終審法院上訴許可的條件？其他

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：覃美金及梅啟明 訴 德勤 • 關黃陳方會計師行 及 其他 - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：袁家寧法官、關淑馨法官、朱芬齡法官 - 判決日期：2012年9月24日 ### 案情摘要 本案源於覃美金女士及梅啟明先生（原告人）就高等法院原訟法庭撤銷其申索，向高等法院上訴法庭提出上訴。上訴法庭於2012年3月9日駁回了他們的上訴。隨後，覃女士及梅先生申請許可，擬就上訴法庭的判案向終審法院提出上訴。在申請許可期間，覃女士因未能支付律師費而被頒令破產，其訴訟因由 (cause of action) 轉由破產人的產業的受託人 (trustee in bankruptcy) 管理。受託人決定撤回覃女士的許可申請。本判案書主要處理梅先生的終審上訴許可申請。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案主要處理梅先生向終審法院申請上訴許可的問題。爭議點包括：梅先生的上訴是否符合《香港終審法院條例》第22(1)(a)條所訂明的「當然權利」上訴要求，即涉及款額或價值達1,000,000港元或以上的民事權利；以及是否符合第22(1)(b)條所訂明的「具有重大廣泛的或關乎公眾的重要性的問題」的酌情許可要求。答辯人一方就第22(1)(a)條的適用性提出不同意見，並要求梅先生繳存保證金作為上訴條件。 ### 判決理由 上訴法庭分析了《香港終審法院條例》第22(1)(a)條及第22(1)(b)條的規定。法庭認為梅先生的上訴直接涉及兩個物業的即時享用權，其市價均超過1,000,000港元，因此符合第22(1)(a)條所訂明的「當然權利」上訴要求。法庭區分了本案與 China Field Ltd v Building Appeal Tribunal (No.1) 一案的情況，指出本案中答辯人並未強調需要先向遺囑執行人申索。然而，法庭認為梅先生的上訴不符合第22(1)(b)條關於「重大廣泛的或關乎公眾的重要性的問題」的要求。根據第23(2)條，既然上訴符合當然權利的要求，法庭不得拒絕給予上訴許可，但可根據第25條要求繳存保證金。 ### 引用案例與條文 China Field Ltd v Building Appeal Tribunal (No.1) [2009] 12 HKCFAR 68：本案引用此案例，以區分其與梅先生上訴情況的不同。該案例指出，即使訴訟成功，若仍需先向第三方申索才能獲得經濟利益，則可能不符合《香港終審法院條例》第22(1)(a)條的「當然權利」上訴要求。然而，本案法庭認為梅先生的上訴直接涉及物業享用權，與該案例情況不同。 本案亦依據《香港法例》第484章《香港終審法院條例》第22(1)(a)、22(1)(b)、23(2)及25條作出判決。 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭批准梅先生向終審法院提出上訴的許可申請，但設有條件。梅先生須於三個月內繳存兩筆各250,000港元的保證金予法庭，分別支付予兩組答辯人。梅先生亦須在繳存保證金後三星期內製備有關紀錄。若梅先生未能符合繳存保證金的條件，則本申請的訟費須由梅先生支付給答辯人。 ### 判決啟示 本案強調了《香港終審法院條例》第22(1)(a)條「當然權利」上訴的適用性，即使在涉及物業權益而非直接金錢申索的情況下，只要物業價值達到法定門檻，仍可構成當然權利。同時，法庭在給予當然權利上訴許可時，仍有權根據第25條要求上訴人繳存保證金，以保障答辯人的訟費，這對未來類似的終審上訴許可申請具有指導意義。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: Tarm Mei Kam and Mui Kai Ming v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and Others - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Hon Cheung JA, Hon Kwan JA, Hon Chu JA - Date of Judgment: 24 September 2012 ### Factual Background This case originated from an appeal by Ms. Tarm Mei Kam and Mr. Mui Kai Ming (the plaintiffs) to the Court of Appeal against the striking out of their claims by the Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal on 9 March 2012. Subsequently, Ms. Tarm and Mr. Mui applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. During the leave application process, Ms. Tarm was declared bankrupt due to unpaid legal fees, and her cause of action was transferred to her trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee decided to withdraw Ms. Tarm's leave application. This judgment primarily concerns Mr. Mui's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. ### Key Legal Issues The main issue was Mr. Mui's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The core questions were whether Mr. Mui's appeal met the requirements for an appeal as of right under Section 22(1)(a) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, specifically concerning a civil right involving an amount or value of HK$1,000,000 or more. Additionally, it was considered whether the appeal met the discretionary leave requirements under Section 22(1)(b) for questions of great general or public importance. The respondents held differing views on the applicability of Section 22(1)(a) and requested Mr. Mui to deposit security for costs. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Appeal analyzed the provisions of Sections 22(1)(a) and 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. The Court found that Mr. Mui's appeal directly involved the immediate right to enjoy two properties, both valued over HK$1,000,000, thus satisfying the 'appeal as of right' requirement under Section 22(1)(a). The Court distinguished this case from China Field Ltd v Building Appeal Tribunal (No.1), noting that in the present case, the respondents had not emphasized the need to first claim against the executor. However, the Court determined that Mr. Mui's appeal did not meet the 'great general or public importance' criteria under Section 22(1)(b). Pursuant to Section 23(2), since the appeal qualified as an appeal as of right, the Court could not refuse leave but could impose conditions under Section 25, such as requiring security for costs. ### Key Precedents & Statutes China Field Ltd v Building Appeal Tribunal (No.1) [2009] 12 HKCFAR 68: This case was cited to distinguish its circumstances from Mr. Mui's appeal. It suggested that if a successful claim still requires a prior claim against a third party to obtain immediate economic benefit, it might not qualify as an 'appeal as of right' under Section 22(1)(a) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. However, the Court in this case found Mr. Mui's appeal directly involved property enjoyment rights, differing from the cited precedent. The judgment also relied on Sections 22(1)(a), 22(1)(b), 23(2), and 25 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484). ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal granted Mr. Mui's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, subject to conditions. Mr. Mui must deposit two sums of HK$250,000 each as security for costs to the court within three months, payable to the two groups of respondents. He must also prepare the relevant record within three weeks after depositing the security. If Mr. Mui fails to meet the security for costs condition, the costs of this application will be paid by him to the respondents. ### Key Takeaways This judgment highlights the applicability of Section 22(1)(a) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance for 'appeal as of right,' even when the claim involves property interests rather than direct monetary claims, provided the property value meets the statutory threshold. It also affirms the Court's power under Section 25 to require security for costs when granting leave for an appeal as of right, safeguarding respondents' legal expenses. This provides guidance for similar future applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.