DCCC419/2025 香港特別行政區 訴 朱超健及另一人
DCCC 419/2025
[2026] HKDC 483
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2025年第419號
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香港特別行政區
訴
朱超健
（第一被告人）
DINH XUAN MANH
（第二被告人）
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主審法官：
區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期:
2026年3月17日
出席人士：
周亦樂先生，律政司檢控官，代表香港特別行政區
鄭煦喬女士，由法律援助署委派的何謝韋律師事務所延聘，代表第一被告人
許祈峰先生，由法律援助署委派的范黃曹律師行延聘，代表第二被告人
控罪：
[1] - [2] 入屋犯法罪（Burglary）
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判刑理由書
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1. 本案的 2 名被告人一同被控 2 項 「入屋犯法」罪，違反香港法例第 210 章《盜竊罪條例》第 11(1)(b) 及 (4) 條。他們承認控罪。
案情
2. 兩名被告人承認的「經修訂的案情撮要」如下：
(i) 宏豐工程有限公司（受害公司 1）及沃昇工程有限公司（受害公司 2）是一項建築工程的分判商。
(ii) 受害公司 1 及 2 在涉案建築地盤設有辦公室。兩間公司的辦公室位於香港新界葵涌葵涌醫院道 3-15 號葵涌醫院建築地盤 DE 座 LGM 層的建築地盤辦公室區域（辦公室區域）。建築地盤的開工時間為上午 9 時至下午 6 時。
(iii) 在上述辦公室區域內，受害公司 1 設有兩個辦公室（受害公司 1的辦公室），受害公司 2 則設有一個辦公室（受害公司 2的辦公室）。兩間公司的辦公室彼此相鄰。
(iv) 2024 年 9 月 20 日下午約 5 時 30 分，受害公司 1 的職員周家和（控方第一證人）檢查並點算受害公司 1 的辦公室內所有建築工具。控方第一證人用掛鎖鎖好受害公司 1 的辦公室，然後離開。
(v) 與此同時，受害公司 2 的職員曾建雄 （控方第三證人）正準備收工離開受害公司 2 的辦公室。離開前，控方第三證人見到受害公司 2 的辦公室入口附近的枱上有 3 部手提電腦。受害公司 2 的辦公室有用掛鎖鎖好。
(vi) 2024 年 9 月 21 日上午約 8 時 45 分，控方第一證人返回辦公室區域，發現鎖住受害公司 1 辦公室的兩個掛鎖均被撬開。經檢查，發現不見了 16 把電鑽、14 部磨機及 70 粒電池（受害公司 1的被盜物品），總值港幣 39,000 元。
(vii) 與此同時，控方第三證人返回受害公司 2 的辦公室，發現鎖住該辦公室的掛鎖被撬開。經檢查，發現不見了 3 部手提電腦（受害公司 2的被盜物品），總值港幣 30,000 元。
(viii) 涉案辦公室區域裝有閉路電視鏡頭，拍攝到受害公司 1 及 2 的辦公室。2024 年 9 月 21 日清晨 5 時 52 分至 6 時，閉路電視鏡頭拍攝到第一被告人拿起工具，用來闖入受害公司 1 及 2 的辦公室。同一閉路電視鏡頭拍攝到第一被告人闖入辦公室時，第二被告人在外面等候。
(ix) 2024 年 9 月 23 日，第一及第二被告人同被拘捕和警誡。第二被告人在警誡下承認與第一被告人去建築地盤偷東西，並表示第一被告人會向他支付港幣 500 元作報酬。
(x) 2024 年 9 月 24 日，警方搜查第一被告人住所，檢獲一件黑色T恤、一條長褲、一條短褲、一把電鑽及 6 粒電池。該把電鑽及該 6 粒電池有受害公司 1 的公司標誌，是屬於受害公司 1 的財產。
(xi) 第二被告人在其後的錄影會面中於警誡下承認：
(i) 第二被告人與第一被告人去到建築地盤。第二被告人攜帶一個背囊，第一被告人將從涉案辦公室偷取的物品放入第二被告人的背囊；
(ii) 被盜物品包括電池及電鑽；
(iii) 案發時，第二被告人身穿黑色T恤、黑白色短褲及黑白色鞋；
(iv) 警方向第二被告人展示從第一被告人住所檢獲的電鑽及 6 粒電池。第二被告人認得該些物品是第一被告人放入第二被告人背囊的；及
(v) 第一被告以現金方式支付他港幣 500 元報酬。他已經花費 300 元，並將其中 100 元增值入自己的八達通，另外還有剩餘 200 元現金存放在自己的袋內。
(xii) 用來鎖住受害公司 1 辦公室的兩個掛鎖受損，總值港幣 20 元（每個港幣 10 元）。
(xiii) 用來鎖住受害公司 2 辦公室的掛鎖受損，價值港幣 20 元。
(xiv) 除了從第一被告人住所檢獲的電鑽及六粒電池外，受害公司 1 及 2 的被盜物品均未能尋回。
(xv) 第二被告人是表格 8 擔保書持有人。
(xvi) 案發時，第一及第二被告人作為侵入者在進入涉案辦公室區域後，在該處偷竊受害公司 1 的被盜物品。
(xvii) 案發時，第一及第二被告人作為侵入者在進入涉案辦公室區域後，在該處偷竊受害公司 2 的被盜物品。
被告人的背景
第一被告
3. 第一被告人現年 31 歲，於內地曾接受教育至初中一年級。他於 2024 年 3 月離婚，與前妻育有 2 子，分別 3 歲和 8 歲。前妻是家庭主婦，負責照顧一對兒子。妻子和兩名兒子均由第一被告人供養。第一被告人 60 歲的父親是退休人士；60 歲的母親是家庭主婦，在內地居住，並由第一被告人負責供養。
4. 第一被告人有一項刑事定罪紀錄，涉及兩項控罪，與本案相同，另有一項「入屋犯法」罪留檔。定罪日期為 2024 年 4 月 5 日，每項控罪被判處 20 個月監禁，第 2 項控罪的其中 2 個月與第 1 控罪分期執行。（即總刑期為 22 個月監禁）。
第二被告
5. 第二被告現年 41 歲，已婚，與太太育有一名 15 歲的女兒。他是越南人，於 2016 年生意失敗，因欠債離開越南，非法入境香港。他現正等候難民申請的司法覆核結果，是表格 8（Form 8 Recognizance）持有人。他的太太及女兒則於越南生活。
6. 第二被告人曾接受至中學程度教育，無業。他在香港過往沒有刑事定罪紀錄。
原則
7. 「入屋犯法」是嚴重控罪，最高刑期為 14 年監禁。上訴法庭亦訂明量刑指引。如案件涉及商業處所，量刑基準為 2 年 6 個月監禁：Attorney General v Lai Kam Chi [1993] 1 HKC 215；R v Wong Man [1993] 1 HKC 89；Secretary for Justice v Tsang Hon Yin [2004] HKCU 1497（CACC 5/2004，2004 年 12 月 6 日，未經𢑥編）；HKSAR v Khan Asif [2010] 4 HKC 31。可是該量刑基準只適用於初犯者及沒有加刑或減刑因素的案件：HKSAR v Sim Ka Wing [2001] HKCU 498（CACC 450/2000，2001 年 5 月 31 日，未經𢑥編）；HKSAR v Chan Kong Yiu [2011] 4 HKLRD 292。
8. 被告人是難民身份（mandated refugee）是加刑因素，量刑基準由 30 個月監禁上調至 33 個月監禁：HKSAR v Junaid Ahmed [2018] HKCU 939。
9. 於 HKSAR v Cheng Wai Kai（CACC 338 及 339/2007，2005 年 5 月 28 日，未經𢑥編），上訴法庭列出一些加刑因素，包括：
(i) 犯案手法是精心部署及熟練地執行及涉及使用重型工具或器材；
(ii) 犯案人夥同他人犯案；
(iii) 罪行以價值可觀的處所和財物為目標；
(iv) 犯案者並非隨機行事，而是職業爆竊犯；
(v) 犯案者已有定罪紀錄（尤其是相同性質的紀錄）；
(vi) 犯案者同時干犯多項控罪。
10. 如犯案者只是機會主義者，犯案情節猶如小偷進入沒鎖上的辦公室，隨機盜竊，量刑基準可稍作下調（the conventional starting point can be lowered in the case of the opportunistic burglar, akin perhaps to the sneak thief who walks into an open office to steal whatever he can find）
討論
量刑基準
第一被告
11. 大律師指，第一被告於 2023 年有相同的定罪紀錄，屬加重刑責的考慮，而涉及的財物有相當價值，被爆竊處所是一個地盤而非空置或廢棄地方。然而，辯方希望法庭接受兩名被告人犯案的手法原始，亦不涉及精密的計劃，沒有特別帶備工具或使用重型的爆竊工具，而是使用在案發地盤內找到的鐵筆犯案。另外，雖然本案涉及兩家受害公司，但兩間公司的辦公室均處於同一地盤內，並在鄰近的地方。因此要求法庭輕判及下令兩項控罪的部份刑期同期執行。
12. 本席不完全同意大律師的說法。大律師的說法並不準確：
(i) 第一被告是於 2024 年 4 月 5 月於 DCCC 443/2023 就 2 項「入屋犯法」罪被定罪，而非大律師所述的 2023 年。因此，第一被告不但有相同的刑事定罪紀錄，出獄後便隨即再干犯相同控罪；
(ii) 大律師將被竊處所稱為一個地盤，嘗試營造這是一個沒有上鎖的處所，而第一被告只是一個機會主義者。可是根據第一被告承認的事實，被竊處所是地盤內的三個鎖上的辦公室，而第一被告是用工具損毀掛鎖後才進入進行偷竊。這與大律師援引的 Cheung To Ming案的案情簡直南轅北轍。於該案中，沒有任何證供顯示上訴人毁壞窗戶進入案發現場；
(iii) 大律師指第二被告是第一被告的朋友；2024 年 6 月第二被告來港並於第一被告家中居住，每月租金港幣 4,000 元。大律師似乎是指兩名被告是沒有計劃地即興犯案。可是根據第一被告的經歷供詞，案發時他居於深水埗桂林街 79 號 6 樓 D 室，而根據第二被告的經歷供詞，當時第二被告居於油麻地上海街 408 號 3 樓 Y 室。第一被告大律師從沒就此提出異議或作澄清；
(iv) 雖然兩間受害公司相鄰，但每間辦公室是獨立的處所，有獨立的門，分別 3 個掛鎖被損毁。
13. 沒有爭議的是，本案涉及商業處所，初步量刑基準應為 2 年 6 個月（即 30 個月）監禁。可是，本案中就第一被告有加刑因素：
(i) 第一被告不但有相同刑事定罪紀錄，還於出獄後不久便再干犯相同控罪；及
(ii) 第一被告連同他人犯案（即第二被告）。
14. 基於上述因素，本席將每項控罪的量刑基準上調 6 個月，即每項控罪的量刑基準為 3年監禁。
第二被告
15. 大律師指第二被告並非主謀，他只是按第一被告的指示行事，所獲的酬勞只是 500 元。
16. 根據大律師的陳詞，第一被告先提議到案發地點「偷東西」，而第二被告同意參與。該陳詞只顯示兩人討論一同犯案。本席不接受第二被告的罪責因此比第一被告輕微。「入屋犯法」是嚴重罪行。第二被告選擇為 500 元而犯案極愚蠢。況且，犯案人只獲少量酬勞並非減刑因素。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
“[30-310] That the accused was promised only a small reward for his role in the offence may count for little or nothing, particularly if his part in its commission was considerable: HKSAR v Chen Siu Ming [2005] HKCU 1770 (CACC 270/2005, 8 December 2005, unreported) …”
17. 大律師嘗試減弱第二被告人的角色。事實上，除了「睇水」之外，第二被告人還帶備背囊，負責搬走被盜物品。被盜物品包括 16 把電鑽、14 部磨機、70 粒電池及 3 部手提電腦，該些物品有一定的重量。如沒有第二被告的參與，第一被告很難獨自將物品取走。而且，案情顯示第二被告是早有預謀。
18. 第二被告在香港沒有任何刑事定罪紀錄。首先，量刑指引是適用於初犯者。再者，Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
“[7-6] Credit for a clear record is, however, by no means a given. Much will depend upon the nature of the offence and the position of the offender. In HKSAR v Law Num Chun [2014] 6 HKC 606, 617, Lunn VP said:
‘[T]he principle is that good character is not a factor relevant generally to determining the starting point to be taken for sentence in serious criminal offences for which a deterrent sentence is required. …’
[7-14] The practice of the courts in recent times has been to give the accused who plead guilty a sentencing discount of one-third: HKSAR v Lo Chi Yip and Anor [2000] 3 HKLRD 270, 277 … However, much depends on the timelines of the plea, with the full discount being awarded for a plea at the earliest opportunity, and a lesser discount attaching to pleas entered at a later stage: HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231. The accused who pleaded guilty at the outset will receive a full discount irrespective of whether he has a criminal record, is caught red-handed, or is genuinely remorseful. Since the ‘one-third rule’ has solidified into principle, there is no scope for a further discount, save in exceptional circumstances, such as where assistance is provided to the authorities. In HKSAR v Yun Wai Ming [2003] HKCU 264 (CACC 417/2002, 26 February 2003, unreported), Stuart-Moore VP said:
‘In the days before the discount of one-third on timely pleas of guilty became standard practice, previous good character used to be one of many factors which judges would take into account in deciding what discount to give on a plea of guilty. The one-third discount is usually, as we have said on numerous occasions, to be taken as the high watermark of the discount unless there are very special factors to be taken into account.’
[7-15] In Secretary for Justice v Ko Wai Kit [2001] 3 HKLRD 751, 757 … Stock JA said that the ‘lack of previous convictions will often be subsumed in the credit given for a plea of guilty’. In Secretary for Justice v Lee Cho Keung and Ors [2004] 4 HKC 179, 189, the court noted that ‘The established course is now to view the presence of good character as part and parcel of the one-third discount given upon a plea’. The ‘element of good character is normally taken as being included in the one-third discount for a plea of guilt’: Secretary for Justice v Tso Tsz Kin [2004] 2 HKC 139, 144. In HKSAR v Cheng Kelly Kit Yin [2014] 4 HKLRD 34 …, Barma J said ‘the one-third discount for a plea of guilty is the discount to be afforded even to those with clear record’ [16]. In Secretary for Justice v Cheng Tsz Hin [2020] 1 HKC 576 …, a judge who awarded a two-month sentencing discount to an accused who have been convicted of dangerous driving causing death for his clear record and perfect driving record was held to have erred …
[7-16] The judge who granted an accused who pleaded guilty an additional discount of three months’ imprisonment ‘to take account of her [hitherto] good character’, was said to have erred in Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan Fun [2007] 1 HKC 423, 428 … The discount for a guilty plea already has ‘built into it andallowance for good record where there is one’: HKSAR v Yung Wai Siu [2001] 1HKLRD 277, 279 … The withholding of an additional discount for a clear record ‘has not been a valid ground of appeal for a considerable time’: HKSAR v Yan Wai Ming [2003] HKCU 264 (CACC 417/2002, 26 February 2003, unreported). In this context, a clear record is not so much a mitigating factor as a ‘neutral feature in the case’: HKSAR v Wen Zelang [2006] 4 HKLRD 460, 465 …
[7-17] In HKSAR v Wong King Wai [2008] 2 HKC 614, 622, Stuart-Moore ACJHC said:
‘Personal circumstances, including a clear record, may, of course, have a bearing on mitigation for offences which are comparatively minor in nature. However, for serious offenses, we have indicated time and time again that, with the introduction of the ‘one-third rule’ which in usual circumstances provides a discount of a third of the prison sentence that would normally have been imposed of the trial following timely pleas of guilty, there should be no further discount for a clear record unless evidence of positive good character is forthcoming.’
[7-25] Deterrence apart, other situations can arise which make the clear record of an accused a factor of minimal or no significance … The courts have also ‘repeatedly said that a clear record in the case of illegal immigrants is, for practical purposes, a matter of almost no consequence’: HKSAR v Tong Fuk Sing [1999] 3 HKC 332, 336 …”
19. 沒有爭議的是第二被告是表格 8 持有人。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
“[1-98] If an offender comes to Hong Kong from the Mainland on a two-way permit specifically to commit serious crime, this will constitute an aggravating factor: HKSAR v Chau Chun Yee [2001] 3 HKC 605, 608.
[1-99] The same applies not only to a foreign national who enters Hong Kong with the intention of committing an offence, but also to a foreigner who is allowed to remain by the authorities, pending the resolution of an asylum claim, but then abuses the hospitality he has been shown by turning into crime: HKSAR v Sandagdorj Altankhuyang and Anor [2014] 1 HKC 206. It is equally an aggravating factor if a foreigner who has mandated refugee status commits an offense, and such a persons are treated in the same way as torture claimants: HKSAR v Junaid Ahmed [2018] HKCU 939 …
[1-100] … In HKSAR v Londono Montealegre [2017] 1 HKLRD 450 … an accused’s immigration status as a Form 8 holder was considered to be an aggravating factor in a drug trafficking case … In HKSAR v Gursevak [2019] 2 HKLRD 274 … a robbery case, it was said that there are two principles underlying the amount of enhancement where the accused is a Form 8 recognizance holder, namely, denunciation of criminal activity by Form 8 holders, and deterrence of all Form 8 holders from committing crimes while they enjoy the freedom to live in Hong Kong as they await resolution of their claims. Form 8 holders, must be firmly discouraged from becoming involved in serious crime: HKSAR v Ali Saif [2018] 6 HKC 19 … In HKSAR v Butt Mohammad Gulzar [2020] 3 HKLRD 805 … it was emphasized that ‘The enhancement for being a Form 8 recognizance holder must be substantial otherwise it has no deterrent effect’ …”
20. 本案中，就第二被告而言亦有加刑因素
(i) 第二被告是表格 8 持有人；及
(ii) 第二被告聯同他人犯案（即第一被告）。
21. 因此，本席將量刑基準上調 6 個月，即每項控罪的量刑基準為 3 年監禁。
減刑因素
22. 兩名被告人均適時認罪，可獲三分一的扣減。每項控罪的刑期減為 2 年監禁。
23. 兩位大律師指兩名被告人都是因經濟困難而犯案。眾所周知，經濟困難並非減刑因素：見 Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 第 [30-143] 至 [30-145] 段。於第 [30-145] 段，作者指出：
“That the accused committed the offence because he owed money to loan sharks due to gambling losses, will not avail him … Neither will the fact that the motive for the offence was to raise money for his family: Attorney General v Shek Sui Tai [1989] 1 HKLR 178, 179 … Financial difficulty and personal circumstances are not relevant as mitigation in serious cases, no matter how desperate or tragic the situation of the accused: Secretary for Justice v Nones Carmelita Galay [2023] 1 HKC 139 …”
24. 兩位大律師均指兩名被告人現十分後悔。如上文所述，認罪折扣已是最高分水線（high watermark），涵蓋悔意及所有求情因素，除非有極特殊的求情因素，否則不應予以額外折扣。本案中，除了適時認罪外，根本沒有其他求情因素。因此，本席判處兩名被告人：
控罪 1：2 年監禁
控罪 2：2 年監禁
總刑期
25. 兩位大律師均指兩項控罪的時間及地點相近。第一被告大律師要求兩項控罪的部位刑期同期執行。第二被告大律師則要求兩項控罪的刑期完全同期執行。
26. 本席的確須考慮總刑期原則。可是兩位大律師似乎是依賴「單次犯案原則」（one transaction rule）。於 HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching（倪耀偵）[2011] 6 HKC 238，上訴法庭指：
“13. When a judge is faced with the task of sentencing for multiple offences he is required as an initial step to identify the appropriate sentence for each offence and as the final step to achieve a total sentence appropriate to the culpability of the offender. The issue with which this appeal is concerned is the decision that the judge faced whether to order any of the sentences for the offences to run concurrently with each other or to be served consecutively.
14. The question whether to order concurrent or consecutive sentences can arise in many different scenarios. An offender may be charged in respect of a number of different, or similar, offences committed on wholly separate occasions over a period of time or with a number of different offences committed in the course of one episode of criminal activity. This case is concerned with the latter situation.
15. In the case of several offences committed in the course of a single episode, the prosecuting authorities might choose to proffer only one charge, where one charge embraces all the criminal conduct reflected by the evidence or, as in the present instance, separate charges for each criminal act.
16. If it chooses the former course, the instances of proved conduct embraced by the single charge but which could have been the subject of separate charges are taken into account in deciding what penalty reflects the true overall criminality.
17. But when the prosecuting authority elects the latter course, namely, to charge two or more offences arising from an episode of criminal activity, the objective is still the same; that is to say, the ultimate overall sentence must still reflect the overall and true culpability, although the sentencing judge must take care, first, to pass a sentence for each individual offence that is appropriate to that offence and the circumstances of its commission and, second, not to punish the offender twice for the same conduct.
18. It was in an attempt to safeguard fairness to the offender by ensuring that he was not punished twice for the same conduct that the courts developed the “one transaction” rule. In essence, this rule said that if the number of offences have been charged arising from the one transaction or course of criminal conduct, then concurrent sentences should be imposed.
19. The one transaction rule was not developed as an inflexible rule of law. It was never intended as anything more than a practical rule of thumb to guide judges in the exercise of the power to impose consecutive sentences so that the final sentence was not one that was unfair to an offender.
20. However, once stated, this practical working rule tended to develop a life of its own and has led to some difficulty in its application. Judicial dicta explained what was meant by “one course of criminal conduct” and exceptions to the rule developed … All of this, understandably enough, became material for advocates who sought to argue that the multiple offences of which their client had been convicted were part of one transaction and that it inevitably followed that the correct sentence was one where all the sentences were concurrent.
21. There are several problems associated with this line of reasoning. First it runs the risk of elevating a practical working rule to a rule of law, thereby providing an opportunity to argue that departure from it inevitably meant that the sentence imposed on the client was excessive. Secondly, it tends to obscure the real point which is not whether two or more offences are committed at about the same time, but whether the second or other further offences add to the culpability or criminality of the first. Thirdly, it ignores the reality that whatever sentence is arrived at after application of the rule is still subject to the totality principle.
22. The importance of the totality principle cannot be overstated. It is there to ensure not only fairness to the offender, in the sense that he is not punished twice for the same offence and, further, that the sentence is not an unduly crushing punishment but it is also a tool by which to ensure that “the overall effect of the sentences is sufficient having regard to the usual principles of deterrence, rehabilitation and denunciation.”: R v K M [2004] NSWCCA 65 at paragraph 55.
23. The emphasis therefore should be on a reflection in the sentence of true culpability disclosed by the offences of which the accused has been convicted. This is an approach which this court has consistently adopted in recent times, for example in HKSAR v Kwok Shui To [2006] 2 HKC 421 … and HKSAR v Iu Wai Shun [2008] 1 HKC 79. It is likely to be a more effective approach in reflecting an offender’s overall culpability than one which becomes overly concerned with the one transaction rule, although in the case of more than one offence, the court must guard carefully against punishing twice for the same act. If the second offence which takes place in the course of the suggested single episode adds to the culpability of the first offence, it will normally follow that the sentence for the second offence will run wholly or partially consecutive to that for the first; to what extent, if at all, will depend upon an assessment of the totality appropriate for the conduct as a whole. As with most sentencing exercises, the approach is an art, sensitive to the individual circumstances of the case and the offender.”
27. 首先，如上文所述，連環犯案已是加刑因素。本席衡量每項控罪的量刑起點時，並沒考慮到兩名被告人連環犯案的元素。
28. 兩項控罪涉及不同的受害公司及不同的被竊物品。明顯地，控罪 2 令控罪 1 更嚴重，兩項控罪的刑期理應分期執行。本席認為兩項控罪適當的總刑期為 3 年監禁，下令控罪 2 的其中 1 年與控罪 1 的刑期分期執行，即總刑期為 3 年監禁。
（ 謝沈智慧 ）
區域法院法官
DCCC419/2025 香港特別行政區 訴 朱超健及另一人
DCCC 419/2025
[2026] HKDC 483
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2025年第419號
________________________
香港特別行政區
訴
朱超健
（第一被告人）
DINH XUAN MANH
（第二被告人）
________________________
主審法官：
區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期:
2026年3月17日
出席人士：
周亦樂先生，律政司檢控官，代表香港特別行政區
鄭煦喬女士，由法律援助署委派的何謝韋律師事務所延聘，代表第一被告人
許祈峰先生，由法律援助署委派的范黃曹律師行延聘，代表第二被告人
控罪：
[1] - [2] 入屋犯法罪（Burglary）
________________________
判刑理由書
________________________
1. 本案的 2 名被告人一同被控 2 項 「入屋犯法」罪，違反香港法例第 210 章《盜竊罪條例》第 11(1)(b) 及 (4) 條。他們承認控罪。
案情
2. 兩名被告人承認的「經修訂的案情撮要」如下：
(i) 宏豐工程有限公司（受害公司 1）及沃昇工程有限公司（受害公司 2）是一項建築工程的分判商。
(ii) 受害公司 1 及 2 在涉案建築地盤設有辦公室。兩間公司的辦公室位於香港新界葵涌葵涌醫院道 3-15 號葵涌醫院建築地盤 DE 座 LGM 層的建築地盤辦公室區域（辦公室區域）。建築地盤的開工時間為上午 9 時至下午 6 時。
(iii) 在上述辦公室區域內，受害公司 1 設有兩個辦公室（受害公司 1的辦公室），受害公司 2 則設有一個辦公室（受害公司 2的辦公室）。兩間公司的辦公室彼此相鄰。
(iv) 2024 年 9 月 20 日下午約 5 時 30 分，受害公司 1 的職員周家和（控方第一證人）檢查並點算受害公司 1 的辦公室內所有建築工具。控方第一證人用掛鎖鎖好受害公司 1 的辦公室，然後離開。
(v) 與此同時，受害公司 2 的職員曾建雄 （控方第三證人）正準備收工離開受害公司 2 的辦公室。離開前，控方第三證人見到受害公司 2 的辦公室入口附近的枱上有 3 部手提電腦。受害公司 2 的辦公室有用掛鎖鎖好。
(vi) 2024 年 9 月 21 日上午約 8 時 45 分，控方第一證人返回辦公室區域，發現鎖住受害公司 1 辦公室的兩個掛鎖均被撬開。經檢查，發現不見了 16 把電鑽、14 部磨機及 70 粒電池（受害公司 1的被盜物品），總值港幣 39,000 元。
(vii) 與此同時，控方第三證人返回受害公司 2 的辦公室，發現鎖住該辦公室的掛鎖被撬開。經檢查，發現不見了 3 部手提電腦（受害公司 2的被盜物品），總值港幣 30,000 元。
(viii) 涉案辦公室區域裝有閉路電視鏡頭，拍攝到受害公司 1 及 2 的辦公室。2024 年 9 月 21 日清晨 5 時 52 分至 6 時，閉路電視鏡頭拍攝到第一被告人拿起工具，用來闖入受害公司 1 及 2 的辦公室。同一閉路電視鏡頭拍攝到第一被告人闖入辦公室時，第二被告人在外面等候。
(ix) 2024 年 9 月 23 日，第一及第二被告人同被拘捕和警誡。第二被告人在警誡下承認與第一被告人去建築地盤偷東西，並表示第一被告人會向他支付港幣 500 元作報酬。
(x) 2024 年 9 月 24 日，警方搜查第一被告人住所，檢獲一件黑色T恤、一條長褲、一條短褲、一把電鑽及 6 粒電池。該把電鑽及該 6 粒電池有受害公司 1 的公司標誌，是屬於受害公司 1 的財產。
(xi) 第二被告人在其後的錄影會面中於警誡下承認：
(i) 第二被告人與第一被告人去到建築地盤。第二被告人攜帶一個背囊，第一被告人將從涉案辦公室偷取的物品放入第二被告人的背囊；
(ii) 被盜物品包括電池及電鑽；
(iii) 案發時，第二被告人身穿黑色T恤、黑白色短褲及黑白色鞋；
(iv) 警方向第二被告人展示從第一被告人住所檢獲的電鑽及 6 粒電池。第二被告人認得該些物品是第一被告人放入第二被告人背囊的；及
(v) 第一被告以現金方式支付他港幣 500 元報酬。他已經花費 300 元，並將其中 100 元增值入自己的八達通，另外還有剩餘 200 元現金存放在自己的袋內。
(xii) 用來鎖住受害公司 1 辦公室的兩個掛鎖受損，總值港幣 20 元（每個港幣 10 元）。
(xiii) 用來鎖住受害公司 2 辦公室的掛鎖受損，價值港幣 20 元。
(xiv) 除了從第一被告人住所檢獲的電鑽及六粒電池外，受害公司 1 及 2 的被盜物品均未能尋回。
(xv) 第二被告人是表格 8 擔保書持有人。
(xvi) 案發時，第一及第二被告人作為侵入者在進入涉案辦公室區域後，在該處偷竊受害公司 1 的被盜物品。
(xvii) 案發時，第一及第二被告人作為侵入者在進入涉案辦公室區域後，在該處偷竊受害公司 2 的被盜物品。
被告人的背景
第一被告
3. 第一被告人現年 31 歲，於內地曾接受教育至初中一年級。他於 2024 年 3 月離婚，與前妻育有 2 子，分別 3 歲和 8 歲。前妻是家庭主婦，負責照顧一對兒子。妻子和兩名兒子均由第一被告人供養。第一被告人 60 歲的父親是退休人士；60 歲的母親是家庭主婦，在內地居住，並由第一被告人負責供養。
4. 第一被告人有一項刑事定罪紀錄，涉及兩項控罪，與本案相同，另有一項「入屋犯法」罪留檔。定罪日期為 2024 年 4 月 5 日，每項控罪被判處 20 個月監禁，第 2 項控罪的其中 2 個月與第 1 控罪分期執行。（即總刑期為 22 個月監禁）。
第二被告
5. 第二被告現年 41 歲，已婚，與太太育有一名 15 歲的女兒。他是越南人，於 2016 年生意失敗，因欠債離開越南，非法入境香港。他現正等候難民申請的司法覆核結果，是表格 8（Form 8 Recognizance）持有人。他的太太及女兒則於越南生活。
6. 第二被告人曾接受至中學程度教育，無業。他在香港過往沒有刑事定罪紀錄。
原則
7. 「入屋犯法」是嚴重控罪，最高刑期為 14 年監禁。上訴法庭亦訂明量刑指引。如案件涉及商業處所，量刑基準為 2 年 6 個月監禁：Attorney General v Lai Kam Chi [1993] 1 HKC 215；R v Wong Man [1993] 1 HKC 89；Secretary for Justice v Tsang Hon Yin [2004] HKCU 1497（CACC 5/2004，2004 年 12 月 6 日，未經𢑥編）；HKSAR v Khan Asif [2010] 4 HKC 31。可是該量刑基準只適用於初犯者及沒有加刑或減刑因素的案件：HKSAR v Sim Ka Wing [2001] HKCU 498（CACC 450/2000，2001 年 5 月 31 日，未經𢑥編）；HKSAR v Chan Kong Yiu [2011] 4 HKLRD 292。
8. 被告人是難民身份（mandated refugee）是加刑因素，量刑基準由 30 個月監禁上調至 33 個月監禁：HKSAR v Junaid Ahmed [2018] HKCU 939。
9. 於 HKSAR v Cheng Wai Kai（CACC 338 及 339/2007，2005 年 5 月 28 日，未經𢑥編），上訴法庭列出一些加刑因素，包括：
(i) 犯案手法是精心部署及熟練地執行及涉及使用重型工具或器材；
(ii) 犯案人夥同他人犯案；
(iii) 罪行以價值可觀的處所和財物為目標；
(iv) 犯案者並非隨機行事，而是職業爆竊犯；
(v) 犯案者已有定罪紀錄（尤其是相同性質的紀錄）；
(vi) 犯案者同時干犯多項控罪。
10. 如犯案者只是機會主義者，犯案情節猶如小偷進入沒鎖上的辦公室，隨機盜竊，量刑基準可稍作下調（the conventional starting point can be lowered in the case of the opportunistic burglar, akin perhaps to the sneak thief who walks into an open office to steal whatever he can find）
討論
量刑基準
第一被告
11. 大律師指，第一被告於 2023 年有相同的定罪紀錄，屬加重刑責的考慮，而涉及的財物有相當價值，被爆竊處所是一個地盤而非空置或廢棄地方。然而，辯方希望法庭接受兩名被告人犯案的手法原始，亦不涉及精密的計劃，沒有特別帶備工具或使用重型的爆竊工具，而是使用在案發地盤內找到的鐵筆犯案。另外，雖然本案涉及兩家受害公司，但兩間公司的辦公室均處於同一地盤內，並在鄰近的地方。因此要求法庭輕判及下令兩項控罪的部份刑期同期執行。
12. 本席不完全同意大律師的說法。大律師的說法並不準確：
(i) 第一被告是於 2024 年 4 月 5 月於 DCCC 443/2023 就 2 項「入屋犯法」罪被定罪，而非大律師所述的 2023 年。因此，第一被告不但有相同的刑事定罪紀錄，出獄後便隨即再干犯相同控罪；
(ii) 大律師將被竊處所稱為一個地盤，嘗試營造這是一個沒有上鎖的處所，而第一被告只是一個機會主義者。可是根據第一被告承認的事實，被竊處所是地盤內的三個鎖上的辦公室，而第一被告是用工具損毀掛鎖後才進入進行偷竊。這與大律師援引的 Cheung To Ming案的案情簡直南轅北轍。於該案中，沒有任何證供顯示上訴人毁壞窗戶進入案發現場；
(iii) 大律師指第二被告是第一被告的朋友；2024 年 6 月第二被告來港並於第一被告家中居住，每月租金港幣 4,000 元。大律師似乎是指兩名被告是沒有計劃地即興犯案。可是根據第一被告的經歷供詞，案發時他居於深水埗桂林街 79 號 6 樓 D 室，而根據第二被告的經歷供詞，當時第二被告居於油麻地上海街 408 號 3 樓 Y 室。第一被告大律師從沒就此提出異議或作澄清；
(iv) 雖然兩間受害公司相鄰，但每間辦公室是獨立的處所，有獨立的門，分別 3 個掛鎖被損毁。
13. 沒有爭議的是，本案涉及商業處所，初步量刑基準應為 2 年 6 個月（即 30 個月）監禁。可是，本案中就第一被告有加刑因素：
(i) 第一被告不但有相同刑事定罪紀錄，還於出獄後不久便再干犯相同控罪；及
(ii) 第一被告連同他人犯案（即第二被告）。
14. 基於上述因素，本席將每項控罪的量刑基準上調 6 個月，即每項控罪的量刑基準為 3年監禁。
第二被告
15. 大律師指第二被告並非主謀，他只是按第一被告的指示行事，所獲的酬勞只是 500 元。
16. 根據大律師的陳詞，第一被告先提議到案發地點「偷東西」，而第二被告同意參與。該陳詞只顯示兩人討論一同犯案。本席不接受第二被告的罪責因此比第一被告輕微。「入屋犯法」是嚴重罪行。第二被告選擇為 500 元而犯案極愚蠢。況且，犯案人只獲少量酬勞並非減刑因素。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
“[30-310] That the accused was promised only a small reward for his role in the offence may count for little or nothing, particularly if his part in its commission was considerable: HKSAR v Chen Siu Ming [2005] HKCU 1770 (CACC 270/2005, 8 December 2005, unreported) …”
17. 大律師嘗試減弱第二被告人的角色。事實上，除了「睇水」之外，第二被告人還帶備背囊，負責搬走被盜物品。被盜物品包括 16 把電鑽、14 部磨機、70 粒電池及 3 部手提電腦，該些物品有一定的重量。如沒有第二被告的參與，第一被告很難獨自將物品取走。而且，案情顯示第二被告是早有預謀。
18. 第二被告在香港沒有任何刑事定罪紀錄。首先，量刑指引是適用於初犯者。再者，Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
“[7-6] Credit for a clear record is, however, by no means a given. Much will depend upon the nature of the offence and the position of the offender. In HKSAR v Law Num Chun [2014] 6 HKC 606, 617, Lunn VP said:
‘[T]he principle is that good character is not a factor relevant generally to determining the starting point to be taken for sentence in serious criminal offences for which a deterrent sentence is required. …’
[7-14] The practice of the courts in recent times has been to give the accused who plead guilty a sentencing discount of one-third: HKSAR v Lo Chi Yip and Anor [2000] 3 HKLRD 270, 277 … However, much depends on the timelines of the plea, with the full discount being awarded for a plea at the earliest opportunity, and a lesser discount attaching to pleas entered at a later stage: HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231. The accused who pleaded guilty at the outset will receive a full discount irrespective of whether he has a criminal record, is caught red-handed, or is genuinely remorseful. Since the ‘one-third rule’ has solidified into principle, there is no scope for a further discount, save in exceptional circumstances, such as where assistance is provided to the authorities. In HKSAR v Yun Wai Ming [2003] HKCU 264 (CACC 417/2002, 26 February 2003, unreported), Stuart-Moore VP said:
‘In the days before the discount of one-third on timely pleas of guilty became standard practice, previous good character used to be one of many factors which judges would take into account in deciding what discount to give on a plea of guilty. The one-third discount is usually, as we have said on numerous occasions, to be taken as the high watermark of the discount unless there are very special factors to be taken into account.’
[7-15] In Secretary for Justice v Ko Wai Kit [2001] 3 HKLRD 751, 757 … Stock JA said that the ‘lack of previous convictions will often be subsumed in the credit given for a plea of guilty’. In Secretary for Justice v Lee Cho Keung and Ors [2004] 4 HKC 179, 189, the court noted that ‘The established course is now to view the presence of good character as part and parcel of the one-third discount given upon a plea’. The ‘element of good character is normally taken as being included in the one-third discount for a plea of guilt’: Secretary for Justice v Tso Tsz Kin [2004] 2 HKC 139, 144. In HKSAR v Cheng Kelly Kit Yin [2014] 4 HKLRD 34 …, Barma J said ‘the one-third discount for a plea of guilty is the discount to be afforded even to those with clear record’ [16]. In Secretary for Justice v Cheng Tsz Hin [2020] 1 HKC 576 …, a judge who awarded a two-month sentencing discount to an accused who have been convicted of dangerous driving causing death for his clear record and perfect driving record was held to have erred …
[7-16] The judge who granted an accused who pleaded guilty an additional discount of three months’ imprisonment ‘to take account of her [hitherto] good character’, was said to have erred in Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan Fun [2007] 1 HKC 423, 428 … The discount for a guilty plea already has ‘built into it andallowance for good record where there is one’: HKSAR v Yung Wai Siu [2001] 1HKLRD 277, 279 … The withholding of an additional discount for a clear record ‘has not been a valid ground of appeal for a considerable time’: HKSAR v Yan Wai Ming [2003] HKCU 264 (CACC 417/2002, 26 February 2003, unreported). In this context, a clear record is not so much a mitigating factor as a ‘neutral feature in the case’: HKSAR v Wen Zelang [2006] 4 HKLRD 460, 465 …
[7-17] In HKSAR v Wong King Wai [2008] 2 HKC 614, 622, Stuart-Moore ACJHC said:
‘Personal circumstances, including a clear record, may, of course, have a bearing on mitigation for offences which are comparatively minor in nature. However, for serious offenses, we have indicated time and time again that, with the introduction of the ‘one-third rule’ which in usual circumstances provides a discount of a third of the prison sentence that would normally have been imposed of the trial following timely pleas of guilty, there should be no further discount for a clear record unless evidence of positive good character is forthcoming.’
[7-25] Deterrence apart, other situations can arise which make the clear record of an accused a factor of minimal or no significance … The courts have also ‘repeatedly said that a clear record in the case of illegal immigrants is, for practical purposes, a matter of almost no consequence’: HKSAR v Tong Fuk Sing [1999] 3 HKC 332, 336 …”
19. 沒有爭議的是第二被告是表格 8 持有人。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：
“[1-98] If an offender comes to Hong Kong from the Mainland on a two-way permit specifically to commit serious crime, this will constitute an aggravating factor: HKSAR v Chau Chun Yee [2001] 3 HKC 605, 608.
[1-99] The same applies not only to a foreign national who enters Hong Kong with the intention of committing an offence, but also to a foreigner who is allowed to remain by the authorities, pending the resolution of an asylum claim, but then abuses the hospitality he has been shown by turning into crime: HKSAR v Sandagdorj Altankhuyang and Anor [2014] 1 HKC 206. It is equally an aggravating factor if a foreigner who has mandated refugee status commits an offense, and such a persons are treated in the same way as torture claimants: HKSAR v Junaid Ahmed [2018] HKCU 939 …
[1-100] … In HKSAR v Londono Montealegre [2017] 1 HKLRD 450 … an accused’s immigration status as a Form 8 holder was considered to be an aggravating factor in a drug trafficking case … In HKSAR v Gursevak [2019] 2 HKLRD 274 … a robbery case, it was said that there are two principles underlying the amount of enhancement where the accused is a Form 8 recognizance holder, namely, denunciation of criminal activity by Form 8 holders, and deterrence of all Form 8 holders from committing crimes while they enjoy the freedom to live in Hong Kong as they await resolution of their claims. Form 8 holders, must be firmly discouraged from becoming involved in serious crime: HKSAR v Ali Saif [2018] 6 HKC 19 … In HKSAR v Butt Mohammad Gulzar [2020] 3 HKLRD 805 … it was emphasized that ‘The enhancement for being a Form 8 recognizance holder must be substantial otherwise it has no deterrent effect’ …”
20. 本案中，就第二被告而言亦有加刑因素
(i) 第二被告是表格 8 持有人；及
(ii) 第二被告聯同他人犯案（即第一被告）。
21. 因此，本席將量刑基準上調 6 個月，即每項控罪的量刑基準為 3 年監禁。
減刑因素
22. 兩名被告人均適時認罪，可獲三分一的扣減。每項控罪的刑期減為 2 年監禁。
23. 兩位大律師指兩名被告人都是因經濟困難而犯案。眾所周知，經濟困難並非減刑因素：見 Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 第 [30-143] 至 [30-145] 段。於第 [30-145] 段，作者指出：
“That the accused committed the offence because he owed money to loan sharks due to gambling losses, will not avail him … Neither will the fact that the motive for the offence was to raise money for his family: Attorney General v Shek Sui Tai [1989] 1 HKLR 178, 179 … Financial difficulty and personal circumstances are not relevant as mitigation in serious cases, no matter how desperate or tragic the situation of the accused: Secretary for Justice v Nones Carmelita Galay [2023] 1 HKC 139 …”
24. 兩位大律師均指兩名被告人現十分後悔。如上文所述，認罪折扣已是最高分水線（high watermark），涵蓋悔意及所有求情因素，除非有極特殊的求情因素，否則不應予以額外折扣。本案中，除了適時認罪外，根本沒有其他求情因素。因此，本席判處兩名被告人：
控罪 1：2 年監禁
控罪 2：2 年監禁
總刑期
25. 兩位大律師均指兩項控罪的時間及地點相近。第一被告大律師要求兩項控罪的部位刑期同期執行。第二被告大律師則要求兩項控罪的刑期完全同期執行。
26. 本席的確須考慮總刑期原則。可是兩位大律師似乎是依賴「單次犯案原則」（one transaction rule）。於 HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching（倪耀偵）[2011] 6 HKC 238，上訴法庭指：
“13. When a judge is faced with the task of sentencing for multiple offences he is required as an initial step to identify the appropriate sentence for each offence and as the final step to achieve a total sentence appropriate to the culpability of the offender. The issue with which this appeal is concerned is the decision that the judge faced whether to order any of the sentences for the offences to run concurrently with each other or to be served consecutively.
14. The question whether to order concurrent or consecutive sentences can arise in many different scenarios. An offender may be charged in respect of a number of different, or similar, offences committed on wholly separate occasions over a period of time or with a number of different offences committed in the course of one episode of criminal activity. This case is concerned with the latter situation.
15. In the case of several offences committed in the course of a single episode, the prosecuting authorities might choose to proffer only one charge, where one charge embraces all the criminal conduct reflected by the evidence or, as in the present instance, separate charges for each criminal act.
16. If it chooses the former course, the instances of proved conduct embraced by the single charge but which could have been the subject of separate charges are taken into account in deciding what penalty reflects the true overall criminality.
17. But when the prosecuting authority elects the latter course, namely, to charge two or more offences arising from an episode of criminal activity, the objective is still the same; that is to say, the ultimate overall sentence must still reflect the overall and true culpability, although the sentencing judge must take care, first, to pass a sentence for each individual offence that is appropriate to that offence and the circumstances of its commission and, second, not to punish the offender twice for the same conduct.
18. It was in an attempt to safeguard fairness to the offender by ensuring that he was not punished twice for the same conduct that the courts developed the “one transaction” rule. In essence, this rule said that if the number of offences have been charged arising from the one transaction or course of criminal conduct, then concurrent sentences should be imposed.
19. The one transaction rule was not developed as an inflexible rule of law. It was never intended as anything more than a practical rule of thumb to guide judges in the exercise of the power to impose consecutive sentences so that the final sentence was not one that was unfair to an offender.
20. However, once stated, this practical working rule tended to develop a life of its own and has led to some difficulty in its application. Judicial dicta explained what was meant by “one course of criminal conduct” and exceptions to the rule developed … All of this, understandably enough, became material for advocates who sought to argue that the multiple offences of which their client had been convicted were part of one transaction and that it inevitably followed that the correct sentence was one where all the sentences were concurrent.
21. There are several problems associated with this line of reasoning. First it runs the risk of elevating a practical working rule to a rule of law, thereby providing an opportunity to argue that departure from it inevitably meant that the sentence imposed on the client was excessive. Secondly, it tends to obscure the real point which is not whether two or more offences are committed at about the same time, but whether the second or other further offences add to the culpability or criminality of the first. Thirdly, it ignores the reality that whatever sentence is arrived at after application of the rule is still subject to the totality principle.
22. The importance of the totality principle cannot be overstated. It is there to ensure not only fairness to the offender, in the sense that he is not punished twice for the same offence and, further, that the sentence is not an unduly crushing punishment but it is also a tool by which to ensure that “the overall effect of the sentences is sufficient having regard to the usual principles of deterrence, rehabilitation and denunciation.”: R v K M [2004] NSWCCA 65 at paragraph 55.
23. The emphasis therefore should be on a reflection in the sentence of true culpability disclosed by the offences of which the accused has been convicted. This is an approach which this court has consistently adopted in recent times, for example in HKSAR v Kwok Shui To [2006] 2 HKC 421 … and HKSAR v Iu Wai Shun [2008] 1 HKC 79. It is likely to be a more effective approach in reflecting an offender’s overall culpability than one which becomes overly concerned with the one transaction rule, although in the case of more than one offence, the court must guard carefully against punishing twice for the same act. If the second offence which takes place in the course of the suggested single episode adds to the culpability of the first offence, it will normally follow that the sentence for the second offence will run wholly or partially consecutive to that for the first; to what extent, if at all, will depend upon an assessment of the totality appropriate for the conduct as a whole. As with most sentencing exercises, the approach is an art, sensitive to the individual circumstances of the case and the offender.”
27. 首先，如上文所述，連環犯案已是加刑因素。本席衡量每項控罪的量刑起點時，並沒考慮到兩名被告人連環犯案的元素。
28. 兩項控罪涉及不同的受害公司及不同的被竊物品。明顯地，控罪 2 令控罪 1 更嚴重，兩項控罪的刑期理應分期執行。本席認為兩項控罪適當的總刑期為 3 年監禁，下令控罪 2 的其中 1 年與控罪 1 的刑期分期執行，即總刑期為 3 年監禁。
（ 謝沈智慧 ）
區域法院法官