To consolidate the law relating to the status of married persons.
[7 October 1971]
(Format changes—E.R. 2 of 2019)
This Ordinance may be cited as the Married Persons Status Ordinance.
Save where otherwise appears, this Ordinance applies to persons who are parties to a marriage, whether married before or after the commencement of this Ordinance.
Subject to this Ordinance, a married woman shall—
be capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of, any property;
be capable of rendering herself, and being rendered, liable in respect of any tort, contract, debt or obligation;
be capable of suing and being sued, either in tort or in contract or otherwise; and
be subject to the law relating to bankruptcy and to the enforcement of judgements and orders,
in all respects as if she were unmarried. [cf. 1935 c. 30 s. 1 U.K.]
A married woman may act as a trustee or personal representative in all respects as if she were unmarried. [cf. 1882 c. 75 s. 18 U.K.]
Subject to this Ordinance, all property which—
immediately before 20 March 1936 was the separate property of a married woman or held for her separate use in equity; or (Amended E.R. 2 of 2019)
belonged or belongs at the time of her marriage to a woman married after that date; or
after that date has been or is acquired by or devolved or devolves upon a married woman,
shall belong to her in all respects as if she were unmarried and may be disposed of accordingly. [cf. 1935 c. 30 s. 2 U.K.]
No restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached, whether before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, to the enjoyment of any property by a woman which could not have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be of any effect.
[cf. 1949 c. 78 s. 1(1) & (2) U.K.]
Subject to this section, each of the parties to a marriage shall have the like right of action in tort against the other as if they were unmarried. [cf. 1962 c. 48 s. 1(1) U.K.]
Where an action in tort is brought by one of the parties to a marriage against the other during the subsistence of the marriage, the court may stay the action if it appears—
that no substantial benefit would accrue to either party from the continuation of the proceedings; or
that the question or questions in issue could more conveniently be disposed of on an application made under section 6. [cf. 1962 c. 48 s. 1(2) U.K.]
Without prejudice to subsection (2)(b), the court may, in such an action, either exercise any power which could be exercised on an application under section 6 or give such directions as it thinks fit for the disposal under that section of any question arising in the proceedings.
The references in subsection (1) to the parties to a marriage include references to the persons who were parties to a marriage which has been dissolved. [cf. 1962 c. 48 s. 3(3) U.K.]
This section does not apply to any cause of action which arose, or would but for the subsistence of a marriage have arisen, before the commencement of this Ordinance. [cf. 1962 c. 48 s. 3(4) U.K.]
In any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property the husband or the wife may apply by summons or otherwise in a summary way to a judge to determine the question.
On any such application the judge may make such order with respect to the property in dispute and as to the costs of and consequent on the application as he thinks fit, or may direct such application to stand over and any inquiry touching the matters in question to be made in such manner as he thinks fit.
An order made under subsection (2) shall be subject to appeal in the same way as an order made by the judge in an action in the Court of First Instance would be. (Amended 92 of 1975 s. 59; 25 of 1998 s. 2)
If either party so requests, the judge may hear the application in private.
[cf. 1882 c. 75 s. 17 U.K.]
Any right of a wife, under section 6, to apply to a judge, in any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, shall include the right to make such an application where it is claimed by the wife that her husband has had in his possession or under his control—
money to which, or to a share of which, she was beneficially entitled (whether by reason that it represented the proceeds of property to which, or to an interest in which, she was beneficially entitled, or for any other reason); or
property (other than money) to which, or to an interest in which, she was beneficially entitled,
and that either that money or other property has ceased to be in his possession or under his control or that she does not know whether it is still in his possession or under his control.
Where, on an application made to a judge under section 6, as extended by subsection (1), the judge is satisfied—
that the husband has had in his possession or under his control money or other property as mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b); and
that he has not made to the wife, in respect of that money or other property, such payment or disposition as would have been appropriate in the circumstances,
the power to make orders under that section shall be extended in accordance with subsection (3).
Where subsection (2) applies, the power to make orders under section 6 shall include power for the judge to order the husband to pay to the wife—
in a case falling within subsection (1)(a), such sum in respect of the money to which the application relates, or the wife’s share thereof, as the case may be; or
in a case falling within subsection (1)(b), such sum in respect of the value of the property to which the application relates, or the wife’s interest therein, as the case may be,
as the judge may consider appropriate.
Where on an application under section 6, as extended by this section, it appears to the judge that there is any property which—
represents the whole or part of the money or property in question; and
is property in respect of which an order could have been made under that section if an application had been made by the wife thereunder in a question as to the title to or possession of that property,
the judge (either in substitution for or in addition to the making of an order in accordance with subsection (3)) may make any order under that section in respect of that property which he could have made on such an application as is mentioned in paragraph (b).
Subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall have effect in relation to a husband as they have effect in relation to a wife, as if any reference to the husband were a reference to the wife and any reference to the wife were a reference to the husband.
Any power of a judge under section 6 to direct inquiries or give any other directions in relation to an application under that section shall be exercisable in relation to an application made under that section, as extended by this section; and subsections (3) and (4) of that section shall apply in relation to any order made under section 6, as extended by this section, as they apply in relation to an order made under that section apart from this section.
For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that any power conferred by section 6 to make orders with respect to any property includes power to order a sale of the property.
[cf. 1958 c. 35 s. 7 U.K.]
An application may be made under section 6 (including that section as extended by section 7) by either of the parties to a marriage notwithstanding that their marriage has been dissolved or annulled so long as the application is made within the period of three years beginning with the date on which the marriage was dissolved or annulled; and references in sections 6 and 7 to a husband or a wife shall be construed accordingly.
(Added 39 of 1972 s. 33)
[cf. 1970 c. 45 s. 39 U.K.]
It is hereby declared that, where a husband or wife contributes in money or money’s worth to the improvement of real or personal property in which or in the proceeds of sale of which either or both of them has or have a beneficial interest, the husband or wife so contributing shall, if the contribution is of a substantial nature and subject to any agreement between them to the contrary express or implied, be treated as having them acquired by virtue of his or her contribution a share or an enlarged share, as the case may be, in that beneficial interest of such an extent as may have been then agreed or, in default of such agreement, as may seem in all the circumstances just to any court before which the question of the existence or extent of the beneficial interest of the husband or wife arises (whether in proceedings between them or in any other proceedings).
(Added 39 of 1972 s. 33(3))
[cf. 1970 c. 45 s. 37 U.K.]
Subject to this Ordinance, the husband of a woman shall not, by reason only of his being her husband, be liable—
in respect of any tort committed by her whether before or after the marriage, or in respect of any contract entered into, or debt or obligation incurred, by her before the marriage; or
to be sued or made a party to any legal proceedings brought in respect of any such tort, contract, debt or obligation.
[cf. 1935 c. 30 s. 3 U.K.]
Any rule of law or equity conferring on a wife authority, as agent of necessity of her husband, to pledge his credit or to borrow money on his credit is hereby abrogated.
[cf. 1970 c. 45 s. 41 U.K.]
Nothing in this Ordinance shall be construed as validating—
as against creditors of the husband, any gift, by a husband to his wife, of any property which, after such gift, continues to be in the order or disposition or reputed ownership of the husband or any deposit or other investment of moneys of the husband made by or in the name of his wife in fraud of his creditors; or
as against creditors of the wife, any gift, by a wife to her husband, of any property which, after such gift, continues to be in the order or disposition or reputed ownership of the wife or any deposit or other investment of moneys of the wife made by or in the name of her husband in fraud of her creditors,
and any such money so deposited or invested may be followed as if this Ordinance had not been passed.
[cf. 1882 c. 75 s. 10 U.K.]
This section applies to a policy of assurance or endowment expressed to be for the benefit of, or by its express terms purporting to confer a benefit upon, the wife, husband or child of the insured.
The policy shall create a trust in favour of the objects therein named.
The moneys payable under the policy shall not, so long as any part of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the insured or be subject to his or her debts.
If it is proved that the policy was effected and the premiums paid with intent to defraud the creditors of the insured, they shall be entitled to receive, out of the moneys payable under the policy, a sum equal to the premiums so paid.
The insured may by the policy, or by any memorandum under his or her hand, appoint a trustee or trustees of the moneys payable under the policy, and from time to time appoint a new trustee or new trustees thereof, and may make provision for the appointment of a new trustee or new trustees thereof, and for the investment of the moneys payable under any such policy.
In default of any such appointment of a trustee, such policy, immediately on its being effected, shall vest in the insured and his or her legal personal representatives, in trust for the purposes aforesaid.
The receipt of a trustee or trustees duly appointed, or in default of any such appointment, or in default of notice to the insurer, the receipt of the legal personal representative of the insured, shall be a discharge to the insurer for the sum secured by the policy, or for the value thereof, in whole or in part.
[cf. 1882 c. 75 s. 11 U.K.]
Section 19 of the Wills Ordinance (Cap. 30) (which provides for the cases in which a will is to be construed as speaking from the death of the testator) shall apply to the will of a married woman made during coverture whether she is or is not possessed of or entitled to any property at the time of making it, and such will shall not require to be re-executed or republished after the death of her husband.
[cf. 1893 c. 63 s. 3 U.K.]
A married infant shall have power to give valid receipts for all income (including statutory accumulations of income made during minority) to which the infant may be entitled in like manner as if the infant were an adult.
[cf. 1925 c. 20 s. 21 U.K.]
A married woman, whether an infant or not, shall have power, as if she were unmarried and an adult, by deed, to appoint an attorney on her behalf for the purpose of executing any deed or doing any other act which she might herself execute or do.
[cf. 1925 c. 20 s. 129 U.K.]
For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in this Ordinance—
renders the husband of a married woman liable in respect of any contract entered into, or debt or obligation incurred, by her after the marriage in respect of which he would not have been liable if this Ordinance had not been passed;
exempts the husband of a married woman from liability in respect of any contract entered into, or debt or obligation (not being a debt or obligation arising out of the commission of a tort) incurred, by her after the marriage in respect of which be would have been liable if this Ordinance had not been passed;
prevents a husband and wife from acquiring, holding, and disposing of, any property jointly or as tenants in common, or from rendering themselves, or being rendered, jointly liable in respect of any tort, contract, debt or obligation, and of suing and being sued either in tort or in contract or otherwise, in like manner as if they were not married;
prevents the exercise of any joint power given to a husband and wife.
[cf. 1935 c. 30 s. 4(2) U.K.]