司法覆核延期申請被拒是否可自動上訴？上訴駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：KWOK CHEUK KIN v LEUNG CHUN YING AND MI v PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR SECURTIY - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：張舉能首席法官、林文瀚副庭長、關淑馨上訴法庭法官 - 判決日期：2018年7月23日 ### 案情摘要 本案涉及兩宗司法覆核申請上訴，兩宗案件均因申請人未能在《高等法院規則》第53號命令第4條(1)款規定的三個月期限內提出申請，而需申請延期。在CACV 110/2017一案中，郭卓堅先生（Kwok Cheuk Kin）申請司法覆核前行政長官梁振英先生於2012年就職時的宣誓，但其申請已嚴重逾期。在CACV 162/2017一案中，申請人MI和IYW就保安局常任秘書長於2015年6月10日拒絕撤銷針對第一申請人的遞解離境令提出司法覆核申請，同樣超出三個月期限。兩案的原審法官均拒絕批予延期，並駁回司法覆核許可申請。本上訴法庭需處理的共同初步法律爭議是，申請人是否可自動上訴，抑或必須先取得上訴許可。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案的核心法律爭議在於，當原審法官拒絕批予司法覆核申請的延期時，申請人是否有權自動上訴，還是必須根據《高等法院規則》第59號命令第2B條取得上訴許可。申請人一方認為，拒絕延期與拒絕司法覆核許可的決定是複合的，應視為拒絕許可，因此可自動上訴。答辯人一方則認為，拒絕延期是一個獨立的決定，屬於中間命令 (interlocutory order)，故須取得上訴許可。 ### 判決理由 上訴法庭裁定，根據《高等法院條例》第21K條及《高等法院規則》第53號命令第4條(1)款，延期申請與司法覆核許可申請是兩個獨立的步驟。法庭必須先處理延期申請，若不批予延期，則無法繼續審議許可申請。拒絕延期是一個中間命令，不屬於《高等法院規則》第59號命令第21條(1)(g)款所列的自動上訴情況。因此，根據《高等法院條例》第14AA條，上訴人必須取得上訴許可才能上訴。法庭進一步指出，原審法官在拒絕延期時的自由裁量權，除非有法律錯誤或明顯錯誤，否則上訴法庭不會干預。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了多個案例來支持其裁決，包括： - Reg v Dairy Tribunal Ex p Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738：確立了延期與許可申請的獨立性。 - Reg v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex p A [1999] 2 AC 330：重申即使有充分理由延期，仍可拒絕許可。 - Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676：確立了合理可爭辯性測試。 - Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Yeung Wai Man Kiu Yip Co Ltd (2003) 6 HKCFAR 222 及 Hip Hing Timber Co Ltd v Tang Man Kit (2004) 7 HKCFAR 212：用於判斷命令是否為中間性質。 - BI v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKLRD 520：提供了處理延期申請的程序指引。 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭拒絕批予兩宗案件的上訴許可，並駁回兩宗上訴。法庭命令郭卓堅先生支付梁振英先生在上訴中的訟費，包括2017年7月28日傳票及2018年6月8日聆訊的訟費。MI和IYW亦須支付保安局常任秘書長在上訴中的訟費，包括2017年8月8日傳票及2018年6月8日聆訊的訟費。 ### 判決啟示 本判決澄清了司法覆核申請中延期申請與許可申請的法律性質和上訴權利。它強調，拒絕延期是一個獨立的中間命令，上訴人必須獲得上訴許可才能對此類決定提出上訴。這對未來處理逾期司法覆核申請具有重要指導意義，確保了司法程序的效率和確定性，同時也重申了上訴法庭對原審法官自由裁量權的尊重原則。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: KWOK CHEUK KIN v LEUNG CHUN YING AND MI v PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR SECURTIY - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Cheung CJHC, Lam VP, Kwan JA - Date of Judgment: 23 July 2018 ### Factual Background This judgment concerns two appeals against the refusal of leave to apply for judicial review, where both applicants had failed to bring their applications within the three-month period stipulated by Order 53 Rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court. In CACV 110/2017, Mr. Kwok Cheuk Kin sought judicial review of the oath taken by former Chief Executive Mr. CY Leung in 2012, but his application was grossly out of time. In CACV 162/2017, applicants MI and IYW sought judicial review of the Permanent Secretary for Security's decision in 2015 to refuse to rescind a deportation order against the 1st applicant, also outside the three-month period. The judges at first instance refused to grant extensions of time and dismissed the applications for leave to apply for judicial review. The common preliminary issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the applicants could appeal as of right or only with leave to appeal. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal question in dispute was whether an applicant has an automatic right of appeal when a judge refuses to grant an extension of time for a judicial review application, or if leave to appeal is required under Order 59 Rule 2B. The applicants argued that the refusal of extension of time and refusal of leave were composite, thus allowing an appeal as of right. The respondents contended that the refusal of extension of time was a discrete, interlocutory order, requiring leave to appeal. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Appeal held that, under Section 21K of the High Court Ordinance and Order 53 Rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, the application for extension of time and the application for leave to apply for judicial review are two discrete steps. The court must first address the extension of time; without it, the leave application cannot be entertained. A refusal of extension of time is an interlocutory order and does not fall under the exceptions in Order 59 Rule 21(1)(g) for appeals as of right. Therefore, leave to appeal is required under Section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance. The court further emphasized that the first instance judge's exercise of discretion in refusing an extension of time would not be disturbed unless there was an error of law or principle, or the decision was clearly wrong. ### Key Precedents & Statutes The judgment cited several precedents to support its decision, including: - Reg v Dairy Tribunal Ex p Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738: Established the discrete nature of extension of time and leave applications. - Reg v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex p A [1999] 2 AC 330: Reaffirmed that leave may still be refused even if good reason for extension of time is shown. - Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676: Established the reasonably arguable test. - Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Yeung Wai Man Kiu Yip Co Ltd (2003) 6 HKCFAR 222 and Hip Hing Timber Co Ltd v Tang Man Kit (2004) 7 HKCFAR 212: Used for determining the interlocutory nature of an order. - BI v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKLRD 520: Provided guidance on procedural options for extension of time applications. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal in both cases and dismissed both appeals. Mr. Kwok Cheuk Kin was ordered to pay Mr. Leung Chun Ying's costs in the appeal, including costs of and incidental to the summons of 28 July 2017 and the hearing on 8 June 2018. MI and IYW were also ordered to pay the Permanent Secretary for Security's costs in the appeal, including costs of and incidental to the summons of 8 August 2017 and the hearing on 8 June 2018. ### Key Takeaways This judgment clarifies the legal nature of extension of time applications versus leave applications in judicial review proceedings and the right to appeal. It emphasizes that a refusal of an extension of time is a discrete interlocutory order, requiring leave to appeal. This has significant implications for future handling of out-of-time judicial review applications, ensuring procedural efficiency and certainty, while also reaffirming the appellate court's deference to the first instance judge's exercise of discretion. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.