未傳召證人是否構成不利推論？上訴駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：AGEAS INSURANCE COMPANY (ASIA) LIMITED (前稱 FORTIS INSURANCE COMPANY (ASIA) LIMITED) 訴 LAM HAU WAH INNEO - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：林文瀚副庭長、關淑馨上訴法官、鮑晏明上訴法官 - 判決日期：2015年5月19日 ### 案情摘要 本案源於被告就高等法院原訟法庭法官朱芬齡（當時的職稱）在為期十天的審訊後作出的判決提出上訴，該上訴已於2015年1月9日被上訴法庭駁回。被告現向終審法院申請上訴許可，理由是擬議上訴涉及「具有重大普遍重要性」的法律問題，並要求根據「其他理由」授予許可。被告提出的主要法律問題是關於在何種情況下，法院會因一方未能傳召關鍵證人作證而作出不利推論 (adverse inference)。原審法官接納原告的解釋，即其前行政總裁楊先生（Andrew Yang）離職時與公司關係不睦，且因多項違反受信責任 (breach of fiduciary duty) 而被原告起訴，因此原告不願傳召楊先生作證是可理解的，並拒絕作出不利推論。 ### 核心法律爭議 被告申請上訴許可，主要爭議點在於： 1. 關於未能傳召關鍵證人作證時，何種情況構成「可信的解釋」(credible explanation)，特別是證人「不願」作證而非「不能」作證是否構成充分解釋，以避免法院作出不利推論。 2. 案件是否涉及「具有重大普遍重要性」的法律問題，或存在「其他理由」應獲准上訴至終審法院。 ### 判決理由 上訴法庭認為，被告提出的關於不利推論的問題，雖然在原審時曾提出，但在上訴法庭階段並未被追究。根據終審法院的既定實踐，對於未在上訴法庭階段追究的新論點，通常不會授予上訴許可，除非存在「非常特殊情況」(very exceptional circumstances)。法庭亦指出，該問題本質上是事實敏感的，且屬於原審法官的事實裁斷，不構成法律問題。此外，被告未能解釋為何未傳召或傳喚楊先生作證，因此難以質疑原審法官不作出不利推論的決定。至於「其他理由」的上訴許可申請，上訴法庭亦傾向將此類決定留待終審法院上訴委員會處理。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了終審法院在 Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356 一案中，包致金常任法官關於「未經中級上訴法院審議」的論點，強調除非有非常特殊情況，終審法院不應審議未經上訴法庭充分審議的議題。此外，亦提及 Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai & Another (No 2) (1997–98) 1 HKCFAR 55 和 Ahamath v Sariffa Umma [1931] AC 799 等案例，以支持此原則。本案未有特別引用。 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭駁回被告向上訴法庭申請上訴至終審法院的許可申請，並命令被告須支付原告的訟費。法庭將是否授予終審法院上訴許可的決定，留待終審法院上訴委員會處理。 ### 判決啟示 本判決重申了香港終審法院上訴許可申請的慣例，即對於未經上訴法庭充分審議的論點，終審法院通常不會受理，除非存在非常特殊情況。這強調了在各級法院審理案件時，應全面提出並追究所有論點的重要性。此外，判決也指出，關於是否作出不利推論的問題，往往是事實敏感的，屬於原審法官的事實裁斷，而非法律問題。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: AGEAS INSURANCE COMPANY (ASIA) LIMITED (formerly known as FORTIS INSURANCE COMPANY (ASIA) LIMITED) v LAM HAU WAH INNEO - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Hon Lam VP, Kwan JA, Barma JA - Date of Judgment: 19 May 2015 ### Factual Background This case concerns the defendant's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, following the Court of Appeal's dismissal on 9 January 2015 of his appeal against a judgment by Deputy High Court Judge Chu (as she then was) after a ten-day trial. The defendant seeks leave on the ground that the intended appeal involves a question of "great general or public importance" and also under the "or otherwise" limb. The core legal question raised by the defendant is what circumstances constitute a credible explanation for failing to call a material witness, particularly whether a witness's perceived unwillingness (as opposed to inability) to testify is a sufficient explanation. The trial judge accepted the plaintiff's explanation that its former CEO, Andrew Yang, had left employment on acrimonious terms and was sued for breaches of fiduciary duty, making it understandable that the plaintiff did not wish to call him, and thus declined to draw an adverse inference. ### Key Legal Issues The defendant's application for leave to appeal primarily raised two issues: 1. What circumstances constitute a "credible explanation" for failing to call a material witness, especially whether a witness's perceived unwillingness (as opposed to inability) to give favourable evidence is a sufficient explanation to avoid an adverse inference. 2. Whether the case involves a question of "great general or public importance" or falls under the "or otherwise" limb to warrant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Appeal held that the issue concerning adverse inference, though raised at trial, was not pursued in the Court of Appeal. Following established practice of the Court of Final Appeal, leave to appeal is generally not granted for points not pursued in the intermediate appellate court, unless there are "very exceptional circumstances." The court also noted that the question was fact-sensitive and a matter of fact for the trial judge, not a question of law. Furthermore, the defendant offered no explanation for not calling or subpoenaing Yang, making it difficult to challenge the judge's decision not to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiff. Regarding the "or otherwise" limb, the Court of Appeal preferred to leave such decisions to the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal. ### Key Precedents & Statutes The judgment cited Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356, where Bokhary PJ discussed the "not considered on intermediate appeal" hurdle, emphasizing that the Court of Final Appeal should be reluctant to consider issues not duly raised and considered in the Court of Appeal, except in very exceptional circumstances. Other cases like Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai & Another (No 2) (1997–98) 1 HKCFAR 55 and Ahamath v Sariffa Umma [1931] AC 799 were also referenced to support this principle. None prominently cited. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs. The decision on whether to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was left to the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal. ### Key Takeaways This judgment reinforces the practice in Hong Kong regarding applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal: points not fully pursued in the Court of Appeal will generally not be entertained by the Court of Final Appeal unless there are very exceptional circumstances. This highlights the importance of fully presenting and pursuing all arguments at each level of the court system. Additionally, it clarifies that the question of drawing an adverse inference is often fact-sensitive and a matter for the trial judge's factual findings, rather than a question of law. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.