DCCC160/2024

DCCC160/2024

A A B B DCCC 160/2024 C [2025] HKDC 392 C D D IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE E HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION E CRIMINAL CASE NO 160 OF 2024 F F G ---------------------------- G HKSAR H H v I BRAR HARVIR SINGH (D1) I KULVIR-SINGH (D3) J J ---------------------------- K K Before: Deputy District Judge Peony Wong L L Date: 5 March 2025 M Present: Mr Ma Yu Kit Justin, Senior Public Prosecutor (Ag.), for M HKSAR N N Mr Simon N M Young, instructed by Lee Law Firm, for the O 1st and 3rd defendants O Offence: [1] Dangerous driving (危險駕駛) - 3rd Defendant P P [2] Driving while disqualified (於取消駕駛資格期間駕駛) - Q Q 3rd Defendant R [3] Driving an unlicensed vehicle (駕駛未領牌車輛) - 3rd R Defendant S S [4] Using a motor vehicle without third party insurance (沒有 T T 第三者保險而使用汽車) - 3rd Defendant U U V V  -2- A A B B [5] Failing to stop after accident whereby damage was caused C to other thing (發生意外以致其他東西受到損害後沒有停 C 車) - 3rd Defendant D D [6] Failing to report an accident involving damage (沒有報告 E E 涉及損害的意外) - 3rd Defendant F [7] Doing an act or a series of acts tending and intended to F pervert the course of public justice (作出一項或一連串傾向 G G 並意圖妨礙司法公正的作為) - 1 and 3 Defendant st rd H H I I --------------------------------------- J J REASONS FOR SENTENCE K --------------------------------------- K L L M 1. The 3rd Defendant (“D3”) indicated that he will plead guilty M to Charges 1 to 6 at the first hearing before the District Court. By letter N N dated 2nd July 2024, i.e. after the trial had been fixed, the 1st Defendant O (“D1”) and D3 indicated their guilty pleas to Charge 7. O P P 2. The charges are as follows:- Q Q (a) Charge 1: Dangerous driving, section 37(1) of the Road R R Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374; S S (b) Charge 2: Driving whilst disqualified, section 44(1)(b) of the T T Road Traffic Ordinance; U U V V  -3- A A B B C (c) Charge 3: Driving an unlicensed vehicle, section 52(1)(a) C and (10)(a) of the Road Traffic Ordinance; D D E (d) Charge 4: Using a motor vehicle without third party insurance, E section 4(1) and (2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third F F Party Risks) Ordinance, Cap 272; G G (e) Charge 5: Failing to stop after accident whereby damage was H H caused to other thing, section 56(1)(b) and (5) of the Road I Traffic Ordinance; I J J (f) Charge 6: Failing to report an accident involving damage, K section 56(2A) and (6) of the Road Traffic Ordinance; and K L L (g) Charge 7: Doing an act or a series of acts tending and M intended to pervert the course of public justice, Common M Law and punishable under section 101I(5) of the Criminal N N Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221. O O Facts of the Case P P Q 3. D3 was the registered owner of the private car in question Q (hereinafter referred to as the “Vehicle”). The vehicle licence was valid R R th th from 14 July 2022 to 13 July 2023. The Third Party Insurance covers S 24th October 2022 to 23rd October 2023, but was only valid if, amongst S other things, the person driving was not disqualified from holding a driving T T licence. U U V V  -4- A A B B 4. D3 was convicted of dangerous driving on 11th May 2023, and C was disqualified from holding a driving licence for 6 months with C immediate effect. D D E 5. On 28th July 2023, at around 5:15 am, D2 drove the Vehicle, E with D3 and an Indian male (hereinafter referred to as “X”) onboard to F F Central. They then went to a restaurant in Central. At around 6:50 am, G they left the restaurant and boarded the Vehicle, with D3 as the driver. G H H 6. At around 7 am, the Vehicle was travelling downhill and I making a right turn on Lower Albert Road. The weather was fine and the I road surface was dry. The Vehicle suddenly swerved to its left onto the J J pedestrian pavement on Lower Albert Road near West Wing, Justice Place K (hereinafter referred to as “West Wing”), and crashed into a security kiosk K at West Wing where a security guard was stationed inside. L L M 7. After the accident, D2, D3 and X immediately alighted, and M fled together towards the direction of Wyndham Street, and boarded a taxi N N at Queen’s Road Central at around 7:05 am. O O 8. A report was immediately made to the police, and no brake P P marks were found at the scene by the police who had arrived at the scene Q shortly after the report. CCTV camera captured the events. Q R R 9. D2, D3 and X alighted the taxi outside a carpark at Ka Wai S Chuen in Hung Hom at around 7:16 am. D2 and X waited at the carpark S whereas D3 returned to his residence nearby at around 7:19 am. T T U U V V  -5- A A B B 10. At about 7:27 am, D3 and his younger brother D1 left their C residence. D1 was wearing the T-shirt, trousers and shoes worn by D3 at C the time of the accident. D1 and D3 then met with D2 and X at the said D D carpark at around 7:28 am. At around 7:29 am, D1, D2, D3 and X left the E carpark together. E F F 11. At around 7:30 am, D1 and D2 boarded a taxi and asked to be G taken to Central. When the taxi reached Cotton Tree Drive, the taxi driver G was instructed to go to Lan Kwai Fong. What transpired was that before H H the taxi actually reached any particular destination, the taxi driver was I instructed to go to various places both in Central and elsewhere, including I further up Cotton Tree Drive, to make a u-turn and go downhill on Garden J J Road, then to Hung Hom, and then Lan Kwai Fong. K K 12. When the taxi reached Cotton Tree Drive, a male voice from L L a video call using the mobile phone gave instructions to the taxi driver. As M a result the taxi went to Upper Albert Road, Glenealy, Wyndham Street, M Wellington Street, Lyndhurst Terrace, Hollywood Road and Lower Albert N N Road. O O 13. When the taxi reached Ice House Street near the Hong Kong P P Diamond Exchange Building at about 8:05 am, D1 and D2 alighted the taxi, Q and walked towards Lower Albert Road, with D1 walking ahead of D2. Q D2 was holding a mobile phone next to his ear. At about 8:06 am, D2 made R R a U-turn towards Queen’s Road Central. S S 14. At about 8:07 am, D1 approached the police on Lower Albert T T Road near the accident scene. D1 represented to the police that he was the U U V V  -6- A A B B driver of the Vehicle from Hung Hom to Lan Kwai Fong in the early hours C of 28th July 2023, he had parked the Vehicle at Lan Kwai Fong, and that he C was the driver of the Vehicle at the time of the accident. He stated that he D D was afraid and therefore fled the scene, but had returned to face the E consequences. The police arrested D1 for the offences of dangerous E driving and criminal damage. F F G 15. D3 surrendered to the police on 31st July 2023. No report of G the accident was made by D3 to the police before the surrender. D3 was H H arrested for various charges, including driving related offences and I conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice. I J J 16. Motor vehicle examination of the Vehicle on 31st July 2023 K found its steering and functions operative, and there was no mechanical K defect. There were, however, some damage to the Vehicle caused by the L L collision, including the deployment of driver’s airbag and passengers M seatbelts. D3’s DNA was found on the surface of the airbag at the driver’s M seat. N N O D1’s Antecedent Statement, Background Report and Mitigation O P P 17. D1 is 25 years old and has a clear record. He obtained an Q Associate Degree in Mobile Information Technology in 2019 and a Q Bachelor of Science in Information Management in 2021. He worked as a R R software developer. He is also a part-time instructor teaching STEM S coding. S T T U U V V  -7- A A B B 18. Defence submits that the present offence is out of character, C and he had been a role model to young people in the ethnic minority C community, evidenced by the press articles on his studies and career path, D D as well as the projects and platforms he had participated in, assisting Hong E Kong’s ethnic minority community and low-income students. Defence E submits that he was woken up by his elder brother D3 at the time, and had F F committed the offence instinctively in an attempt to help D3. It is urged G upon the Court to consider his deep remorse. G H H 19. The background report refers to D1 leading a stable life and I had planned a move with his girlfriend to Canada in September 2023 to I further his career in information technology. The plan was cancelled and J J the relationship with his girlfriend ended due to his arrest for the present K case. K L L D3’s Antecedent Statement, Background Report and Mitigation M M 20. D3 is 27 years old and has one previous conviction of N N dangerous driving, whereby he was disqualified from holding a driver’s O licence, the breach of which being the subject matter of this case. He works O in food delivery, after having sustained injuries at a traffic accident which P P rendered it difficult for him to resume his previous construction work. Q Q 21. It is submitted that D3 had obtained his driving licence at 18 R R years of age, and his first traffic conviction was in 2023. The Defence S urges the Court to consider his deep remorse for the offence and having S caused trouble to D1 and his family, and of the almost 8 months’ remand. T T U U V V  -8- A A B B Sentencing Considerations C C 22. For all charges against D1 and D3, the Court has considered D D the guilty pleas, all mitigation and mitigation documents, the authorities E submitted by both parties, D1’s clear record and D3’s criminal conviction E record, their willingness to compensate, and D3’s surrender to the police. F F G Charge 1: Dangerous Driving G H H 23. The Defence cited HKSAR v Kwan Wan Ki [2020] 5 HKLRD I 433. Although that case is a dangerous driving causing grievous bodily I harm case, certain basic sentencing principles relevant to dangerous J J driving charges in general emerge therefrom. K K 24. The Court of Appeal in Kwan Wan Ki stated that as a matter L L of principle for offences involving dangerous driving, it is an aggravating M factor where the defendant has a criminal record, especially of multiple M similar convictions. The main concern of the Court is the culpability of the N N defendant’s dangerous driving and the seriousness of the consequences. O O 25. Defence cited this case to show that the Court of Appeal has P P stated that for a case which did not involve any particular aggravating Q factor, except that the appellant drove through the pedestrian crossing Q without paying regard to the traffic sign and traffic signal, causing grievous R R bodily harm which the victim had fully recovered, a sentence of not less S than 10 months’ immediate imprisonment is appropriate as the starting S point. T T U U V V  -9- A A B B 26. The sentence in Kwan Wan Ki is however of limited C assistance to the present case, as it was a dangerous driving causing C grievous bodily harm case, and there were no particular aggravating factors D D as in the present case of a previous same conviction just over 2 months E before the present offence. E F F 27. In the present case, the degree of danger in D3’s manner of G driving was much more serious than the momentary lapse of attention of G missing the traffic signal in Kwan Wan Ki. D3 had completely lost control H H of the Vehicle with absolutely no explanation and swerved in a very sudden I manner with high speed right into the entrance of Justice Place, tore down I a sign post, damaged stone walls, and dived head on at the security kiosk. J J The photos of the aftermath and the CCTV video showed the full horror of K the incident. It was most fortunate that the security kiosk was built with K much sturdier materials than ordinary ones, and therefore no injuries to the L L security personnel stationed inside were caused. It was also sheer luck that M no one was at the entrance of Justice Place within the route of the Vehicle M as it crashed in, but the potential damage remains grave. N N O 28. Bearing in mind D3’s willingness to make full compensation, O I shall adopt a starting point of 9 months’ imprisonment for Charge 1. Due P P to D3’s indicated guilty plea before trial date was fixed, I shall apply 1/3 Q discount to the sentence. For Charge 1, D3 is sentenced to 6 months’ Q imprisonment, disqualification order of 2 years and the requirement for R R completion of a driving improvement course within the time limit set by S the law. As this is the second conviction of dangerous driving for D3 S within 5 years, the disqualification order shall not commence until D3 has T T completed serving all other imprisonment terms for this present case. U U V V  - 10 - A A B B C 29. I shall also make a compensation order for $3,685, to be C deducted from D3’s bail. D D E Charge 2: Driving Whilst Disqualified E F F 30. It is trite law that driving whilst disqualified would normally G result in an immediate custodial sentence, as the offence involves a G disobedience of Court order. H H I 31. In the present case, there is no explanation offered by the I Defence as to why D3 had to drive the Vehicle upon leaving the restaurant J J in Central. D2 was the person who drove the Vehicle there. They could K have flagged down a taxi easily at around 6:50 a.m. in Central when they K left the restaurant. They could have arranged someone to drive away the L L Vehicle at a fee if they so desired. There could not have been any M acceptable explanation for D3 taking over the driving of the Vehicle when M he had only been disqualified around 2.5 months earlier. N N O 32. Defence prays for a lenient sentence for this charge with the O case of HKSAR v Liu Yim Hung HCMA 267/1998. It is true that the P P appellant in that case was disqualified not long prior to the offence (in the Q Liu Yim Hung case being 1 month), has only 1 previous conviction record Q for which he was disqualified, and that there was no good reason for R R driving, which are all similar to the present case which involved D3 driving S 2.5 months after being disqualified for 6 months. S T T U U V V  - 11 - A A B B 33. The said case, however, differs from the present case in that C there was no particular aggravation in the manner of driving, involving C only a simple speeding offence, and no other evidence of bad driving. The D D present case involves dangerous driving which caused an accident, the E circumstances of which must have caused fear for the life of the security E staff stationed at the security kiosk, and damage to property. F F G 34. I am therefore satisfied that the appropriate starting point for G this charge should be 6 months’ imprisonment, and allowing 1/3 discount H H for the guilty plea, D3 shall be sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment for I Charge 2, with a disqualification order of 12 months, to commence after I completion of the disqualification order of Charge 1. J J K Charge 3: Driving an Unlicensed Vehicle K L L 35. V’s vehicle licence was valid from 14th July 2022 to 13th July M 2023. The licence had expired for 15 days when the accident occurred. I M shall order that D3 be fined $2,000 for this Charge. N N O Charge 4: Using a Motor Vehicle Without Third Party Insurance O P P 36. Concerning Charge 4, the Court does not agree that the fact Q that the insurance coverage was paid for a period covering the date of the Q offence is any mitigation. D3 knew that he had been disqualified and that R R rd rd the 3 party insurance coverage could not protect 3 parties involved in S any accident caused by his driving during the disqualification period. The S purpose of the insurance was the protection of 3rd parties, and therefore the T T U U V V  - 12 - A A B B effective period of insurance coverage had the disqualification order not C been imposed has no relevance to sentencing. C D D 37. In the present case, an accident occurred, and although there E were no personal injuries caused, property damage was occasioned, the E costs of repairs being $3,685, for which D3 was willing to make full F F compensation. I shall adopt a starting point of 3 months’ imprisonment, G and allow 1/3 discount for his guilty plea. D3 shall be sentenced to 2 G months’ imprisonment for Charge 4, with a disqualification order of 12 H H months. I I Charges 5: Failing to Stop After Accident & Charge 6: Failing to Report J J an Accident K K 38. The Court considers that there were no injuries to anyone due L L to the accident, but property damage was caused, and the repair costs M amounted to $3,685. I will impose a fine of $2,000 each for Charges 5 and M 6. N N O Charge 7: Doing an Act or a Series of Acts Tending and Intended to O Pervert the Course of Public Justice P P Q 39. I have considered both authorities submitted by the Q Prosecution and the Defence. R R S 40. The basic principles in sentencing this type of offence is stated S in AG v Yeung Kwong-chi [1989] 1 HKLR 266. It was held that the normal T T sentence for an attempt to pervert the course of justice was one of U U V V  - 13 - A A B B immediate imprisonment. In order to justify any non immediate custodial C sentence, abnormal circumstances must be present. Although clear record, C good family background, a single fall from grace, the likelihood of leading D D a blameless life in future were all proper matters for consideration, they are E by no means abnormal when put in the context of a crime of this nature so E as to justify a suspended sentence. F F G 41. Amongst the several cases submitted by the Defence, HKSAR G v Tse Nicholas [2004] 1 HKC 39 is an appeal against conviction, and H H therefore the sentence at first instance is of very limited assistance, if any, I to this Court. Further the facts did not indicate whether the substitution I had the purpose of allowing the driver to avoid penalty for matters outside J J the manner of driving and the crash itself. K K 42. The case of HKSAR v Yuen Sun Wing [2010] 3 HKLRD 145, L L concerns a ‘syndicate type’ arrangement with substitution of an appellant M in place of the many taxi drivers who had contravened traffic regulations. M The background is very different from the present case. Further, the case N N of Yuen Sun Wing involves traffic contraventions that were minor, i.e. O speeding or disregarding traffic signals, which would involve O accumulation of driving points leading eventually to disqualification under P P the driving points system. That cannot be compared with the much more Q serious matters of dangerous driving and driving whilst disqualified, for Q which imprisonment terms are likely. I am therefore of the view that the R R case of Yuen Sun Wing offers little assistance. S S 43. The case of HKSAR v Lo Hing Kit HCMA 147/2006 which T T the Defence submitted, relates to the appeal of an appellant who was U U V V  - 14 - A A B B convicted after trial. The facts indicate that the appellant arrived at the C scene of an accident where the foreigner driver was the appellant’s friend. C The appellant was sentenced to CSO upon appeal, based on his relative D D youth of 26 years, previous clear record, positive good character and E favourable CSO report, the fact that he had nothing to gain through the E offence, his misguided sense of loyalty to his friend, the effect of F F imprisonment on his insurance and financial planning career, and his G family circumstances. G H H 44. First of all, the judgment of Lo Hing Kit mentioned the I “appellant’s background has many aspects of it which are deserving of I sympathy, perhaps more for his parents than for himself.” Secondly, it J J was also clearly stated that “This sentence is by no means intended to be a K precedent for sentences in cases of perverting the course of justice and K should not be taken as such. In such cases, an immediate custodial sentence L L should still be the norm.” M M 45. I have also noticed that in Lo Hing Kit, there is nothing N N indicating that the appellant’s act of misrepresentation had the tendency to O allow the driver to escape from the responsibility concerning anything O other than the crash itself. In the present case, however, D1 and D3’s P P agreement had the result of not only allowing D3 to escape from his Q responsibility concerning Charges 1, 3, 5 and 6, but also to escape from the Q liability for Charges 2 and 4, with Charge 2 leading to an almost inevitable R R immediate custodial sentence. This was the reason for which they had S engaged in the offence involving Charge 7. This is a much more serious S situation than that in Lo Hing Kit. T T U U V V  - 15 - A A B B 46. For the case of 香港特別行政區 訴 何浩峰 HCMA 443/2010, C the appellant was convicted after trial and had appealed against the C sentence of 3 months’ imprisonment. He was the passenger of a car driven D D by his friend, after the 2 of them went to a bar to drink, and his friend was E drunk while driving the car, resulting in an accident. The appellant claimed E to the police that he was the driver at the time of the accident, yet another F F person present contradicted this statement. The appellant changed his G stance 20 minutes later. At appeal the appellant’s counsel stated that the G appellant pleaded not guilty as he thought he had a defence of intoxication. H H I 47. It was stated by the Court during appeal in the case of 何浩峰 I J that the appellant came from a decent family, and had changed his J occupation from assistant engineer to transportation worker due to issues K K with income. The Court in 何浩峰 case considered the appellant’s positive L CSO report concerning his fair work attitude and personal qualities, and L ordered the original imprisonment term to be substituted by a CSO of 180 M M hours. N N 48. The appellant’s actions in 何浩峰 case would obviously allow O O his friend to escape the consequences of a drink driving and careless P driving or dangerous driving conviction. Depending on the level of P intoxication and the seriousness of the accident and its aftermath (which Q Q were entirely unknown upon reading the judgment), one cannot say that R immediate imprisonment is a highly likely or normal sentence for the R appellant’s friend if he had been caught as the driver. S S T T U U V V  - 16 - A A B B 49. It also appears from the facts of 何 浩 峰 case that the C premeditation of the appellant, if it existed, would be minimal as there C would not be a lot of time before the police arrived. His actions were also D D limited although admittedly crucial, i.e. waiting at the scene and telling the E police that he was the driver. E F F 50. The present case tells a much different story. As stated, D3 G had breached a Court imposed disqualification order just 2.5 months after G the order had been imposed, and will therefore highly likely be sentenced H H to immediate imprisonment. D3 had changed his clothes with D1, so as to I create the impression that D1 was the driver when the police started I investigating the case and viewing the CCTV videos. D1 and D3 left home J J and engaged in a discussion with others nearby. D1 then took a taxi to the K vicinity of the accident, and alighted some distance away from the accident K location, obviously in order to avoid being detected with D2 who had L L escaped the scene with D3 and X, and had travelled with D1 back to the M area. D1 then gave the police a story about where he had parked the car M prior to the journey which ended with the accident, and brought the police N N to various locations covered by the route as claimed by him. O O P 51. The above shows that the misrepresentation was a carefully P thought out and detailed plan, agreed upon by at least D1 and D3. Q Q Although there is no indication as to the amount of police manpower R wasted on this misguided investigation direction concerning the accident, R it is to be expected that heavy input was made into investigating an accident S S involving an unexplained car crash at Justice Place. This necessarily brings T the case outside the simple scenario of a car accident with the passenger or T U U V V  - 17 - A A B B someone else not present being called upon to attend the scene and claim C as driver. C D D 52. The Prosecution submitted the case of Secretary for Justice v E Lee Ying Tung [2023] 3 HKLRD 667, which was a review of the sentence E filed by the Secretary for Justice. The respondent’s husband was F F intercepted by the police while leaving their apartment, and alerted the G respondent that there were police approaching, and not to open the door. G Several minutes later, a bag of dangerous drugs was thrown out of the H H window from the apartment. The respondent was charged with perverting I the course of public justice, and was sentenced to 84 days’ imprisonment I after a guilty plea. It was stated that the general starting point for providing J J false account to the police investigating a serious offence is between 2 and K 3 years; and for concealment of evidence, the same bracket of 2 to 3 years’ K starting point applies. Upon review, the starting point of 3 years was L L adopted. M M 53. I am of the view that, despite the present case having the N N element of providing a false account to the investigating police, although O the offence involved crashing into Justice Place, it was not intended as a O provocation to the authorities. It was no more than D3 losing control of P P the Vehicle and thereby committing the act of dangerous driving. As such, Q although it cannot be seen as a minor case, it is not very high in the Q spectrum of seriousness for the offence. Therefore I do not think a starting R R point as high as 2 to 3 years for this Charge is warranted. S S 54. Defence in the supplemental mitigation bundle submitted T T more cases on suspended sentence for Charge 7. HKSAR v Wong Shing U U V V  - 18 - A A B B Yim [2003] 3 HKLRD 1046 was an appeal against conviction only and C therefore of no assistance. C D D 55. For Yuen Man Chiu v R CACC 399/1980, it involves a E barrister inciting others to pervert the course of public justice by making E false statements to the police about an assault, by preparing a statement for F F those involved in the assault containing false account of the events to G present it at the police station. On appeal, the sentence was suspended, G with ‘mitigating factors of substantial weight’ including the fact that other H H persons involved were given immunity, a recent medical report showing a I serious deterioration in both the appellant’s mental and physical condition, I the likelihood that his career at the Bar would be finished, and that he had J J been in custody for 6 months. K K 56. The Court observes that Yuen Man Chiu has a rather different L L factual background from the present case, and therefore its sentence is of M little assistance. Secondly, amongst the ‘mitigating factors of substantial M weight’, the only similarity with the present case is the previous detention. N N Although D1’s dreams of pursuing his career overseas had probably been O dashed, he could still pursue the same area of work in Hong Kong, unlike O the appellant in Yuen Man Chiu. There is also no disparate treatment of P P D1 and D3 from other persons alleged to be involved in the present case, Q and no humanitarian ground of deteriorating health for either of them. I Q am therefore of the view that the sentence of Yuen Man Chiu lies very much R R with its own facts and circumstances of the appellant. S S 57. HKSAR v Yeung Wai Birney DCCC 1090/2007 is a District T T Court case and therefore has no binding effect on this Court. But even so, U U V V  - 19 - A A B B the facts of that case is different from the present case, in that the defendant C was a solicitor who was not the mastermind. He had merely signed the C letters to the witness of a trial trying to dissuade her from testifying. The D D letters were in fact drafted by a counsel. The defendant’s career as a E solicitor would be over because of this case, and he had assisted the E Prosecution in providing witness statements and testifying in Court against F F the counsel concerned. I am therefore of the view that the suspended G sentence in that case is not of assistance here. G H H 58. Of the culpability between D1 and D3, I find that D3 was the I mastermind of the plan. He was the person who had every benefit from I the plan, in order to avoid imprisonment for his driving whilst disqualified. J J He was also the person who approached D1 while D1 was asleep early in K the morning, and abused D1’s brotherly love. Panic is not a mitigating K factor for this kind of offence. The root of the panic was D3’s irresponsible L L conduct and disregard of the order of the Court. I am therefore of the view M that D3 bears a much greater blame for the events than D1. M N N 59. Bearing in mind all the relevant considerations for CSO and O suspended sentence and the factors discussed above, I am of the view that O immediate imprisonment term for D3 is inevitable, even considering his P P surrender to the police. CSO and suspended sentences, even considering Q D3’s earlier detention before bail, are not sufficiently deterrent sentences Q against both D3 and others who are minded to commit similar offences. R R S 60. But that is not to say that D1 should be dealt with by sentences S other than immediate custodial sentence. I accept that he has nothing to T T gain from the offence. Yet despite his good record and background, he is U U V V  - 20 - A A B B an educated man and should know the seriousness, if not the penalty, of C tampering with the course of justice. Even though he had been woken up C from his sleep in order to assist D3, the actions involved in the charge were D D not just transitory representations, and instead involve multiple steps of E changing clothes, discussions concerning the plan, taking taxi to the E vicinity, alighting well ahead and away from the location, approaching the F F police and making the false representation, telling a detailed story of what G happened prior to the accident and making good that story by bringing the G police to different locations. H H I 61. Even though D1 may not be the mastermind, and that he has I nothing to gain from the offence, D1’s actions involved a good deal of J J premeditation and planning, and cannot be acts of impulse or the result of K lack of consequential thinking. I am of the view that there are no abnormal K or exceptional circumstances justifying imposing anything other than an L L immediate custodial sentence. CSO and suspended sentence are therefore M not suitable options. M N N 62. I shall therefore adopt starting points for Charge 7 of 16 O months and 20 months for D1 and D3 respectively. Both of them had O entered pleas of not guilty to Charge 7 on 27th February 2024. A trial date P P th commencing on 10 February 2025 was therefore fixed on that day. On Q 2nd July 2024, i.e. 4 odd months after the fixing of trial date and 7 months Q before the trial, D1 and D3 indicated that they would wish to plead guilty R R to Charge 7. S S 63. The Defence accepts that according to HKSAR v Ngo Van T T Nam [2016] 5 HKLRD 1, an indication of plea of guilty after the fixing of U U V V  - 21 - A A B B trial date but before the first day of trial would normally attract a discount C between 25% and 20%. Defence submits that as the guideline remains C subject to the overriding discretion of the judge in sentencing, in rare cases D D the discount can be above the said range. Defence urges the Court to E consider that as D1 and D3 had indicated their guilty pleas around 7 months E prior to the commencement of trial, that allowed the prosecution to dispose F F of the case in an efficient and orderly manner, therefore the discount in G sentence should be at 30%. G H H 64. I do not agree. The normal discount for guilty pleas before the I trial date is fixed would be 1/3, i.e. 33.33%. To grant a discount of 30% in I this case, which is very close to 33.33%, would blur the division between J J pleading guilty before and after trial date had been fixed. Any indication K of plea of guilty before the trial date would have the effect of more efficient K disposal, and that is already subsumed in the range of 25% to 20%. The L L range was designed to allow differing degrees of discount within that range, M after taking into account various matters including the timing of the M indication. N N O 65. I am not satisfied that either D1 or D3’s case come within the O overriding discretion of the Court, or that this is a rare case. Considering P P the plea was indicated about 7 months ahead of the trial, I shall allow a Q discount of 25% for both D1 and D3 concerning Charge 7. D1 shall be Q sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, whereas D3 shall be sentenced to R R 15 months’ imprisonment. S S T T U U V V  - 22 - A A B B Totality and Further Deductions C C D1 D D E 66. Considering D1’s lost opportunities to move to Canada with E his girlfriend and pursue his career there, and his impeccable behavior in F F the past and having served as a role model to young people of ethnic G minorities and low income groups, the Court will further discount D1’s G sentence for Charge 7 by 2 months. He is therefore sentenced to 10 months’ H H imprisonment. I I D3 J J K 67. As Charges 1, 2 and 4 arise from the same event, I shall order K that the sentences of Charges 2 and 4 to run concurrently with that of L L Charge 1. M M 68. As Charge 7 has a different basis of culpability from Charges N N 1, 2 and 4, I shall order that 12 months of the sentence of Charge 7 be O served consecutively to the sentences of Charges 1, 2 and 4. O P P 69. The total imprisonment term for D3 shall be 18 months’ Q imprisonment. The total fine shall be $6,000. Q R R S S T T U U V V  - 23 - A A B B Sentence C C D1: D D E Charge 7 10 months’ imprisonment E F F D3: G G Charge 1 6 months’ imprisonment, disqualification order of 2 years to H H commence after completion of all imprisonment terms in this I case (in accordance with s69A(2) Road Traffic Ordinance), I Driving Improvement Course & compensation order of J J $3,685 K K Charge 2 4 months’ imprisonment concurrent with Charge 1, and L L disqualification order of 12 months, to commence after M completion of the disqualification order of Charge 1 (in M accordance with s44(3) Road Traffic Ordinance) N N O Charge 3 $2,000 fine O P P Charge 4 2 months’ imprisonment concurrent with Charge 1, and Q disqualification order of 12 months Q R R Charge 5 $2,000 fine S S Charge 6 $2,000 fine T T U U V V  - 24 - A A B B Charge 7 15 months’ imprisonment, with 12 months consecutive to C Charges 1, 2 and 4. C D D Total sentence: 18 months’ imprisonment. E E Total fine: $6,000 (to be deducted from D3’s bail) F F G Compensation order: $3,685 (to be deducted from D3’s bail) G H H I I ( Peony Wong ) J Deputy District Judge J K K L L M M N N O O P P Q Q R R S S T T U U V V