案件基本資料
- 案件名稱:Ng Siu Tung 及其他人 訴 入境事務處處長
- 法院:香港終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA)
- 法官:李國能首席法官、包致金常任法官、陳兆愷常任法官、李義常任法官、梅師賢非常任法官
- 判決日期:2002年1月10日
案情摘要
本案上訴人(申請人)均為內地出生、父母至少一方為香港永久居民的中國公民,他們聲稱根據《基本法》第24(2)(3)條享有香港居留權。他們尋求法院裁定,即使全國人民代表大會常務委員會(「全國人大常委會」)於1999年6月26日對《基本法》第22(4)條和第24(2)(3)條作出解釋(「《解釋》」),他們仍有權享有居留權。該《解釋》實際上取代了終審法院在吳嘉玲案和陳錦雅案中對相關條文的解釋。申請人亦要求撤銷入境事務處處長作出的多項決定,包括根據《入境條例》(香港法例第115章)第19條發出的遣送離境令。他們主要基於五個理由提出申索,包括已作出的判決不受影響原則、合法期望、程序濫用、以及入境時間點(第1及第2時期)和「酌情處理政策」的影響。
核心法律爭議
本案主要法律爭議點有五個:
- 《基本法》第158(3)條中「已作出的判決不受影響」的真正涵義,以及該原則是否適用於本案申請人,使其居留權不受《解釋》影響。
- 申請人是否因政府的公開聲明及吳嘉玲案和陳錦雅案的「測試案件」性質而產生合法期望,應獲得與該兩案當事人相同的待遇。
- 入境事務處處長執行遣送離境令是否構成程序濫用。
- 於1997年7月1日前或1997年7月1日至7月10日期間抵港的申請人,是否不受《基本法》第22(4)條及《解釋》的影響。
- 於1999年1月29日前抵港的申請人,是否對政府的「酌情處理政策」有合法期望。
判決理由
終審法院裁定,《基本法》第158(3)條中「已作出的判決不受影響」原則僅適用於吳嘉玲案和陳錦雅案的實際當事人。然而,法院認為政府官員的公開聲明以及法律援助署的特定回覆,確實對特定類別的申請人產生了合法期望,即他們將獲得與「測試案件」當事人相同的待遇。儘管《解釋》導致無法完全實現這些期望,但入境事務處處長仍有權根據《入境條例》第11、13及19(1)條行使酌情權,允許這些特定申請人留港。法院強調,處長在行使酌情權時,必須充分考慮這些合法期望所帶來的不公平。對於在1997年7月1日前抵港的A組申請人(父母一方已是永久居民),法院裁定他們不受《基本法》第22(4)條影響,有權核實居留權。至於「程序濫用」論點,法院認為遣送離境令的發出屬於行政權力行使,而非司法程序的一部分,故不構成程序濫用。對於「酌情處理政策」,法院認為處長對政策的解釋並無錯誤,但對「申索」的定義過於嚴格,應以實質內容判斷。
引用案例與條文
- Ng Ka Ling & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4: 確立了《基本法》第24(2)(3)條的解釋,並裁定《入境條例》部分條文違憲。
- Chan Kam Nga & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82: 裁定《基本法》第24(2)(3)條適用於在父母一方成為永久居民前後出生的中國公民。
- Lau Kong Yung & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300: 確立全國人大常委會的《解釋》對香港法院具有約束力。
- R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622: 確立了實質性合法期望原則,即行政機關若不履行承諾可能構成權力濫用。
- Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629: 確立了公共機關受其程序承諾約束的原則。
- R v. Hertfordshire County Council, Ex parte Cheung, The Times, 4 April 1986: 討論了「測試案件」在公法領域的影響,指出類似情況者不應被要求另行提起訴訟。
- R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Bajram Zeqiri [2001] EWCA Civ 342: 重申了「測試案件」的原則,即等待結果者有合法期望獲得相同待遇。
裁決與命令
法院裁定:
- 羅寶麗女士(RA3)的上訴獲准,其遣送離境令被撤銷,並宣告她為香港永久居民。
- 陳基銳先生(RA11)的上訴獲准,其遣送離境令被撤銷,入境事務處處長須重新考慮根據《入境條例》第11、13及19(1)條行使酌情權。
- 袁志偉先生(RA13)的上訴獲准,其遣送離境令被撤銷,入境事務處處長須重新考慮根據《入境條例》第11、13及19(1)條行使酌情權。
- 李淑芬女士(HCAL2/2000)的上訴獲准,並宣告她符合「酌情處理政策」。
- 其他代表申請人的上訴被駁回。
- 訟費方面,申請人自己的訟費將根據法律援助規例評定,本案不作其他訟費命令。
判決啟示
本案確認了全國人大常委會對《基本法》的解釋對香港法院具有約束力,但同時強調了「已作出的判決不受影響」原則對特定當事人的保護。判決詳細闡述了合法期望原則在香港行政法中的應用,特別是在政府政策變更時,行政機關仍需考慮因其承諾而產生的合法期望。法院區分了普遍性聲明和特定性聲明所產生的合法期望強度,並指出在特定情況下,即使無法完全實現期望,行政機關仍有責任在法律允許範圍內行使酌情權以減輕不公平。此外,判決澄清了「測試案件」的影響,以及在「酌情處理政策」下,對「申索」的判斷應以實質內容為準,而非過於嚴格的形式要求。包致金常任法官的異議意見,主張「已作出的判決不受影響」原則應更廣泛地適用於所有符合條件的居留權申請人,並對合法期望原則的適用範圍有更寬鬆的看法,這為未來相關案件的發展提供了潛在方向。
免責聲明
本摘要由人工智能自動生成,內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏,僅供參考,不構成法律意見。如需法律建議,請諮詢合資格律師。
### 案件基本資料
- 案件名稱:Ng Siu Tung 及其他人 訴 入境事務處處長
- 法院:香港終審法院 (Court of Final Appeal, CFA)
- 法官:李國能首席法官、包致金常任法官、陳兆愷常任法官、李義常任法官、梅師賢非常任法官
- 判決日期:2002年1月10日
### 案情摘要
本案上訴人(申請人)均為內地出生、父母至少一方為香港永久居民的中國公民,他們聲稱根據《基本法》第24(2)(3)條享有香港居留權。他們尋求法院裁定,即使全國人民代表大會常務委員會(「全國人大常委會」)於1999年6月26日對《基本法》第22(4)條和第24(2)(3)條作出解釋(「《解釋》」),他們仍有權享有居留權。該《解釋》實際上取代了終審法院在吳嘉玲案和陳錦雅案中對相關條文的解釋。申請人亦要求撤銷入境事務處處長作出的多項決定,包括根據《入境條例》(香港法例第115章)第19條發出的遣送離境令。他們主要基於五個理由提出申索,包括已作出的判決不受影響原則、合法期望、程序濫用、以及入境時間點(第1及第2時期)和「酌情處理政策」的影響。
### 核心法律爭議
本案主要法律爭議點有五個:
1. 《基本法》第158(3)條中「已作出的判決不受影響」的真正涵義,以及該原則是否適用於本案申請人,使其居留權不受《解釋》影響。
2. 申請人是否因政府的公開聲明及吳嘉玲案和陳錦雅案的「測試案件」性質而產生合法期望,應獲得與該兩案當事人相同的待遇。
3. 入境事務處處長執行遣送離境令是否構成程序濫用。
4. 於1997年7月1日前或1997年7月1日至7月10日期間抵港的申請人,是否不受《基本法》第22(4)條及《解釋》的影響。
5. 於1999年1月29日前抵港的申請人,是否對政府的「酌情處理政策」有合法期望。
### 判決理由
終審法院裁定,《基本法》第158(3)條中「已作出的判決不受影響」原則僅適用於吳嘉玲案和陳錦雅案的實際當事人。然而,法院認為政府官員的公開聲明以及法律援助署的特定回覆,確實對特定類別的申請人產生了合法期望,即他們將獲得與「測試案件」當事人相同的待遇。儘管《解釋》導致無法完全實現這些期望,但入境事務處處長仍有權根據《入境條例》第11、13及19(1)條行使酌情權,允許這些特定申請人留港。法院強調,處長在行使酌情權時,必須充分考慮這些合法期望所帶來的不公平。對於在1997年7月1日前抵港的A組申請人(父母一方已是永久居民),法院裁定他們不受《基本法》第22(4)條影響,有權核實居留權。至於「程序濫用」論點,法院認為遣送離境令的發出屬於行政權力行使,而非司法程序的一部分,故不構成程序濫用。對於「酌情處理政策」,法院認為處長對政策的解釋並無錯誤,但對「申索」的定義過於嚴格,應以實質內容判斷。
### 引用案例與條文
- Ng Ka Ling & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4: 確立了《基本法》第24(2)(3)條的解釋,並裁定《入境條例》部分條文違憲。
- Chan Kam Nga & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82: 裁定《基本法》第24(2)(3)條適用於在父母一方成為永久居民前後出生的中國公民。
- Lau Kong Yung & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300: 確立全國人大常委會的《解釋》對香港法院具有約束力。
- R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622: 確立了實質性合法期望原則,即行政機關若不履行承諾可能構成權力濫用。
- Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629: 確立了公共機關受其程序承諾約束的原則。
- R v. Hertfordshire County Council, Ex parte Cheung, The Times, 4 April 1986: 討論了「測試案件」在公法領域的影響,指出類似情況者不應被要求另行提起訴訟。
- R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Bajram Zeqiri [2001] EWCA Civ 342: 重申了「測試案件」的原則,即等待結果者有合法期望獲得相同待遇。
### 裁決與命令
法院裁定:
- 羅寶麗女士(RA3)的上訴獲准,其遣送離境令被撤銷,並宣告她為香港永久居民。
- 陳基銳先生(RA11)的上訴獲准,其遣送離境令被撤銷,入境事務處處長須重新考慮根據《入境條例》第11、13及19(1)條行使酌情權。
- 袁志偉先生(RA13)的上訴獲准,其遣送離境令被撤銷,入境事務處處長須重新考慮根據《入境條例》第11、13及19(1)條行使酌情權。
- 李淑芬女士(HCAL2/2000)的上訴獲准,並宣告她符合「酌情處理政策」。
- 其他代表申請人的上訴被駁回。
- 訟費方面,申請人自己的訟費將根據法律援助規例評定,本案不作其他訟費命令。
### 判決啟示
本案確認了全國人大常委會對《基本法》的解釋對香港法院具有約束力,但同時強調了「已作出的判決不受影響」原則對特定當事人的保護。判決詳細闡述了合法期望原則在香港行政法中的應用,特別是在政府政策變更時,行政機關仍需考慮因其承諾而產生的合法期望。法院區分了普遍性聲明和特定性聲明所產生的合法期望強度,並指出在特定情況下,即使無法完全實現期望,行政機關仍有責任在法律允許範圍內行使酌情權以減輕不公平。此外,判決澄清了「測試案件」的影響,以及在「酌情處理政策」下,對「申索」的判斷應以實質內容為準,而非過於嚴格的形式要求。包致金常任法官的異議意見,主張「已作出的判決不受影響」原則應更廣泛地適用於所有符合條件的居留權申請人,並對合法期望原則的適用範圍有更寬鬆的看法,這為未來相關案件的發展提供了潛在方向。
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### 免責聲明
本摘要由人工智能自動生成,內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏,僅供參考,不構成法律意見。如需法律建議,請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details
- Case Name: Ng Siu Tung and Others v. The Director of Immigration
- Court: Court of Final Appeal (CFA)
- Judge: Chief Justice Li, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Chan PJ, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ and Sir Anthony Mason NPJ
- Date of Judgment: 10 January 2002
### Factual Background
The appellants (applicants) in this case are Chinese nationals born in Mainland China, with at least one parent being a Hong Kong permanent resident, claiming the right of abode under Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law. They sought a determination that they are entitled to the right of abode, notwithstanding the Interpretation issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) on 26 June 1999, which effectively displaced the Court of Final Appeal's interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) in the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases. The applicants also sought to quash various decisions of the Director of Immigration, including removal orders made under section 19 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115). Their case was based on five grounds: the "judgments previously rendered" issue, legitimate expectation, abuse of process, the "Periods 1 and 2" issue (arrival times), and the "Concession" issue.
### Key Legal Issues
The core legal questions in dispute were five-fold:
1. The true construction of "judgments previously rendered shall not be affected" in Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, and whether it applies to the applicants, protecting their right of abode from the NPCSC Interpretation.
2. Whether the applicants had a legitimate expectation, arising from public statements by the government and the "test case" nature of the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga litigation, to receive the same treatment as the parties in those cases.
3. Whether the Director of Immigration's execution of removal orders constituted an abuse of process.
4. Whether applicants who arrived in Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 or between 1 July and 10 July 1997 were unaffected by Article 22(4) of the Basic Law and the Interpretation.
5. Whether applicants who arrived before 29 January 1999 had a legitimate expectation regarding the government's "Concession" policy.
### Ratio Decidendi
The CFA ruled that the principle "judgments previously rendered shall not be affected" in Article 158(3) applied only to the actual parties in the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases. However, the Court found that public statements by government officials and specific replies from the Legal Aid Department did create a legitimate expectation for certain classes of applicants to be treated similarly to the "test case" parties. While the Interpretation prevented full realization of these expectations, the Director of Immigration retained discretionary powers under sections 11, 13, and 19(1) of the Immigration Ordinance to allow these specific applicants to remain in Hong Kong. The Court emphasized that the Director must give substantial weight to the unfairness caused by disappointing these legitimate expectations when exercising discretion. For Group A applicants (born after one parent became a permanent resident) who arrived before 1 July 1997, the Court held they were not subject to Article 22(4) and were entitled to have their right of abode verified. The "abuse of process" argument failed as removal orders were deemed an exercise of administrative power, not part of the curial process. Regarding the "Concession" policy, the Director's interpretation was largely upheld, but his application of what constituted a "claim" was found to be too strict, requiring a substantive assessment.
### Key Precedents & Statutes
- Ng Ka Ling & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4: Established interpretation of Basic Law Article 24(2)(3) and found parts of the Immigration Ordinance unconstitutional.
- Chan Kam Nga & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82: Ruled that Basic Law Article 24(2)(3) applied to Chinese nationals born before or after one parent acquired permanent resident status.
- Lau Kong Yung & others v. The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300: Affirmed the binding nature of the NPCSC Interpretation on Hong Kong courts.
- R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622: Established the principle of substantive legitimate expectation, where failure to honour a promise may constitute an abuse of power.
- Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629: Established that a public authority is bound by its undertakings regarding procedure.
- R v. Hertfordshire County Council, Ex parte Cheung, The Times, 4 April 1986: Discussed the effect of "test cases" in public law, suggesting that others in similar positions should not be expected to initiate separate proceedings.
- R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Bajram Zeqiri [2001] EWCA Civ 342: Reaffirmed the principle of "test cases" and the legitimate expectation of similar treatment for those awaiting results.
### Decision & Orders
The Court ordered:
- Ms Lo Po Lai (RA3)'s appeal was allowed; her removal order was quashed, and she was declared a permanent resident of Hong Kong.
- Mr Chan Kei Yui (RA11)'s appeal was allowed; his removal order was quashed, and the Director of Immigration was directed to reconsider exercising discretion under sections 11, 13, and 19(1) of the Immigration Ordinance.
- Mr Yuan Zhi Wei (RA13)'s appeal was allowed; his removal order was quashed, and the Director of Immigration was directed to reconsider exercising discretion under sections 11, 13, and 19(1) of the Immigration Ordinance.
- Ms Li Shuk Fan (HCAL2/2000)'s appeal was allowed, and she was declared to fall within the "Concession" policy.
- Appeals by other representative applicants were dismissed.
- No order as to costs was made, except for the taxation of the applicants' own costs in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.
### Key Takeaways
This judgment affirms the binding nature of NPCSC interpretations on Hong Kong courts but upholds the "judgments previously rendered" principle for specific parties. It significantly elaborates on the doctrine of legitimate expectation in Hong Kong administrative law, particularly when government policy changes. The Court distinguished between general and specific representations, noting that even if full expectation cannot be met, the administration must exercise discretion to mitigate unfairness. It clarified the impact of "test cases" and emphasized a substantive, rather than overly strict, approach to defining a "claim" under the "Concession" policy. Justice Bokhary's dissenting opinion, advocating for a broader application of the "judgments previously rendered" principle and a more expansive view of legitimate expectation, offers a potential direction for future related cases.
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### Disclaimer
This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.