訟費命令是否可依「筆誤原則」更改？申請駁回

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：TO PUI KUI, the Administratrix of the estate of NG PO SUM, deceased v NG KWOK PIU and Others - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：關淑馨副庭長、鮑馬漢上訴法官 - 判決日期：2023年9月28日 ### 案情摘要 本案源於一個家族公司股權分配的爭議，涉及原告（已故丈夫的遺產管理人）與其八名子女。家族成員分為兩派：「母親陣營」（原告、第二、三、六及八被告）和「Philip陣營」（第一、四、五、七及九被告）。初審時，法庭裁定「母親陣營」在股份轉讓文件偽造問題上勝訴，但在股份配發決議偽造問題上敗訴。上訴法庭推翻了股份轉讓文件的裁決，並維持了股份配發決議的裁決。其後，上訴法庭於2016年3月2日頒布了一項訟費命令（「2016年3月訟費命令」），命令原告及「母親陣營」的被告支付「Philip陣營」75%的初審訟費。第二被告於六年多後申請更改該命令。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案的核心法律爭議是，上訴法庭是否有權根據「筆誤原則」(slip rule) 或其固有司法管轄權 (inherent jurisdiction)，更改其於2016年3月頒布的訟費命令，以豁免第二被告支付初審訟費。第二被告主張該命令將其納入支付訟費範圍是無心之失，因為法庭此前未曾表明會對「母親陣營」作出不利的訟費命令。Philip陣營則認為「筆誤原則」不適用，因為2016年3月訟費命令清晰地反映了法庭當時的意圖，且第二被告延遲申請構成偏見。 ### 判決理由 法庭分析指出，「筆誤原則」或固有司法管轄權僅適用於糾正判決或命令中表達法庭「明顯意圖」(manifest intention) 的錯誤，而非糾正法庭決定本身的錯誤。法庭認為，2016年3月訟費命令準確地記錄了法庭當時的意圖，即命令原告及「母親陣營」的被告支付訟費。即使該意圖是錯誤的，也應透過上訴而非依賴「筆誤原則」來糾正。法庭強調，其在訟費方面的酌情權廣泛，不受各方立場限制，且初審中「母親陣營」的被告積極參與，與上訴階段的角色不同。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了以下案例，確立了「筆誤原則」的適用範圍： - Lo Yuen Chong v IWS Environmental Technologies Limited [2021] HKCA 89：總結了《高等法院規則》命令20第11條（「筆誤原則」）的適用原則。 - Skink Ltd (in liquidation) v Comtowell Ltd [1998] 1 HKLRD 542：闡明法庭固有權力僅限於糾正表達意圖的錯誤，而非糾正法庭本身的錯誤。 - Li Tze Cho v Ching Hua Co (H.K.) Ltd (No. 3) [1961] HKLR 201 - MKKWH (also known as MKGWH) v RKSH [2018] HKCA 395 - Bank of China v Xinyuan Trading Co Ltd (CACV 276/1998, 21 June 2000) - R v Cripps, ex parte Muldoon [1984] QB 68 - Man Ping Nam & another v Man Fong Hang (No. 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 140 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭駁回了第二被告要求更改2016年3月訟費命令的申請。法庭命令第二被告向「Philip陣營」（即第一、四、五、七及九被告）支付港幣200,000元的訟費，作為本次申請的總額評定訟費。 ### 判決啟示 本案重申了「筆誤原則」和固有司法管轄權的嚴格限制，即它們僅用於糾正命令中表達法庭意圖的錯誤，而非糾正法庭決定本身的錯誤。若當事人認為法庭的決定有誤，正確的途徑是提出上訴，而非在多年後試圖通過「筆誤原則」來規避上訴期限。此判決強調了及時上訴的重要性，以及法庭在訟費問題上的廣泛酌情權。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: TO PUI KUI, the Administratrix of the estate of NG PO SUM, deceased v NG KWOK PIU and Others - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Hon Kwan VP and Barma JA - Date of Judgment: 28 September 2023 ### Factual Background This case originated from a family dispute concerning the distribution of shareholdings in a family company, involving the plaintiff (administratrix of her late husband's estate) and her eight children. The family was divided into two camps: "Mother's Camp" (the plaintiff, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th defendants) and "Philip's Camp" (1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 9th defendants). At trial, the court found in favour of Mother's Camp on the Share Transfer Issue but in favour of Philip's Camp on the Allotment Issue. The Court of Appeal subsequently allowed Philip's Camp's appeal on the Share Transfer Issue and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on the Allotment Issue. Later, on 2 March 2016, the Court of Appeal made a costs order ("the March 2016 Costs Order") directing the plaintiff and the "unsuccessful defendants" (Mother's Camp) to pay 75% of Philip's Camp's trial costs. The 2nd defendant applied more than six years later to vary this order. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal question was whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under the "slip rule" or its inherent jurisdiction to vary its March 2016 Costs Order to exempt the 2nd defendant from paying trial costs. The 2nd defendant argued that her inclusion in the costs order was an accidental slip, as the court had not previously indicated it would make an adverse costs order against Mother's Camp. Philip's Camp contended that the slip rule was not engaged, as the March 2016 Costs Order clearly reflected the court's intention, and the 2nd defendant's delay in applying caused prejudice. ### Ratio Decidendi The court's analysis focused on the principle that the "slip rule" or inherent jurisdiction applies only to correct errors in expressing the court's "manifest intention," not to correct a mistake in the court's decision itself. The court found that the March 2016 Costs Order accurately recorded the court's intention to order the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendants to pay costs. Even if that intention was mistaken, the proper recourse was an appeal, not an application under the slip rule. The court emphasized its wide discretion in costs matters, which is not limited by the parties' positions, and noted the active role of the unsuccessful defendants at trial, distinguishing it from their role on appeal. ### Key Precedents & Statutes This case cited the following precedents to establish the scope of the "slip rule": - Lo Yuen Chong v IWS Environmental Technologies Limited [2021] HKCA 89: Summarized the principles governing the application of the "slip rule" under RHC Order 20 rule 11. - Skink Ltd (in liquidation) v Comtowell Ltd [1998] 1 HKLRD 542: Clarified that the court's inherent power is limited to correcting errors in expressing its intention, not correcting its own mistakes. - Li Tze Cho v Ching Hua Co (H.K.) Ltd (No. 3) [1961] HKLR 201 - MKKWH (also known as MKGWH) v RKSH [2018] HKCA 395 - Bank of China v Xinyuan Trading Co Ltd (CACV 276/1998, 21 June 2000) - R v Cripps, ex parte Muldoon [1984] QB 68 - Man Ping Nam & another v Man Fong Hang (No. 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 140 ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal dismissed the 2nd defendant's application to vary the March 2016 Costs Order. The court ordered the 2nd defendant to pay HK$200,000 to Philip's Camp (i.e., the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 9th defendants) as summarily assessed costs for this application. ### Key Takeaways This judgment reaffirms the strict limitations of the "slip rule" and inherent jurisdiction, which are only for correcting errors in expressing the court's intention, not for rectifying mistakes in the court's decision itself. If a party believes the court's decision was wrong, the proper course is to appeal, rather than attempting to circumvent the appeal period years later via the slip rule. The decision underscores the importance of timely appeals and the court's broad discretion in costs matters. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.