HCA641/2014 KEEN LLOYD HOLDINGS LTD v. CHURK YAT MING AND ANOTHER - LawHero
HCA641/2014
高等法院（民事訴訟）Au-Yeung J25/8/2020[2020] HKCFI 2182
HCA641/2014
A A
B HCA 641/2014 B
[2020] HKCFI 2182
C C
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
D HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION D
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
E E
ACTION NO 641 OF 2014
F ____________ F
G BETWEEN G
H KEEN LLOYD HOLDINGS LIMITED Plaintiff H
I
and I
CHURK YAT MING 1st Defendant
J J
ZHENWEI LIMITED 2 Defendant
nd
K ____________ K
L L
Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
M Date of Hearing: 14 August 2020 M
Date of Decision: 26 August 2020
N N
O O
DECISION
P P
Q Q
Introduction
R R
1. D1 is subject to a Mareva Injunction Order. By a summons
S S
dated 15 July 2020, he sought to discharge or vary the Mareva Injunction
T Order on the ground of delay in prosecution of this action. D1 proposed to T
U U
V V
-2-
A A
B give an undertaking to apply all the assets subject to the Mareva Injunction B
Order to comply with a part judgment entered in favour of the Plaintiff.
C C
D 2. The Plaintiff opposes the discharge of the Mareva Injunction D
Order but has, in principle, no objection to a variation. Its grounds in
E E
opposition are that the delay in prosecution of this action was not
F intentional and that the Plaintiff was entitled to lay hands on the half F
interest in a property held by D1’s wife (Madam Chan).
G G
H H
Background
I 3. D1 was and is the shareholder and director of D2 and sole I
signatory to a bank account at the Bank of China (“the BOC account”).
J J
K 4. There was an Agreement between the Plaintiff and D2 at the K
end of January 2012 whereby the Plaintiff would deposit receivables into
L L
the BOC account and D2 would hold the monies on trust for the Plaintiff.
M M
5. D1 and Madam Chan orally undertook to the Plaintiff to be
N N
answerable for any sums in the event D1 or D2 misappropriated the trust
O O
monies. At the same time, D1 and his wife requested the Plaintiff and
P
Mr Chin Kam Chiu (“Mr Chin”) to pay for the overseas tuition fees for P
D1’s daughters, which the Plaintiff agreed to.
Q Q
R 6. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Plaintiff deposited a total of R
HK$13,679,770.40 into the BOC account. The Plaintiff claims that after
S S
some withdrawals, there was a balance of HK$8,006,385.66 (“the
T Balance”) which D1 had failed to return to the Plaintiff. T
U U
V V
-3-
A A
B 7. According to the Plaintiff, D1 admitted that he had B
misappropriated the Balance to improve the standard of living of his family
C C
and to purchase stocks. Further, D1’s son had forged the monthly
D statements of the BOC account. D
E E
8. The Plaintiff claimed against D1 for the Balance and against
F D1 and D2 for damages for breach of trust and conspiracy to defraud. F
G G
9. In defence, D1 claimed that there were the tertiary education
H fees of his daughters and monthly dues to D1 and D2 which the Plaintiff H
had promised to pay but failed to take into account. D1 only admitted
I I
a sum of HK$5,901,605.66 as owing. These are denied by the Plaintiff,
J J
who said that the Plaintiff had only agreed to lend HK$500,000 to D1.
K K
10. The writ was issued on 9 April 2014. The Mareva Injunction
L L
Order was made by DHCJ B Chu (as she then was) on 11 April 2014. It
M
was continued and eventually amended on 29 February 2016. It restrained M
D1 from disposing of his assets up to a value of the Balance and required
N N
him to disclose his assets up to the same value.
O O
11. D1 duly made disclosure. He has a property at Fullview
P P
Garden, Siu Sai Wan, Hong Kong (“the Property”), held in the names of
Q himself and Madam Chan. He has shares in various listed companies and Q
bank accounts.
R R
S 12. On 25 July 2016, Master Hui gave part judgment to the S
Plaintiff in the sum of $5,901,605.66 (“Master Hui’s Order”).
T T
U U
V V
-4-
A A
B 13. D1 took out the present summons for discharge of the Mareva B
Injunction Order. By then, the Mareva Injunction Order has been in force
C C
for over 6 years; and the action has become dormant for about 4 years since
D Master Hui's Order. D
E E
Legal principles
F F
14. The Court can set aside a Mareva injunction where a plaintiff
G is guilty of delay in bringing an action on for trial: Hong Kong Civil G
Procedure 2020, Vol 1, §29/1/42; China Merchants Bank v I-China
H H
Holdings Ltd [2003] HKLRD 271, at §12 (where examples of discharge of
I injunction due to delay from 19 months to 3½ years were given). I
J J
15. In China Merchants Bank, DHCJ Saunders (as he then was)
K held that delay was not the only factor for considering whether an K
injunction should be discharged. Other factors included (§§10-11):
L L
(1) Whether the lapse of time was a result of a deliberate decision
M M
on the part of the plaintiff;
N N
(2) The length of time lapse and the explanation put forth by the
O O
plaintiff;
P P
(3) The degree of prejudice liable to be caused to the plaintiff if
Q
the injunction is discharged; Q
R (4) Whether the plaintiff has sought to rectify the position and R
proceed with the action or whether the lapse of time was still
S S
continuing at the time of the hearing;
T T
U U
V V
-5-
A A
B (5) The degree of prejudice caused to the defendant as a result of B
the lapse of time; and
C C
(6) Whether the defendant has, through his conduct, either caused
D D
the lapse of time or contributed to it.
E E
F Whether the Plaintiff’s delay in prosecution of this action was intentional F
16. I accept for the purpose of this application that Mr Chin was
G G
the person in charge of the affairs of the Plaintiff. He was the Chairman
H and director of the Plaintiff from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2015; and from H
14 June 2017 till now.
I I
J 17. Mr Chin was remanded in custody for the period of J
1 September 2015 to 30 December 2016 for charges of conspiracy. In
K K
between 12 February 2016 and 11 September 2018, he had had 32 mention
L hearings. Save for the first 2, he had acted in person. He was only L
acquitted on 26 June 2019.
M M
N N
18. Mr Chin claimed that his involvement in the complex criminal
O
proceedings and freezing of his and the Plaintiff’s assets have brought the O
Plaintiff to a complete halt. His focus was on the criminal proceedings and
P P
he had no capacity to deal with this action. His involvement in the criminal
Q
proceedings was not caused by his fault, as illustrated by the fact that he Q
was granted costs after his acquittal. In the premises, the Plaintiff submits
R R
that the delay in prosecution of this action was not intentional.
S S
19. However, D1 has demonstrated that this action was not
T T
affected by the criminal proceedings. In between September 2015 and
U U
V V
-6-
A A
B mid-January 2017 (ie for about 16 months when Mr Chin was not B
a director), the Plaintiff has proceeded with this action and taken out
C C
substantive steps, including (i) filing of 3 witness statements, (ii) taking out
D applications for enforcement of the disclosure order, (iii) summary D
judgment which led to Master Hui’s Order, and (iv) time extension for
E E
payment of an order for security for costs. The Plaintiff had also attended
F 8 substantive hearings. Plainly, someone was looking after this action on F
behalf of the Plaintiff whilst Mr Chin was busy handling his criminal
G G
proceedings.
H H
20. Since mid-January 2017, this action has lain dormant for over
I I
2 years before Mr Chin’s acquittal on 26 June 2019. After that, there had
J J
been another 11 months before D1 issued the present summons.
K K
21. It was plain that the inaction on the Plaintiff’s part, at least
L L
since mid-January 2017 was inordinate and inexcusable. The fact that D1
M
did nothing for about 3½ years did not undermine the delay of the Plaintiff. M
The first ground in opposition is not substantiated.
N N
O Plaintiff’s entitlement to freeze Madam Chan’s share in the Property O
P
22. The Plaintiff claimed that there was an agreement in 2019 P
between Mr Chin and Madam Chan (“2019 Agreement”) in the presence
Q Q
of D1 whereby Madam Chan agreed to sell the Property and apply the
R entire proceeds of sale to repay the debt due to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff R
then promised Madam Chan that, on that basis, Madam Chan would have
S S
discharged her liabilities and the Plaintiff would not join her as a defendant.
T T
U U
V V
-7-
A A
B 23. The Plaintiff also claimed that D1 had, on 31 March 2014, B
admitted to Mr Chin that D1 had applied the trust money to discharge the
C C
mortgage of the Property and had given some money to Madam Chan. The
D Plaintiff claimed that it would be in the interest of justice to determine if D
the Plaintiff has a proprietary interest over the Property and the extent of it
E E
before the proceeds of the sale of the Property are released to D1.
F F
24. For present purposes, even if the 2019 Agreement existed, it
G G
was not relevant as it was not alleged that D1 was a party to it. D1 had
H shown that the mortgage in respect of the Property was discharged in 2013, H
well before commencement of this action.
I I
J J
25. Even if D1 had misappropriated the Plaintiff’s money to fund
K
the purchase of the Property, the Mareva Injunction Order only applied to K
D1’s assets. Despite Madam Chan being added as the 3rd defendant
L L
4 months after the writ was issued, there has never been an injunction order
M
against her. The statement of claim never made a proprietary claim over M
the Property.
N N
O 26. This action against Madam Chan stood dismissed on O
18 January 2017 as the Plaintiff was unable to meet an order for security
P P
for costs in her favour. Although the Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the
Q Plaintiff can undertake to join Madam Chan as a party within 2 weeks, the Q
Plaintiff has taken no step as yet.
R R
S 27. The second ground in opposition is unsubstantiated. S
T T
U U
V V
-8-
A A
B Prejudice to D1 B
28. To continue the Mareva Injunction Order would prejudice D1.
C C
Not only will there be an action hanging over his head but interests will
D D
continue to accrue under Master Hui’s Order. The Plaintiff has not shown
E
that D1 has other assets that could be restrained in accordance with the E
Mareva Injunction Order or that could be applied to meet Master Hui’s
F F
Order. D1 has not contributed to the delay.
G G
The proper order to make
H H
29. The Mareva Injunction Order should be discharged in
I principle despite the fact that the total disclosed assets cannot even satisfy I
Master Hui’s Order.
J J
K 30. However, this is a claim in fraud/conspiracy against D1 and K
part judgment has already been entered. Under no circumstances should
L L
assets that form the subject matter of the Mareva Injunction Order fall into
M the hands of D1 until judgment debts are satisfied. M
N N
31. Accordingly, I give leave to sell the Property and the shares,
O O
but I direct that any proceeds of sale should be handled directly by D1’s
P
solicitors without going through the hands of D1. P
Q Q
32. The Plaintiff is concerned that the Property, being a property
R under the Housing Authority, might be subject to a restriction against R
alienation or a premium has to be paid upon sale. However, the Property
S S
has been acquired for 27 years by now and the mortgage has been cleared.
T T
U U
V V
-9-
A A
B To address the Plaintiff’s concern, I direct the parties to agree upon B
a reserve price for sale, failing which the Court will decide it for them.
C C
D 33. The Plaintiff is concerned with the value of the shares and D
submit that there should be a time frame in which to sell the assets. D1
E E
does not oppose. I therefore direct that a copy of this order be served on
F the Bank of China and that the shares be sold within 14 days of such service. F
Bank of China shall release the net proceeds of sale to D1’s solicitors
G G
directly.
H H
34. Upon compliance with the terms of variation, D1’s solicitors
I I
shall inform the Court by letter, copied to the Plaintiff. The Court will deal
J J
with the formal discharge of the Mareva Injunction Order on paper without
K
the need for an oral hearing. This will give certainty to the parties as to K
when the Mareva Injunction Order shall end.
L L
M
35. A sum of not more than $11,600 shall be retained out of the M
net proceeds of sale of the Property and the shares solely for costs of D1’s
N N
solicitors for implementing this order (which shall not include costs of
O conveyancing or costs of this summons) pursuant to paragraph 1 of the O
Exceptions to the Mareva Injunction Order.
P P
Q 36. Since D1 is successful in this application, I make an order nisi Q
that the Plaintiff should bear the costs of D1 for this summons, summarily
R R
assessed at $140,000.
S S
37. On the bases set out in paragraphs 29 to 36 above, I make an
T T
order in terms of the draft order submitted by D1 as amended.
U U
V V
- 10 -
A A
B 38. I thank counsel for their assistance. B
C C
D D
E E
F F
(Queeny Au-Yeung)
G G
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
H H
I I
Ms Mandy Yau, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the Plaintiff
J J
st
Ms Sally S Y Wong, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co, for the 1 Defendant
K K
L L
M M
N N
O O
P P
Q Q
R R
S S
T T
U U
V V
KEEN LLOYD HOLDINGS LTD v. CHURK YAT MING AND ANOTHER
A A
B HCA 641/2014 B
[2020] HKCFI 2182
C C
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
D HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION D
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
E E
ACTION NO 641 OF 2014
F ____________ F
G BETWEEN G
H KEEN LLOYD HOLDINGS LIMITED Plaintiff H
I
and I
CHURK YAT MING 1st Defendant
J J
ZHENWEI LIMITED 2 Defendant
nd
K ____________ K
L L
Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
M Date of Hearing: 14 August 2020 M
Date of Decision: 26 August 2020
N N
O O
DECISION
P P
Q Q
Introduction
R R
1. D1 is subject to a Mareva Injunction Order. By a summons
S S
dated 15 July 2020, he sought to discharge or vary the Mareva Injunction
T Order on the ground of delay in prosecution of this action. D1 proposed to T
U U
V V
-2-
A A
B give an undertaking to apply all the assets subject to the Mareva Injunction B
Order to comply with a part judgment entered in favour of the Plaintiff.
C C
D 2. The Plaintiff opposes the discharge of the Mareva Injunction D
Order but has, in principle, no objection to a variation. Its grounds in
E E
opposition are that the delay in prosecution of this action was not
F intentional and that the Plaintiff was entitled to lay hands on the half F
interest in a property held by D1’s wife (Madam Chan).
G G
H H
Background
I 3. D1 was and is the shareholder and director of D2 and sole I
signatory to a bank account at the Bank of China (“the BOC account”).
J J
K 4. There was an Agreement between the Plaintiff and D2 at the K
end of January 2012 whereby the Plaintiff would deposit receivables into
L L
the BOC account and D2 would hold the monies on trust for the Plaintiff.
M M
5. D1 and Madam Chan orally undertook to the Plaintiff to be
N N
answerable for any sums in the event D1 or D2 misappropriated the trust
O O
monies. At the same time, D1 and his wife requested the Plaintiff and
P
Mr Chin Kam Chiu (“Mr Chin”) to pay for the overseas tuition fees for P
D1’s daughters, which the Plaintiff agreed to.
Q Q
R 6. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Plaintiff deposited a total of R
HK$13,679,770.40 into the BOC account. The Plaintiff claims that after
S S
some withdrawals, there was a balance of HK$8,006,385.66 (“the
T Balance”) which D1 had failed to return to the Plaintiff. T
U U
V V
-3-
A A
B 7. According to the Plaintiff, D1 admitted that he had B
misappropriated the Balance to improve the standard of living of his family
C C
and to purchase stocks. Further, D1’s son had forged the monthly
D statements of the BOC account. D
E E
8. The Plaintiff claimed against D1 for the Balance and against
F D1 and D2 for damages for breach of trust and conspiracy to defraud. F
G G
9. In defence, D1 claimed that there were the tertiary education
H fees of his daughters and monthly dues to D1 and D2 which the Plaintiff H
had promised to pay but failed to take into account. D1 only admitted
I I
a sum of HK$5,901,605.66 as owing. These are denied by the Plaintiff,
J J
who said that the Plaintiff had only agreed to lend HK$500,000 to D1.
K K
10. The writ was issued on 9 April 2014. The Mareva Injunction
L L
Order was made by DHCJ B Chu (as she then was) on 11 April 2014. It
M
was continued and eventually amended on 29 February 2016. It restrained M
D1 from disposing of his assets up to a value of the Balance and required
N N
him to disclose his assets up to the same value.
O O
11. D1 duly made disclosure. He has a property at Fullview
P P
Garden, Siu Sai Wan, Hong Kong (“the Property”), held in the names of
Q himself and Madam Chan. He has shares in various listed companies and Q
bank accounts.
R R
S 12. On 25 July 2016, Master Hui gave part judgment to the S
Plaintiff in the sum of $5,901,605.66 (“Master Hui’s Order”).
T T
U U
V V
-4-
A A
B 13. D1 took out the present summons for discharge of the Mareva B
Injunction Order. By then, the Mareva Injunction Order has been in force
C C
for over 6 years; and the action has become dormant for about 4 years since
D Master Hui's Order. D
E E
Legal principles
F F
14. The Court can set aside a Mareva injunction where a plaintiff
G is guilty of delay in bringing an action on for trial: Hong Kong Civil G
Procedure 2020, Vol 1, §29/1/42; China Merchants Bank v I-China
H H
Holdings Ltd [2003] HKLRD 271, at §12 (where examples of discharge of
I injunction due to delay from 19 months to 3½ years were given). I
J J
15. In China Merchants Bank, DHCJ Saunders (as he then was)
K held that delay was not the only factor for considering whether an K
injunction should be discharged. Other factors included (§§10-11):
L L
(1) Whether the lapse of time was a result of a deliberate decision
M M
on the part of the plaintiff;
N N
(2) The length of time lapse and the explanation put forth by the
O O
plaintiff;
P P
(3) The degree of prejudice liable to be caused to the plaintiff if
Q
the injunction is discharged; Q
R (4) Whether the plaintiff has sought to rectify the position and R
proceed with the action or whether the lapse of time was still
S S
continuing at the time of the hearing;
T T
U U
V V
-5-
A A
B (5) The degree of prejudice caused to the defendant as a result of B
the lapse of time; and
C C
(6) Whether the defendant has, through his conduct, either caused
D D
the lapse of time or contributed to it.
E E
F Whether the Plaintiff’s delay in prosecution of this action was intentional F
16. I accept for the purpose of this application that Mr Chin was
G G
the person in charge of the affairs of the Plaintiff. He was the Chairman
H and director of the Plaintiff from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2015; and from H
14 June 2017 till now.
I I
J 17. Mr Chin was remanded in custody for the period of J
1 September 2015 to 30 December 2016 for charges of conspiracy. In
K K
between 12 February 2016 and 11 September 2018, he had had 32 mention
L hearings. Save for the first 2, he had acted in person. He was only L
acquitted on 26 June 2019.
M M
N N
18. Mr Chin claimed that his involvement in the complex criminal
O
proceedings and freezing of his and the Plaintiff’s assets have brought the O
Plaintiff to a complete halt. His focus was on the criminal proceedings and
P P
he had no capacity to deal with this action. His involvement in the criminal
Q
proceedings was not caused by his fault, as illustrated by the fact that he Q
was granted costs after his acquittal. In the premises, the Plaintiff submits
R R
that the delay in prosecution of this action was not intentional.
S S
19. However, D1 has demonstrated that this action was not
T T
affected by the criminal proceedings. In between September 2015 and
U U
V V
-6-
A A
B mid-January 2017 (ie for about 16 months when Mr Chin was not B
a director), the Plaintiff has proceeded with this action and taken out
C C
substantive steps, including (i) filing of 3 witness statements, (ii) taking out
D applications for enforcement of the disclosure order, (iii) summary D
judgment which led to Master Hui’s Order, and (iv) time extension for
E E
payment of an order for security for costs. The Plaintiff had also attended
F 8 substantive hearings. Plainly, someone was looking after this action on F
behalf of the Plaintiff whilst Mr Chin was busy handling his criminal
G G
proceedings.
H H
20. Since mid-January 2017, this action has lain dormant for over
I I
2 years before Mr Chin’s acquittal on 26 June 2019. After that, there had
J J
been another 11 months before D1 issued the present summons.
K K
21. It was plain that the inaction on the Plaintiff’s part, at least
L L
since mid-January 2017 was inordinate and inexcusable. The fact that D1
M
did nothing for about 3½ years did not undermine the delay of the Plaintiff. M
The first ground in opposition is not substantiated.
N N
O Plaintiff’s entitlement to freeze Madam Chan’s share in the Property O
P
22. The Plaintiff claimed that there was an agreement in 2019 P
between Mr Chin and Madam Chan (“2019 Agreement”) in the presence
Q Q
of D1 whereby Madam Chan agreed to sell the Property and apply the
R entire proceeds of sale to repay the debt due to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff R
then promised Madam Chan that, on that basis, Madam Chan would have
S S
discharged her liabilities and the Plaintiff would not join her as a defendant.
T T
U U
V V
-7-
A A
B 23. The Plaintiff also claimed that D1 had, on 31 March 2014, B
admitted to Mr Chin that D1 had applied the trust money to discharge the
C C
mortgage of the Property and had given some money to Madam Chan. The
D Plaintiff claimed that it would be in the interest of justice to determine if D
the Plaintiff has a proprietary interest over the Property and the extent of it
E E
before the proceeds of the sale of the Property are released to D1.
F F
24. For present purposes, even if the 2019 Agreement existed, it
G G
was not relevant as it was not alleged that D1 was a party to it. D1 had
H shown that the mortgage in respect of the Property was discharged in 2013, H
well before commencement of this action.
I I
J J
25. Even if D1 had misappropriated the Plaintiff’s money to fund
K
the purchase of the Property, the Mareva Injunction Order only applied to K
D1’s assets. Despite Madam Chan being added as the 3rd defendant
L L
4 months after the writ was issued, there has never been an injunction order
M
against her. The statement of claim never made a proprietary claim over M
the Property.
N N
O 26. This action against Madam Chan stood dismissed on O
18 January 2017 as the Plaintiff was unable to meet an order for security
P P
for costs in her favour. Although the Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the
Q Plaintiff can undertake to join Madam Chan as a party within 2 weeks, the Q
Plaintiff has taken no step as yet.
R R
S 27. The second ground in opposition is unsubstantiated. S
T T
U U
V V
-8-
A A
B Prejudice to D1 B
28. To continue the Mareva Injunction Order would prejudice D1.
C C
Not only will there be an action hanging over his head but interests will
D D
continue to accrue under Master Hui’s Order. The Plaintiff has not shown
E
that D1 has other assets that could be restrained in accordance with the E
Mareva Injunction Order or that could be applied to meet Master Hui’s
F F
Order. D1 has not contributed to the delay.
G G
The proper order to make
H H
29. The Mareva Injunction Order should be discharged in
I principle despite the fact that the total disclosed assets cannot even satisfy I
Master Hui’s Order.
J J
K 30. However, this is a claim in fraud/conspiracy against D1 and K
part judgment has already been entered. Under no circumstances should
L L
assets that form the subject matter of the Mareva Injunction Order fall into
M the hands of D1 until judgment debts are satisfied. M
N N
31. Accordingly, I give leave to sell the Property and the shares,
O O
but I direct that any proceeds of sale should be handled directly by D1’s
P
solicitors without going through the hands of D1. P
Q Q
32. The Plaintiff is concerned that the Property, being a property
R under the Housing Authority, might be subject to a restriction against R
alienation or a premium has to be paid upon sale. However, the Property
S S
has been acquired for 27 years by now and the mortgage has been cleared.
T T
U U
V V
-9-
A A
B To address the Plaintiff’s concern, I direct the parties to agree upon B
a reserve price for sale, failing which the Court will decide it for them.
C C
D 33. The Plaintiff is concerned with the value of the shares and D
submit that there should be a time frame in which to sell the assets. D1
E E
does not oppose. I therefore direct that a copy of this order be served on
F the Bank of China and that the shares be sold within 14 days of such service. F
Bank of China shall release the net proceeds of sale to D1’s solicitors
G G
directly.
H H
34. Upon compliance with the terms of variation, D1’s solicitors
I I
shall inform the Court by letter, copied to the Plaintiff. The Court will deal
J J
with the formal discharge of the Mareva Injunction Order on paper without
K
the need for an oral hearing. This will give certainty to the parties as to K
when the Mareva Injunction Order shall end.
L L
M
35. A sum of not more than $11,600 shall be retained out of the M
net proceeds of sale of the Property and the shares solely for costs of D1’s
N N
solicitors for implementing this order (which shall not include costs of
O conveyancing or costs of this summons) pursuant to paragraph 1 of the O
Exceptions to the Mareva Injunction Order.
P P
Q 36. Since D1 is successful in this application, I make an order nisi Q
that the Plaintiff should bear the costs of D1 for this summons, summarily
R R
assessed at $140,000.
S S
37. On the bases set out in paragraphs 29 to 36 above, I make an
T T
order in terms of the draft order submitted by D1 as amended.
U U
V V
- 10 -
A A
B 38. I thank counsel for their assistance. B
C C
D D
E E
F F
(Queeny Au-Yeung)
G G
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
H H
I I
Ms Mandy Yau, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the Plaintiff
J J
st
Ms Sally S Y Wong, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co, for the 1 Defendant
K K
L L
M M
N N
O O
P P
Q Q
R R
S S
T T
U U
V V