地役權是否適用於多層大廈共同擁有土地？其他

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：KUNG MING TAK TONG CO. LTD v PARK SOLID ENTERPRISES LIMITED and INFO KING LIMITED - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：Le Pichon, Yuen JJA 及 Chu J - 判決日期：2007年6月20日 ### 案情摘要 原告人申請許可上訴至終審法院。本案背景涉及一宗關於地役權 (easement) 適用於共同擁有土地（包括多層建築物）的法律爭議。原告人此前在上訴法庭的論點是基於《Wheeldon v Burrows》規則下的默示授予通行權 (right of way)。上訴法庭已裁定，地役權概念不適用於共同擁有土地的多層建築物，該等建築物的共同業主只能透過公契 (deed of mutual covenant) 而非地役權來規管其專有使用區域的權利和義務。 ### 核心法律爭議 本案的核心法律爭議是原告人是否應獲准許上訴至終審法院，以提出一個新的法律論點，即在香港，關於地役權的法律（包括《Wheeldon v Burrows》原則）是否經必要修改後，類推適用於共同擁有的土地（包括多層建築物），以及在存在公契的情況下，默示條款（關於準地役權 (quasi-easements) 及類似權利）的檢驗標準是否低於「必要性」並與普通法中透過默示創設地役權的原則（包括不貶損授予原則 (non-derogation from grant)）相同。 ### 判決理由 上訴法庭拒絕授予上訴許可，主要理由是原告人提出的法律論點，即關於地役權法律類推適用於共同擁有土地的爭議，是一個新的論點，並未在上訴法庭的聆訊中提出或審議。法庭認為，在這種情況下，不宜由上訴法庭授予許可。至於該新論點是否具有重大普遍性或公共重要性，以及是否應允許原告人提出，應由終審法院自行決定。法庭亦重申，上訴許可申請失敗的訟費應遵循慣例，由敗訴方支付。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案引用了《Chiu Shu Choi v Merrilong Dyeing Works Ltd [1990] 1 HKLR 385》一案，該案確立了地役權概念不適用於共同擁有土地的多層建築物，共同業主應透過公契規管權利和義務。此判例對本上訴法庭具有約束力。 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭拒絕原告人根據《終審法院條例》第22(1)(b)條申請上訴至終審法院的許可，並命令原告人支付訟費。 ### 判決啟示 本判決強調，若申請人欲向終審法院提出新的法律論點，則應由終審法院自行決定是否允許提出該論點及該論點是否具有重大普遍性或公共重要性。上訴法庭不會為此授予上訴許可。此外，上訴許可申請失敗的訟費通常會判給勝訴方。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: KUNG MING TAK TONG CO. LTD v PARK SOLID ENTERPRISES LIMITED and INFO KING LIMITED - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Le Pichon, Yuen JJA and Chu J - Date of Judgment: 20 June 2007 ### Factual Background The plaintiff applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The background of the case involves a legal dispute concerning the applicability of easements to co-owned land, including multi-storey buildings. The plaintiff's argument before the Court of Appeal was based on an implied grant of a right of way under the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows. The Court of Appeal had previously held that the concept of easements does not apply to multi-storey buildings with co-owned land, where co-owners can only govern rights and obligations over the use of areas in their exclusive possession through covenants, not easements. ### Key Legal Issues The core legal issue was whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal to raise a new point of law: whether the law relating to easements in Hong Kong, including the doctrine of Wheeldon v Burrows, applies by analogy with necessary modification to co-owned land (including multi-storey buildings), and whether, in cases with a deed of mutual covenant, the test for any implied term (concerning quasi-easements and similar rights) is less than 'necessary' and the same as common law regarding creation of easements by implication, including the doctrine of non-derogation from grant. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal primarily because the legal point the plaintiff wished to raise, concerning the analogous application of easement law to co-owned land, was a new point not argued or considered during the Court of Appeal hearing. The court deemed it inappropriate for the Court of Appeal to grant leave under such circumstances. Whether the new point raised a matter of great general or public importance and whether the plaintiff should be allowed to take it were matters for the Court of Final Appeal itself to decide. The court also reiterated that costs for an unsuccessful leave application should follow the event. ### Key Precedents & Statutes The case cited Chiu Shu Choi v Merrilong Dyeing Works Ltd [1990] 1 HKLR 385, which held that the concept of easements does not apply to multi-storey buildings where owners have equal undivided shares in the land. Instead, such co-owners govern rights and obligations through deeds of mutual covenant. This decision was binding on the Court of Appeal. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal refused the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs. ### Key Takeaways This judgment highlights that if an applicant wishes to raise a new point of law before the Court of Final Appeal, it is for the Court of Final Appeal itself to decide whether to allow the new point and whether it is of great general or public importance. The Court of Appeal will not grant leave for this purpose. Furthermore, costs for an unsuccessful leave application typically follow the event. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.