Cap. 347 《時效條例》Limitation Ordinance

In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires—

A person shall be deemed to claim through another person, if he became entitled by, through, under, or by the act of that other person to the right claimed: Provided that a person becoming entitled to any estate or interest by virtue of a special power of appointment shall not be deemed to claim through the appointer.

References in this Ordinance to a right of action to recover land shall include references to a right to enter into possession of the land or, in the case of rentcharges, to distrain for arrears of rent, and references to the bringing of such an action shall include references to the making of such an entry or distress.

In the case of rentcharges, references in this Ordinance to the possession of land shall be construed as references to the receipt of the rent, and references to the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land shall be construed as references to the date of the last receipt of rent.

In Part III of this Ordinance, references to a right of action shall include references to a cause of action and to a right to receive money secured by a mortgage or charge on any property or to recover proceeds of the sale of land, and to a right to receive a share or interest in the personal estate of a deceased person; and references to the date of the accrual of a right of action shall—

This Part prescribes the ordinary limitation periods for bringing actions of the various classes mentioned in this Part.

The ordinary limitation periods are subject to extension or exclusion in accordance with Part III.

The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say—

Provided that— (i)(Repealed 31 of 1991 s. 4) (ii)nothing in this subsection shall be taken to refer to any action to which section 6 applies.

An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than 6 years before the commencement of the action.

An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance.

An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable, and no arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.

An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture, recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that for the purposes of this subsection the expression penalty (罰金) shall not include a fine to which any person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence.

Subsection (1) shall apply to an action to recover seamen’s wages, but save as aforesaid this section shall not apply to any cause of action within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court which is enforceable in rem.

This section shall not apply to any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief, except in so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the court by analogy in like manner as the corresponding enactment contained in the Limitation Act 1980 (1980 c. 58 U.K.) is applied in the English Courts. (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 4)

(Repealed 31 of 1991 s. 4)

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 2 U.K.; 1954 c. 36 s. 2(1) U.K.]

Where any cause of action in respect of the conversion or wrongful detention of a chattel has accrued to any person and, before he recovers possession of the chattel, a further conversion or wrongful detention takes place, no action shall be brought in respect of the further conversion or detention after the expiration of 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion or detention.

Where any such cause of action has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action and for bringing any action in respect of such a further conversion or wrongful detention as aforesaid has expired and he has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 3 U.K.]

Where under section 3 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Ordinance (Cap. 377) any person becomes entitled to a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage from any other person, no action to recover contribution by virtue of that right shall (subject to sections 22 and 26) be brought after the end of the period of 2 years from the date on which that right accrued.

For the purposes of this section the date on which a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage accrues to any person (in this subsection referred to as the relevant date) shall be ascertained as follows, that is to say—

and for the purposes of this subsection no account shall be taken of any judgment or award given or made on appeal in so far as it varies the amount of damages awarded against the person in question.

No action shall be brought by the Crown to recover any land after the expiration of 60 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the Crown or, if it first accrued to some person through whom the Crown claims, to that person.

No action shall be brought by any other person to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person: Provided that, if the right of action first accrued to the Crown through whom the person bringing the action claims, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of the period during which the action could have been brought by the Crown, or of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the Crown, whichever period first expires. (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 5)

Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he claims, has been in possession thereof, and has while entitled thereto been dispossessed or discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.

Where any person brings an action to recover any land of a deceased person, whether under a will or on intestacy, and the deceased person was on the date of his death in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by will or taking effect upon his death, in possession of the land charged, and was the last person entitled to the land to be in possession thereof, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of his death.

Where any person brings an action to recover land, being an estate or interest in possession assured otherwise than by will to him, or to some person through whom he claims by a person who, at the date when the assurance took effect, was in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by the assurance, in possession of the land charged, and no person has been in possession of the land by virtue of the assurance, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the assurance took effect.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 5 U.K.]

Subject as hereafter provided in this section the right of action to recover any land shall, in a case where the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest and no person has taken possession of the land by virtue of the estate or interest claimed, be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest.

If the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest, not being a term of years absolute, was not in possession of the land on the date of the determination thereof, no action shall be brought by the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest, or 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest, whichever period last expires:Provided that, where the Crown is entitled to the succeeding estate or interest, the foregoing provisions of this subsection shall have effect with the substitution for the reference to 12 years of a reference to 60 years, and for the reference to 6 years of a reference to 12 years. (Amended L.N. 100 of 1968; 31 of 1991 s. 6)

No person shall bring an action to recover any estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom he claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest, unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought such an action.

Where any person is entitled to any estate or interest in land in possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to any future estate or interest in that land, and his right to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred under this Ordinance, no action shall be brought by that person, or by any person claiming through him, in respect of the future estate or interest, unless in the meantime possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled to an intermediate estate or interest.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 6 U.K.]

Subject to the provisions of section 20(1), the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to equitable interests in land, including interests in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale, in like manner as they apply to legal estates, and accordingly a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance but not otherwise, be deemed to accrue to a person entitled in possession to such an equitable interest in the like manner and circumstances and on the same date as it would accrue if his interest were a legal estate in the land.

Where any land is held upon trust, including a trust for sale, and the period prescribed by this Ordinance has expired for the bringing of an action to recover the land by the trustees, the estate of the trustees shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale either has not accrued or has not been barred by this Ordinance, but if and when every such right of action has been so barred, the estate of the trustee shall be extinguished.

Where land is held upon trust, including a trust for sale, an action to recover the land may be brought by the trustees on behalf of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in possession in the land or in the proceeds of sale whose right of action has not been barred by this Ordinance, notwithstanding that the right of action of the trustees would apart from this provision have been barred by this Ordinance.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 7 U.K.]

A tenancy at will shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of a period of 1 year from the commencement thereof, unless it has previously been determined, and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of such determination.

A tenancy from year to year or other period, without a lease in writing, shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of the first year or other period, and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of such determination: Provided that, where any rent has subsequently been received in respect of the tenancy, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the last receipt of rent.

Where any person is in possession of land by virtue of a lease in writing by which a rent of not less than $20 is reserved, and the rent is received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease, and no rent is subsequently received by the person rightfully so entitled, the right of action of the last-named person to recover the land shall be deemed to have accrued at the date when the rent was first received by the person wrongfully claiming as aforesaid and not at the date of the determination of the lease.

Subsections (1) and (3) shall not apply to any tenancy at will or lease granted by the Government. (Amended 29 of 1998 s. 105)

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 9 U.K.]

No right of action to recover land shall be deemed to accrue unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (hereafter in this section referred to as adverse possession) and where under the foregoing provisions of this Ordinance any such right of action is deemed to accrue on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall not be deemed to accrue unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land.

Where a right of action to recover land has accrued and thereafter, before the right is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be deemed to have accrued and no fresh right of action shall be deemed to accrue unless and until the land is again taken in adverse possession.

For the purposes of this section—

No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property, or to recover proceeds of the sale of land, after the expiration of 12 years from the date when the right to receive the money accrued. (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 8)

No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued: (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 8) Provided that if, after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, the right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to have accrued until the date on which his possession discontinued.

The right to receive any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall not be deemed to accrue so long as that property comprises any future interest or any life insurance policy which has not matured or been determined.

Nothing in this section shall apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Ordinance relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an action.

No action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land, or to recover damages in respect of such arrears, shall be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due: Provided that— (a)where a prior mortgagee or other incumbrancer has been in possession of the property charged, and an action is brought within 1 year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent incumbrancer, he may recover by that action all the arrears of interest which fell due during the period of possession by the prior incumbrancer or damages in respect thereof, notwithstanding that the period exceeded 6 years; (b)where the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises any future interest or life insurance policy and it is a term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest shall be treated as part of the principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or charge, interest shall not be deemed to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued.

This section shall not apply to any mortgage or charge on a ship.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 18 U.K.]

No period of limitation prescribed by this Ordinance shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—

Subject as aforesaid, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance, shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued: Provided that the right of action shall not be deemed to have accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property, until the interest fell into possession.

No beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Ordinance shall derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than he could have obtained if he had brought the action and this Ordinance had been pleaded in defence.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 19 U.K.]

If on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 6 years from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation had expired: Provided that— (a)this section shall not affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims; (b)when a right of action which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the death of that person while still under a disability, to another person under disability, no further extension of time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person; (Amended L.N. 100 of 1968) (c)no action to recover land or money charged on land shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or some person through whom he claims; (d)this section shall not apply to any action to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way thereof, by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment, except where the action is brought by an aggrieved party.

If the action is one to which section 27 or 28(3) applies subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words “6 years” there were substituted the words “3 years”. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 4) [cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 2 U.K.]

Where this section applies by virtue of section 6, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words “6 years” there were substituted the words “2 years”. (Added 67 of 1976 s. 4)

For the purposes of this section and section 22A, a person shall be deemed to be under a disability while he is an infant or of unsound mind, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this subsection, a person shall be conclusively presumed to be of unsound mind while he is detained in pursuance of any Ordinance or imperial enactment authorizing the detention of persons of unsound mind, including persons convicted of offences or awaiting trial, or while he is receiving treatment voluntarily under the provisions of the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap. 136). (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 10)

[cf. 1939 c. 21 ss. 22 & 31(2) & (3) U.K.; 1954 c. 36 s. 2(2) U.K.]

Subject to subsection (2), if in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by section 31—

the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 3 years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period mentioned above has expired.

An action may not be brought by virtue of subsection (1) after the end of the period of limitation prescribed by section 32.

Where there has accrued any right of action (including a foreclosure action) to recover land or any right of a mortgagee of personal property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property, and—

the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or payment. (Amended L.N. 100 of 1968)

Where a mortgagee is by virtue of the mortgage in possession of any mortgaged land and either receives any sum in respect of the principal or interest of the mortgage debt or acknowledges the title of the mortgagor, or his equity of redemption, an action to redeem the land in his possession may be brought at any time before the expiration of 12 years from the date of the payment or acknowledgment.

Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment: Provided that a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder then due, but any payment of interest shall be treated as a payment in respect of the principal debt. (Amended L.N. 346 of 1982)

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 23 U.K.]

Every such acknowledgment as aforesaid shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment.

Any such acknowledgment or payment as aforesaid may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under section 23, and shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 24 U.K.]

An acknowledgment of the title to any land or mortgaged personalty by any person in possession thereof shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.

A payment in respect of a mortgage debt by the mortgagor or any person in possession of the mortgaged property shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.

Where 2 or more mortgagees are by virtue of the mortgage in possession of the mortgaged land, an acknowledgment of the mortgagor’s title or of his equity of redemption by one of the mortgagees shall bind only him and his successors and shall not bind any other mortgagee or his successors, and where the mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a part of the mortgaged land and not to any ascertained part of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem that part of the land on payment, with interest, of the part of the mortgage debt which bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value of the part of the land bears to the whole of the mortgaged land.

Where there are 2 or more mortgagors, and the title or right to redemption of one of the mortgagors is acknowledged as aforesaid, the acknowledgment shall be deemed to have been made to all the mortgagors.

An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledgor and his successors but not any other person:Provided that an acknowledgment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment.

A payment made in respect of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof:Provided that a payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any person other than the person making the payment and his successors, and shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the payment.

An acknowledgment by one of several personal representatives of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person, or to any share or interest therein, or a payment by one of several personal representatives in respect of any such claim shall bind the estate of the deceased person.

[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 25 U.K.]

Subject to subsection (4), where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, either—

the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.

References in subsection (1) to the defendant include references to the defendant’s agent and to any person through whom the defendant claims and his agent.

For the purposes of subsection (1), deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.

Nothing in this section shall enable any action—

to be brought against the purchaser of the property or any person claiming through him in any case where the property has been purchased for valuable consideration by an innocent third party since the fraud or concealment or (as the case may be) the transaction in which the mistake was made took place.

A purchaser is an innocent third party for the purposes of this section—

Sections 31 and 32 shall not apply to any action to which subsection (1)(b) applies (and accordingly the period of limitation referred to in that subsection, in any case to which either of those sections would otherwise apply, is the period applicable under section 4(1)).

This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under an Ordinance or imperial enactment or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.

Section 4 shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.

Subject to section 30, an action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period specified in subsections (4) and (5).

Except where subsection (5) applies, the said period is 3 years from—

If the person injured dies before the expiration of the period in subsection (4), the period as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate of the deceased by virtue of section 20 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) shall be 3 years from—

whichever is the later.

In this section, and in section 28, references to a person’s date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—

and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant.

For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the plaintiff would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

For the purposes of this section and section 28 a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—

but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.

If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.

This section has effect subject to section 30.

An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall not be brought if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Ordinance or in any other Ordinance, or any other reason); and where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 27, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 30.

An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from—

whichever is the later.

Subsection (3) shall not apply to an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any Ordinance other than this Ordinance, and section 27 shall not apply to an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22).

An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall be one to which section 22 applies, but otherwise sections 22 to 26, inclusive, and Part IV shall not apply to the action.

This section applies where there is more than one person for whose benefit an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) is brought.

Section 28(3)(b) shall be applied separately to each of them, and if that would debar one or more of them, but not all, the court shall direct that any person who would be so debarred shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought unless it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of that person it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 22, or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise).

If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which— (Amended L.N. 307 of 1998)

the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.

The court shall not under this section disapply section 28(2) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 27; so that if, for example, the person injured could at his death no longer maintain an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) because of the time limit under the Carriage by Air Ordinance (Cap. 500), the court has no power to direct that section 28(2) shall not apply. (Amended 13 of 1997 s. 20)

In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to—

In a case where the person injured died when, because of section 27, he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased.

In a case under subsection (4), or any other case where the time limit, or one of the time limits, depends on the date of knowledge of a person other than the plaintiff, subsection (3) shall have effect with appropriate modifications, and shall have effect in particular as if references to the plaintiff included references to any person whose date of knowledge is or was relevant in determining a time limit.

A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 28(2) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect in section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22).

References in this section to section 27 include references to that section as extended by any provision of this Part and Part IV.

This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 27 applies, where the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both—

(referred to in this section as the date of knowledge) falls after the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The period of limitation prescribed by section 4(1) in respect of actions founded on tort shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.

An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4).

That period is either—

Knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1).

For the purposes of this section or section 33 a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—

but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection or section 33 to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.

An action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 27 applies, shall not be brought after the expiration of 15 years from the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which there occurred any act or omission—

This section bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) applies notwithstanding that—

before the end of the period of limitation prescribed by this section.

For the purposes of this Ordinance, any new claim made in the course of any action shall be deemed to be a separate action and to have been commenced—

In this section a new claim means any claim by way of set-off or counterclaim, and any claim involving either—

and third party proceedings (第三方法律程序) means any proceedings brought in the course of any action by any party to the action against a person not previously a party to the action, other than proceedings brought by joining any such person as defendant to any claim already made in the original action by the party bringing the proceedings.

Except as provided by section 30 or by rules of court, the court shall not allow a new claim within subsection (1)(b), other than an original set-off or counterclaim, to be made in the course of any action after the expiry of any time limit under this Ordinance which would affect a new action to enforce that claim.

For the purposes of subsection (3), a claim is an original set-off or an original counterclaim if it is a claim made by way of set-off or (as the case may be) by way of counterclaim by a party who has not previously made any claim in the action.

Rules of court may provide for allowing a new claim to which subsection (3) applies to be made as there mentioned, but only if the conditions specified in subsection (6) are satisfied, and subject to any further restrictions the rules may impose.

The conditions referred to in subsection (5) are—

The addition or substitution of a new party shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (6)(b) as necessary for the determination of the original action unless either— (Amended L.N. 446 of 1994)

Subject to subsection (5), rules of court may provide for allowing a party to any action to claim relief in a new capacity in respect of a new cause of action notwithstanding that he had no title to make that claim at the date of the commencement of the action.

Subsection (8) shall not be taken as prejudicing the power of rules of court to provide for allowing a party to claim relief in a new capacity without adding or substituting a new cause of action.

Subsections (3) to (9) shall apply in relation to a new claim made in the course of third party proceedings as if those proceedings were the original action, and subject to such other modifications as may be prescribed by rules of court in any case or class of case.

The power to make rules of court under section 54 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (Cap. 4) shall include power to make rules of court for the purposes of this section.

Rules of court made before the commencement^# of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 (58 of 1984) which would have been validly made had this section been in operation when they were made shall have effect as from the commencement^# of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 (58 of 1984) as if made by virtue of this section.

Sections 22(2) and (2A), 27, 28, 29 and 30 shall have effect in relation to causes of action which accrued before, as well as causes of action which accrue on or after, 1 February 1977 and shall have effect in relation to any cause of action which accrued before 1 February 1977 notwithstanding that an action in respect thereof has been commenced and is pending on 1 February 1977. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 6)

For the purposes of this section an action shall not be taken to be pending at any time if a final order or judgment has been made or given therein, notwithstanding that an appeal is pending or that the time for appealing has not expired. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 6)

A decision taken at any time by a court to grant, or not to grant, leave under the former sections 27 to 33 inclusive (which, so far as they relate to leave, are repealed by the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (67 of 1976)) does not affect the determination of any question in proceedings under the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (67 of 1976), but in such proceedings account may be taken of evidence admitted in proceedings under the said sections repealed by the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (67 of 1976). (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 6. Amended L.N. 587 of 1995)

Save as aforesaid, nothing in this Ordinance shall—

Subject to the provisions of section 6 and subsection (4) of this section, the time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action which accrued before the commencement of this Ordinance shall, if it has not then already expired, expire at a time when it would have expired apart from the provisions of this Ordinance or at any time when it would have expired if the provisions of this Ordinance had at all material times been in force, whichever is the later:

Provided that where a cause of action, for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, has accrued before the commencement of this Ordinance in any case in which, but for the provisions of this Ordinance, no time for bringing proceedings in respect thereof is limited, the time for bringing such proceedings, as limited by the provisions of this Ordinance, shall commence to run from the date of the coming into operation of this Ordinance. [cf. 1954 c. 36 s. 7(1) U.K.]

The time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action—

which accrued before 1 July 1991 shall, if it has not then already expired, expire at the time when it would have expired apart from the provisions of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 (31 of 1991).

Nothing in section 22A, 31 or 32 shall—

Subject to subsection (2), sections 22A, 31 and 32 shall have effect in relation to causes of action accruing before, as well as in relation to causes of action accruing on or after, 1 July 1991.