。因此，沒有任何資料顯示被告人犯案與他
R R
的精神狀況有任何關係（causal link or contribution）;
S S
(iv) 就算被告人病情復發，根據他之前的症狀，最多也
T T
只是暴躁（irritable），與持械行劫無關；
U U
V V
- 19 -
A A
B B
C (v) 被告人的精神病徵明顯是可治療的，而非永久性 C
（permanent disability ）。就算被告人病情復發也是
D D
因他自己不服藥；
E E
F
(vi) 醫生從沒指被告人的精神狀況令被告人無法意識 F
到控罪的嚴重性；及
G G
H (vii) 本案涉及「持械行劫」，性質極嚴重；法庭需考慮 H
I
保護社會大眾的安全及利益。 I
J J
家人及女友的支持/判刑對家人的影響
K K
21. 大律師指被告人的母親和女友均支持被告人。雖然母親居
L L
於養老院，但被告人經常照顧母親，希望盡快與母親重聚。眾所周知，
M M
這些均非減刑因素：見 Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 第 [30-130]
N 至 [30-142] 段。 N
O O
認罪折扣
P P
Q 22. 被告人適時認罪，可獲三份一的扣減（即由 60 個月監禁 Q
減為 40 個月監禁）。於 HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231, 上
R R
訴法庭已指出，認罪折扣已是減刑的最高分水線（High watermark），
S S
涵蓋悔意及其他求情因素；除非有極特殊的求情因素，法庭不應予以
T 額外減刑。本案中，除了適時認罪外，根本沒有其他減刑因素。 T
U U
V V
- 20 -
A A
B B
23. 因此，本席判處被告人 40 個月監禁。
C C
D D
E （ 謝沈智慧 ） E
區域法院法官
F F
G G
H H
I I
J J
K K
L L
M M
N N
O O
P P
Q Q
R R
S S
T T
U U
V V