上訴至終審法院的許可標準？其他

### 案件基本資料 - 案件名稱：Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling (the Administratrix of the estate of Tsang Kwong Lik Deceased) and Maryo Development Limited - 法院：高等法院上訴法庭 (Court of Appeal, CA) - 法官：Hon Cheung CJHC, Lam VP and Kwan JA - 判決日期：2014年11月14日 ### 案情摘要 本案源於原告Ho Sin Ying向上訴法庭申請許可，以就上訴法庭於2014年7月25日駁回其上訴的判決，向上訴法庭申請上訴至終審法院。上訴法庭在原審判決中維持了原訟法庭的裁決，即原告的訴訟因違反承諾 (Undertaking) 而構成濫用程序 (abuse of process)。原告提出的上訴理由主要圍繞「訴訟因由 (cause of action)」的定義、訴訟中止對訴訟因由的影響，以及時效條例的適用性等法律問題。 ### 核心法律爭議 原告申請上訴至終審法院，主要爭議點在於其提出的四個法律問題是否具有「重大、普遍或公眾重要性 (great, general or public importance)」或屬於「其他理由 (otherwise limb)」，足以獲准上訴。這些問題包括：訴訟因由的定義；基於相同事實的不同法律主張是否構成同一訴訟因由；經同意中止的訴訟是否會因「訴訟理由已判 (res judicata)」原則或「Henderson v Henderson濫用程序」原則而阻止後續訴訟；以及在無遺囑死亡案件中，時效條例 (Limitation Ordinance) 是否在遺產管理書批出前開始計算。 ### 判決理由 上訴法庭重申，申請上訴至終審法院的程序不應被用作重新審理實質性爭論的機會。法庭認為，原告提出的前兩個關於「訴訟因由」定義的問題，其解釋取決於具體語境，且上訴法庭已根據既定文件解釋原則處理，不具備重大、普遍或公眾重要性。第三個關於濫用程序的問題，法庭強調其判決是基於違反承諾而非單純中止訴訟，因此該問題亦不具備重大、普遍或公眾重要性。第四個關於時效條例的問題，因未在上訴法庭的主判決中審議，故不能作為上訴理據。至於「其他理由」的上訴申請，法庭指出此類許可僅在特殊情況下授予，而本案不符合此條件。 ### 引用案例與條文 本案未有特別引用。 ### 裁決與命令 上訴法庭駁回原告向上訴法庭申請上訴至終審法院的通知動議 (Notice of Motion)，並命令原告支付訟費。法庭暫定訟費為80,000港元，並給予雙方在七天內提交不超過五頁的書面陳詞，以調整訟費評估。 ### 判決啟示 本判決重申了香港終審法院條例 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance) 第22條下申請上訴至終審法院的嚴格標準。上訴法庭明確指出，此類申請不應被用作重新辯論實質性上訴論點的平台，律師應將重點放在符合條例規定的上訴許可準則上。法庭警告，未來可能會退回超出此範圍的陳詞，且不支付相關準備費用，這對法律執業者具有重要指導意義。 --- ### 免責聲明 本摘要由人工智能自動生成，內容可能存在錯誤或遺漏，僅供參考，不構成法律意見。如需法律建議，請諮詢合資格律師。### Case Details - Case Name: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling (the Administratrix of the estate of Tsang Kwong Lik Deceased) and Maryo Development Limited - Court: Court of Appeal (CA) - Judge: Hon Cheung CJHC, Lam VP and Kwan JA - Date of Judgment: 14 November 2014 ### Factual Background This case concerns the Plaintiff's application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision of 25 July 2014, which dismissed her substantive appeal. The Court of Appeal had upheld the Court of First Instance's ruling that the Plaintiff's action constituted an abuse of process due to a breach of an undertaking. The Plaintiff's proposed grounds of appeal revolved around legal questions such as the definition of "cause of action," the effect of discontinuance on a cause of action, and the applicability of the Limitation Ordinance. ### Key Legal Issues The Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, primarily contending whether the four legal questions she formulated possessed "great, general or public importance" or fell under the "otherwise limb" to warrant leave. These questions included: the definition of a cause of action; whether different legal formulations of claims based on the same underlying facts constitute the same cause of action; whether a plaintiff in an action discontinued by consent is precluded by res judicata or Henderson v Henderson abuse of process from bringing a subsequent action; and whether, for a claim against an intestate estate arising after death, time for the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347) begins to run before letters of administration are granted. ### Ratio Decidendi The Court of Appeal reiterated that applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal should not be used to re-run substantive arguments. The court found that the first two questions regarding the definition of "cause of action" depended on context and had been addressed by the Court of Appeal using established principles of document construction, thus lacking great, general or public importance. For the third question on abuse of process, the court emphasized its decision was based on a breach of undertaking, not mere discontinuance, so it also lacked great, general or public importance. The fourth question on the Limitation Ordinance was not considered in the main judgment and could not form a basis for appeal. Regarding the "otherwise limb," the court noted that leave is granted only in exceptional circumstances, which were not met in this case. ### Key Precedents & Statutes None prominently cited. ### Decision & Orders The Court of Appeal dismissed the Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and ordered the Plaintiff to pay costs. The court provisionally fixed costs at HK$80,000, allowing parties seven days to submit written arguments of no more than five pages to vary the assessment. ### Key Takeaways This judgment reinforces the strict criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. The Court of Appeal explicitly stated that such applications are not platforms for re-arguing substantive appeal points, and practitioners should focus on meeting the statutory leave criteria. The court warned that it might return submissions exceeding these parameters in the future, with no entitlement to costs for their preparation, providing significant guidance for legal practitioners. --- ### Disclaimer This summary is AI-generated and may contain errors or omissions. It is for reference only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a qualified lawyer for professional legal advice.