上訴許可申請的標準？申請駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：WADDINGTON LIMITED v CHAN CHUN HOO THOMAS (陳俊豪) 及其他人 - 法院：高等法院原訟法庭 (Court of First Instance, CFI) - 法官：周家明法官 (Hon Chow J) - 判決日期：2017年5月25日 ### 案情摘要 原告Waddington Limited向法庭申請兩項上訴許可 (leave to appeal)。第一項申請（第一上訴許可傳票）針對法庭於2017年2月9日就原告要求第五被告支付進一步中期付款 (interim payment) 及彌償 (indemnity) 的命令。第二項申請（第二上訴許可傳票）則針對法庭於2017年4月5日就第五被告介入原告傳票的訟費命令。原告在第一上訴許可傳票中提出四項上訴理由，主要涉及中期付款的金額計算、彌償範圍及訟費評定方式。在第二上訴許可傳票中，原告則質疑法庭不應在實質性裁決前處理介入申請的訟費問題。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案主要法律爭議在於原告提出的兩項上訴許可申請是否符合上訴許可的標準，即上訴是否有合理成功機會 (reasonable prospect of success) 或存在其他符合司法公正的理由。具體而言，爭議點包括：法庭在決定中期付款金額時是否應考慮第五被告提出的「建議訟費」；彌償範圍是否應涵蓋原告的所有訟費，以及是否應設定上限；以及法庭在處理介入申請的訟費時，是否應將其保留至實質性裁決之後。 ### 判決理由 法官重申了授予上訴許可的既定標準，即上訴須有合理成功機會或存在其他符合司法公正的理由。法官認為，原告提出的所有上訴理由均未能達到此標準。對於第一上訴許可傳票，法官指出第五被告提出的「建議訟費」並非承認，而是「不損害權利」的初步意見，且原告在原審聆訊中並未提出相關論點。對於中期付款的計算，法官強調「一般規則」僅適用於中期付款的「金額」而非是否應授予中期付款。對於彌償上限，法官認為原告未能提供足夠資料支持其申索，且無證據顯示第一被告無法支付其應負責任的訟費。對於第二上訴許可傳票，法官認為介入申請的訟費問題與實質性裁決是獨立的，且原告反對第五被告介入的理由不合理。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了 SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 127，確立了授予上訴許可的「合理成功機會」標準，即成功機會須「多於虛幻」但無需「必然」。此外，亦提及 Re Lehman Brothers Securities Asia Ltd (No 1) [2010] 1 HKLRD 43，但法官指出該案中關於中期付款「三分之二」的「一般規則」僅適用於中期付款的金額計算，而非是否應授予中期付款的先決問題。 ### 裁決與命令 法庭駁回了原告的兩項上訴許可申請。第一上訴許可傳票被駁回，原告須向第五被告支付訟費，按主訟人及答辯人基準評定，如未能達成協議則由兩名大律師核定。第二上訴許可傳票亦被駁回，原告須向第五被告支付訟費，按彌償基準評定，如未能達成協議則由一名初級大律師核定，因該申請完全沒有理據。 ### 判決啟示 本判決重申了上訴許可申請的嚴格標準，強調申請人必須證明上訴有合理成功機會或存在其他司法公正理由。同時，判決也提醒訴訟方，在原審聆訊中未能提出的論點，通常不應在申請上訴許可時才提出。此外，對於中期付款和彌償的申請，申請人有責任提供充分的證據和理據支持其申索，否則法庭有權設定限制或駁回申請。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: WADDINGTON LIMITED v CHAN CHUN HOO THOMAS (陳俊豪) and Others - Court: Court of First Instance (CFI) - Judge: Hon Chow J - Date of Judgment: 25 May 2017 ### Factual Background The plaintiff, Waddington Limited, sought leave to appeal on two summonses. The first summons (the 1st Leave Summons) was against the court's orders dated 9 February 2017 regarding the plaintiff's application for further interim payment and indemnity from the 5th defendant. The second summons (the 2nd Leave Summons) was against the costs order dated 5 April 2017 concerning the 5th defendant's application to intervene in the plaintiff's summons. The plaintiff raised four grounds of appeal in the 1st Leave Summons, primarily concerning the calculation of interim payments, the scope of indemnity, and the method of costs assessment. In the 2nd Leave Summons, the plaintiff questioned whether the court should have dealt with the costs of the intervention application before the substantive determination. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal questions in dispute were whether the plaintiff's two applications for leave to appeal met the established test for granting leave, i.e., whether the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success or there was some other reason in the interests of justice. Specifically, the issues included: whether the court should have considered the 5th defendant's 'proposed costs' when determining the amount of interim payment; whether the indemnity should cover all of the plaintiff's costs and if a cap should be imposed; and whether the court should have reserved the costs of the intervention application until after the substantive determination. ### Ratio Decidendi The judge reiterated the settled test for granting leave to appeal, which requires a reasonable prospect of success or some other reason in the interests of justice. The judge found that none of the plaintiff's proposed grounds of appeal met this standard. For the 1st Leave Summons, the judge noted that the 5th defendant's 'proposed costs' were not an admission but a 'without prejudice' preliminary opinion, and the plaintiff had not raised these arguments at the original hearing. Regarding the calculation of interim payment, the judge emphasized that the 'general rule' applied only to the 'quantum' of interim payment, not the anterior question of whether it should be granted. For the indemnity cap, the judge found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information to support its claim, and there was no evidence that the 1st defendant would be unable to pay its share of costs. For the 2nd Leave Summons, the judge held that the costs of the intervention application were separate from the substantive determination, and the plaintiff's opposition to the 5th defendant's intervention was unreasonable. ### Key Precedents & Statutes This case cited SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 127, which established that a 'reasonable prospect of success' for granting leave to appeal means a prospect that is 'more than fanciful' but not necessarily 'probable'. It also referred to Re Lehman Brothers Securities Asia Ltd (No 1) [2010] 1 HKLRD 43, but the judge clarified that the 'general rule' of two-thirds for interim payment in that case applied only to the quantum of the payment, not the preliminary question of whether interim payment should be made. ### Decision & Orders The court dismissed both of the plaintiff's applications for leave to appeal. The 1st Leave Summons was dismissed with costs to the 5th defendant, to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed, with a certificate for two counsel. The 2nd Leave Summons was also dismissed with costs to the 5th defendant, to be taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed, with a certificate for junior counsel only, as the application was found to be completely without merits. ### Key Takeaways This judgment reaffirms the strict standard for leave to appeal applications, emphasizing that applicants must demonstrate a reasonable prospect of success or other reasons in the interests of justice. It also reminds litigants that points not raised at the original hearing should generally not be introduced for the first time in an appeal application. Furthermore, for applications for interim payment and indemnity, applicants bear the responsibility of providing sufficient evidence and grounds to support their claims, failing which the court may impose limitations or dismiss the applications. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.