DCCC221/2020

DCCC221/2020

A A B B DCCC 221/2020 C [2021] HKDC 1607 C D D 香港特別行政區 E 區域法院 E 刑事案件 2020 年第 221 號 F F G G --------------------------------- H 香港特別行政區 H 訴 I I 陳樂怡（第一被告人） J J 周錦威（第二被告人） K 黃溢霖 EDMUND（第三被告人） K --------------------------------- L L M 主審法官： 區域法院法官謝沈智慧 M N 日期： 2021 年 12 月 23 日 N 出席人士： 鄭明斌先生，為外聘大律師，代表香港特別行政區 O O 陳偉彥先生帶領陳柏暉先生，由法律援助署委派的劉志 P 華律師行延聘，代表第一及第二被告人 P Q 蘇俊文先生，由法律援助署委派的植振輝律師事務所延 Q 聘，代表第三被告人 R R 控罪： [1] 暴動（Riot） - 第一至第三被告人 S S [2] 在公眾地方管有攻擊性武器（Possession of offensive T weapons in a public place） - 第二被告人 T U U V V  -2- A A B B [3] 故 意 阻 撓 在 正 當 執 行 職 務 的 警 務 人 員 （ Wilfully C obstructing a police officer in the due execution of his duty） C - 第二被告人 D D E E --------------------- F 裁決理由書 F --------------------- G G H 1. 本案涉及三名被告人及三項控罪，即：— H I I (1) 三名被告共同被控一項暴動罪，違反香港法例第 J J 245 章《公安條例》第 19(1)及(2)條（控罪一）； K K (2) 第二被告被控一項在公眾地方管有攻擊性武器，違 L L 反香港法例第 245 章《公安條例》第 33(1)及(2)條 M M （控罪二）； N N (3) 第二被告被控一項故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警 O O 務人員，違反香港法例第 212 章《侵害人身罪條例》 P 第 36(b)條（控罪三）。 P Q Q 論點 R R S 2. 控方指三名被告人於 2019 年 9 月 22 日在香港新界沙田 S 源禾路好運中心外，連同其他身分不詳的人士，參與暴動。另控方指 T T 第二被告當時攜有攻擊性武器，即一個鐵錘，一把鉗子及一把螺絲批。 U U V V  -3- A A B B 控方亦指當第一被告正被制服時，第二被告突然從路旁花圃內的草叢 C 跳出，試圖拉走第一被告，故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員。 C D D 3. 控方的案情是三名被告事發前於新城市廣場外的空地與 E E 其他示威者聚集，之後陸續步往源禾路作堵路、縱火及暴動。在第一 F 及第二被告的審前覆核問卷，他們承認事發時，於源禾路近担杆莆街 F 被截停及拘捕，但對傳媒於新城市廣場外所攝片段內的一對男女（控 G G 方指為首兩名被告）的身分有爭議。另外亦提出下述論點：— H H I (1) 當時於源禾道發生的事情是否構成暴動； I J J (2) 如有暴動，第一及第二被告有否參與暴動； K K (3) 於第二被告身上檢取的鐵錘、鉗子及螺絲批是否攻 L L 擊性武器； M M N (4) 如該些物品是攻擊性武器，第二被告有否合理辯解 N 藏有該些武器； O O P P (5) 第二被告有否阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員。 Q Q 4. 證供完結後，第一及第二被告同意案發當日於源禾路發生 R R 暴動。根據大律師的結案陳詞，就控罪二，唯一的爭議是涉案錘子、 S S 鉗子和螺絲批是否法例訂明的攻擊性武器。換句話說，就第一及第二 T 被告，論點為：— T U U V V  -4- A A B B C (1) 新聞片段所攝，於新城市廣場外的一對男女是否第 C 一及第二被告； D D E (2) 第一及第二被告有否參與暴動； E F F (3) 第二被告管有的錘子、鉗子及螺絲批是否攻擊性武 G G 器； H H (4) 第二被告有否阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員。 I I J J 5. 第三被告亦不爭議當日在源禾路發生暴動。他亦同意他當 K 日的部份行為被新聞片段攝錄（包括與示威者一同將小巴站頭的站牌 K 移往源禾路中心）。唯一的爭議是他的行為是否構成參與暴動。 L L M M 各方承認的事實 N N 6. 控方及各被告人根據香港法例第 221 章《刑事訴訟程序條 O O 例》第 65C 條的規定，承認以下事實：— P P A. 截停各被告人 Q Q R R 於 2019 年 9 月 22 日約下午 5 時 45 分，警方在沙田源禾 S 路近担杆莆街交界處截停第一、第二及第三被告。 S T T U U V V  -5- A A B B B. 警方從互聯網上取得的片段 C C (2) 警方透過互聯網取得下述的新聞片段：— D D E (i) 一段香港電台（RTHK）的新聞片段 E F {片名：錄制 RTHK - [各區最新情況] 現場直 F 播_2019_10_31_2335} G G [控方證物 P2A]； H H I (ii) 一段 NOW TV 的新聞片段 I { 片 名 ： 錄 製 NOW TV - 各 區 示 威 現 場 J J _2019_10_31_2351} K [控方證物 P2B]； K L L (iii) 一段蘋果日報（Apple Daily）的新聞片段 M M {片名：錄製 Apple Daily - 沙田新城市廣場及 N 連城廣場「和你 shop」_2019_11_01_0039} N [控方證物 P2C]； O O P P (iv) 一段有線寛頻（i-CABLE）的新聞片段 Q {片名：錄製有線寛頻 i-CABLE - 沙田有人堵 Q 路縱火防暴警驅散（現埸）} R R [控方證物 P2D]； S S T T U U V V  -6- A A B B (v) 一段立埸新聞（Stand News）的新聞片段 C {片名：錄製 Stand News 立場新聞 - [沙田現 C 場.直播 1]_2019_11_01_0004}； D D [控方證物 P2E]；及 E E F (vi) 一段南華早報（SCMP）的新聞片段 F {片名：SCMP - live riot police}。 G G [控方證物 P2F]； H H I (3) 警方其後把該些片段下載，完整地燒錄入並儲存在 I 一個外置電腦硬盤。該硬盤呈為 [控方證物 P2]。該些片 J J 段呈為 [控方證物 P2A，P2B，P2C，P2D，P2E 及 P2F]。 K K L C. 各被告人的個人物品 L (4) 第一被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品列為下述證 M M 物：— N N O 一個藍、白色口罩 [控方證物 P3]； O 一副藍、黑色泳鏡 [控方證物 P4]； P P 一個黑色腰包 [控方證物 P5]； Q Q 一個藍色背囊（印有 MINIgo）[控方證物 P6]； R 一個白色頭盔（印有 DELTAPLUS）[控方證物 P7]； R 一頂啡色鴨舌帽 [控方證物 P8]； S S 一件白色短袖 T-恤 [控方證物 P9]； T T 一對灰、粉紅色濾罐 [控方證物 P10]； U U V V  -7- A A B B 一個灰色面具（印有 3M）[控方證物 P11]； C 一副黑、藍色護目鏡（印有 3M）[控方證物 P12]； C 一對灰、紅色手套 [控方證物 P13]及 D D 一對黑、藍色手袖 [控方證物 P14]。 E E F (5) 第二被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品列為下述證 F 物：— G G H H 一把藍色手柄錘仔連一個黃色標籤 [控方證物 I P15]； I 一把紅色鉗子 [控方證物 P16]； J J 一把綠色螺絲批 [控方證物 P17]； K K 一個白色頭盔（印有 DELTAPLUS）連頭帶 [控方證 L 物 P18]； L 一個灰色面具（印有 3M）連兩個灰、粉紅色濾罐 M M [控方證物 P19]； N N 一個藍色樽，內有白色固體（印有 POCARI SWEAT） O [控方證物 P20]； O 一頂啡色鴨舌帽（印有 Carhartt）[控方證物 P21]； P P 兩支“Pattex”牌膠水 [控方證物 P22]； Q Q 一個藍色口罩連膠袋（印有 Prozone）[控方證物 R P23]； R S 一個藍、紅色的肩背袋（印有 DOUGHNUT）[控方 S 證物 P24]； T T U U V V  -8- A A B B 一副藍色泳鏡（印有 GOMA）連一個盒 [控方證物 C P25]； C 一對黑、灰色手袖 [控方證物 P26]； D D 一對灰色手套 [控方證物 P27]； E E 一條藍色頸巾 [控方證物 P28]； F 一條灰色毛巾（印有 AVENGERS）[控方證物 P29]； F 一件藍色 T-恤 [控方證物 P30]； G G 一個黑色腰包 [控方證物 P31]； H H 一個灰色背囊 [控方證物 P32]； I 一個黑色電筒 [控方證物 P33]及 I J 一隻灰、粉紅色防火手套（連一個“IKEA”膠袋 [控 J 方證物 P34]。 K K L (6) 第三被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品列為下述證 L M 物：— M N N 一條黑、白色頸巾 [控方證物 P35]； O 一件黑、紅、白色 T-恤（印有“Just do it”）[控方 O 證物 P36]； P P 一件綠色背心 [控方證物 P37]； Q Q 一條灰色運動褲（印有“Nike”）[控方證物 P38]及 R 一個“Adidas”牌子黑色背囊 [控方證物 P39]。 R S S 除該些物品外，第三被告同時亦攜帶著包括下述物 T T 品：— U U V V  -9- A A B B C 一部金色“蘋果”流動電話連手機殼； C 一張 SIM 咭 S/N B78985200012770571054; D D 一個保溫水杯； E E 一罐健身奶粉； F 一條綠、白色毛巾； F 兩條拉背帶； G G 一對無線耳機； H H 一支洗面液； I 一支止汗劑； I 一支沐浴露； J J 一包紙巾； K K 兩個印有「蜘蛛俠」的玩具； L 一張單據； L M 一張信用咭單據； M 一條皮帶； N N 一張第三被告的身份証及 O 一張第三被告的職員証。 O P P D. 照片 Q Q R (7) 警方於 2019 年 9 月 22 日晚上在沙田源禾路與橫壆 R 街交界處一帶拍攝了合共 5 幅的晚間照片，呈為 [控方證 S S 物 P40(1)-(5)]（即相簿 1/8）。 T T U U V V  - 10 - A A B B (8) 警方再於近沙田中心的源禾路一帶拍攝了合共 5 幅 C 的日間照片，呈為 [控方證物 P41(1)-(5)]（即相簿 2/8）。 C D D (9) 警方就第一被告人被警方截停時身穿的部份衣物 E E 拍攝了合共 2 幅照片，呈為 [控方證物 P42(1)-(2)]（即相 F 簿 3/8）。 F G G (10) 警方就第一被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品拍攝 H H 了合共 15 幅照片，呈為 [控方證物 P43(1)-(15)]（即相簿 I 4/8）。 I J J (11) 警方就第二被告被警方截停時身穿的部份衣物拍 K 攝了合共 3 幅照片，呈堂為 [控方證物 P44(1)-(3)]（即相 K L 簿 5/8）。 L M M (12) 警方就第二被告被警方截停時攜帶的物品拍攝了 N 合共 28 幅照片，呈為 [控方證物 P45(1)-(28)]（即相簿 6/8） 。 N O O (13) 警方就第三被告被警方截停時身穿的部份衣物拍 P P 攝了合共 2 幅照片，呈為 [控方證物 P46(1)-(2)]（即相簿 Q 7/8）。 Q R R (14) 警方就第三被告被警方截停時攜帶的物品拍攝了 S S 合共 10 幅照片，呈為 [控方證物 P47(1)-(10)]（即相簿 8/8） 。 T T U U V V  - 11 - A A B B E. 地圖 C C (15) 控方呈遞一張地圖 [控方證物 P48]，顯示沙田源禾 D D 路與橫壆街交界處一帶的情況（非比例地圖）。該證物以 E E 及當中以文字標註的街道和建築物均大致上準確地反映 F 2019 年 9 月 22 日該地區一帶的情況。 F G G F. 其他 H H I (16) 本案所有由警方封存或檢取的證物自被封存或檢 I 取後直至法庭呈堂前，一直被妥善保存，沒有受到任何不 J J 當或非法干擾。 K K (17) 所有呈堂的照片，都如實反映相關的底片或數碼檔 L L 案。本案所有照片在法庭呈堂前均獲妥善保存和處理，沒 M M 有受到任何不當或非法干擾。照片冊的目錄準確地描述了 N 相關照片所顯示的事物。 N O O (18) 所有呈堂的片段，當中的影像和音頻都如實反映了 P P 相關時間所拍攝和收錄得到的情況。 Q Q (19) 本案所有用以拍攝照片和拍攝片段的儀器，在所有 R R 關鍵時間都運作正常。 S S T (20) 本案所有用以從互聯網上取得的電腦和儀器，在所 T 有關鍵時間都運作正常。 U U V V  - 12 - A A B B C (21) 本案所有用以把片段和照片燒錄為光碟的電腦和 C 儀器，在所有關鍵時間都運作正常。 D D E G. 刑事定罪紀錄 E F F (22) 三名被告人在香港均沒有刑事定罪紀錄。 G G H 控方的證供 H I I 7. 控方共傳召 3 名證人；其餘兩名證人的證供不受爭議，其 J J 證人供詞亦根據香港法例第 221 章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第 65B 條的 K 規定納為證供。 K L L 8. 總督察 58483 是控方第一證人（PW1）。當日他於下午 1 M M 時開始，穿著防暴級別的軍裝當值，於沙田體育館對開候命。該體育 N 館位於沙田源禾路及鄉事會道交界。同日下午約 5 時 40 分，PW1 經 N 對講機接獲消息，有人在源禾路近好運中心堵路及縱火。他與隊員遵 O O 從命令，上前到源禾路進行驅散、掃蕩及拘捕。PW1 目睹源禾路好運 P P 中心外的馬路上有用大量不同物品堆切而成的路障，完全堵塞該道路 Q 的三條行車綫；部分的物品更正在燃燒。該些路障引致源禾路上的交 Q 通完全癱瘓。 R R S S 9. 一群超過 100 人的示威者正站在近担杆莆街的路障後面。 T 該群示威者大部份均穿著黑衣黑褲，以粗言穢語及「死黑警」等字詞 T 辱罵警方。PW1 留意到站在最前的一排示威者中有一男一女。上述男 U U V V  - 13 - A A B B 子穿著黑色 T-恤、黑色褲，雙臂穿著防曬手袖，面上戴著泳鏡，背上 C 孭著灰色背囊。該男子身旁的女子穿著黑色 T-恤、黑色長褲，面上戴 C 著護目鏡或泳鏡，雙臂穿著手袖，背上孭著藍色背囊。 D D E E 10. 基於以上情景，PW1 認為該群示威者已干犯非法集結， F 決定作出驅散和拘捕。因此他大叫：「警察，唔好走！」PW1 隨即衝 F 向示威者。這時，示威者立即轉身逃跑，而 PW1 則尾隨追截。後來， G G PW1 於源禾路及担杆莆街交界的花圃旁成功追上上述女子。各方沒 H H 有爭議該名女子是第一被告。PW1 用手搭著第一被告的肩膊；第一被 I 告失了平衡，伏在花圃上，不停大叫大喊。於是 PW1 便按著她，將 I 她制服。接著，警員 11723 及女警 23439 上前協助。PW1 向兩名同僚 J J 交代拘捕原因後，便打算將第一被告交由該兩名同僚處理。突然，之 K K 前站在該女子身旁的男子從花圃的草叢跳出來。沒有爭議，該名男子 L 是第二被告。第二被告伸手拖著女子，嘗試將她帶走。於是 PW1 立 L M 即上前。第二被告轉身逃走，PW1 追截，從後捉著第二被告的肩膊。 M 第二被告失了平衡，跌在地上，被一同跌倒的 PW1 壓在地上。第二 N N 被告不停掙扎及大叫。警方最終將第二被告制服，期間曾使用胡椒噴 O 霧。後來警員 11723 及警員 17113 前來協助。期後 PW1 的同僚向第 O P 一及第二被告宣布拘捕。 P Q Q 11. 之後，控方於 PW1 作供期間播放各方同意的新聞片段， R 顯示警方行動前的情況。從 P2A 可見，案發當日下午約 5 時 30 分， R S 有大批人士聚集於沙田新城市廣場外的行人專用區。該批人士大部份 S 穿著黑色上衣，黑色褲，用面罩或圍巾遮蓋口鼻。其中一些人士戴上 T T 泳鏡或護目鏡、手袖、手套及推著可伸縮的黑色鐵閘。該批人士在行 U U V V  - 14 - A A B B 人專用區聚集後，一同朝著担杆莆街的方向步行往源禾路。沿途，其 C 中一些人士推著大型黑色伸縮鐵閘，亦有人推著大型垃圾筒及拿著屏 C 風。到達源禾路後，該批人士於馬路上架設路障，以作堵路。他們打 D D 開伸縮鐵閘，用膠索帶將鐵閘連結，造成長長的鐵閘，分別放於三段 E E 的馬路上，形成三排路障。該些路障橫跨源禾路的三條行車線，令交 F 通完全癱瘓。該批人士續而將不同的雜物放置於鐵閘上，包括不同的 F 大型垃圾筒、屏風、沙包、小巴站頭的站牌及大型的枯葉等。有人在 G G 馬路上淋上擬似食油的液體，亦有人在中間的一排路障上淋上不明液 H H 體。隨即，有人將中間的一排路障上的雜物燃點，引起大火，冒出濃 I 煙。不久後，警方便到場展開行動。片段亦顯示第一及第二被告被截 I J 獲及制服的過程。 J K K 12. PW1 指從 P2A 可見，在新城市廣場外聚集的人士包括一 L 男一女；該對男女的特徵與第一及第二被告完全脗合。控方指該對男 L M 女便是首兩名被告。辯方否認該指控。除此之外，第一及第二被告對 M PW1 的大部份證供沒有爭議。辯方大律師只向 PW1 指出，第二被告 N N 從草叢跳出後從沒嘗試拉走第一被告，第二被告亦從沒掙扎或嘗試逃 O 走。PW1 否認該説法。 O P P 13. 控方第二證人，警員 11723（PW2）的證供不受爭議。控 Q Q 辯各方根據香港法例第 221 章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第 65B 條同意將 R PW2 的書面供詞呈為控方第 49 號證物。除了 PW2 的個人資料，他的 R S 證供如下：— S T T 「於 2019 年 9 月 22 日，當值…特別更份…負責對新界南總 區內特發事故作出即時快速應變。 U U V V  - 15 - A A B B 於同日 1740 時，本隊於沙田源禾路體育館外在車上候命， C 其後從通訊機得知源禾路好運中心外有示威者堵路及縱火， C 於是本隊奉新界南衝鋒隊警司命立即落車上前作出驅散或 D 拘捕，當時距離事發位置約 100 米，本人已見到前方有人群、 D 雜物、火勢及黑煙，相信前方人群正在參與非法集結，本人 緊隨高級督察林佩武向好運中心方向跑，而本隊其他人員在 E E 本人後方尾隨，跑至好運中心外，現場環境非常嘈吵混亂， 聽到大量「屌你老母、死黑警、死全家」 等等辱罵的言語， F 好運中心橫跨源禾路之行人天橋上，亦有示威者向我方掟雜 F 物，而前方有大量雜物堆成之路障，並已起火焚燒，冒起大 G 量黑煙、橫跨源和路三條行車線，路障後方約 10 米距離有 G 約超過一百名穿黑衣，戴頭盔，口罩的示威者，當見到我方 衝前後，大量示威者立即掉頭跑，本人越過兩重路障後，在 H H 源和路轉入担杆莆街近花槽位置，見到高級督察林佩武正制 服一名不斷反抗的女子（後知為女子/陳樂怡，24 歲，約 1.6 I 米高，長髮，當時身穿黑色短 tee，黑色長褲，黑色鞋，戴 I 口罩，護目鏡、後稱 AP1），於是立即上前協助，其間本人 J 感到前方有其他不是警方的人正干擾我方，林佩武高級督察 J 上前處理，而女警員 23439 亦緊接到場接管 AP1，本人再次 K 跟上前協助林佩武高級督察，亦見到他正在制服一名不斷反 K 抗的男子（後知為男子/周錦威，約 1.7 米高，23 歲，短髮， 當時身穿黑色短 tee，黑色長褲，戴泳鏡，灰手套，後稱 AP2） ， L L 於是亦立即上前協助制服 AP2，其間仍有示威者想向我方 上前，於是林佩武高級督察再向示威者作出驅散，而 AP2 則 M 由緊隨到達之警員 17113 接管，本隊其他人員亦相繼到達， M 本人繼續隨大隊往前作出驅散行動」。 N N 14. 2019 年 9 月 22 日下午約 5 時 40 分，控方第三證人，女 O O 警 23439（PW3）正與其他隊員於沙田體育館外候命。同日約 5 時 46 P P 分，她與同僚接獲命令到源禾路進行掃蕩。沿途，PW3 目睹源禾路， Q 好運中心外的馬路上有路障，而且有物品正在燃燒。現場亦有超過 100 Q 名，穿黑衣的示威者。大部分的示威者集結於路障後面。當 PW3 跑 R R 經路障時聽見有人以粗言穢語辱罵警方。跑至源禾路與担杆莆街交界 S S 的花圃時，PW3 看見 PW1 正在制服一名黑衣女子；更有人大叫：「女 T 警」。於是 PW3 便立即上前。她看見 PW2 正在協助 PW1 制服一名 T U U V V  - 16 - A A B B 黑衣女子（即第一被告）。當時，第一被告不斷大叫，掙扎及反抗。 C 於是 PW3 亦上前增援。PW3 接手後，PW2 便離開。後來，PW3 向第 C 一被告宣布拘捕。 D D E E 15. 雖然辯方大律師要求控方傳召 PW3 上庭作供，但對 PW3 F 的證供全無盤問。明顯地，她的證供不受爭議。 F G G 16. 控辯各方亦根據香港法例第 221 章《刑事訴訟程序條例》 H H 第 65B 條的規定同意控方第四證人，警員 17113 的證供，呈為控方第 I 50 號證物。除了他及兩名被告的個人資料、無關痛癢的事實及已於承 I 認事實列出的事項之外，他的供詞如下：— J J K 「我係警員 17113… K L 於 2019 年 9 月 22 日，我值勤於新界南衝鋒隊…於同日 1345 L 時由小隊指揮官 SIP LAM K.P.作更前訓示，而…隊員有 SGT53779，PCs 2087，22838，20169，19573，7957，於新 M M 界南警區區份執勤。 N 於同日 1740 時，本小隊於沙田源禾路沙田體育館外等候指 N 示。 O O 於同日 1746 時，本小隊由新界南衝鋒隊之大隊長 SP CHAN K.F.指示前往源禾路往沙田市中心方向進行一個掃蕩行動， P P 因為上址一帶有大約 100 人集結及開始焚燒物品。其後，由 於本小隊前進路線之馬路被設置路障，於是我跟隨本隊成員 Q 於源禾路沙田體育館外下車向沙田市中心方向進行掃蕩。當 Q 我向沙田市中心推進時，我見到源禾路與鄉事會路交界之行 R 人路及馬路都有人聚集，及不時聽到有人大叫「死黑警」， R 「時代革命」等口號，而且前方有大量身穿黑色衣服的人士 向沙田市中心方向逃跑。其後，我跟隨本隊成員跑過源禾路 S S 好運中心外之行人天橋後，我見到上址 3 條行車線均有雜物 堵塞及被縱火，而且不時有人向我前方有警察之位置投擲雜 T 物。其後，當我跑到源禾路與担杆莆交界時，我見到本小隊 T 人員正制服兩名人士（一名男子後稱 AP2 叫周錦威，CHAU U U V V  - 17 - A A B Kam-wai…當時身穿黑色短袖衫，黑色長褲，左腳著深色波 B 鞋（另一邊無著鞋），左右手均穿上深色手袖及手套，戴著 C 藍色泳鏡及藍色面罩，背孭深灰色背囊，胸前孭著一個紅藍 C 色斜孭袋，另一名女子，後稱 AP1 叫陳樂怡 CHAN Lok-yi… D 而當時我與正處理 AP1，2 之人員相距約 6 米。當我上前準 D 備協助制服 AP2 時，我辨認出正在制服 AP2 之人員為本小 隊 2 I/C LAM P.M.及 PC11723，而且我見到 AP2 不斷掙扎 E E 反抗及大叫「我係周錦威」。於成功制服 AP2 後，我聽到 SIP LAM P.M.講 AP2 是曾參與非法集結之人士後，於同日 F 1751 時我拘捕了 AP2「非法集結罪，經警誡後，AP2 頭向 F 下望，無講任何野。由於現場我見到不時都有身穿口罩及黑 G 色衣物之人士靠近，於是我用手扣（S/N No. 23510）將 AP2 G 雙手鎖於 AP2 背後，因為我擔心 AP2 逃走或有人過來搶走 AP2。當我與 PC19811 帶 AP2 離開上址返回源禾路沙田體 H H 育館外警車停泊位置期間，AP2 不斷向附近的人士嗌「我叫 周錦威」，及一堆相信為電話號碼的數字，而旁邊不時有身 I I 穿反光背心拎著相機的人士靠近問 AP2 姓名，電話… J 於同日 1838 時，由我於接見室 T04 號房內向 AP2 執行 Pol. J 1123 之程度一搜身，並由 PC19811 見證下進行。於同日 1839 K 時，我於 AP2 之深灰色背囊（後證物 45）大格內搵到一把 K 藍色手柄既鐵鎚（後知約 33cm 長，後稱證物 27）；而於證 物 45 之前格內搵到一枝綠色間條手柄既一字螺絲批（後知 L L 約 18cm 長，後稱證物 29）及一把紅色手柄既鉗（後知約 29cm 長，後稱證物 28），隨即我向 AP2 作出拘捕，罪名為 M 「藏有工具可作非法用途罪」，經警誡後，AP2 講：「啲工 M 具因為工程所需先袋响袋度。」於同日 1843 時，搜查完畢 N 後，並無發現其他利器。」 N O 17. 2019 年 9 月 22 日，控方第五證人警長 52059（PW5）以 O P 軍裝當值。同日下午約 5 時 30 分，PW5 正於沙田區候命。約下午 5 P 時 46 分，PW5 從對講機知悉源禾路，好運中心外的馬路上發生非法 Q Q 集結及縱火。他接獲命令上前作掃蕩後便沿源禾路向好運中心前進。 R R 他目睹源禾路上有三排路障，中間的一排路障正在燃燒，而前方有約 S 100 名人士，大部分穿著黑色衣服；該批人士亦佔據馬路，有人大叫 S 「黑警」。PW5 繼續上前。當他走近最前的一排路障（近担杆莆街） T T 時，示威者仍站在路障後面，面向警方，不但與其對峙，還向警方投 U U V V  - 18 - A A B B 擲雜物，例如水瓶及石頭等。於是 PW5 便急步向前衝，衝過最前一 C 排的路障後（近担杆莆街），PW5 看見第三被告。當時第三被告站在 C 示威者的最前方，身旁有一名穿著黑衣黑褲的男子；該男子手持一支 D D 約一米長的金屬棒。警方到場後，第三被告仍面對警方，站著不動。 E E PW5 聽見同僚大叫：「go！go！go！」，於是他便衝上前作驅散，期 F 間大叫：「即刻走開！你哋即刻走！」。這時才有示威者轉身逃走。 F 因第三被告站在最前，最接近 PW5，PW5 便用手捉著第三被告近肩 G G 膊位置的衣物，大叫：「唔好走，停低！」。可是第三被告作出反抗， H H PW5 作出口頭警告無果後，便用警棍敲打了第三被告的大腿一下。第 I 三被告仍繼續反抗，用手推 PW5。因此，PW5 再作警告及再用警棍 I J 敲打第三被告的大腿。可是第三被告仍在掙扎，於是 PW5 警告後再 J 用警棍敲打第三被告的大腿。這時第三被告終於停止掙扎，坐在地上。 K K PW5 將第三被告交予其他同僚後便衝前追截手持金屬棒的男子，但 L L 無果。 M M 18. 控方向 PW5 播放新聞片段，展示警方到場前所發生的事 N N 情。辯方不爭議片段顯示，示威者堵路前，第三被告於新城市廣場外 O 的空地。當時第三被告穿著綠色 T 恤及黑長褲。後來示威者步向担杆 O P 莆街，有部份示威者推著可伸縮鐵欄。此時，第三被告也向著同一方 P 向走，期間將頸上的頸箍拉起，遮蓋口和鼻。後來示威者於源禾路上 Q Q 以鐵欄、垃圾桶及屏風等築起三排路障。用伸縮鐵欄築起路障後，有 R R 數名示威者將路旁小巴站頭的站牌翻倒在地上，繼而合力將站牌搬向 S 中間的一排路障。原本，第三被告只與另一名男子站在一旁。數秒後， S 第三被告步出馬路，彎下身子，用雙手握著地上的小巴站牌，與數名 T T 示威者一同將小巴站牌搬往中間的一排路障。不久後便有示威者將黃 U U V V  - 19 - A A B B 色液體淋在中間的一排路障上。後來，警方便到場，PW5 亦如上文所 C 述，拘捕第三被告。 C D D 辯方證供 E E F 19. 第三被告選擇作供。他現年 45 歲，已婚，育有一名女兒， F 與家人同住馬鞍山。他現職一間地產公司的區域經理。他有健身的習 G G 慣；每天早上 8 時便離家，前往沙田連城廣場的 Physical 健身中心做 H H 運動。 I I 20. 案發當日，第三被告如常於早上 8 時離家，帶備健身所需 J J 物品，前往沙田連城廣場的 Physical 健身。出門時，他穿著黑色 Nike K T 恤及深灰色褲，而運動所需的物品則放在一個黑色的背囊內。同日 K L 上午約 11 時，第三被告做完運動後，於健身室淋浴，換上被捕時穿 L 著的綠色 T 恤和黑褲，並於約 11 時 20 分離開健身室。雖然當日是星 M M 期天，但有樓盤在下午 2 時開始，於金鐘舉行展銷會，因此他仍需工 N N 作。同日下午約 4 時，展銷會完結後，第三被告便乘巴士，打算往沙 O 田購買健身奶粉。他於下午約 5 時 15 分到達沙田廣場，並於沙田中 O 心的 BC Shop 購買奶粉。單據顯示，購買的時間為下午 5 時 29 分。 P P 該單據呈為辯方第一號證物（D1）。 Q Q R 21. 購物後，第三被告打算回馬鞍山與妻女吃晚飯。他平日會 R 乘坐馬鞍山鐵路，但案發當日港鐵已封站；於是他便想前往大涌橋路 S S 乘搭專線小巴。他通常會經新城市廣場、源禾路、沙田鄉事會路，再 T T 過橋往小巴站。當他步出新城市廣場時，突然聞到一陣刺鼻的味道， U U V V  - 20 - A A B B 令他感到不適；於是他便拿出健身用的頸箍，遮蓋口鼻。之後，他沿 C 著担杆莆街到達源禾路。 C D D 22. 第三被告承認新聞片段顯示他協助示威者將小巴站牌搬 E E 往源禾路。他解釋到達源禾路時，看見數人將小巴站牌翻倒在地上。 F 他要求這一群人將站牌放回原位，但不果。第三被告指他正想離開時， F 突然聽見遠處傳來「砰」一聲。這時站在小巴站牌頂部，頭戴黑帽的 G G 男子忽然「彈一彈」。第三被告看見該男子應該是被小巴站牌搌到或 H H 絆倒，之後有人叫：「小心睇腳！」。當時有人正將小巴站牌向前拉， I 而站牌在地上滾動。第三被告認為情況危險，猶豫了一會後便上前將 I 小巴站牌「逗一逗」。搬運站牌的一群人繼續向前走，但又突然急轉 J J 彎。第三被告勸喻這群人別再拖行小巴站牌，但他們並沒理會。再前 K K 行數步後，該群人士便停低；第三被告亦立即放開小巴站牌，更向這 L 群人說：「有冇搞錯呀你哋！」。 L M M 23. 之後，第三被告便離開，沿著源禾路步向鄉事會路方向。 N N 當他到達源禾路和鄉事會路交界時，一名婆婆突然不停大叫：「防暴 O 警嚟啦！」。該婆婆隨即一面大叫，一面用手推向第三被告，着他離 O 開。第三被告轉身，看見他前面有約 30 人正在狂奔；他的後方及兩 P P 旁均有人走過，更撞到他。當時他十分驚慌，出於自然反應便開始急 Q Q 步走向大會堂附近的小巴站，期間他被身旁的人推撞，於是便與他們 R 一起奔跑。突然，有人連續及快速地打了他的膝蓋三下。之後有人從 R S 後推他，結果他便倒地。這時，他才看見他身後的人是防暴警察。他 S 立即表示不會反抗，警方亦將他的頭按在地上。有人問：「叫咩名？ T T 幾多號電話呀？」，他便說出自己的名字及電話號碼。當時亦有一名 U U V V  - 21 - A A B B 女子說：「佢已經話唔反抗啦，你係咪想殺人？」。第三被告向警方 C 解釋他剛購買奶粉，並説：「你唔信，睇吓我個袋啦」；可是警員好 C 像聽而不聞。第三被告否認參與那天的集結；他稱其實他並不認同示 D D 威者的作為；協助示威者搬運小巴站牌只是因擔心有人會受傷。當日 E E 是他首次遇上社運事件，因驚慌而不知所惜，又因被婆婆推撞，才轉 F 身走向担杆莆街。 F G G 指引 H H I 24. 此乃刑事法庭，舉證責任在於控方；控方必須在毫無合理 I 疑點下證案。如有任何合理疑點，疑點利益歸予三名被告人。 J J K 25. 三名被告人均無刑事定罪紀錄。本席謹記，他們犯案的機 K L 會較低，說出真相的機會較高。 L M M 26. 本案的其中一項爭議是首兩名被告的身份。本席明白誠實 N 的證人也可能會認錯人；認錯人的證人也可能很具說服力。因此，本 N O 席謹記 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 一案內的原則及指引。雖然衣著及 O 裝扮可協助法庭作辨認，本席謹記其他人也可能有相同的服飾及裝 P P 扮。 Q Q R 27. 控方指警方採取行動時，三名被告人均有嘗試逃走。本席 R 明白只有在法庭能肯定他並非因“與犯罪無關的”理由而逃走時，他 S S 的逃走行動才可以被視為支持控方指控的證供。 T T U U V V  - 22 - A A B B 證供的分析 C C A. 控方的證供 D D E 28. 本案中，辯方爭議於新城市廣場外空地的一對男女是否第 E F 一及第二被告。PW1 作供期間曾於新聞片段（P2A）中指出新城市廣 F 場外空地的一對男女，及其特徵，並表示這些特徵與首兩名被告相似。 G G 辯方援引 AG’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 21 321; R v H H Clare & Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 及 Grant v The Queen [1982] 2 I SCR 819，指法庭若要接納 PW1 的身份辨認證供呈堂，控方必須在毫 I 無合理疑點下證明 PW1 是一名特設專家（expert ad hoc)，擁有特別知 J J 識（special knowledge）。大律師指該特別知識是事實裁斷者沒有的； K K 而 PW1 並沒資格成為一名特設專家，就辨認首兩名被告給予意見證 L 供。因此，大律師要求法庭完全無視 PW1 對 P2A 片段所作出的「辨 L 認」證供。 M M N N 29. 於 AG’s Reference (No.2 of 2002)一案中，英國上訴法院引 O 用 R v Clare & Peach，裁定透過影片所作的辨認證供可在特定的情況 O 下獲接納：— P P Q “16. Clare and Peach, to which we have referred, is authority Q for the proposition that a witness who has spent a great deal of R time viewing and analysing a video film of an incident, acquires R a “special knowledge that the court does not possess” and is entitled to give the court the benefit of that knowledge. By S comparing good quality still photographs taken on the day, S which were undoubtedly of the defendants, with images on the video recording, evidence was given that the person on the still T T photograph was the same person shown on the video film. This Court upheld the admissibility of such identification evidence. U U V V  - 23 - A A B The special knowledge was required only because the witness B did not know the defendant and because the basis of his C identification was the many hours of intensive viewing of the C film which he had carried out… D 19. In our judgment, on the authorities, there are, as it seems D to us at least four circumstances in which, subject to the judicial E discretion to exclude, evidence is admissible to show, subject to E appropriate directions in the summing-up, a jury can be invited to conclude that the defendant committed the offence on the F basis of a photographic image from the scene of the crime: F (i) where the photographic image is sufficiently G G clear, the jury can compare it with the defendant sitting in the dock (Dodson and Williams); H H (ii) Where a witness knows the defendant sufficiently well to recognise him as the offender I depicted in the photographic image, he can give I evidence of this (Fowden and White, Kamala v J Noble, Grimer, Caldwell and Dixon and J Blenkinsop); and this may be so even if the photographic image is no longer available for the K jury (Taylor v Chief Constable of Chester); K (iii) Where a witness who does not know the L L defendant spends substantial time viewing and analysing photographic images from the scene, M thereby acquiring special knowledge which the M jury does not have, he can give evidence of identification based on a comparison between N those images and a reasonably contemporary N photograph of the defendant, provided that the O images and the photograph are available to the O jury (Clare & Peach); P (iv) A suitably qualified expert with facial mapping P skills can give opinion evidence of identification Q based on a comparison between images from the Q scene, (whether expertly enhanced or not) and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the R defendant, provided the images and the R photograph are available for the jury (R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260; R v Clarke S S [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 and R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750).” T T U U V V  - 24 - A A B B 30. 於 Clare & Peach 一案中，英國上訴法院引用其他司法管 C 轄區的案件後裁定：— C D D “ …The phrase “expert ad hoc” seeks to put witnesses like Detective Parsons and P.C. Fitzpatrick into the traditional E category of those qualified to give opinion evidence. Whether E or not the tag is appropriate, we are clearly of the view that P.C. F Fitzpatrick had “special knowledge that the Court did not F possess”, to quote the Canadian judgment cited above. P.C. Fitzpatrick had acquired the knowledge by lengthy and studious G application to material which was itself admissible evidence. To G afford the jury the time and facilities to conduct the same research would be utterly impracticable. Accordingly, it was in H H our judgment legitimate to allow the officer to assist the jury by pointing to what he asserted was happening in the crowded I scenes on the film. He was open to cross-examination, and the I jury, after proper direction and warnings, were free either to accept or reject his assertions.” J J K 31. 於 Grant v The Queen，加拿大最高法院的 Dickson J 提 K 及： — L L M “If the court is being told that which it is in itself entirely M equipped to determine without the aid of the witness on that point then of course the evidence is supererogatory and N N unnecessary. It would be a waste of time listening to superfluous testimony.” O O 32. 沒爭議的是，當日並沒警員在新城市廣場外的空地。事實 P P 上，控方亦沒要求 PW1 認人。PW1 只是指出新城市廣場空地的一對 Q Q 男女，及指出控方希望法庭留意的特徵。他從沒將該對男女「認出」 R 為首兩名被告，可是他的確曾用兩名首被告的相片與 P2A 的片段作 R 出比對，並指出首兩名被告與片段中男女相約的特徵（簡稱意見證 S S 供），而控方亦沒任何證供證明 PW1 曾花大量時間觀看及分析 P2A T T U U V V  - 25 - A A B B 的片段，從而獲得法庭沒有的知識。因此，法庭同意不能接納上述的 C 意見證供。 C D D 33. PW1 的證供清晰直接，在盤問下沒動搖。事實上，除了上 E E 述的意見證供，他絕大部份的證供不受爭議；相反來說，辯方大律師 F 對 PW1 差不多沒有盤問，只是向 PW1 指出，警方制服第一被告時， F 第二被告沒有嘗試拉走第一被告及被捕時，第二被告沒有掙扎。如上 G G 所述，法庭不會接納上述的意見證供。除此之外，本席裁定 PW1 為 H H 誠實可靠的證人，接納他餘下的證供。 I I 34. 控辯各方根據香港法例第 221 章《刑事訴訟程序條例》將 J J PW2 及 PW4 的證人供詞納為證供。本席亦於上文贅述供詞的內容， K K 現不再重覆。 L L 35. 控方應辯方的要求傳召 PW3 作供，但其實她的證供不受 M M 爭議，辯方亦沒有任何盤問。本席裁定她為誠實可靠的證人，接納她 N N 的證供。 O O 36. PW5 的大部份證供不受爭議；首兩名被告的大律師沒有 P P 任何盤問，而第三被告的大律師只向 PW5 指出：— Q Q R (1) 他拘捕第三被告前，在完全沒有警告下，用警棍連 R 續打了第三被告三下； S S T T U U V V  - 26 - A A B B (2) PW5 衝前拘捕前，第三被告正背向警方，步向担杆 C 莆街，而非與示威者一同站於最後一排路障，面向 C 警方。 D D E E 37. PW5 的證供清晰直接，在盤問下沒動揺。本席裁定他為 F 誠實可靠的證人，接納其證供。 F G G 辯方的證供 H H I 38. 本席已小心考慮證供及代表第三被告大律師的陳詞。本席 I 認為第三被告的證供違反常理、自相矛盾，與不爭的新聞片段不脗合， J J 最明顯例子如下：— K K (1) 第三被告指於新城市廣場外突然聞到一陣剌鼻的 L L 氣味，令他十分不舒服。因此才用頸箍遮蓋口鼻。 M M 後來，第三被告到達源禾路（即已離開新城市廣場）， N 但他仍以頸箍遮蓋口鼻； N O O (2) 第三被告指聽見「砰」一聲及看見站於小巴站牌頂 P P 部的男子「彈一彈」，認為該男子可能被搌到或絆 Q 到；因憂心會有人受傷才出手相助。如果第三被告 Q R 認為該名男子被小巴站牌所傷，自然反應是上前慰 R 問及察看傷勢。可是，盤問下，第三被告承認不但 S S 沒有慰問或查看傷勢，連望也沒望該男子一眼，對 T 其視若無睹，只顧出手搬運小巴站頭； T U U V V  - 27 - A A B B C (3) 第三被告指認為站在站牌頂部的男子可能被搌到 C 或絆到。根據新聞片段，第三被告指稱擔心的男子 D D 從沒跌倒；相反地，第三被告上前搬運小巴站牌前， E E 該男子已走往站牌的另一邊，繼續搬運； F F (4) 第三被告指上前「逗一逗」小巴站牌前，他並不知 G G 悉站牌底部由水泥造成，更不知站牌如此沉重。小 H H 巴站牌放在路上，如沒重量，根本不能抵受風吹雨 I 打。況且，示威者將站牌翻倒在地上後，第三被告 I 正站在路邊，面向站牌的底部。另外，當時已有 3 J J 至 4 人在搬運小巴站牌，但也不能將站牌抬起。如 K K 果第三被告並不知道或認為站牌很重，他又為何會 L 擔心有人會受傷？他的證供自相矛盾； L M M (5) 第三被告稱，上前協助搬運小巴站牌，是因擔心會 N N 有人受傷。盤問下，第三被告指上前協助時，曾問 O 示威者想將站牌「拖」到那裏。很明顯，將站牌拖 O 行而引致身體受傷的機會極微； P P Q Q (6) 主問時，第三被告稱，看見示威者將小巴站牌翻倒， R 上前勸喻他們將站牌放回原位。盤問下，他卻稱上 R 前時詢問示威想將站牌「拖」往哪裏，隨即便出手 S S 相助。首先，他的證供前後矛盾。另外，他自稱不 T T U U V V  - 28 - A A B B 認同示威者的所作所為，但他於新聞片段內的行為 C 卻與他所述的意見或立場南轅北轍； C D D (7) 新聞片段顯示，示威者搬運小巴站牌時，一名女子 E E 大叫：「拖呀！拖呀！睇腳！」。第三被告稱只聽 F 見「睇腳」，但沒聽見「拖呀！」。可是他又稱上 F 前協助時，問示威者要將站牌「拖」往哪裏。新聞 G G 片段顯示，第三被告上前協助搬運小巴站牌後，上 H H 述女子才大叫「睇腳」； I I (8) 第三被告稱上前時，詢問示威者要將小巴站頭「拖」 J J 往那裏。新聞片段顯示，當時示威者已用伸縮鐵閘 K K 及其他雜物築起三個大型路障，意途顯而易見； L L (9) 第三被告稱搬運完小巴站牌後便離開。可是，不爭 M M 議的是，警方到場後，第三被告仍在現場，即源禾 N N 路近担杆莆街； O O (10) 第三被告指他離開示威現場，但到達源禾路與鄕事 P P 會路交界時，有一名婆婆大叫：「防暴警嚟啦！」。 Q Q 主問時，他稱因首次遇上社運事件，不知所惜，婆 R 婆又不斷推他，他才轉身向担杆莆街走。盤問下， R 欲指他並不害怕防暴警察、婆婆或其他行人；但否 S S 認是因為婆婆不斷推他才轉身走向担杆莆街。覆問 T T 下又改說走回頭路是因被婆婆不斷推撞； U U V V  - 29 - A A B B C (11) 第三被告指每天均會健身，更服食健身的高蛋白質 C 奶粉。沒有爭議的是第三被告的體型十分健碩。他 D D 指稱因被婆婆推撞而前往源禾路及担杆莆街交界 E E 令人難以信服； F F (12) 盤問下，第三被告承認源禾路有不只一條路可通往 G G 大涌橋路小巴站；他沒有前往小巴站，而是轉身往 H H 担杆莆街。最初，他解釋前路有障礙。當他無法說 I 出是什麼障礙時，又改說是因心情亂。 I J J 39. 本席裁定第三被告並非誠實可靠的證人，拒納他的證供。 K K L 身份 L M M 40. 如上述，第一及第二被告否認他們是新聞片段內的一對男 N 女。兩名被告的大律師雖然反對 PW1 作辨認身份的證供，亦反對 PW1 N 將新聞片段的一對男女與首兩名被告作比較，但他承認，作為事實裁 O O 斷者，法庭有絕對權利自行觀看有關片段，並自行作比對及辨認，以 P P 裁定片中人是否首兩名被告。 Q Q 41. 本席同意大律師的陳述。Archbold Hong Kong 2021，第 14- R R 85 段指出：— S S T “ Murphy, held that the trial judge was correct in using a film T for his recognition of the appellants and to decide if other witnesses’ identification from the same film was correct. There U U V V  - 30 - A A B had been a submission that a judge sitting alone could not decide B on his or her perception of a film recognition of an accused… C This submission was contrary to Murphy on Evidence, ibid at C 513. Kelly LJ…so reasoned and held the trial judge’s perception of the film was real evidence and admissible… The conclusion D of the Court in Murphy were that the trial judge could use his D judgment of the film to identify and understand what it showed E and for the correctness of other witnesses’ identification.” E F 42. 大律師續指，法庭要利用有關片段自行作比對及辨認的 F 話，大前提是有關片段必須要足夠清晰（sufficiently clear）。他指：— G G H H (1) 有關片段的畫面質素低，影像並不清晰； I I (2) 部分片中人的影像不清晰，不能被依賴作有意義及 J J 公平的分析及比對；原因是有關片段均不能清晰顯 K K 示片中人的特徵，包括但不限于五官、面形、頭髮、 L 性別、實際身高、身材和步姿等； L M M (3) 就算將有關片段的影像放大，清晰度只會更差； N N (4) 部分有關片段的鏡頭及片中人一直在移動，進一步 O O 降低片中人於影像中的清晰度； P P Q (5) 有關片段中的物品和實物可能存在色差的問題。 Q R R 43. 本席對大律師大部份的陳述不敢苟同。本席同意攝錄者遠 S S 距離拍攝新城市廣場外空地情況時，控方所依賴影像內的一對男女比 T 較細小（見相簿 1，第 1 及 2 頁），而將影像放大，令影像變得模糊。 T U U V V  - 31 - A A B B 可是，由相簿 1，第 3 至 23 頁，控方所依賴影像的一對男女清晰可 C 見。控方已將其依賴的畫面截圖，不存在因片中人移動而影響法庭觀 C 察的元素。辯方大律師似乎忘記了控方是要求法庭用首兩名被告被捕 D D 時拍攝的相片（而非實物）與片段的截圖作比對。相片與片段均經過 E E 鏡頭拍攝，沒有片段與實物出現色差的問題。 F F 44. 當時新城市廣場外空地的一對男女用口罩、頸箍及泳鏡遮 G G 蓋面容，無論片段何等清晰，法庭根本沒有可能看見他們的面容。控 H H 方要求法庭留意的是片段中一對男女的身形、髮型、衣物及身上的袋 I 和背囊。 I J J 45. Archbold Hong Kong 2021，第 1053 頁，第 14-16 段指： — K K “Identification by clothing L L The recognition of apparel can be supportive of an M identification. The judge should clarify that the fact that M someone wore particular clothing did not preclude the probability that someone else was dressed similarly: R v Hickin N N [1996] Crim L R 584, CA.” O O 46. 本席明白首兩名被告身上的衣物均為普通的衣物，其他人 P 亦有可能穿著類同，甚至相同的衣物。因此，以衣物作辨認基礎時， P 法庭須特別小心。 Q Q R R 47. 本席已小心地用首兩名被告被捕時的外型比對新聞片段 S 2A 內的一對男女。第一被告被捕後，於警署拍攝的照片顯示：— S T T (1) 她的身型比較嬌小，肥瘦適中； U U V V  - 32 - A A B B C (2) 長髮，束馬尾；束馬尾的橡根近後頸位置； C D D (3) 她身上的物品包括一個粉藍色的醫學口罩、黑色的 E 泳鏡、深藍色背囊及一對灰黑色手套； E F F (4) 上身穿著黑色圓領短袖 T 恤、T 恤在褲外，T 恤長 G G 度過盤骨位；雙臂穿著一對黑色手袖； H H (5) 下身穿黑色貼身的長褲。 I I J J 48. 第二被告被捕後，於警署拍攝的照片顯示：— K K (1) 他的身型修長高挑； L L M (2) 中等長度髪型； M N N (3) 上身穿著黑色圓領短袖 T 恤； O O P (4) 下身穿著黑色長褲； P Q Q (5) 從他身上檢獲的物品包括一個灰色背囊、黑藍色的 R R 頸箍、一個藍色透明泳鏡、一對黑色手袖、一支藍 S 色手柄的錘子；錘子上有螢光黃色的標籤及一個藍 S 紅色的肩背袋。 T T U U V V  - 33 - A A B B 49. 片段內的女子的身形、髮型、口罩、泳鏡（包括顏色及形 C 狀）、手袖、手套、T 恤（包括領口、袖長及身長）、背囊、長褲均 C 與第一被告完全脗合。當時，該名女子與一名男子同行。同行的男子 D D 無論身型、髮型、頸箍（包括顏色及花紋）、泳鏡（形狀）、背囊、 E E 手袖、T 恤、長褲均與第二被告完全脗合。 F F 50. 片段中的男子於步行期間手持一個錘子。該錘子的手抦是 G G 藍色的，而錘子上有螢光黃色的標籤。該錘子與從第二被告身上檢取 H H 的錘子亦完全脗合。片段中的女子向著担杆莆街方向步行時，手持一 I 個藍紅色肩背袋，並將該袋子交給同行的男子；該肩背袋與從第二被 I 告身上檢獲的肩背袋脗合。另外，片段中男子的灰色背囊內有一瓶水， J J 瓶蓋白色，瓶身上有紫白色標籤。第二被告被制服期間，有一瓶水從 K K 其背囊掉出，該瓶水的蓋子和標籤均與片段中的瓶子脗合。 L L 51. 本席明白首兩名被告的身形、髮型、衣物及身上的物品均 M M 為普通的日常用品。可是要於同一日、同一時段和同一地段找到有齊 N N 上述特徵的女子或男子的機會已經是微乎其微；要找到一對同行男 O 女，而該男女各自有齊首兩名被告上述特徵，更是沒有可能。唯一及 O 不可抗拒的推論是，新聞片段中的一對男女便是第一及第二被告。 P P Q Q 控罪一 R R 52. 根據香港法例第 245 章《公安條例》第 18 條：— S S T 「(1) 凡有 3 人或多於 3 人集結在一起，作出擾亂秩序的行 T 為或作出帶有威嚇性、侮辱性或挑撥性的行為，意圓導致或 U U V V  - 34 - A A B 相當可能導致任何人合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會 B 安寧，或害怕他們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧， C 他們即屬非法集結。 C D (2) 集結的人如作出上述般的行為，則即使其原來的集結 D 是合法的，亦無關重要。 E (3) 任何人如參與憑藉第(1)款屬非法集結的集結，即犯 E 非法集結罪 F F (a) 一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁 5 年；及 G G (b) 一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第 2 級罰款及監禁 3 年。」 H H 53. 根據《公安條例》第 19 條：— I I J J 「(1) 如任何參與憑藉第 18(1)條被定為非法集結的集結的 人破壞社會安寧，該集結即屬暴動，而集結的人即屬集結暴 K 動。 K L (2) 任何人參與暴動，即犯暴動罪 L (a) 一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁 10 年；及 M M (b) 一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第 2 級罰款及監禁 N 5 年。」 N O O 54. 控辯雙方對上述控罪的原素、法律原則及法庭須裁決的事 P 項似乎有爭議。 P Q Q 控方立場 R R 55. 控方指，「非法集結罪」和「暴動罪」可被視為層遞性質 S S 的罪行。當中「暴動罪」需要是有人（但不一定是被告）已經作出破 T T 壞社會安寧的作為。因此：— U U V V  - 35 - A A B B C (A) 「暴動罪」的元素如下：— C D D (1) 關鍵時間存在一個非法集結； E E (2) 參與非法集結的人（可以是，但不一定是被 F F 告）破壞社會安寧，從而令該非法集結成為暴 G G 動；及 H H (3) 該暴動仍然進行期間，被告作出了參與暴動 I I 的作為，及意圖參與該暴動。 J J K (B) 至於「非法集結罪」的罪行元素則分列如下：— K L L (1) 在控罪所指的時間及地點，有 3 人或多於 3 人 M M 集結在一起，而這些集結的人有「共同目的」 ； N N (2) 這些集結的人（可以是，但不一定是被告）在 O O 上述共同目的下： P P (a) 作出了擾亂秩序的行為； Q Q R R (b) 作出帶有威嚇性、侮辱性或挑撥性的行 S 為（下稱「訂明行為」）； S T T U U V V  - 36 - A A B B (3) 該些集結在一起的人在作出一或多項「訂明 C 行為」時，他們（可以是，但不一定是被告） ：— C D D (a) 意圖導致任何在場的人（主觀的準則） E E F (i) 合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞 F 社會安寧，或 G G H (ii) 合理地害怕他們會藉以上的行為 H I 激使其他人破壞社會安寧；或 I J J (b) 訂明行為相當可能導致任何在場的人 K （客觀的準則）：— K L L (i) 合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞 M M 社會安寧；或 N N (ii) 合理地害怕他們會藉以上的行為 O O 激使其他人破壞社會安寧。 P P Q (4) 該非法集結進行期間，被告作出了參與該非 Q 法集結的作為，及意圖參與該非法集結 [詳 R R 見：林文瀚法官（當時官階）在 Secretary of S S Justice v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD T 556 (CFI)（香港特別行政區 訴 梁國華 HCMA T 54/2012，未經𢑥編，2012.10.19）（「梁國華 U U V V  - 37 - A A B B 案」）一案第 16 段列出了《公安條例》第 18(1) C 條下「非法集結」的組成元素。] C D D 56. 經控方在聆訊中展示相關證供後，辯方表示不會爭議案發 E E 當日在現場有暴動。因此，就控罪一，控方只集中於有關首兩名被告 F 的「身分」爭議及三名被告如何「參與」暴動的法律原則。 F G G 57. 控方指，有關條文採用「參與」的字眼，因此控方需要證 H H 明被告「參與」了有關非法活動。什麼構成「參與」的作為是一個事 I 實的問題。考慮這個議題時，也必須考慮被告人的「認知」 I （knowledge）。倘若一名被告人不知道面前有一個暴動，他是不可以 J J 被視為「參與」了該場暴動。若證供顯示他是構成暴動的人士（即作 K K 出破壞社會安寧的行為的人），那自不然是知道有暴動發生。問題通 L 常出現在暴動仍然存在，但當刻暴動場面沒有在被告人面前出現；這 L 時候是否「知情」將變得更為重要。 M M N N 58. 控方援引上訴法院於 Secretary for Justice v Tong Wai Hung O & Others [2021] HKCA 404，CASJ 1/2020，（未經𢑥編），2021.3.25 O （湯偉雄案），第 50 段，指出「暴動罪」及「非法集結罪」的控訴要 P P 旨，在於他們聚眾行事，以人多勢眾來達到他們的共同目的：— Q Q R “50. The gravamen of unlawful assembly and riot, whether as R common law or statutory offences, lies in the participants of the unlawful assembly or riot acting in large numbers and using S those numbers to achieve their common purpose: Wong Chi S Fung, supra, at [123]-[127] referring to R v Caird (1970) 54 Cr App R 499; R v Gilmour [2011] EWCA Crim 2458; R v T T Blackhawks [2012] 1 Cr App R(S) 114; HKSAR v Tang Ho Yin [2019] 3 HKLRD 502, at [24]; Leung Tin Kei, supra, at [78].” U U V V  - 38 - A A B B C 59. 控方指上訴法庭於湯偉雄案亦考慮了何謂旁觀者或路人。 C 上訴法院明確指出，當和平示威淪為非法集結或暴動，和平的參與者 D D 或旁觀者應在合理切實可行的情況下盡快離開現場。雖然參與者或旁 E E 觀者如純粹基於一些合理理由或因現場的實際情況而繼續留在現場， F 無須負上法律責任，然而一旦參與使用暴力或威嚇使用暴力，便須負 F 上法律責任（見第 77 至 81 段）。套用共同犯罪計劃的原則於暴動罪 G G 及非法集結罪時，上訴庭在湯偉雄案中提及，下列的環境證據可以供 H H 法庭推論被告與參與暴動的人仕有一個共同犯罪的計劃：— I I (1) 與參與暴動人士的距離接近； J J K (2) 與參與暴動人士身穿相似的衣著裝備； K L L (3) 管有可以用作通訊的器具； M M N (4) 被警方發現時企圖逃離現場。 N O O 60. 相關判詞（第 27 段）：— P P Q “27. Mr. Pun’s reliance on the findings by the judge is Q misplaced. For the Questions do not stem from the judged findings but from the undisputed circumstantial evidence relied R on by the prosecution, such as the fact that the respondents were R found in close vicinity soon after the police took action to disperse the protestors; that they wore black outfits with gear S S similar to other protestors taking part in the riot; that, in the case of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, they were each in possession of T a radio transceiver without licence; and that they attempted to T flee when found by the police. Those undisputed facts are capable of proving inferentially their participation in the riot or U U V V  - 39 - A A B unlawful assembly on Des Voeux Road West based on the B doctrine of joint enterprise, if applicable as a matter of law.” C C 首兩名被告的立場 D D E 61. 首兩名被告的大律師指，根據香港特別行政區 訴 梁天琦 E F 及另二人 [2020] 1 HKLRD 1246 第 78 段，要證明被告人參與了非法 F 集結，控方需證明：— G G H (a) 在控罪所指的時間及地點，被告人與 2 人或多於 2 H I 人集結在一起；及 I J J (b) 被告人當時與該些人集結在一起的共同目的；及 K K (c) 被告人當時與該些集結在一起的人在這個共同目 L L 的下，故意地：— M M N (i) 作出擾亂秩序的行為，或 N O O (ii) 作出帶有威脅性、侮辱性或挑撥性的行為（下 P 稱「訂明行為」）；及 P Q Q (d) 被告人與該些集結在一起的人在作出一或多項「訂 R R 明行為」時：— S S (i) 他們意圖導致任何在埸的人合理地害怕如此 T T 集結的人會破壞社會安寧，或合理地害怕他 U U V V  - 40 - A A B B 們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安 C 寧；或 C D D (ii) 相當可能導致任何人合理地害怕如此集結的 E E 人會破壞社會安寧，或合理地害怕他們會藉 F 以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧（「知道 F 或罔顧」的要求已被 HKSAR v Leung Chung G G Hang Sixtus [2021] HKCFA 24 第 60 段推翻。 H H I 62. 大律師指法庭需要為何時一個集結演變成非法集結或暴 I 動，作出事實的裁決。於湯偉雄案及香港特別行政區 訴 陳起行及另 J J 三人 [2021] HKDC 808 （陳起行案）內，區域法院法官亦裁定非法集 K K 結何時才演變為暴動。 L L 63. 大律師援引 湯偉雄 案，原審法官判詞的第 54 段 [2020] M M HKDC 588，指在考慮參與非法集結的人實際做了什麼行為破壞社會 N N 安寧而令非法集結成為暴動時，一般針對的都是那些「蓄意使用暴力」 O 的行為。大律師續指，並非所有的行為都會被視為符合「暴動」嚴重 O 性。於湯偉雄案內，區域法院法官於第 55 至 62 段內分析不同的行 P P 為，在考慮客觀因素，包括在場市民的反應後，裁定架設路障和堵塞 Q Q 交通最多只是非法集結的行為，不屬於暴動的程度；暴動行為當時所 R 產生的威脅必須是相當及即時的，例如示威者展示或揮舞攻擊性武 R 器，如「開山刀」或手持燃點了的「氣油彈」。因此，即使當時早在 S S 5 時許已有路障和堵塞交通的程況，區域法院法官裁定在 7 時 02 分， T T U U V V  - 41 - A A B B 「當警方防線向前推進，示威者向警方投擲雜物的那一刻」開始，該 C 集結才演變成暴動。 C D D 64. 就「共同目的」，首兩名被告的大律師指，根據 SJ v Leung E E Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556 第 16 至 22 段，非法集結罪（以及暴 F 動罪）具有集體性質。他亦援引 R v To Kwan Hang [1995] HKCLR 251， F 第 254 頁 10 至 15 段，指有 3 人或以上集結在一起並作出訂明行為 G G 時，構成非法集結的是該些人，而非其他也集結在一起，但沒有作出 H H 訂明行為的人。他指有 3 人或以上集結在一起並作出訂明行為時，法 I 庭仍必需考慮該些人在作出訂明行為時，是否仍可被視為集結在一 I 起；被告人們的行為之間必須有足夠連繫，例如共同目的，法庭才可 J J 一併考慮他們。 K K L 65. 至於「參與」的元素，大律師援引「陪審團指引（2020 年 L 就特選課題作修訂的版本）第 101-4 及 5 頁，關於參與方面的法律： M M 若一個人身在犯罪現場，但沒有參與干犯該罪行，則他是沒有犯下該 N N 罪行的；另外：若一個人身在犯罪現場，而故意地憑藉他的在場或言 O 語或行為，鼓勵另一人干犯該罪行，則他同樣是有犯下該罪行的，唯 O 控方必需指出被告如何給予鼓勵或給予了甚麼鼓勵… 除此之外，大 P P 律師援引 Leung Kwok Hung v SJ [2020] 2 HKLRD 771 的第 225 至 226 Q Q 段，指法庭要基於一個人繼續身在未經批准集結現場，這一點去使他 R 負上刑責，必先確保該人知道該集結是未經批准的，以及獲給予合理 R S 機會離開現場。大律師亦依賴 SJ v Tong Wai Hung [2021] 2 HKLRD S 399，上訴法院判決第 80 段，指當和平示威演變成非法集結甚至暴動 T T 時，和平示威者或旁覲者應在合理可行的情況下盡快離開現場：一方 U U V V  - 42 - A A B B 面，如他因合理理由不如此做，或因現場的實際情況而無法如此做， C 則他的在場本身並不會使他干犯非法集結或暴動罪；另一方面，如他 C 變成牽涉在暴力或暴力威脅之中，則他越過了受法律保護的合法集會 D D 和示威，和受法律制裁和限制的非法活動之界線；根據實際情況和證 E E 據，他可能以主犯，從犯或共同犯罪者的身份，而牽涉在暴力或暴力 F 威脅中。 F G G 66. 換句話說，大律師的論點是，控方除證實被告身在暴動現 H H 場，而未能證明其他元素，法庭便不應將被告人定罪。大律師援引香 I 港特別行政區 訴 林子浩 [2020] HKDC 394，區域法院法官考慮到證 I 據只顯示被告是在警方追捕曾經堵路和投擲物品的人群時被制服，以 J J 及他管有防毒面具、眼罩、手套、背包、黑色 T 恤、黑色褲、黑色襪 K K 和黑色運動鞋，認為合理的可能性是他剛巧路經該處而遇上警察，而 L 與該懷疑暴動無關。大律師亦依賴 HKSAR v Nanik [2018] HKCA 500 L M 第 31 至 34 段，有關「純粹在場不足以構成協助及教唆罪責」。另外， M 大律師亦指於香港特別行政區 訴 余德穎及另七人 [2020] HKDC 992 N N 一案中，區域法院法官考慮到沒有證據顯示被告人被捕前身在何處、 O 在做什麼，認為無法推斷他們憑藉身在現場鼓勵其他人。另外，該案 O P 的法官認為不應把穿著黑衣和帶備防護裝備的人視為參與暴動，理由 P 是這做法有可能冤枉無辜，因服飾顏色是個人喜好，穿著其他顏色衣 Q Q 服的人也可參與暴動，而且合理的可能性是有人希望見證難得的歷史 R R 時刻，遮蓋容貌以免為誤認為參與暴動者，並帶備防毒面具，口罩和 S 眼罩等以備在催淚煙或暴力場面中保護自己。大律師續指，於陳起行 S 一案內，區域法院法官考慮到沒有證據顯示第一及第二被告身處暴動 T T 的核心範圍多久，供法庭推論他們知道暴動的情況，亦沒有證據顯示 U U V V  - 43 - A A B B 他們在言行上直接或間接參與暴動，認為即使第一被告衣著裝備包括 C 黑色上衣、黑色長褲、護目鏡、防毒面具和 3M 手套及隔熱手套，而 C 第二被告的衣著裝備包括黑色上衣、黑色長褲和保鮮紙，而兩人均在 D D 暴動的核心範圍附近被捕，雖有合理定罪機會，但不至毫無合理疑點。 E E 大律師提及湯偉雄案，第 113 段，指區域法院法官裁定即使將控方案 F 情推至最高，配戴裝備頂多顯示被告有意圖參與集結，卻無法推論被 F 告必然已經實際參與非法集結或暴動。被告人亦有可能來到現場後， G G 來不及參與就被捕，這個可能性在現有證據下無法被合理排除。[就純 H H 粹身在現場不足以構成犯法的案例，亦見 R v Cook (1994) 74 A Crim I R 1 及 Boxer v The Queen (1995) 14 WAR 505]。 I J J 67. 綜合以上論點，首兩名被告的大律師指，雖然一個人可以 K K 以從犯的身份干犯暴動罪，包括夥同犯罪或協助及教唆他人參與暴動， L 唯一會令一個人足夠透過親身參與而干犯非法集結或暴動罪的方法， L M 是他身處現場，且作出暴力行為或威脅使用暴力。 M N N 第三被告的立場 O O 68. 就犯罪意圖（mens rea），第三被告援引終審法院於 HKSAR P P v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus FACC 2/2021 就非法集結罪的判決：— Q Q R “20. The offence under the intended limb expressly requires R mens rea, specifying explicitly that it requires proof of intention. The actus reus requirements in section 18(1) are: (1) for there to S be 3 or more persons; (2) assembled together; and (3) who S conduct themselves in the prohibited manner, i.e. in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner. Since “intended” T T here can only be understood to mean “intended by the assembled persons”, the intended limb lays down as part of the mens rea U U V V  - 44 - A A B requirements of the offence that the assembled persons B conducting themselves in the prohibited ways must intend to C “cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so C assembled will commit a breach of the peace”. Thus, construing the intended limb, there is no need to embark on the exercise D envisaged in Hin Lin Yee or Kulemesin since the statute is D neither silent nor ambiguous as to the state of mind required. E The offence created by the intended limb expressly spells out the E required mens rea in relation to the consequence of causing a reasonable fear of a breach of the peace. F F 21. The likely limb stipulates the same three actus reus elements, namely: (1) for there to be 3 or more persons; (2) G G assembled together; and (3) who conduct themselves in the prohibited manner, i.e. in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or H provocative manner. But at this point, a crucial difference from H the intended limb arises. The words which then follow, “likely to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so I assembled will commit a breach of the peace…”, do not address I the mental state of the assembled persons. Instead, they refer to J the quality or likely consequences of the prohibited conduct by J the assembled persons as observed externally. Thus, the prohibited conduct must be of such a nature as to be likely to K result in any person reasonably apprehending a breach of the K peace by the assembled persons. L L 59. In answer to the certified question of law: M (1) The actus reus elements of the likely limb of M section 18(1) of the POO are: (I) there must be “3 or more persons”; (ii) they must be “Assembled N together”; (iii) they must “conduct themselves in N a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or O provocative manner”; and (iv) their conduct, O viewed objectively, must “cause any person reasonably to fear that [they] will commit a P breach of the peace…or provoke other persons to P commit a breach of the peace”. Q Q (2) The prosecution will need to prove full mens rea on the part of the defendant in respect of each of R elements (i) to (iii) above. No mens rea is R required in respect of element (iv). S S (3) The prosecution must also prove the defendant took part in the unlawful assembly within section T 18(3) of the POO.” T U U V V  - 45 - A A B B 69. 大律師指除了上述元素，控方必須證明被告是故意參與暴 C 動。他續指根據第三被告的證供，第三被告並不認同示威者的所作所 C 為，因此第三被告與示威者沒有共同的目的。 D D E E 適用的法律原則 F F 70. 本席對辯方的陳述不盡苟同。本席同意舉證責任在於控 G G 方，控方必須在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪的每一個原素。因此，如控 H H 方只能證明控罪的某一個或某些（但並非所有）元素，被告人便不應 I 負上刑責（例如控方只能證明被告人純粹在現場或被告人的裝扮與示 I 威者類似，而未能證實控罪的其他元素）。這是香港法律的基石。 J J K 71. 可是，首兩名被告的大律師不斷「援引」一些區域法院的 K L 判決，將它們升華為案例。眾所周知，區域法院的判決並非案例，對 L 同級法院並無約束力。況且，每一件案件均有其獨特的案情；法庭須 M M 根據每一件案件的證供而作出裁決（Each case must be decided on its N N own facts）。 O O 72. 首兩名被告的大律師多次提及 湯偉雄 案內區域法院法官 P P 的裁決。其實本案聆訊時，湯偉雄案內就「共同犯案」的裁決已被上 Q Q 訴法院推翻，辯方所指的「模糊暴動與非法集結兩者的分別及將暴動 R 罪的門檻大為降低」（over charging）的裁決亦被上訴法院否決。 R S S 73. 事實上，控方的立場十分清晰；控方的指控是三名被告 T 「參與」暴動。終審法院已於 HKSAR v Leung Tin Kei, Lo Kin Man & T U U V V  - 46 - A A B B Wong Ka Kiu FACC No 6 of 2021 [ 終審法院稱之為 盧建民 案] 及 C Secretary for Justice v Tong Wai Hung & Others [湯偉雄終院上訴案] 清 C 晰及詳細解釋「非法集結罪」及「暴動罪」的元素及法律原則（包括 D D 「參與」的意思）。另外，終審法院亦清楚解釋何謂「共同目的」。 E E 因此，本席會根據終審法院所述的法律原則考慮本案，不打算逐一處 F 理辯方的陳述。因首兩名被告大律師所述的法律原則與終審法院的裁 F 決相差太大，而且終審法院於本案陳詞後才作出判決，本席去信首兩 G G 名被告的大律師，要求作進一步陳詞。法庭於 12 月 16 日接獲大律師 H H 的進一步陳述。基本上，大律師指沒有足夠證供顯示首兩名被告參與 I 暴動。第三被告大律師的法律陳述切合終審法院的判決，但本席於判 I J 決前亦邀請大律師作進一步陳述。 J K K 74. 終審法院指：— L L “4. The questions raised in the two Annexes concern a M proper understanding of the structure and elements of the M offences created by sections 18 and 19 and their relationship N with certain common law doctrines. In particular, issues arise as N to (i) the existence and nature of a requirement (if any) for proof of a “common purpose” shared by the defendant and other O persons assembled; (ii) the applicability of the doctrine of joint O enterprise to the two statutory offences and whether that doctrine enables liability to be established without the defendant being P P present at the scene; (iii) whether a defendant can be found guilty under sections 18 and 19 on the basis of “encouragement Q through [the defendant’s] presence”, without committing acts Q specifically prohibited by those sections… R 8. As was done in HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus, it R is convenient for the purposes of exposition to divide up and S number (in square brackets) the elements making up the two S offences as follow: T Unlawful Assembly (section 18) T [1] When 3 or more persons, U U V V  - 47 - A A B B [2] assembled together, C C [3] conduct themselves in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner, D D [4] intended or likely to cause any person reasonably E to fear that the persons so assembled will commit E a breach of the peace, or will by such conduct provoke other persons to commit a breach of the F peace, F [5] they are an unlawful assembly, [section 18(1)] G G [6] it is immaterial that the original assembly was H lawful if being assembled, they conduct H themselves in such a manner as aforesaid, [18(2)] I [7] Any person who takes part in an assembly which I is an unlawful assembly….[section 18(3)] J J Riot (section 19) K [8] when any person taking part in an assembly K which is an unlawful assembly by virtue of section 18(1), L L [9] commits a breach of the peace, M M [10] the assembly is a riot and the persons assembled are riotously assembled [section 19(1)] N N [11] any person who takes part in a riot shall be guilty O of the offence of riot…[section 19(2)] O P P Q Q R R S S T T U U V V  - 48 - A A B A.2 Unlawful Assembly B C 9. Elements [1] to [4] are the constituent elements of an C unlawful assembly. Where they are established, the assembly is…an unlawful assembly. Element [1] requires there to be 3 or D more persons [2] assembled together, who conduct themselves D in the disorderly manner specified in [3], with the intended or E likely consequences stated in [4]. Those persons will be referred E to as “the constituent offenders” and their conduct specified in [3] and [4] as the “prohibited conduct”. The true construction F of element [4] is dealt with in detail in HKSAR v Leung Chung F Hang Sixtus. Notably, the “likely” limb is an aspect of the actus reus requiring the objectionable conduct, objectively assessed, G G to be likely to produce the reasonable fear of a breach of the peace specified. H H 10. Element [6] reflects the scheme of graduated liability. An assembly might start off as lawful, then turn into an unlawful I assembly and then become a riot. The time such a I transformation may take will vary according to the J circumstances. An unlawful assembly could develop almost J immediately into a riot. K 11. Element [7] is the offence-creating provision. Any K person who “takes part” in an assembly which is an unlawful assembly commits the section 18 offence. The actus reus is L L “taking part “. This may or may not involve the same acts as, and should not be confined with, the prohibited conduct of the M constituent offenders referred to in [3] and [4]. M 12. If the defendant was one of the constituent offenders, by N engaging in the prohibited conduct, he or she will (along with N the other constituent offenders) have taken part in the unlawful O assembly that they will together have brought into being. But O the defendant need not be one of the constituent offenders and can “take part” by joining in later. This is clear from element [7] P which provides that the offence is committed by any person who P takes part in the unlawful assembly… Q Q 13. What then constitutes “taking part” in an unlawful assembly? What acts must the defendant perform? The sections R do not spell out the meaning of those words. As a matter of R textual analysis, it is implicit that if the defendant is one of the constituent offenders whose conduct falls within [3] and [4] he S S or she would “take part” since it is by such acts that the unlawful assembly is established, being of the essence of the offence. And T if the defendant was not among the constituent offenders, but T joined in and similarly did acts also prohibited by [3] and [4], he or she would also be found to have “taken part”. U U V V  - 49 - A A B B 14. However, the offence is not confined to such conduct. C As a matter of language, “taking part” is a broad expression. In C our view, those words also embrace conduct which does not itself fall within [3] and [4] but which involves the defendant D facilitating, assisting or encouraging the performance of such D conduct by others participating in the assembly. Such conduct E would traditionally give rise to accessorial liability, but, by E offering such facilitation, assistance or encouragement, the defendant acts in furtherance of the prohibited conduct and may F thus also be regarded as “taking part” in the unlawful assembly. F In so doing, he or she may attract liability as a principal offender under section 18 or an aider and abettor. G G 15. An important feature which emerges from the statutory H language is that unlawful assembly is what might be called a H “participatory offence”. Thus, the offence requires the constituent offenders who are “assembled together” to “conduct I themselves” in the prohibited manner so that the intended or I likely fear of a breach of the peace is fear of what “the persons J so assembled” will do. Element [6] draws the line between J lawful and unlawful assemblies by reference to persons who “being assembled” engage in the prohibited conduct. The K offence is committed by someone “taking part “in the unlawful K assembly. L L 16. The defendant must therefore be shown not merely to have been engaging in disorderly conduct alone, but to have M acted as part of an assembly with others who were also M participants. The offence is “participatory” in that sense. Such participation is a requirement recognised by Lam JA (as Lam PJ N then was) in SJ v Leung Kwok Wah, holding that the defendant’s N conduct has to be assessed to see if a sufficient nexus with other O participants exists to justify regarding them as acting together. O His Lordship held that their conduct has to justify the inference that they had what he called “a common purpose in acting in the P statutorily prescribed manner”; ie, a shared objective of P engaging in the “prohibited conduct” forming elements [3] and Q [4]. Q 17. The defendant must accordingly intend to take part in, R that is become part of, the unlawful assembly, being aware of R the related conduct of other participants and intending, while assembled together with them, to engage in or act in furtherance S S of the prohibited conduct. The defendant must, in other words, have what we will call a “participatory intent”. T T 18. It follows (leaving aside for now accessory and inchoate liability (especially regarding liability for conspiracy and U U V V  - 50 - A A B incitement) that may be incurred by a person who is absent), that B to be guilty under section 18 as a principal offender, the C defendant has to be present as part of the assembly together with C other participants. D A.3 Riot D E 19. The offence of riot builds on that of unlawful assembly. E It’s starting point is that an unlawful assembly exists, ie, that elements [1] to [5] are established. Element [8] specifies that F when any person taking part in the unlawful assembly [9] F commits a breach of the peace, the assembly [10] becomes a riot and the people assembled are riotously assembled. The actus G G reus of the offence of riot under section 19 is committed [11] when any person “takes part” in the riot. H H 20. Thus, as with unlawful assembly, the offence of riot has its initial constituent elements which are distinct from the actus I reus of “taking part in a riot”. Any person taking part in an I unlawful assembly may turn that assembly into a riot by J committing a breach of the peace. That person does not have to J be one of the constituent offenders who initially constituted the unlawful assembly, but he or she has to be a participant in the K unlawful assembly. Any person who “takes part” in a riot which K has come into existence commits the offence of riot [11]. Such a person does not have to be the person responsible for the initial L L constituent breach of the peace. Neither does he or she have to have taken part in the unlawful assembly prior to it turning into M a riot. Any person may take part by joining in after the unlawful M assembly has become a riot. N 21. Mirroring the analysis regarding unlawful assembly, the N defendant’s conduct amounting to “taking part” in the riot must O involve acts in furtherance of the riot. It must involve O committing breaches of the peace or doing acts facilitating, assisting or encouraging breaches of the peace by others, making P the defendant guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor. We P will return below to consider what committing a breach of the Q peace entails. Q 22. The offence of riot is also participatory in nature. The R constituent act involves a breach of the peace by a person who R was taking part in an unlawful assembly. When that occurs, the “persons assembled” are declared by element [10] to be S S “riotously assembled”. The person who first committed a breach of the peace would thus be taking part in an assembly which has T become a riotous assembly. Any other person who commits the T offence by “taking part” in the riot, does so as part of the “riotous assembly”. Such person must have a participatory intent, U U V V  - 51 - A A B intending to take part in the riot by committing, or acting in B furtherance of, breaches of the peace together with other C participants engaged in riotous activities. C 23. As with unlawful assembly, it follows that liability for D the offence of riot as a principal implicitly requires the defendant D to be present and acting with the others riotously assembled. E Again, this is subject to what is said about accessorial and E inchoate liability incurred by persons who are absent, discussed below… F F B. “Common Purpose” G G 25. In the Lo Case, the appellant’s propositions on “common purpose”, reflected in Annex 1, Questions 1a-1d, may be H summarised as follows: H (a) The offences of unlawful assembly and riot were I common law offences. At common law, it was I necessary for the prosecution to prove against the J defendant all the elements of the unlawful J assembly which then became a riot. These included the prohibited disorderly conduct and a K shared intent to engage in such conduct (what we K have called a “participatory intent”). L L (b) Additionally, so the argument runs, it was necessary to prove that the assembled persons M had a “common purpose” which they jointly M intended to pursue, such as to wreck a dinner or cause a work stoppage. Such a purpose may be N referred to as an “extraneous common purpose” N which is distinct from and goes beyond the O participatory intent to engage in the prohibited O conduct or to commit breaches of the peace. It is “extraneous” in that it is not a purpose which P relates to any element of the offences but P involves an external objective motivating the Q offenders. Lo’s submission is that the common Q law required such an extraneous purpose, which might or might not be lawful in itself, to be R shared in common by those taking part in the R unlawful assembly or riot. S S (c) It is argued that an extraneous common purpose continues to be required by the POO as a T necessary element of both unlawful assembly T and riot. The Judge, it is said, erred in failing to U U V V  - 52 - A A B recognise, and give directions on, this additional B element. C C 26. The prosecution’s position, adopted by the Judge in her directions to the jury and upheld by the Court of Appeal, is that D the prosecution has to prove that the defendant, assembled D together with other persons, acted with a participatory intent, E intending together with others assembled to behave in the E prohibited manner or to commit or further the commission of the prohibited acts or breaches of the peace, but that there is no F extraneous common purpose to be proved… F B.2 “Common purpose” and sections 18 and 19 G G 38. In our jurisdiction, statutory changes were introduced H somewhat earlier by the Public Order Bill 1967 (“POB”) H 39. The Objects and Reasons of the Bill make it clear that I sections 18 and 19 “replace the common law” as part of the I codification exercise. In particular, the intention is to eliminate J any requirement for proof of a “common purpose”… J 40. …as we have seen, a common purpose - in the sense of K an extraneous common purpose - is not one of the elements of K either offence as presently enacted. The Objects and Reasons indicate that this was a deliberate feature of the codification. L L Thus, it is preferable not to refer to “common purpose” but to recognise instead the requirement of a participatory intent, M reflecting the participatory nature of the two offences. It is in M any event clear that no requirement for proof of an extraneous common purpose exists. N N 41. As previously noted, that was the approach to section 18 O adopted by Lam JA (as Lam PJ then was) in SJ v Leung Kwok O Wah. His Lordship held that the elements of the offence reflected what he called the “corporate” nature of the offence: P P “…the conduct of the defendants had to be assessed Q together to see whether this criterion can be satisfied. Q There must be a sufficient nexus between the conduct of these defendants to justify having them considered R together. And the fear required is that such persons so R assembled, viz acting together, will commit a breach of the peace.” S S 42. He added: T T “…if three persons in a lawful assembly committed acts of the prescribed nature at different purposes, sparking U U V V  - 53 - A A B off different incidents, involving and affecting an B entirely different mix of persons, there would not be a C sufficient nexus to turn these independent acts into an C unlawful assembly of those three persons.” D 43. His Lordship was thus concerned with identifying the D participatory requirements of unlawful assembly as a matter of E statutory construction and held that the “corporate nature” of the E offence entailed proof of a “common purpose” in the sense of what we have called a participatory intent”. This is how his F statement that “the requirement of having a common purpose in F acting in the statutorily prescribed manner remains good law in dealing with a charge under S 18” should be understood. He was G G certainly not suggesting that an additional element involving proof of an extraneous common purpose is required… H H 45. The Court of Appeal endorsed Lam JA’s approach stating (in translation): I I “According to the true construction of S 18(1), the actus J reus that constitutes unlawful assembly must have J corporate nature to satisfy the requirement of offenders being jointly responsible. The offenders must have K assembled together and conducted themselves in the K manner prescribed in the ordinance when assembling. The offenders must have a common purpose so that the L L court can regard them as assembling to act together. Therefore, the requirement of having a common purpose M is still applicable to S 18(1). In other words, the common M law requirement of having a common purpose remains an ingredient of the offence of unlawful assembly under N S 18(1)”. N O 46. The “common law requirement of having a common O purpose” is clearly a reference to a participatory intent. The Court made this clear by adding: “…if the offenders just had the P common purpose of conducting themselves in the prescribed P manner, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of common Q purpose under S 18(1).” The Court of Appeal was not endorsing Q an “extraneous common purpose”. Indeed, the submission that such a purpose is required was rejected as “completely wrong in R law”. R 47. The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the S S offence of riot. A defendant committing the offence must have a participatory intent. He or she must intend to take part in the T riot along with other participants in the riotous assembly. No T extraneous common purpose has to be shown… U U V V  - 54 - A A B C.6. The taking part point B C 66. This point, which concerns the applicability of the joint C enterprise doctrine where the defendant is present at the scene, also flows from recognising the centrality of “taking part” as the D actus reus of both offences. Since, as we have just seen, the D offences under sections 18 and 19 require proof of the defendant E taking part in the disorderly or riotous conduct in common with E the other persons assembled, it is otiose and confusing to introduce as a requirement, a prior layer of common intention F and collective conduct which merely mirrors the statutory F requirement of “taking part”. G G 67. As noted above, a BHE involves the co-adventurers agreeing to carry out and then executing a planned crime. With H the offences of unlawful assembly and riot, proving that the H defendants executed their plan would provide proof of their “taking part” in the unlawful assembly or riot and thus establish I guilt of the statutory offences, without any need to pray in aid I the doctrine of joint enterprise. Their participatory intent would J be inferred from their prohibited conduct while assembled J together… K C.8 Presence and the location and scope of the assembly K 74. The Court noted in Kwok Wing Hang v Chief Executive L L in Council, that at the height of the disturbances in 2019: M “The frequency of outbreaks of violent protests M increased and the locations at which they took place also spread from one or two areas to become a phenomenon N described colloquially as ‘blossoming everywhere’ in N which multiple outbreaks of violence happened O simultaneously on Hong Kong Island, in Kowloon and O in the New Territories.” P 75. And as Poon CJHC observed in the Tong Case: P “…unlawful assemblies and riots nowadays are highly fluid in Q nature.” He pointed to participants assuming different roles and Q communicating with each other using their phones and in social media. Offenders could not be expected to be assembled as a R stationary group with a fixed membership in a single location. R Participants would move around in varying groups along main thoroughfares, running into side streets and buildings, spreading S S out and re-coalescing whether in response to action by the police, in pursuit of different targets or for other reasons. Violence T would periodically flare up and die down. Participants would T often be in communication with each other, coordinating their activities. U U V V  - 55 - A A B B 76. It will be necessary in each case for the tribunal to C determine where and when an unlawful assembly or riot took C place and whether a defendant, if charged as a principal, was present and took part. However, the above mentioned fluidity D should be taken into account and an overly rigid view should not D be taken of what constitutes the assembly, it’s location and E duration. Evidence regarding the geographical area affected, the E conduct of and communications maintained among the participants and the duration of the disturbances should be F considered as a whole. The defendant’s role in the assembly, if F any, should be considered for the purposes of assessing his or her potential principal, accessorial or inchoate liability. G G 77. A realistic view should be taken of the duration of the H unlawful assembly or riot. So long as three or more participants H remain actively engaged in the criminal assembly (not necessarily including the constituent offenders establishing the I unlawful assembly nor the person or persons whose breach or I breaches of the peace transformed the unlawful assembly into a J riot - they may have left), the unlawful assembly or riot remains J in being as a matter of law. Such an assembly remains in being as long as the participants remain at the scene even if, in the case K of a riot, the violence ebbs and flows. Any person taking part in K such a riotous assembly commits the offence. L L 78. The focus should be on whether the evidence directly proves or supports an irresistible inference that the defendant M had taken part in the unlawful assembly or riot. Evidence which M might support such an inference could include such matters as the time and place of arrest and items found on the defendant, N such as a helmet, body armour, goggles, a respirator, a radio N transceiver, plastic ties, laser pointers, weapons and materials to O make weapons such as petrol bombs which might have been O used by those taking part in the criminal assembly. Such fluidity and the basis of the defendant’s alleged liability should also be P borne in mind in the drafting of the charge, catering for P alternative possibilities. Q Q D. Encouragement R 79. Question 2d in Annex 1 asks whether a person can be R found guilty of riot “without specific conduct on his part falling under the prescribed conduct provided in sections 18 and 19”, S S but “merely by virtue of alleged encouragement through his presence”… T T 81. It is obviously important to avoid treating innocent passers-by who find themselves caught up in an unlawful U U V V  - 56 - A A B assembly or riot as guilty of an offence just because they were B present at the scene. Presence at the scene in itself is not enough C to constitute “taking part” or aiding and abetting. As the C Queensland Court of Appeal held in R v Cook, at common law, mere presence in an unlawful assembly or riot is generally D insufficient to found liability. It has traditionally been D considered necessary that there be some intentional activity in E furtherance of the riot. E 82. That is not to say that the bar is set high. It does not take F a great deal of activity on the defendant’s part to move the case F from the “mere presence” to the “encouragement” category. Thus in 1810, Mansfield CJ stated in Clifford v Brandon: G G “The law is, that if any person encourages or promotes, H or takes part in riots, whether by words, signs, or gestures, H or by wearing the badge or ensign of the rioters, he is himself to be considered a rioter, and he is liable to be I arrested for a breach of the peace”. I J 83. This was echoed more recently in Caird, where Sachs LJ J said: K “It is the law… that any person who actively encourages K or promotes an unlawful assembly or riot, whether by words, by signs or by actions, or who participated in it, L L is guilty of an offence which derives its great gravity from the simple fact that the persons concerned were M acting in numbers and using those numbers to achieve M their purpose.” N 84. And as Byrne J stated in R v Cook: N O “Generally, mere presence at the scene of a crime does O not involve criminal responsibility. But presence to facilitate the commission of an offence by others has P every potential to attract criminal responsibility under s P 7 [of the Criminal Code (Qld)]. And so those present to Q ‘lend the courage of their presence to the rioters, or to Q assist, if necessary’ may be guilty with the active participants.” R R 85. Whether a defendant has done enough to constitute “taking part” especially if by way of encouragement, is a matter S S of fact and degree, taking all the circumstances into account. T 86. Question 2d contains certain rolled-up propositions. T Aiders and abettors or counsellors and procurers may obviously perform acts which are not themselves acts of disorderly conduct U U V V  - 57 - A A B or breaches of the peace but which offer encouragement or B assistance to others in the commission of such acts, thus C founding secondary liability (or, as previously explained, C possibly also liability as principals for “taking part”). Thus, if the defendant’s presence occurs in circumstances qualifying it D as “encouragement” of the prohibited conduct by others, then D the answer to Question 2d would be in the affirmative. But mere E presence without more is not treated as encouragement, whether E for the purpose of “taking part”, or accessorial or inchoate liability. F F E. Breach of the peace G G 88. As we have seen, breaches of the peace are the distinguishing feature of a riot. In this jurisdiction, R v Howell H has often been cited as authority for what constitutes such a H breach. Watkins LJ there stated: I “…there is a breach of the peace whenever harm is I actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his J presence to his property or a person is in fear of being so J harmed through an assault, an affront, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance. It is for this breach of the K peace when done in his presence or the reasonable K apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without warrant.” L L 89. With its focus on an act which actually harms a person, M or in his presence, harms his property, or is likely to cause such M harm, etc, this appears to be a markedly narrow formulation. In recent experience, rioters have often engaged in wanton damage N to property which is not privately owned and not done in the N presence of the owner - such as tearing down road railings to O make barriers, digging up bricks to use as projectiles, smashing O traffic lights, damaging CCTV cameras, throwing Molotov cocktails into Mass Transit Railway stations and vandalising P shops identified with persons of opposing political views. Such P acts often occurred in the middle of the night when the premises Q were closed and no owner was present. Plainly, such conduct Q also constitutes breaches of the peace. R 90. In R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire, R Lord Bingham of Cornhill put the proposition derived from Howell more widely, stating that “the essence of the concept was S S to be found in violence or threatened violence”. We would adopt that as a general approach to the phrase ‘breach of the peace” in T the context of section 19. Someone who commits or threatens T an act if violence against another person or another person’s U U V V  - 58 - A A B property or acts so that such violence may reasonably be B apprehended, commits a breach of the peace. C C 91. As is apparent from the passage cited above, Watkins LJ’s statement in Howell was made in affirming the existence of D a common law power of arrest without warrant. … D E 92. Thus the power of arrest, asked on an apprehended E breach of the peace, was held to arise so that such situations could be prevented from deteriorating into public disorder F involving provoked retaliation by persons present and feeling F threatened in respect of their persons or property. G G 93. In POO sections 18 and 19, policy consideration is covered by element [4]. Conduct prohibited under section 18(1) H includes conduct which would “provoke other persons to H commit a breach of the peace”. Thus, the concept of a “breach of the peace” in sections 18 and 19 includes, but is not confined I to, situations which might give rise to provoked retaliation as I envisaged in Howell. In cases involving actual or threatened J violence to property, the owner of such property need not be J present for there to be a breach of the peace… K G. Conclusions and disposition of the appeals K 109. We summarise our conclusions as follows: L L (a) POO section 18 defines the elements which M constitute an unlawful assembly and makes M “taking part” in the unlawful assembly so constituted the actus reus of the offence. The N constituent elements are for three or more N persons assembled together to conduct O themselves in the prohibited disorderly, etc, O manner intended or likely to cause a reasonable apprehension that the persons so assembled will P commit or provoke a breach of the peace. Any P person who takes part in an unlawful assembly Q commits the offence. Q (b) POO section 19 builds on section 18, making the R existence of an unlawful assembly one of the R constituent elements of the offence of riot. A riot comes into being when any person taking part in S S an unlawful assembly commits a breach of the peace, turning the assembly into a riotous T assembly. The offence is committed by any T person who takes part in a riot so constituted. U U V V  - 59 - A A B (c) Both offences are participatory in nature. The B defendant must be shown not just to have been C acting alone but to have taken part in the C unlawful assembly or riotous assembly, acting together with others so assembled, being aware D of their related conduct and with the intention of D so taking part, ie, with a participatory intent. E There is no requirement for the persons taking E part to share some extraneous common purpose. F (d) To “take part” in the relevant criminal assembly, F the accused must perform the acts prohibited, ie, by behaving in the prohibited disorderly, etc G G fashion (section 18); or committing a breach of the peace (section 19); or acting in furtherance of H such prohibited conduct by facilitating, assisting H or encouraging those taking part in the criminal assembly. I I (e) Mere presence at the scene of an unlawful or J riotous assembly does not give rise to criminal J liability. However, if the accused, being present, provides encouragement by words, signs or K actions, he or she, any be held to be “taking part” K and guilty as a principal or held to be an aider and abettor. In deciding whether a defendant was L L present at the scene, the court should take into account the possible fluidity of the criminal M assembly and the communications maintained by M participants with each other in ascertaining the time, place and scope of the assembly in question. N N (f) … O O (g) The common law doctrine of joint enterprise in its basic form cannot operate in a manner P inconsistent with the statutory language… Even P in cases where the defendant is present at the Q scene, the basic joint enterprise doctrine is Q inapplicable, being otiose and liable to cause confusion, since the actus reus of each of the R statutory offences already involves “taking part” R with others assembled together. S S (h) … T (i) “Breach of the peace” in the context of sections T 18 and 19 includes, but is not confined to, situations which might give rise to provoked U U V V  - 60 - A A B retaliation. It extends to cases involving actual B or threatened violence to persons or property, C without any need for the owner of such property C to be present. D (j) … D E 111. The Tong Case comes to this Court via a reference under E CPO section 81D to the Court of Appeal on two questions of law. Since, by virtue of section 81D(4), such a reference does not F affect Tong’s acquittal, the issues before this Court are confined F to the questions of law set out in Annex 2. It is unnecessary and would be inappropriate to conduct a review of the trial Judge’s G G finding of fact…” H H 討論 I I 75. 本席現將終審法院所解釋的法律原則應用於本案。 J J K K 76. 首先，首兩名被告的大律師於本案開審前，向法庭確認辯 L 方不爭議當日於源禾路發生了暴動。可是於結案陳詞中，他似乎又推 L 翻該說法指：— M M N 「本案爭議 N O 7. 就控罪一「暴動」罪而言，法庭須裁定： O a. 案發當日 2019 年 9 月 22 日香港新界沙田源 P P 禾路好運中心外是否發生暴動； Q b. 如(a)的答案為「有」，該暴動發生的實際時間 Q 及地點… R R c. … S d. 如(a)的答案為「沒有」，在有關範圍是否發生 S 了非法集結；及 T T U U V V  - 61 - A A B e. 如法庭裁定在有關範圍發生了非法集結，第一 B 被告及第二被告有否與非法集結者集結在一 C 起，並參與了該非法集結。」 C D D 77. 所有被告人均應獲得公平的審訊，而公平的意思是指審訊 E 對控辯各方都要公平。於是，法庭去信要求大律師澄清其立場及解釋。 E 12 月 16 日，大律師確認不爭議當時於源禾路發生暴動，但似乎爭議 F F 暴動何時發生。 G G H 78. 既然首兩名被告對當日在源禾路上何時發生「暴動」有爭 H 議，本席便先處理該課題。不受爭議的新聞片段顯示當日下午約 5 時 I I 30 分，有一大群示威者（不少於 100 人）在新城市廣場外。他們大多 J J 穿著黑色衣物、以防毒面罩、口罩或以其他衣物（例如頸箍）蒙面， K 亦戴上其他防護裝備（例如手套、泳鏡、眼罩、手袖等）。同日約下 K 午 5 時 40 分，這群示威者由新城市廣場外的空地出發，向担杆莆街 L L 及源禾路方向進發；其中一些示威者帶備伸縮鐵閘，亦有示威者沿途 M M 擅自拿用路上的大型垃圾桶、屏風和其他雜物。示威者到達近好運中 N 心外的一段源禾路後，便隨即以伸縮鐵閘、索帶及上述雜物築成 3 排 N O 路障，令源禾路上的交通完全癱瘓。有部份示威者更於源禾路擅自取 O 去街上物品（包括小巴站站牌及枯樹葉等）加築路障。很明顯，當時 P P 源禾路上有超過 3 人集結在一起，作出擾亂秩序的行為，而該行為相 Q 當可能導致任何人合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧。換句話 Q R 說，示威者一到達源禾路，該集結已構成非法集結。 R S S 79. 架設路障期間，有示威者將疑似易燃液體灑在路障上，更 T 有示威者多次大叫「魔法師」；隨即有示威者用點火器燃點中間的一 T U U V V  - 62 - A A B B 排路障。根據終審法院於湯偉雄終院上訴案，「破壞社會安寧」是指 C 使用暴力或威脅使用暴力，而故意損毀他人的物品，無論是私人物品 C 或公物，均屬「破壞社會安寧」。於這類集結中常遭毀壞的公物包括 D D 道路上的鐵欄、街上的地磚、交通燈、閉路電視、地鐵站設施及被指 E E 持不同政見的店舖；毀壞的手段包括扯破（tearing down）、挖掘 F （digging up）、打碎（smashing）、損毀（damaging）、投擲氣油彈 F （throwing Molotov cocktails）及毀爛（vandalise）。顯而易見，「縱 G G 火」切合「破壞社會安寧」的定義。換句話說，由縱火的一刻開始， H H 該「非法集結」已演變為「暴動」。 I I 80. 首兩名被告否認他們是新聞片段中，於新城市廣場外的一 J J 對男女。本席於上文已裁定，第一及第二被告正是該對男女。大律師 K K 指，就算法庭裁定首兩名被告便是該對男女，也無關宏旨，因為「暴 L 動」的地點並非新城市廣場外的空地。他指，根據 PW1 的證供，警 L M 方到場時，首兩名被告只是站在示威者的最前，沒有證供顯示他們有 M 任何動作，以支持「參與」暴動的指控。大律師亦指法庭無法從首兩 N N 名被告的衣著、裝備、身上物品或被捕時的反應，推斷首兩名被告有 O 「參與」暴動。最後，大律師指沒有證供顯示首兩名被告何時到達現 O P 場，他們途中可能坐下休息、去了別處、不知道現場情況、無法走避 P 等。 Q Q R 81. 大律師於陳詞中，聲稱覆述控方證人的證供。於陳詞中， R S 大律師扭曲證供，混淆視聽。於陳詞的第 36 段，大律師指：「證據 S 上，PW1 聲稱他一路沿著源禾路向前進時，觀察到有約一百人。當 T T PW1 越過著火的障礙物後，PW1 看見人群掉頭離開，這時他留意到 U U V V  - 63 - A A B B 一男一女於示威者人群中手拖手離開，而該名女子為第一被告。PW1 C 聲稱他其後於距離示威者大概 20 米時向示威者作出警告不要逃走， C 但示威者掉頭便由源禾路往担杆莆街走。隨後，PW1 便開始跑去追截 D D 示威者…」。因此，大律師指首兩名被告最多也是站在人群當中。事 E E 實上，這並非 PW1 的證供。PW1 指他到達現場時便留意到一群超過 F 100 名的示威者；當時有一男一女與示威者站在一起，而該對男女站 F 在示威者群的最前方，貼近路障。這方面的證供從沒受到質疑。當 PW1 G G 與示威者相距約 20 米時，他大叫，警告示威者他準備執法。此後， H H PW1 向前衝；這時示威者（包括首兩名被告）才轉身逃走。追截期間， I 上述男女最接近 PW1；PW1 亦留意到他們手牽著手逃走。 I J J 82. 本席完全不同意大律師的陳述。新聞片段顯示，事發前首 K K 兩名被告與其他穿著黑色衣物，佩戴裝備的人士於新城市廣場外的空 L 地聚集，期間，首兩名被告曾與該群黑衣人士站在一起，亦有溝通。 L M 聚集時，首兩名被告除了穿著黑色衣物，還戴上手袖、手套、口罩（第 M 一被告）、頸箍（第二被告）。示威人士起行時，首兩名被告亦跟隨， N N 即步向担杆莆街及源禾路，沿途與其他一些示威者一起；另外，首兩 O 名被告輪流手持一把鎚子。於新城市廣場外，第二被告一直戴著泳鏡， O P 而起行時，第一被告亦立即戴上泳鏡；兩人完全遮蓋面目。示威者到 P 達源禾路後便隨即架起路障，癱瘓源禾路上的交通；期間有示威者於 Q Q 路障上灑上疑似是易燃液體，亦有人大叫「魔法師」，有示威者更燃 R R 點路障上的雜物。此時，燃燒物冒出濃煙，新聞片段顯示濃煙從遠處 S 也清晰可見。警方到達現場時，該群示威者並沒散去，反而在大叫口 S 號，有人更向警方投擲雜物。PW1 指，他到達現場時已看見首兩名被 T T 告人。當時兩人與約 100 名示威者一起，站近最前的一排路障，橫跨 U U V V  - 64 - A A B B 源禾路的行車線；首兩名被告更站在示威者的最前排，面向警方。當 C PW1 與示威者相距約 20 米時，他宣佈開始執法。直至警方衝前作拘 C 捕，首兩名被告及其他示威者才轉身逃走。當 PW1 截停第一被告時， D D 她大叫及掙扎。第二被告則突然從花圃的樹叢中跳出，嘗試拉走第一 E E 被告。PW1 截停第二被告時，第二被告亦不斷大叫和掙扎。被拘捕後， F 警方不但從首兩名被告身上檢獲一系列防護裝備，亦於第二被告的身 F 上檢獲鎚子、鉗子及螺絲批。 G G H H 83. 大律師指第一被告身材矮小，可能沒看見現場情況。示威 I 者燃點路障上的物品，引致濃煙密佈，從遠處也可看見。雖然示威者 I 於路上架設路障，但所用的鐵閘是躺在地上，而首兩名被告於暴動核 J J 心，站在示威者的最前排，無論是甚麼高度，首兩名被告的視線都沒 K K 有阻擋。換言之，第一及第二被告均清楚現場的情況。 L L 84. 大律師指沒有足夠證供顯示第一或第二被告何時到達現 M M 場，亦沒證供證明他們任何一位參與暴動。本席亦不同意。終審法院 N N 於湯偉雄終審上訴案內指出，被告可以不同的方式「參與」非法集結 O 或暴動。當 3 個或以上的人集結在一起及作出擾亂秩序的行為，該集 O 結便成為非法集結。而作出擾亂秩序的人已是參與非法集結。如集會 P P 演變成非法集結時，被告人並不在場（即發生非法集結後才到場）， Q Q 但被告人到場後亦作出擾亂秩序的行為，該被告人亦干犯非法集結。 R 如被告人是發生非法集結後才到場，又沒有作出擾亂秩序的行為，但 R S 以言行舉止促進（in furtherance of the prohibited conduct）、促成 S （facilitate）、協助（assist）或鼓勵（encourage）其他示威者作出擾 T T 亂秩序的行為，他們也可被視作參與非法集結。當有任何非法集結者 U U V V  - 65 - A A B B 作出破壞社會安寧的行為時，該集結便成為暴動，而參與該集結的人 C 亦成為暴動者。「參與」暴動的方式與參與非法集結一樣。 C D D 85. 於上述案例中，終審法院亦表示由「純粹身在現場」變為 E E 暴動者的門檻並不高，任何鼓勵或支持暴動的言、行或舉止均可將「純 F 粹身在現場」的人變為暴動者（例如佩戴代表暴動者的襟章或標誌）。 F G G 86. 第一及第二被告於新城市廣場外已與其他黑衣人士站在 H H 一起。他們均穿著黑色衣物及防護裝備，與示威人士一同走向暴動現 I 場。就算根據大律師的陳述，警方到達現場時，集結已演變為暴動。 I 可是第一及第二被告不但沒有嘗試離開，還於暴動核心，與其他暴動 J J 者站在一起，更站於最前，面向警方。暴動罪及非法集結罪的控訴要 K K 旨，在於他們聚眾行事，以人多勢眾來達到他們的目的。唯一及不可 L 抗拒的推論是，首兩名被告及其他示威者是與警方對峙，顯示人多勢 L 眾的實力。此乃促進及鼓勵其他暴動者的行為。 M M N N 87. 當示威者向源禾路出發時，第三被告亦步往同一方向，期 O 間用頸箍掩面。示威者到達源禾路後便隨即以伸縮鐵閘及其他雜物堵 O 路，令路上交通完全癱瘓。該集結已演變成非法集結。新聞片段顯示 P P 第三被告站在行人路上，明顯看見堵路行為，他卻上前協助搬運小巴 Q Q 站頭站牌。後來有人縱火，集會演變成暴動。警方到場時發現第三被 R 告與其他示威者站在一起，面對警方。第三被告站在最前排，身旁的 R 示威者穿著黑色衣褲，手持金屬棒。唯一及不可抗拒的推論是，第三 S S 被告及其他示威者是與警方對峙，顯示人多勢眾的實力。此乃促進及 T T 鼓勵其他暴動者的行為。 U U V V  - 66 - A A B B C 88. 三名被告無論是參與暴動的意圖（participatory intent）或 C 舉止都昭然若揭。本席裁定，控方在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪一；三 D D 名被告均罪名成立。 E E F 控罪二 F G G 89. 沒有爭議的是，警方在第二被告的背囊內檢獲一個鐵錘、 H 一把鉗子和一把螺絲批。控方以香港法例第 245 章《公安條例》第 33(1) H I 及(2)提控。該法例的第 33(1)條訂明：— I J J 「在公眾地方管有攻擊性武器 K (1) 任何人如無合法權限或合理辯解而在任何公眾地方 K 攜有任何攻擊性武器，即屬犯罪…」 L L 90. 法例的第 2 條訂明：— M M N 「釋義 N O 攻擊性武器（offensive weapon）指任何被製造或改裝以用作 O 傷害他人，或適合用作傷害他人的物品，或由管有或控制該 物品的人擬供其本人或他人作如此用途的任何物品」 P P Q 91. Archbold Hong Kong 2021 第 25-119 段列出「本身」為攻 Q 擊性武器（Offensive Weapon per se）的例子：— R R S “In R v Simpson (C) 78 Cr App 115, CA, Lord Lane (considering S the definition of offensive weapon in s 1(4) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953) gave as instances of weapons offensive per se T T a bayonet, a stiletto or a handgun. A police truncheon has been held to be offensive per se. Houghton v Chief Constable of U U V V  - 67 - A A B Greater Manchester 84 Cr App R 319, CA (Civ Div). So have B a sword stick (Davis v Alexander 54 Cr App R 398, DC; R v C Butter [1988] Crim LR 696, CA), and a rice flail (Copus v DPP C [1989] Crim LR 577, DC… D It has also been held that a flick-knife is an offensive weapon D per se (R v Lawrence (1971) 57 Cr App R 64; R v Allamby and E Medford 59 Cr App R 189, CA; and Gibson v Wales [1983] 1 E WLR 393). The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held in Simpson, above, that trial judges are entitled to take judicial F notice of the fact that a flick-knife is an offensive weapon per se. F Weapons which are manufactured for an innocent purpose are not offensive per se, eg a razor (R v Petrie 45 Cr App R 72, CA); G G a pen knife (R v Humphrey’s [1977] Crim LR 225, CA). Not all knives are offensive weapons per se… Where an article has no H readily apparent use except to cause injury to the person, it is H submitted that judicial notice may well be appropriate… I Where the article is a weapon offensive per se, there is no I requirement on the prosecution that it be proved that the person J having it with him also had an intention to use it to cause injury.” J K 92. 於 R v Chong Ah Choi [1994] 2 HKCLR 263 一案內，警方 K 於凌晨時分看見眾上訴人與一名男子於一個卡拉 OK 酒吧外。首兩名 L L 上訴人當時各手持一支鐵棒；第三名上訴人手持金屬管而第四名男子 M M 則手持木板。查問下，第一上訴人指一時貪玩，拾獲鐵棒；第二上訴 N 人稱鐵棒並非屬他所有，而第三上訴人保持緘默。他們三人被控管有 N O 攻擊性武器，違反香港法例第 228 章《簡易程序治罪條例》第 17 條。 O 上訴法庭裁定：— P P Q “Section 33 of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245), which Q creates the offence of possession of an offensive weapon in a public place, was referred to by both counsel in the course of the R R argument… S That submissions makes it necessary for us to consider s. 33 S even though no charge preferred under it is before us. T Sub-section (1) of s. 33 provides that any person “who, without T lawful authority or reasonable excuse, has with him in any U U V V  - 68 - A A B public place any offensive weapon” shall be guilty of an B offence… C C A complication may arise out of the definition of the term “offensive weapon” given in s. 2 of the Public Order Ordinance D (Cap. 245). We pause to mention that the Summary Offences D Ordinance (Cap. 228), contains no definition of the term E “offensive weapon”. The courts have, when dealing with cases E under s.17 of that Ordinance, generally borrowed the definition of “offensive weapon” given in s. 2 of the Public Order F Ordinance (Cap. 245). Anyway, that section defines the term F “offensive weapon” to mean “any article made, or adapted for use, or suitable, for causing injury to the person, or intended by G G the person having it in his possession or under his control for such use by him or some other person.” The inclusion of the H formula “or suitable” casts that definition very widely indeed. H It may be noted in passing that the comparable English I legislation, s. 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, does not I include that formula. Sub-s.(4) of that section defines “offensive J weapon” to mean “any article made or adapted for use for J causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or some other person.” K K A possible solution to any problem under the Bill of Rights created by that formula may be one along these lines. If s. 33 L L would come within R v Edwards (supra) situation but for the inclusion of that formula in the legislative scheme in question, M then it is not the whole of the scheme, which is to be taken as M having been Bill repealed, but only that formula. The result of that would be to leave the statutory definition of “offensive N weapon” in this form: “any article made, or adapted for use, for N causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it O in his possession or under his control for such use by him or O some other person.” P P 93. 於 HKSAR v Lo Kok Leung（HCMA 167/2006, [2007] HKEC Q Q 682）一案內，杜麗冰法官指出，法例內的「適合用作」傷害他人的物 R 品，已被上訴法庭於 R v Chong Ah Choi 內裁定不適用。因此，如涉案 R 工具本身並非攻擊性武器，控方必須舉證被告人有意圖用該工具傷人 S S [見 Hong Kong Archbold 2021, 第 25-118 段]。 T T U U V V  - 69 - A A B B 94. 本案涉及的工具本身並非攻擊性武器，亦並無證供顯示它 C 們為改裝以用作傷人的器具。雖然法庭懷疑第二被告管有涉案工具作 C 非法用途，但控方並無任何證供證明第二被告打算使用涉案工具傷 D D 人；因此無法證案。本席裁定控罪二，第二被告罪名不成立。 E E F 控罪三 F G G 95. 大律師援引終審法院於 HKSAR v Tam Lap Fai (2005) 8 H H HKCFAR 216 一案內對「故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員」罪元 I 素的解釋，但指本案內並沒足夠證據證實第二被告阻撓警務人員。他 I 指根據 PW2 的證供，他制服第一被告時感到「前方有其他不是警方 J J 的人正干擾警方」，但他並沒提及第二被告拉第一被告的手。PW1 指 K K 第二被告從樹叢跳出後用手嘗試拉走第一被告。大律師指當時 PW1 L 正在制服第一被告，應專注於第一被告，沒可能看見第二被告拉第一 L 被告。況且，從新聞片段中亦沒看到第二被告拉第一被告的手。 M M N N 96. 本席不同意。大律師的陳述再次是基於完全扭曲的證供。 O 根據 PW1 的證供，他制服第一被告後，正要將第一被告交予 PW2 時， O 第二被告才從樹叢跳出，嘗試拉走第一被告。因有警員阻擋鏡頭，所 P P 以新聞片段中看不到首兩名被告的動作。本席接納 PW1 及 PW2 的説 Q Q 法。 R R 97. 大律師指，即使法庭接納 PW1 的證供，第二被告的手曾 S S 拉過第一被告的手，控方並無證供顯示第二被告的想法；第二被告可 T T 能只是想了解第一被告的狀況。PW1 指當時第二被告是嘗試拉走第 U U V V  - 70 - A A B B 一被告。大律師於陳詞中已不只一次完全漠視及扭曲證供，混淆視聽， C 強詞奪理，要求法庭作出全無根據的揣測。本席不接受大律師的陳述， C 裁定控方在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪三，第二被告罪名成立。 D D E E F F （ 謝沈智慧 ） G 區域法院法官 G H H I I J J K K L L M M N N O O P P Q Q R R S S T T U U V V