To consolidate Ordinances relating to interests in land, assignments, contract, tort, breach of promise and foreign corporations; and to amend the law relating to the defence of tender before action.
(Amended 3 of 2008 s. 7)
[1 July 1901]
This Ordinance may be cited as the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance.
(Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
(Repealed 62 of 1984 s. 66)
(Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
Any absolute assignment, by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only), of any debt or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be and be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if this section, section 11 of this Ordinance and sections 25 and 49 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219) had not been enacted) to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the assignor:
Provided that if the debtor, trustee or other person liable in respect of such debt or chose in action has had notice that such assignment is disputed by the assignor or any one claiming under him or of any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or chose in action, he shall be entitled to call upon the several person making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or he may pay the same into the court under and in conformity with the provisions of any Ordinance relating to trustees.
(4 of 1901 s. 8 incorporated. Amended 50 of 1911; 1 of 1912 Schedule; 31 of 1988 s. 30)
[cf. 1873 c. 66 s. 25(6) U.K.]
(Repealed 62 of 1984 s. 66)
(Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
Stipulations in contracts, as to time or otherwise, which would not, before 13 October 1873, have been deemed to be or to have become of the essence of such contracts in the court in its equitable jurisdiction shall receive in the court the same construction and effect as they would formerly have received in equity.
(4 of 1901 s. 9 incorporated)
[cf. 1873 c. 66 s. 25(7) U.K.]
(Repealed 72 of 1972 s. 2)
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon or by reason of any representation or assurance made or given concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any person, to the intent or purpose that such other person may obtain credit, money or goods thereupon, unless such representation or assurance is made in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith.
(Added 53 of 1971 s. 2)
[cf. 1828 c. 14 s. 6 U.K.]
A court may award damages for breach of a contract of which there has been part performance notwithstanding that an order for specific performance could not, in the circumstances of the case, be made by the court.
This section shall not apply to any contract made before 31 December 1972.
(Added 72 of 1972 s. 3)
No special promise made by any person to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, being in writing, and signed by the party charged therewith or some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized, shall be deemed invalid to support an action, suit or other proceeding to charge the person by whom such promise has been made, by reason only that the consideration for such promise does not appear in writing or by necessary inference from a written document.
(13 of 1864 s. 4 incorporated. Amended 50 of 1911. Replaced 53 of 1971 s. 2)
[cf. 1856 c. 97 s. 3 U.K.]
Every person who, being surety for the debt or duty of another or being liable with another for any debt or duty, pays such debt or performs such duty, shall be entitled to have assigned to him, or to a trustee for him, every judgment, specialty, or other security which is held by the creditor in respect of such debt or duty, whether such judgment, specialty, or other security is or is not deemed at law to have been satisfied by the payment of the debt or performance of the duty.
Such person shall be entitled to stand in the place of the creditor, to use all the remedies, and, if need be and upon a proper indemnity, to use the name of the creditor, in any action or other proceeding at law or in equity, in order to obtain from the principal debtor or any co-surety, co-contractor or co-debtor, as the case may be, indemnification for the advances made and loss sustained by the person who has so paid such debt or performed such duty, and such payment or performance so made by such surety shall not be a bar to any such action or other proceeding by him.
No co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor, shall be entitled to recover from any other co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor, by the means aforesaid, more than the just proportion to which, as between those parties themselves, such last mentioned person is justly liable.
(13 of 1864 s. 6 incorporated. Replaced 53 of 1971 s. 2)
[cf. 1856 c. 97 s. 5 U.K.]
For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a person (the first person) is able to create, and always has been able to create, in favour of another person (the second person) a legal or equitable charge or mortgage over all or any of the first person’s interest in a chose in action enforceable by the first person against the second person, and any charge or mortgage so created shall operate neither to merge the interest thereby created with, nor to extinguish or release, that chose in action.
(Added 60 of 1991 s. 2)
Where a contract governed by law applicable to the Colony has become impossible of performance or been otherwise frustrated, and the parties thereto have for that reason been discharged from the further performance of the contract, the following provisions of this section shall, subject to the provisions of section 17, have effect in relation thereto.
All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract before the time when the parties were so discharged (in this section and section 17 referred to as the time of discharge) shall, in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him as money received by him for the use of the party by whom the sums were paid, and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so payable:Provided that, if the party to whom the sums were so paid or payable incurred expenses before the time of discharge in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, the court may, if it considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances of the case, allow him to retain or, as the case may be, recover the whole or any part of the sums so paid or payable, not being an amount in excess of the expenses so incurred.
Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything done by any other party thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, obtained a valuable benefit (other than a payment of money to which subsection (2) applies) before the time of discharge, there shall be recoverable from him by the said other party such sum (if any), not exceeding the value of the said benefit to the party obtaining it, as the court considers just, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and, in particular—
the amount of any expenses incurred before the time of discharge by the benefited party in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, including any sums paid or payable by him to any other party in pursuance of the contract and retained or recoverable by that party under subsection (2); and
the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the circumstances giving rise to the frustration of the contract.
In estimating, for the purposes of subsections (1), (2) and (3), the amount of any expenses incurred by any party to the contract, the court may, without prejudice to the generality of the said subsections, include such sum as appears to be reasonable in respect of overhead expenses and in respect of any work or services performed personally by the said party.
In considering whether any sum ought to be recovered or retained under subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) by any party to the contract, the court shall not take into account any sums which have, by reason of the circumstances giving rise to the frustration of the contract, become payable to that party under any contract of insurance unless there was an obligation to insure imposed by an express term of the frustrated contract or by or under any enactment.
Where any person has assumed obligations under the contract in consideration of the conferring of a benefit by any other party to the contract upon any other person, whether a party to the contract or not, the court may, if in all the circumstances of the case it considers it just to do so, treat for the purposes of subsection (3) any benefit so conferred as a benefit obtained by the person who has assumed the obligations as aforesaid.
(26 of 1948 s. 3 incorporated)
[cf. 1943 c. 40 s. 1 U.K.]
This section and sections 16 and 18 shall save as is hereinafter provided apply to contracts whether made before or after 18 June 1948, as respects which the time of discharge is on or after 8 December 1941, but not to contracts as respects which the time of discharge is before the latter date.
This section and sections 16 and 18 shall apply to contracts to which the Crown is a party in like manner as to contracts between subjects.
Where any contract to which this section and sections 16 and 18 apply contains any provision which, upon the true construction of the contract, is intended to have effect in the event of circumstances arising which operate, or would but for the said provision operate, to frustrate the contract, or is intended to have effect whether such circumstances arise or not, the court shall give effect to the said provision and shall only give effect to section 16 to such extent, if any, as appears to the court to be consistent with the said provision.
Where it appears to the court that apart of any contract to which this section and sections 16 and 18 apply can properly be severed from the remainder of the contract, being a part wholly performed before the time of discharge, or so performed except for the payment in respect of that part of the contract of sums which are or can be ascertained under the contract, the court shall treat that part of the contract as if it were a separate contract and had not been frustrated and shall treat section 16 as only applicable to the remainder of that contract.
This section and sections 16 and 18 shall not apply—
to any charterparty, except a time charterparty or a charterparty by way of demise, or to any contract (other than a charterparty) for the carriage of goods by sea; or
to any contract of insurance, save as is provided by section 16(5); or
to any contract to which section 9 of the Sale of Goods Ordinance (Cap. 26), (which avoids contracts for the sale of specific goods which perish before the risk has passed to the buyer) applies, or to any other contract for the sale, or for the sale and delivery, of specific goods, where the contract is frustrated by reason of the fact that the goods have perished.
(26 of 1948 ss. 2 & 4 incorporated)
[cf. 1943 c. 40 s. 2 U.K.]
Nothing in sections 16 and 17 shall affect any settlement or agreement between the parties subsequent to date of discharge whereby the rights and liabilities of the contracting parties fell to be determined otherwise than in accordance with the said sections.
(26 of 1948 s. 5 incorporated)
(Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
(Repealed 77 of 1984 s. 10)
Subject to the provisions of this section, on the death of any person after 26 October 1951, all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate:Provided that this subsection shall not apply to causes of action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to claims for damages on the ground of adultery.
The right of a person to claim under section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) (for bereavement) or under section 20C(1) of this Ordinance (for loss of society) shall not survive for the benefit of his estate on his death. (Added 40 of 1986 s. 2)
Where a cause of action survives as aforesaid for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate of that person—
shall not include any exemplary damages;
shall, where the death of that person has been caused by the act or omission which gives rise to the cause of action—
be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to his estate consequent on his death, except that a sum in respect of funeral expenses may be included;
not include any damages in respect of loss of ability to render services after his death;
not include any damages for loss of property, whether income or otherwise, in respect of any period after his death, except in so far as the court is satisfied that, but for the act or omission that gave rise to the cause of action, the deceased would have achieved an accumulation of wealth by the time that he would otherwise have died, in which case damages may be awarded in respect of the loss of that wealth:Provided that damages awarded under this sub-paragraph shall be subject to such deduction as the court considers it just to make in the circumstances of any particular case on account of the accelerated receipt of that wealth and in order to avoid over-compensation. (Replaced 40 of 1986 s. 2)
(Repealed 52 of 1987 s. 45)
Where damage has been suffered by reason of any act or omission in respect of which a cause of action would have subsisted against any person if that person had not died before or at the same time as the damage was suffered, there shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section and sections 21 and 22, to have been subsisting against him before his death such cause of action in respect of that act or omission as would have subsisted if he had died after the damage was suffered.
The rights conferred by this section and sections 21 and 22 for the benefit of the estates of deceased persons shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the dependants of deceased persons by the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) and so much of this section and sections 21 and 22 as relates to causes of action against the estates of deceased persons shall apply in relation to causes of action under the said Ordinance as it applies in relation to other causes of action not expressly excepted from the operation of subsection (1).
In the event of the insolvency of an estate against which proceedings are maintainable by virtue of this section, any liability in respect of the cause of action in respect of which the proceedings are maintainable shall be deemed to be a debt provable in the administration of the estate, notwithstanding that it is a demand in the nature of unliquidated damages arising otherwise than by a contract, promise or breach of trust.
(36 of 1951 s. 2 incorporated)
[cf. 1934 c. 41 s. 1 U.K.]
In an action for damages for personal injuries—
no damages shall be recoverable in respect of any loss of expectation of life caused to the injured person by the injuries; but
if the injured person’s expectation of life has been reduced by the injuries, the court, in assessing damages in respect of pain and suffering caused by the injuries, shall take account of any suffering caused or likely to be caused to him by awareness that his expectation of life has been so reduced.
The reference in subsection (1)(a) to damages in respect of loss of expectation of life does not include damages in respect of loss of income.
(Added 40 of 1986 s. 3)
[cf. 1982 c. 53 s. 1 U.K.]
Except as provided in section 20C, no person shall be liable in tort—
to a husband on the ground only of having deprived him of the services or society of his wife;
to a parent (or person standing in the place of a parent) on the ground only of having deprived him of the services of a child; or
on the ground only—
of having deprived another of the services of his menial servant;
of having deprived another of the services of his female servant by raping or seducing her; or
of enticement of a servant or harbouring a servant.
(Added 40 of 1986 s. 3)
[cf. 1982 c. 53 s. 2 U.K.]
Where injury is caused to any person by any wrongful act, neglect or default which entitles him to maintain an action and recover damages, and which causes any person referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) to be deprived of his society, the person who is liable to such an action shall, subject to subsection (3), also be liable in damages for the loss of the injured person’s society suffered by such of the following persons as survive 30 days after the date on which the cause of action accrued—
the husband or wife of the injured person, unless they had been living apart for a continuous period of at least 2 years immediately before the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
where there is no spouse entitled to recover damages under paragraph (a), any children of the injured person; or
where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a) or (b), any concubine taken by the injured person before 7 October 1971; or
where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b) or (c), any person who—
was living with the injured person in the same household immediately before the date on which the cause of action accrued; and
had been living with the injured person in the same household for at least 2 years before that date,
as the husband or wife of the injured person; or
where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d), the parents of the injured person or (if the injured person was illegitimate) his mother; or
where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), but the injured person was at the date on which the cause of action accrued a minor, any person who during any marriage to which that person was a party treated the injured person as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; or (Amended L.N. 307 of 1998)
where there is no other person by or for whom a claim can be made under this subsection, any brother or sister of the injured person. (Amended 18 of 2014 s. 153)
The total sum awarded as damages under subsection (1) in respect of any injured person—
shall not exceed the sum specified in section 4(3) of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22); and
shall, where there are 2 or more claimants, be divided equally between them.
Damages shall not be payable by virtue of subsection (1) if the injured person dies as a result of the act, neglect or default referred to in that subsection and his death gives rise to a right to claim damages for bereavement under section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22).
Where injury is caused to any person by any wrongful act, neglect or default which entitles him to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof and which causes any dependant of the injured person to be deprived of his gratuitous services, the action may include a claim for damages by the injured person for impairment of his ability to render such services.
In this section—
child (子女) of an injured person includes—(a)a child adopted by him in pursuance either of an adoption order made under the Adoption Ordinance (Cap. 290) or of any other adoption recognized as valid by the law of Hong Kong; and(b)a person who, during any marriage to which the injured person was at any time a party, was treated by him as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; dependant (受養人), in relation to an injured person, means—(a)the wife, husband, former wife or former husband of the injured person and any person whose marriage to the injured person has been annulled or declared void;(b)a concubine lawfully taken by the injured person before 7 October 1971; (Amended 18 of 2014 s. 153)(c)any person who—(i)was living with the injured person in the same household immediately before the date of his injury; and(ii)had been living with the injured person in the same household for at least 2 years before that date,as the husband or wife of the injured person;(d)any parent or other ascendant of the injured person;(e)any person (not being a parent of the injured person) who, during any marriage to which that person was a party, treated the injured person as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; (f)any child or other descendant of the injured person; (g)any person (not being a child of the injured person) who, during any marriage to which the injured person was at any time a party, was treated by the injured person as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage;(h)any person who is, or is the issue of, a brother, sister, uncle or aunt of the injured person;(i)any person who is, or is the issue of, a brother or sister of a grandparent of the injured person;(j)any godchild or godparent of the injured person according to Chinese custom; injury (傷害) includes any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition; parent (父母) includes any person who, during any marriage to which that person was a party, treated the injured person as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; wife (妻子) has the same meaning as in the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22),and in deducing any relationship for the purposes of this section, section 2(2) of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall apply as it applies for the purposes of that Ordinance.(Added 40 of 1986 s. 3)
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage: (Amended L.N. 337 of 1989)Provided that—(a)this subsection shall not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract; (b)where any contract or enactment providing for the limitation of liability is applicable to the claim, the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant by virtue of this subsection shall not exceed the maximum limit so applicable.
Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of subsection (1) subject to such reduction as is therein mentioned, the court shall find and record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault.
The Civil Liability (Contribution) Ordinance (Cap. 377) shall apply in any case where 2 or more persons are liable or would, if they had all been sued, be liable by virtue of subsection (1) in respect of the damage suffered by any person. (Amended 77 of 1984 s. 10)
Where any person dies as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, and accordingly if an action were brought for the benefit of the estate under section 20 the damages recoverable would be reduced under subsection (1), any damages recoverable in an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall be reduced to a proportionate extent. (Amended 40 of 1986 s. 4)
Where an action is brought under section 20C for the loss of the society of another in circumstances where any damages recoverable by that other in proceedings brought by him would be reduced under subsection (1) of this section, any damages awarded for such loss shall be reduced to a proportionate extent. (Added 40 of 1986 s. 4)
Where, in any case to which subsection (1) applies, one of the persons at fault avoids liability to any other such person or his personal representative by pleading any enactment limiting the time within which proceedings may be taken, he shall not be entitled to recover any damages from that other person or representative by virtue of the said subsection. (Amended 77 of 1984 s. 10)
Where any case to which subsection (1) applies is tried with a jury, the jury shall determine the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault and the extent to which those damages are to be reduced.
Article 21 of the Convention contained in the First Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act 1932 (1932 c. 36 U.K.) (which empowers a court to exonerate wholly or partly a carrier who proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person) shall in its application to the Colony have effect subject to the provisions of this section.
This section shall not apply to any claim to which section 1 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (1911 c. 57 U.K.), applies and that Act shall have effect as if this section and sections 20 and 22 had not been enacted. [cf. 1945 c. 28 s. 3 U.K.]
This section shall not apply to any case where the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred before 26 October 1951. [cf. 1945 c. 28 s. 3 U.K.]
In this section—
court (法院) means, in relation to any claim, the court or arbitrator by or before whom the claim falls to be determined; damage (損害) includes loss of life and personal injury; dependant (受養人) means any person for whose benefit an action could be brought under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22); fault (過失) means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence. [cf. 1945 c. 28 s. 4 U.K.](36 of 1951 s. 4 incorporated)
[cf. 1945 c. 28 s. 1 U.K.]
It shall not be a defence to an employer who is sued in respect of personal injuries caused by the negligence of a person employed by him, that that person was at the time the injuries were caused in common employment with the person injured. [cf. 1948 c. 41 s. 1 U.K.]
Any provision contained in a contract of service or apprenticeship, or in an agreement collateral thereto, (including a contract or agreement entered into before 26 October 1951) shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of excluding or limiting any liability of the employer in respect of personal injuries caused to the person employed or apprenticed by the negligence of persons in common employment with him. [cf. 1948 c. 41 s. 1 U.K.]
(36 of 1951 s. 5 incorporated)
(Part IVA added 20 of 1978 s. 2. Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
Section 22B does not affect the operation of the Nuclear Material (Liability for Carriage) Ordinance (Cap. 479), as to liability for, and compensation in respect of, injury or damage caused by occurrences involving nuclear matter or the emission of ionising radiations. (Amended 45 of 1995 s. 15)
References in this Part to a child being born disabled or with disabilities are to its being born with any deformity, disease or abnormality, including predisposition (whether or not susceptible of immediate prognosis) to physical or mental defect in the future.
If a child is born disabled as the result of such an occurrence before its birth as is mentioned in subsection (2) and a person (other than the child’s own mother) is under this section answerable to the child in respect of the occurrence, the child’s disabilities are to be regarded as damage resulting from the wrongful act of that person and actionable accordingly at the suit of the child.
An occurrence to which this section applies is one which—
affected either parent of the child in his or her ability to have a normal, healthy child; or
affected the mother during her pregnancy, or affected her or the child in the course of its birth, so that the child is born with disabilities which would not otherwise have been present.
Subject to subsections (4) to (7), a person (here referred to as the defendant) is answerable to the child if he was liable in tort to the parent or would, if sued in due time, have been so; and it is no answer that there could not have been such liability because the parent suffered no actionable injury, if there was a breach of legal duty which, accompanied by injury, would have given rise to liability.
In the case of an occurrence preceding the time of conception, the defendant is not answerable to the child if at that time either or both of the parents knew the risk of their child being born disabled (that is to say, the particular risk created by the occurrence); but should it be the child’s father who is the defendant, this subsection does not apply if he knew of the risk and the mother did not.
The defendant is not answerable to the child, for anything he did or omitted to do when responsible in a professional capacity for treating or advising the parent, if he took reasonable care having due regard to then received professional opinion applicable to the particular class of case; but this does not mean that he is answerable only because he departed from received opinion.
Liability to the child under this section may be treated as having been excluded or limited by contract made with the parent affected, to the same extent and subject to the same restrictions as liability in the parent’s own case; and a contract term which could have been set up by the defendant in an action by the parent, so as to exclude or limit his liability to him or her, operates in the defendant’s favour to the same, but no greater, extent in an action under this section by the child.
If in the child’s action under this section it is shown that the parent affected shared the responsibility for the child being born disabled, the damages are to be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the extent of the parent’s responsibility.
[cf. 1976 c. 28 s. 1 U.K.]
Liability to a child under section 22B is to be regarded—
as respects all its incidents and any matters arising or to arise out of it; and
subject to any contrary context or intention, for the purpose of construing references in enactments and documents to personal or bodily injuries and cognate matters,
as liability for personal injuries sustained by the child immediately after its birth.
[cf. 1976 c. 28 s. 4(3) U.K.]
No damages shall be recoverable under section 22B in respect of any loss of expectation of life unless the child lives for at least 48 hours.
[cf. 1976 c. 28 s. 4(4) U.K.]
This Part binds the Crown.
(Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2013)
An agreement between 2 persons to marry one another shall not have effect as a contract giving rise to legal rights and no action shall lie for breach of such an agreement.
This section shall have effect in relation to agreements entered into before 7 October 1971, except that it shall not affect any action begun before that date.
(35 of 1971 s. 4 incorporated)
[cf. 1970 c. 33 s. 1 U.K.]
Where an agreement to marry is terminated, any rule of law relating to the rights of husbands and wives in relation to property in which either or both has or have a beneficial interest shall apply, in relation to any property in which either or both of the parties to the agreement had a beneficial interest while the agreement was in force, as it applies in relation to property in which a husband or wife has a beneficial interest.
Where an agreement to marry is terminated, sections 6 and 7 of the Married Persons Status Ordinance (Cap. 182) (which sections confer power on a judge to settle disputes between husband and wife about property) shall apply, as if the parties were married, to any dispute between, or claim by, one of them in relation to property in which either or both had a beneficial interest while the agreement was in force; but an application made by virtue of this section to the judge under the said sections shall be made within 3 years of the termination of the agreement.
(35 of 1971 s. 4 incorporated)
[cf. 1970 c. 33 s. 2 U.K.]
A party to an agreement to marry who makes a gift of property to the other party to the agreement on the condition (express or implied) that it shall be returned if the agreement is terminated shall not be prevented from recovering the property by reason only of his having terminated the agreement.
The gift of an engagement ring shall be presumed to be an absolute gift; this presumption may be rebutted by proving that the ring was given on the condition, express or implied, that it should be returned if the marriage did not take place for any reason.
(35 of 1971 s. 4 incorporated)
[cf. 1970 c. 33 s. 3 U.K.]
(Part VA added 16 of 1996 s. 2. Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
References in this Part to a person who has unlawfully killed another includes a reference to a person who has unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death of that other and references in this Part to unlawful killing shall be construed accordingly.
[cf. 1982 c. 34 s. 1 U.K.]
Where a court determines that the forfeiture rule has precluded a person (in this section referred to as the offender) who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring any interest in property mentioned in subsection (4), subject to section 25D, the court may make an order modifying the effect of that rule.
The court shall not make an order under subsection (1) unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased concerned and to such other circumstances (if any) as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the particular case requires the effect of the rule to be modified in that case.
In any case where a person stands convicted of an offence of which unlawful killing is an element, the court shall not make an order under subsection (1) modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in that case unless proceedings for the purpose are brought before the expiry of the period of 90 days beginning on—
in case an appeal is taken as regards the conviction, the day on which the appeal is determined or withdrawn; or
in any other case, the day on which the period during which such an appeal may be taken expires.
The interests in property referred to in subsection (1) are—
any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired—
under the relevant deceased’s will or the law relating to intestacy;
on the nomination of that deceased or on the failure of that deceased to make a nomination;
as a donatio mortis causa made by that deceased; or
any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired in consequence of the death of such deceased, being property which, before the death, was held on trust for any person.
An order under subsection (1) may modify the effect of the forfeiture rule in respect of any interest in property to which the order relates and may do so in either or both of the following ways, that is—
where there is more than one such interest, by excluding the application of the rule in respect of any (but not all) of those interests; and
in the case of any such interest in property, by excluding the application of the rule in respect of part of the property.
On the making of an order under subsection (1), the forfeiture rule shall have effect for all purposes (including purposes relating to anything done before the order was made) subject to the modifications made by the order.
A court shall not make an order under subsection (1) modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in respect of any interest in property which, in consequence of the rule, has been acquired before the coming into force of this section by a person other than the offender or a person claiming through him.
In this section—
property (財產) includes any chose in action or incorporeal movable property; will (遺囑) includes a codicil.[cf. 1982 c. 34 s. 2 U.K.]
The forfeiture rule shall not be taken to preclude any person from making any application under a provision mentioned in subsection (2) or the making of any order on any such application.
Nothing in this Part or in any order made under section 25B(1) or referred to in section 25C(1) shall affect the application of the forfeiture rule in the case of a person who stands convicted of murder.
[cf. 1982 c. 34 s. 5 U.K.]
(Format changes—E.R. 1 of 2017)
The fact that a power of attorney or document of authorization given by a foreign corporation to or in favour of any person is not under seal shall not, if such power of attorney or document of authorization is valid as a power of attorney or document of authorization in accordance with the laws of the place under which such corporation is incorporated, affect, for any purpose intended to be effected within Hong Kong, the validity or effect of any instrument under seal executed on behalf of such corporation by such person, which shall for all such purposes be as valid as if such authority had been under seal.
(1 of 1920 ss. 2 & 3 incorporated. Replaced 53 of 1971 s. 3. Amended 23 of 1998 s. 2)
When any sum in respect of emoluments, pension, gratuity or other allowance is payable out of the revenues of the Colony to any public servant, or to the widow or child of any public servant, and the person to whom the sum is payable is certified by 2 persons who are either Government Medical Officers or medical practitioners to be unable by reason of mental disability to manage his or her affairs, the Governor in Council may direct the payment of so much of the said sum as he may think fit to the institution or person having the care of the disabled person, and may direct the payment of the surplus, if any, or so much thereof as he may think fit, for or towards the maintenance and benefit of the wife or husband and relatives of the disabled person, and payment under such direction shall be a sufficient discharge from all liability in respect of any sums so paid.
(27 of 1935 s. 2 incorporated)
[cf. 1890 c. 5 s. 335 U.K.]
(Repealed 62 of 1984 s. 66)
The imposition of a penalty or fine by or under any Ordinance shall not relieve any person from liability to answer in damages to a person injured.
Notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, in proceedings for a monetary claim, whether liquidated or unliquidated, it is a defence for the defendant to prove that before the claimant commenced the proceedings, the defendant had unconditionally offered to the claimant—
the amount due where the claim is liquidated; or
an amount sufficient to satisfy the claim where the claim is unliquidated.
The defendant is not entitled to rely on the defence under subsection (1) unless, before serving his defence on the claimant, he has—
made a payment into court of the amount offered; and
notified the claimant of the payment into court.
This section does not apply in relation to proceedings commenced before the commencement# of this section.
(Added 3 of 2008 s. 8)