DCCC1286/2024 香港特別行政區 訴 梅永亮
DCCC 1286/2024
[2026] HKDC 442
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2024年第1286號
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香港特別行政區
訴
梅永亮
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主審法官：
區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期：
2026年3月10日
出席人士：
朱家誠先生，律政司高級檢控官（署理），代表香港特別行政區
伍健民先生，由法律援助署委派的侯劉李楊律師行延聘，代表被告人
控罪：
[1] – [3] 處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產（Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence）
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判刑理由書
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1. 被告人被控共3項「處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產」，違反香港法例第455章《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第25(1)及(3)條（控罪1-3）。控方指被告人連同其他身份不詳的人士犯案。被告人承認控罪1及2。經雙方認罪協商後，控方願意將控罪3留檔；除非獲法庭批准，否則不可繼續予以起訴。
案情撮要
2. 被告人承認的「經修訂案情撮要」如下：
控罪一所涉帳戶
(1) 案發所有期間，被告人是中國銀行（香港）有限公司銀行帳戶號碼012-687-1-013566-6（中銀帳戶）的唯一持有人及受益人。
(2) 中銀帳戶於 2014年12月31日開立，作儲蓄/日常支出用途。在開戶授權書中，被告人報稱受教育至高中程度，任職導遊，月入港幣15,000元，並提交了香港身份證副本作為身份證明。該帳戶於2021年4月22日結束。
(3) 2018年4月9日至2021年4月22日期間，有總額港幣5,395,173,05元分1,317次交易轉入中銀帳戶，以及有總額港幣5,395,809.09元分2,200次交易轉出。
(4) 提存概要表列如下：
類別
存款次數
提款次數
自動櫃員機
232
1,033
自動櫃員機轉賬
38
66
自動轉賬
3
0
銀行收費
0
18
利息
4
0
無存摺現金交易
7
5
無存摺轉賬交易
5
2
POS轉賬交易
0
438
沖正
2
0
銀行轉賬
1,026
638
總計
1,317
2,200
(5) 一般而言，中銀帳戶每日有多次出入帳交易，而流入資金一是 (i) 以相約金額直接提取；一是 (ii) 分拆為較少金額後經多次交易提取。提款於同日或不久後迅速進行，帳戶的每日結餘一直維持低企。
控罪2所涉帳戶
(6) 案發所有期間，被告人是理慧銀行有限公司銀行帳戶號碼388756025832576（理慧帳戶）的唯一持有人及受益人。
(7) 理慧帳戶於2020年8月22日開立，作儲蓄/定期存款用途。在開戶授權書中，被告人報稱從事建築業，月入港幣10,001元至港幣25,000元，資金來源是其收入。被告人提交了香港身份證副本及兩張活體自拍照作為身份證明。該帳戶於2021年6月11日結束。
(8) 2020年8月22日至2021年6月11日期間，有總額港幣5,142,435.76元分2,433次交易轉入理慧帳戶，以及有相同總額港幣分5,425次交易轉出。全部交易以銀行轉賬方式進行，涉及多個對手方。一般而言，理慧帳戶每日有多次出入帳交易，而流入資金一是 (i) 以相若金額直接提取；一是 (ii) 分拆為較少金額後經多次交易提取。提款於同日或不久後迅速進行，帳戶的每日結餘一直維持低企。
拘捕及警誡
(9) 2024年3月27日，被告人被拘捕，在警誡下保持緘默。警方搜屋，並無發現。
翻查紀錄
(10) 可查的出入境紀錄顯示，被告人於理慧帳戶開立時身在香港。此外，2019年9月23日至2021年12月31日期間，被告人沒有離境紀錄。
(11) 稅務局沒有被告人於2017/2018至2021/2022財政年度的任何紀錄。
(12) 土地註冊處沒有被告人在香港擁有土地的任何紀錄。
(13) 公司註冊處沒有被告人在香港出任董事的任何紀錄。
經修訂控罪
(14) 被告人現承認他在案發期間將中銀帳戶及理慧帳戶借給了別人，以獲港幣6,000元作報酬。
(15) 在控罪1所述相關期間，被告人，連同身份不詳的人，知道或有合理理由相信某項財產，即在中銀帳戶所持總額港幣5,395,173.05元款項，全部或部份、直接或間接代表任何人從可公訴罪行的得益而仍處理該財產。
(16) 在控罪2所述相關期間，被告人，連同身份不詳的人，知道或有合理理由相信某項財產，即在理慧帳戶所持總額港幣5,142,435.76元款項，全部或部份、直接或間接代表任何人從可公訴罪行的得益而仍處理該財產。
被告人的背景
3. 被告人生於1988年6月，現年37歲。他於2002年6月（14歲）來港定居，曾接受至中四程度教育。被告人有一位同居女友，兩人育有三名子女（現時分別3歲至5歲）。被捕前，被告人與父母、女友及三名子女同住。被告人於2024年3月27日被拘捕。當時獲警方保釋。2024年7月13日法庭撤銷被告人的保釋後，被告人的同居女友便離開，留下三名年幼的子女，由被告人父母照顧。
4. 被告人過往有8次刑事定罪紀錄，涉及9項控罪，沒有類同。
5. 大律師指被告人中四輟學後，曾任職快餐店廚房學徒。2017年6月5日，被告人因「藏有攻擊性武器」及「管有危險藥物」被判處共15個月監禁（WK 941/2017）。2018年4月7日刑滿出獄後便開始從事Uber出租車司機，每月平均收入2萬元。
判刑原則
6. 「處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產」是極嚴重的控罪，一經循可公訴程序定罪，最高刑期為罰款500萬元及14年監禁。雖然沒有量刑指引（HKSAR v Shing Siu Ming [1999] 2 HKC 818; HKSAR v Mak Shing [2002] HKCU 1109, CACC 322/2001, 2002年9月18日，未經𢑥編；HKSAR v Kamran [2005] HKCU 923, CACC 400/2004; HKSAR v Boma Amaso [2012] 1 HKC 504），法庭須判處阻嚇式刑罰（HKSAR v Hui Kam [2000] 3 HKLRD 211; HKSAR v Kamran （同上）；HKSAR v Ng Man Yee [2014] 4 HKC 241）。就算是初犯也須即時監禁： HKSAR v Xu Xia Li and Another [2004] 4 HKC 16; Secretary for Justice v Choi Sui Hey [2008] 6 HKC 166; HKSAR v Siu Yuen Yee [2017] 3 HKC 454。
7. 刑期視乎案情而定。財產的來源對判刑並不重要，但如被告人知悉財產源自嚴重罪行是加刑因素。
8. 於香港特別行政區訴許有益 [2010] 5 HKLRD 536， 上訴法庭指被告人本身在這次交易所獲得的利益並非量刑的因素，並訂明一些判刑可考慮的因素：
「9. 由於處理公訴罪行得益的財產這類案件會涉及不同的案情，故此法庭沒有定下量刑指引。但以下各點是量刑的參考因素：
(a) 涉案的金額是重要的考慮因素，而非被告人本身在這次交易所獲得的利益。
(b) 控罪的罪責是協助、支持及鼓勵有關的公訴罪行，故此被告人的參與程度及涉及「洗黑錢」的次數是有關連的因素。
(c) 處理公訴罪行得益的財產控罪與有關的公訴罪行不一定有直接關係，但若果有關的公訴罪行是可以確認的，那麼法庭是可以在處理控罪時考慮有關公訴罪行本身的刑期。
(d) 若案件涉及國際跨境成份，法庭可採用較嚴峻的刑期，以免香港作為國際金融及銀行中心的形象受損。
(e) 涉案的時間。」
9. 於HKSAR v Boma Amaso （同上），上訴法庭指：
“25. The problem remains that the circumstances in which the offence may be committed are highly variable. They run from cases where a wife hides money for a husband who is a gambler through to those who wash money that represents the proceeds of vice offences, or trafficking in dangerous drugs, or fraud, or human trafficking or other manifestations of organised crime. Sometimes it is possible to identify the antecedent offence; other times it is not. Sometimes the offender knows the nature of the antecedent offence, sometimes he does not. Sometimes he can be taken to know or believe the monies to be the proceeds of an indictable offence or reckless as to whether or not they were; otherwise he may be shown to know the grounds upon which a reasonable person will so believe without himself actually knowing the funds to be the proceeds of an indictable offence. Sometimes the offender is the perpetrator of the predicate offence but at other times he lies somewhere down the chain. Sometimes he is the beneficiary of the laundering process; other times a conduit. Then there are cases involving an organized and sophisticated scheme where the offender is the director of the laundering exercise; or he may be a lowly employee in the exercise. The offence may involve a single transaction or, on other hand, many transactions over an extended period. Deceit to achieve the objective may or may not be involved. There are cases where all the activity is embraced in a domestic setting but other cases with an international element. This non-exhaustive postulation of the variety of circumstances suffices to illustrate why it is difficult and undesirable to offer guidelines. It is, in other words, a category of offence in which the sentencing judge is called upon to engage his ‘feel’ for the case bringing to bear his sentencing experience bearing in mind at all times the mischief at which the legislation is directed…
32. At present, however, any sentencing exercise must recognise that the maximum sentence is one of 14 years’ imprisonment…
35. The first factor to which any sentencing court should in this context have regard is the maximum penalty available. It is not possible to identify the worst case possible and difficult to postulate the worst category of case. But it is nonetheless helpful to bear the maximum in mind.
36. The second matter to which the sentencing court must have regard is the fact that in this category of offence, deterrence is paramount. It is to be remembered that “the criminality in laundering arises from the encouragement and nourishment it gives to crime in general. Without it many crimes would be rendered much less fruitful and perhaps more difficult to perpetrate”: R v Basra [2002] 2 Cr App R (S) 469 at 472 …
38. Then there is the question of the amount of money laundered. This is not the be-all and end-all of a case but is a significant feature …
40. Less helpful though this may be than we had hoped, the best we can therefore do is to identify some of the significant features for which the court should look and take into account, though it is not possible to produce an exhaustive list: we can do no better than echo obvious factors that have been referred to by the cases:
(1) The nature of the predicate offence, if known, and the penalty available for the predicate offence: see R v Karen Monfries [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 9. So, for example, where the predicate offence is trafficking in dangerous drugs, the offender should expect a sentence significantly greater than where the predicate offence is gambling … although it is suggested that there must be a difference between the offender who knows what the predicate offence is and the offender who does not: R v Gonzalez [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 35 at [13].
(2) This brings us to the question of the state of knowledge of the offender. This divides itself in two – knowledge of the nature of the predicate offence:
(a) Where the predicate offence is known to the court, the question of knowledge of the offender as to the nature of the predicate offence … this is a question to be approached with considerable caution, since many offenders will assert ignorance of the origin of the proceeds in question, particularly where the offender has deliberately turned a blind eye thereby choosing not to know. In such a case it must be recognised that he is nonetheless “assisting in the original crime, whether with knowledge or blind eye knowledge of it”: R v Basra … The scheme and purpose of the legislation is to ensure care and honesty in the handling of other people’s money and those who are prepared to handle money on other people’s behalf and turn a blind eye to the source of that money do so at their own risk: see Attorney General’s Reference No. 48 of 2006 [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 558 at [24]. So the person who is aware of the fact that he is dealing with proceeds of an indictable offence but deliberately chooses not to ask questions is barely less culpable than the person who asks or who is told.
(b) As to the second question … draws a distinction in culpability between the person who intentionally deals with the proceeds of crime, meaning the person who knows or believes that the funds in question are the proceeds of crime; the person who is reckless as to that question; and the person who is negligent about it. The legislation makes it a criminal offence to deal with proceeds of an indictable offence where there are grounds to believe that that is the origin of the funds and the offender knows of the grounds, even where the offender does not positively know that the funds originate from the commission of such an offence, so care must be taken in the last category not thereby to dilute sentencing so as to defeat the object of the legislation; but the person who is reckless is more culpable and the person who knows or believes is more culpable still …
(3) An international dimension will always be a significant aggravating feature; and by international dimension we include money laundered from, or for those operating in, the Mainland.
(4) The sophistication of the offence is always relevant. This will include the degree of planning and whether deceit is practised to achieve the objective.
(5) Where the offence is committed by or on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate, that is an aggravating fact.
(6) It is relevant to take into account whether there is one transaction or many and the length of time over which the offence was committed.
(7) As in the case of Herzberg, it will be an aggravating feature where the offender continues to launder funds after he has discovered as a fact that the funds are the proceeds of an offence or after he has discovered the nature of an offence which is serious.
(8) The sentencing court should have regard to the role of the offender and the acts performed by him. In this regard, the director of a laundering operation or scheme should attract a greater sentence than a person engaged by him although sentences should be sufficient to deter those who might be prevailed upon by directing minds. In the case of a person down the chain, the court will wish to have regard to whether a benefit has been received and if so the nature and size of the benefit. But within the category of persons down the chain there will gradations of culpability. So for example the drug addict or petty crook who is paid a small sum to open an account and hand over its operation to another with no more participation and no more knowledge than that it is going to be used for some sort of crime is much less culpable than an offender of a different sort not “used” in that way”.
10. 於律政司司長對雲國強 [2012] 1 HKLRD 197，上訴法庭張澤𧙗法官在判案書上列出多種「洗黑錢」案件所涉的金額和判刑。數據顯示，如涉案「黑錢」是100萬元至200萬元，量刑基準約為3年監禁；如涉案「黑錢」是300萬至600萬元，量刑基準約為4年監禁；如涉案「黑錢」是1,000萬元以上，量刑基準可超過5年監禁。
討論
11. 大律師指，本案中沒有證供顯示被告人知道源頭罪行的詳情。他解釋被告人性格好賭，經常在非法賭場流連，因而認識一些壞分子，繼而將自己相關的銀行戶口借出，並收取港幣6千元作報酬。被告人的犯案手法是一般「洗黑錢」罪行中所指的「傀儡」。
12. 本席同意本案中沒有證供顯示被告人知道源頭罪行的詳情，而控方也接受被告人的角色是一般「洗黑錢」罪行中所指的「傀儡」。可是，本席不同意被告人只是借出他本人的相關銀行戶口。控罪1的中銀帳戶於2014年開立。被告人的確只是借出他現有的戶口。中銀帳戶結束日期為2021年4月22日。可是控罪2的理慧帳戶是於2020年8月22日才開設。當時被告人的中銀帳戶仍未結束。該理慧帳戶開設後便立即用作「洗黑錢」，而完成「洗黑錢」後便隨即結束。換言之，該理慧帳戶是為了「洗黑錢」而開設，是有計劃而行事。
13. 大律師援引律政司司長對謝志建（Xie Zhijan）CAAR 4/2024 [2025] HKCA 911。該案的答辯人承認一項「洗黑錢」罪。該案只涉及一個銀行戶口，涉款1億438萬元。原審法官以3年半監禁作為量刑基準；因申請人認罪，減為28個月監禁，再根據《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》加刑百分之20，最終判處答辯人33個月監禁。律政司司長不滿判刑，提出刑期覆核申請。
14. 大律師指就律政司申請刑期覆核時亦引用雲國強案及許有益案所辨識的量刑幅度，但上訴法庭駁回申請。大律師力陳，上訴法庭指出：
「49. 本庭之所以謂「大概量刑幅度」，是因為在許有益案被列出的Xu Xia Li及李家琪案均涉及超過1,100萬元的金額，但有關的量刑基準分別是2年9個月及3年，而Mak Shing及Abayomi Bamidele Fayomi案分別涉及1,500萬元及1,200萬元，量刑基準則為4年及3年6個月。換言之，雲國強案所指「1,000萬元以上則可超過5年」當中的「可」字極為關鍵，不應省略而簡化為1,000萬元以上判處超過5年監禁。
50. 正如司徒敬副庭長（當時官階）在Boma案指出，基於「洗黑錢」這罪行可在各種不同情況下發生，為有關罪行設定量刑指引既困難亦不可取。就這類罪行判刑時，量刑法官應牢記有關法例所針對的禍害，並應結合自己的量刑經驗和對有待判刑的案件的整體「觀感」而考慮適當的刑期。」
15. 雖然於謝志健案，上訴法庭駁回刑期覆核申請，但這並非因為上訴法庭認為量刑基準恰當。原審時，辯方大律師的求情等同不認罪，引起上訴法庭的關注，令案件押後及作進一步陳詞。上訴法庭是因這極特殊的因素，才拒絕覆核判刑。事實上，上訴法庭指明，認為該案量刑基準明顯不足及原則犯錯。上訴法庭指：
「55. 答辯人承認控罪的涉案戶口不只作出單次交易，而是在8個月內有多筆不同貨幣的進支賬項，總額超過港幣一億元，並涉及跨境元素，故不論就案件的嚴重性及本類罪行所需的阻嚇性判罰而言，原審法官採納的3年半量刑基準，均屬明顯不足或原則有錯。然而，本庭在今年4月7日進行聆訊時，得知若根據原審法官的判刑，答辯人將於短期內獲釋。換言之，假如本庭批准司長的申請，這將會為期待即將出獄的答辯人帶來震撼。再加上本庭在上文所指因關注求情事項而涉及的押後聆訊、補充陳詞等轉折，答辯人期間所承受的精神壓力，實不難想像。」
16. 本案涉及2個銀行帳戶。被告人於2018年4月7日刑滿出獄；2日後便隨即干犯控罪1。於控罪1，雖然被告人是借出早已設立的戶口，但涉款5,395,173.05元，金額極可觀。控罪持續超過3年（2018年4月9日至2021年4月22日），涉及1,317次存款及2,200次提款。干犯控罪1的期間，被告人再特意開設理慧帳戶作「洗黑錢」之用。控罪2持續約10個月，涉款5,142,435.76元，金額極可觀；控罪涉及2,433次存款及5,425次提款。
17. 考慮到以上案情，本席認為每項控罪適當的量刑基準為3年半監禁（即每項控罪的量刑基準為42個月監禁）。
減刑因素
18. 被告人適時認罪，可獲三分一的扣減，每項控罪的刑期減為28個月監禁。
19. 大律師指被告人因好賭，誤交損友及為了賺取6千元報酬而犯案。經濟壓力並非求情因素：R v Kwok Yau Fat (CACC 537/1996, 1997年2月28日，未經𢑥編）、Attorney General v Yau Chun Fong [1993] 1 HKCLR 42, 45、HKSAR v Lee Man Wai [2006] HKCU 106 (CACC 386/2005，2006年1月13日，未經𢑥編）。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出：
“[30-145] That the accused committed the offence because he owed money to loan sharks due to gambling losses will not avail him: R v Ying Lai-Chau [1990] 1 HKC 218 …. Neither will the fact that the motive for the offence was to raise money for his family: Attorney General v Shek Sui-tai [1989] 1 HKLR 178 … Financial difficulty and personal circumstances are not relevant as mitigation in serious cases, no matter how desperate or tragic the situation of the accused: Secretary for Justice v Nones Carmelita Galay [2023] 1 HKC 139 …”
20. 大律師續指，被告人的父親身體欠佳，明天及3月17日需接受手術，切除骨瘤及建造人工肛門。眾所周知，判刑對被告人家人的影響並非減刑因素：HKSAR v Li Kwok Ching [2005] HKCU 1702 (HCMA 1132/2005，2005年11月30日，未經𢑥編）、HKSAR v Chan Kin Chung [2002] 4 HKC 314, 321、HKSAR v To Yiu Cho [2009] 5 HKLRD 309, 311、R v Shipra [1988] HKC 412、HKSAR v Chan Tung Hing, Band [2010] 3 HKC 304, 307及HKSAR v Shum Chung Wai [2002] 2 HKLRD 81, 82。於HKSAR v Thapa Kishan [2013] 4 HKC 524, 527，上訴法庭指出，如被告人家人真的遇到困難，可隨時向社署求助。
21. 法庭是於極特殊的情況，才會考慮判刑對被告人家人的影響。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出：
“[30-133] In ‘certain exceptional circumstances’, the hardship associated with a family tragedy ‘may be an irrelevant factor’: HKSAR v Gurung Hemani [2006] HKCU 672 … In Attorney General v Ling Kar-fai [1997] 2 HKC 631, account was taken by the court of the deterioration in the health of the wife during the long period in which her husband faced criminal procedures, and the impact of this upon the accused (see also R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471, 477 … In HKSAR v SM Kawsar Ahammed [2014] HKCU 2843 … a small reduction (three months) was granted to an accused who received an otherwise appropriate sentence (24 months) for two immigration offences as a ‘humanitarian gesture’, as his wife had died, subsequent to sentencing, leaving his ten-year-old daughter without anyone to care for her. But the fact that the accused has an aged mother in the Mainland who is in poor health is not ‘a strong humanitarian consideration for the court to reduce the sentence’: HKSAR v Feng Chun-han (HCMA 1049/2001, 16 April 2002, unreported). The death of an accused’s parents is ‘a situation most of us have to face at some stage’, and ‘does not make imprisonment disproportionately severe’: R v Jackson [2017] NZCA 33, [27].
[30-134] In HKSAR v Lau Pang [2004] 3 HKLRD 565 … the accused had received appropriate sentences for the offences of burglary and remaining in Hong Kong without authority after having landed unlawfully. He had a wife, elderly parents and an eight-year-old son in Hunan province. Subsequent to sentencing, his son had drowned in floodwaters. In deciding that the scale of the tragedy for the accused, and the family was such as to justify an adjustment in sentence, Woo V-P said at 569:
With the drowning of the child in the floodwaters, the whole family has been overwhelmed with grief, and his wife has fallen ill and lost a significant amount of weight. She has become too weak to look after herself, or to work, let alone look after the agent couple. The health of the appellant’s mother has also taken a very bad turn, missing both her son and grandson. In the exceptional circumstances, we consider that this is a proper case for the Court to show mercy.
[30-135] The effect of the sentencing of a parent or parents upon the children of the family is sometimes advanced as mitigation … If one parent is unable to care for the children because of the actions of the other, a court is not likely to be influenced by this: Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan-fun [2007] 1 HKC 423 … In HKSAR v Pham Thi Tam [1998] HKCU 2504 …, it was noted that ‘young children per se do not operate as humanitarian grounds’, and that that needs to be ‘something more’.”
22. 於HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231，上訴法庭已指出，認罪後所獲扣減已是最高分水線 （high watermark）；除非有極特殊的求情因素，法庭不應予以額外扣減。被告人的父親現居於醫院，可獲醫護人員的照顧。被告人母親患有糖尿病，並非特殊的求情因素。如有需要的話，被告人家人可向社署求助。
23. 本案中，除了適時認罪外，沒有其他求情因素。每項控罪的初步量刑為28個月監禁。
加刑申請
24. 控方根據香港法例第455章《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第27(2)條申請加刑。根據李總督察的證人供詞，雖然「洗錢傀儡」案件有回落趨勢，由2024年的7,883宗（即每月超過656宗）減至2025年的5,355宗（即每月超過446宗）。可是，這類案件仍然普遍。辯方不反對加刑申請，只要求加刑幅度為百分之二十計算。控方亦接受一般而言，加刑由百分之二十至三十不等。
25. 考慮到這類案件數目回落的趨勢，本席下令每項控罪加刑百分之二十，即每項控罪的刑期為33個月監禁。
總刑期
26. 兩項控罪涉及兩個不同的銀行帳戶、不同的時段及不同的金錢，刑期理應完全分期執行。另外，控罪2亦令案情更嚴重：見HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching [2011] 6 HKC 238。考慮到本案案情及被告人的角色，本席認為適當的總刑期為3年9個月監禁。本席遂下令每項控罪判處被告人33個月監禁，控罪2的其中12個月與控罪1分期執行（即共3年9個月監禁）。
（謝沈智慧）
區域法院法官
DCCC1286/2024 香港特別行政區 訴 梅永亮
DCCC 1286/2024
[2026] HKDC 442
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2024年第1286號
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香港特別行政區
訴
梅永亮
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主審法官：
區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期：
2026年3月10日
出席人士：
朱家誠先生，律政司高級檢控官（署理），代表香港特別行政區
伍健民先生，由法律援助署委派的侯劉李楊律師行延聘，代表被告人
控罪：
[1] – [3] 處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產（Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence）
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判刑理由書
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1. 被告人被控共3項「處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產」，違反香港法例第455章《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第25(1)及(3)條（控罪1-3）。控方指被告人連同其他身份不詳的人士犯案。被告人承認控罪1及2。經雙方認罪協商後，控方願意將控罪3留檔；除非獲法庭批准，否則不可繼續予以起訴。
案情撮要
2. 被告人承認的「經修訂案情撮要」如下：
控罪一所涉帳戶
(1) 案發所有期間，被告人是中國銀行（香港）有限公司銀行帳戶號碼012-687-1-013566-6（中銀帳戶）的唯一持有人及受益人。
(2) 中銀帳戶於 2014年12月31日開立，作儲蓄/日常支出用途。在開戶授權書中，被告人報稱受教育至高中程度，任職導遊，月入港幣15,000元，並提交了香港身份證副本作為身份證明。該帳戶於2021年4月22日結束。
(3) 2018年4月9日至2021年4月22日期間，有總額港幣5,395,173,05元分1,317次交易轉入中銀帳戶，以及有總額港幣5,395,809.09元分2,200次交易轉出。
(4) 提存概要表列如下：
類別
存款次數
提款次數
自動櫃員機
232
1,033
自動櫃員機轉賬
38
66
自動轉賬
3
0
銀行收費
0
18
利息
4
0
無存摺現金交易
7
5
無存摺轉賬交易
5
2
POS轉賬交易
0
438
沖正
2
0
銀行轉賬
1,026
638
總計
1,317
2,200
(5) 一般而言，中銀帳戶每日有多次出入帳交易，而流入資金一是 (i) 以相約金額直接提取；一是 (ii) 分拆為較少金額後經多次交易提取。提款於同日或不久後迅速進行，帳戶的每日結餘一直維持低企。
控罪2所涉帳戶
(6) 案發所有期間，被告人是理慧銀行有限公司銀行帳戶號碼388756025832576（理慧帳戶）的唯一持有人及受益人。
(7) 理慧帳戶於2020年8月22日開立，作儲蓄/定期存款用途。在開戶授權書中，被告人報稱從事建築業，月入港幣10,001元至港幣25,000元，資金來源是其收入。被告人提交了香港身份證副本及兩張活體自拍照作為身份證明。該帳戶於2021年6月11日結束。
(8) 2020年8月22日至2021年6月11日期間，有總額港幣5,142,435.76元分2,433次交易轉入理慧帳戶，以及有相同總額港幣分5,425次交易轉出。全部交易以銀行轉賬方式進行，涉及多個對手方。一般而言，理慧帳戶每日有多次出入帳交易，而流入資金一是 (i) 以相若金額直接提取；一是 (ii) 分拆為較少金額後經多次交易提取。提款於同日或不久後迅速進行，帳戶的每日結餘一直維持低企。
拘捕及警誡
(9) 2024年3月27日，被告人被拘捕，在警誡下保持緘默。警方搜屋，並無發現。
翻查紀錄
(10) 可查的出入境紀錄顯示，被告人於理慧帳戶開立時身在香港。此外，2019年9月23日至2021年12月31日期間，被告人沒有離境紀錄。
(11) 稅務局沒有被告人於2017/2018至2021/2022財政年度的任何紀錄。
(12) 土地註冊處沒有被告人在香港擁有土地的任何紀錄。
(13) 公司註冊處沒有被告人在香港出任董事的任何紀錄。
經修訂控罪
(14) 被告人現承認他在案發期間將中銀帳戶及理慧帳戶借給了別人，以獲港幣6,000元作報酬。
(15) 在控罪1所述相關期間，被告人，連同身份不詳的人，知道或有合理理由相信某項財產，即在中銀帳戶所持總額港幣5,395,173.05元款項，全部或部份、直接或間接代表任何人從可公訴罪行的得益而仍處理該財產。
(16) 在控罪2所述相關期間，被告人，連同身份不詳的人，知道或有合理理由相信某項財產，即在理慧帳戶所持總額港幣5,142,435.76元款項，全部或部份、直接或間接代表任何人從可公訴罪行的得益而仍處理該財產。
被告人的背景
3. 被告人生於1988年6月，現年37歲。他於2002年6月（14歲）來港定居，曾接受至中四程度教育。被告人有一位同居女友，兩人育有三名子女（現時分別3歲至5歲）。被捕前，被告人與父母、女友及三名子女同住。被告人於2024年3月27日被拘捕。當時獲警方保釋。2024年7月13日法庭撤銷被告人的保釋後，被告人的同居女友便離開，留下三名年幼的子女，由被告人父母照顧。
4. 被告人過往有8次刑事定罪紀錄，涉及9項控罪，沒有類同。
5. 大律師指被告人中四輟學後，曾任職快餐店廚房學徒。2017年6月5日，被告人因「藏有攻擊性武器」及「管有危險藥物」被判處共15個月監禁（WK 941/2017）。2018年4月7日刑滿出獄後便開始從事Uber出租車司機，每月平均收入2萬元。
判刑原則
6. 「處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產」是極嚴重的控罪，一經循可公訴程序定罪，最高刑期為罰款500萬元及14年監禁。雖然沒有量刑指引（HKSAR v Shing Siu Ming [1999] 2 HKC 818; HKSAR v Mak Shing [2002] HKCU 1109, CACC 322/2001, 2002年9月18日，未經𢑥編；HKSAR v Kamran [2005] HKCU 923, CACC 400/2004; HKSAR v Boma Amaso [2012] 1 HKC 504），法庭須判處阻嚇式刑罰（HKSAR v Hui Kam [2000] 3 HKLRD 211; HKSAR v Kamran （同上）；HKSAR v Ng Man Yee [2014] 4 HKC 241）。就算是初犯也須即時監禁： HKSAR v Xu Xia Li and Another [2004] 4 HKC 16; Secretary for Justice v Choi Sui Hey [2008] 6 HKC 166; HKSAR v Siu Yuen Yee [2017] 3 HKC 454。
7. 刑期視乎案情而定。財產的來源對判刑並不重要，但如被告人知悉財產源自嚴重罪行是加刑因素。
8. 於香港特別行政區訴許有益 [2010] 5 HKLRD 536， 上訴法庭指被告人本身在這次交易所獲得的利益並非量刑的因素，並訂明一些判刑可考慮的因素：
「9. 由於處理公訴罪行得益的財產這類案件會涉及不同的案情，故此法庭沒有定下量刑指引。但以下各點是量刑的參考因素：
(a) 涉案的金額是重要的考慮因素，而非被告人本身在這次交易所獲得的利益。
(b) 控罪的罪責是協助、支持及鼓勵有關的公訴罪行，故此被告人的參與程度及涉及「洗黑錢」的次數是有關連的因素。
(c) 處理公訴罪行得益的財產控罪與有關的公訴罪行不一定有直接關係，但若果有關的公訴罪行是可以確認的，那麼法庭是可以在處理控罪時考慮有關公訴罪行本身的刑期。
(d) 若案件涉及國際跨境成份，法庭可採用較嚴峻的刑期，以免香港作為國際金融及銀行中心的形象受損。
(e) 涉案的時間。」
9. 於HKSAR v Boma Amaso （同上），上訴法庭指：
“25. The problem remains that the circumstances in which the offence may be committed are highly variable. They run from cases where a wife hides money for a husband who is a gambler through to those who wash money that represents the proceeds of vice offences, or trafficking in dangerous drugs, or fraud, or human trafficking or other manifestations of organised crime. Sometimes it is possible to identify the antecedent offence; other times it is not. Sometimes the offender knows the nature of the antecedent offence, sometimes he does not. Sometimes he can be taken to know or believe the monies to be the proceeds of an indictable offence or reckless as to whether or not they were; otherwise he may be shown to know the grounds upon which a reasonable person will so believe without himself actually knowing the funds to be the proceeds of an indictable offence. Sometimes the offender is the perpetrator of the predicate offence but at other times he lies somewhere down the chain. Sometimes he is the beneficiary of the laundering process; other times a conduit. Then there are cases involving an organized and sophisticated scheme where the offender is the director of the laundering exercise; or he may be a lowly employee in the exercise. The offence may involve a single transaction or, on other hand, many transactions over an extended period. Deceit to achieve the objective may or may not be involved. There are cases where all the activity is embraced in a domestic setting but other cases with an international element. This non-exhaustive postulation of the variety of circumstances suffices to illustrate why it is difficult and undesirable to offer guidelines. It is, in other words, a category of offence in which the sentencing judge is called upon to engage his ‘feel’ for the case bringing to bear his sentencing experience bearing in mind at all times the mischief at which the legislation is directed…
32. At present, however, any sentencing exercise must recognise that the maximum sentence is one of 14 years’ imprisonment…
35. The first factor to which any sentencing court should in this context have regard is the maximum penalty available. It is not possible to identify the worst case possible and difficult to postulate the worst category of case. But it is nonetheless helpful to bear the maximum in mind.
36. The second matter to which the sentencing court must have regard is the fact that in this category of offence, deterrence is paramount. It is to be remembered that “the criminality in laundering arises from the encouragement and nourishment it gives to crime in general. Without it many crimes would be rendered much less fruitful and perhaps more difficult to perpetrate”: R v Basra [2002] 2 Cr App R (S) 469 at 472 …
38. Then there is the question of the amount of money laundered. This is not the be-all and end-all of a case but is a significant feature …
40. Less helpful though this may be than we had hoped, the best we can therefore do is to identify some of the significant features for which the court should look and take into account, though it is not possible to produce an exhaustive list: we can do no better than echo obvious factors that have been referred to by the cases:
(1) The nature of the predicate offence, if known, and the penalty available for the predicate offence: see R v Karen Monfries [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 9. So, for example, where the predicate offence is trafficking in dangerous drugs, the offender should expect a sentence significantly greater than where the predicate offence is gambling … although it is suggested that there must be a difference between the offender who knows what the predicate offence is and the offender who does not: R v Gonzalez [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 35 at [13].
(2) This brings us to the question of the state of knowledge of the offender. This divides itself in two – knowledge of the nature of the predicate offence:
(a) Where the predicate offence is known to the court, the question of knowledge of the offender as to the nature of the predicate offence … this is a question to be approached with considerable caution, since many offenders will assert ignorance of the origin of the proceeds in question, particularly where the offender has deliberately turned a blind eye thereby choosing not to know. In such a case it must be recognised that he is nonetheless “assisting in the original crime, whether with knowledge or blind eye knowledge of it”: R v Basra … The scheme and purpose of the legislation is to ensure care and honesty in the handling of other people’s money and those who are prepared to handle money on other people’s behalf and turn a blind eye to the source of that money do so at their own risk: see Attorney General’s Reference No. 48 of 2006 [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 558 at [24]. So the person who is aware of the fact that he is dealing with proceeds of an indictable offence but deliberately chooses not to ask questions is barely less culpable than the person who asks or who is told.
(b) As to the second question … draws a distinction in culpability between the person who intentionally deals with the proceeds of crime, meaning the person who knows or believes that the funds in question are the proceeds of crime; the person who is reckless as to that question; and the person who is negligent about it. The legislation makes it a criminal offence to deal with proceeds of an indictable offence where there are grounds to believe that that is the origin of the funds and the offender knows of the grounds, even where the offender does not positively know that the funds originate from the commission of such an offence, so care must be taken in the last category not thereby to dilute sentencing so as to defeat the object of the legislation; but the person who is reckless is more culpable and the person who knows or believes is more culpable still …
(3) An international dimension will always be a significant aggravating feature; and by international dimension we include money laundered from, or for those operating in, the Mainland.
(4) The sophistication of the offence is always relevant. This will include the degree of planning and whether deceit is practised to achieve the objective.
(5) Where the offence is committed by or on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate, that is an aggravating fact.
(6) It is relevant to take into account whether there is one transaction or many and the length of time over which the offence was committed.
(7) As in the case of Herzberg, it will be an aggravating feature where the offender continues to launder funds after he has discovered as a fact that the funds are the proceeds of an offence or after he has discovered the nature of an offence which is serious.
(8) The sentencing court should have regard to the role of the offender and the acts performed by him. In this regard, the director of a laundering operation or scheme should attract a greater sentence than a person engaged by him although sentences should be sufficient to deter those who might be prevailed upon by directing minds. In the case of a person down the chain, the court will wish to have regard to whether a benefit has been received and if so the nature and size of the benefit. But within the category of persons down the chain there will gradations of culpability. So for example the drug addict or petty crook who is paid a small sum to open an account and hand over its operation to another with no more participation and no more knowledge than that it is going to be used for some sort of crime is much less culpable than an offender of a different sort not “used” in that way”.
10. 於律政司司長對雲國強 [2012] 1 HKLRD 197，上訴法庭張澤𧙗法官在判案書上列出多種「洗黑錢」案件所涉的金額和判刑。數據顯示，如涉案「黑錢」是100萬元至200萬元，量刑基準約為3年監禁；如涉案「黑錢」是300萬至600萬元，量刑基準約為4年監禁；如涉案「黑錢」是1,000萬元以上，量刑基準可超過5年監禁。
討論
11. 大律師指，本案中沒有證供顯示被告人知道源頭罪行的詳情。他解釋被告人性格好賭，經常在非法賭場流連，因而認識一些壞分子，繼而將自己相關的銀行戶口借出，並收取港幣6千元作報酬。被告人的犯案手法是一般「洗黑錢」罪行中所指的「傀儡」。
12. 本席同意本案中沒有證供顯示被告人知道源頭罪行的詳情，而控方也接受被告人的角色是一般「洗黑錢」罪行中所指的「傀儡」。可是，本席不同意被告人只是借出他本人的相關銀行戶口。控罪1的中銀帳戶於2014年開立。被告人的確只是借出他現有的戶口。中銀帳戶結束日期為2021年4月22日。可是控罪2的理慧帳戶是於2020年8月22日才開設。當時被告人的中銀帳戶仍未結束。該理慧帳戶開設後便立即用作「洗黑錢」，而完成「洗黑錢」後便隨即結束。換言之，該理慧帳戶是為了「洗黑錢」而開設，是有計劃而行事。
13. 大律師援引律政司司長對謝志建（Xie Zhijan）CAAR 4/2024 [2025] HKCA 911。該案的答辯人承認一項「洗黑錢」罪。該案只涉及一個銀行戶口，涉款1億438萬元。原審法官以3年半監禁作為量刑基準；因申請人認罪，減為28個月監禁，再根據《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》加刑百分之20，最終判處答辯人33個月監禁。律政司司長不滿判刑，提出刑期覆核申請。
14. 大律師指就律政司申請刑期覆核時亦引用雲國強案及許有益案所辨識的量刑幅度，但上訴法庭駁回申請。大律師力陳，上訴法庭指出：
「49. 本庭之所以謂「大概量刑幅度」，是因為在許有益案被列出的Xu Xia Li及李家琪案均涉及超過1,100萬元的金額，但有關的量刑基準分別是2年9個月及3年，而Mak Shing及Abayomi Bamidele Fayomi案分別涉及1,500萬元及1,200萬元，量刑基準則為4年及3年6個月。換言之，雲國強案所指「1,000萬元以上則可超過5年」當中的「可」字極為關鍵，不應省略而簡化為1,000萬元以上判處超過5年監禁。
50. 正如司徒敬副庭長（當時官階）在Boma案指出，基於「洗黑錢」這罪行可在各種不同情況下發生，為有關罪行設定量刑指引既困難亦不可取。就這類罪行判刑時，量刑法官應牢記有關法例所針對的禍害，並應結合自己的量刑經驗和對有待判刑的案件的整體「觀感」而考慮適當的刑期。」
15. 雖然於謝志健案，上訴法庭駁回刑期覆核申請，但這並非因為上訴法庭認為量刑基準恰當。原審時，辯方大律師的求情等同不認罪，引起上訴法庭的關注，令案件押後及作進一步陳詞。上訴法庭是因這極特殊的因素，才拒絕覆核判刑。事實上，上訴法庭指明，認為該案量刑基準明顯不足及原則犯錯。上訴法庭指：
「55. 答辯人承認控罪的涉案戶口不只作出單次交易，而是在8個月內有多筆不同貨幣的進支賬項，總額超過港幣一億元，並涉及跨境元素，故不論就案件的嚴重性及本類罪行所需的阻嚇性判罰而言，原審法官採納的3年半量刑基準，均屬明顯不足或原則有錯。然而，本庭在今年4月7日進行聆訊時，得知若根據原審法官的判刑，答辯人將於短期內獲釋。換言之，假如本庭批准司長的申請，這將會為期待即將出獄的答辯人帶來震撼。再加上本庭在上文所指因關注求情事項而涉及的押後聆訊、補充陳詞等轉折，答辯人期間所承受的精神壓力，實不難想像。」
16. 本案涉及2個銀行帳戶。被告人於2018年4月7日刑滿出獄；2日後便隨即干犯控罪1。於控罪1，雖然被告人是借出早已設立的戶口，但涉款5,395,173.05元，金額極可觀。控罪持續超過3年（2018年4月9日至2021年4月22日），涉及1,317次存款及2,200次提款。干犯控罪1的期間，被告人再特意開設理慧帳戶作「洗黑錢」之用。控罪2持續約10個月，涉款5,142,435.76元，金額極可觀；控罪涉及2,433次存款及5,425次提款。
17. 考慮到以上案情，本席認為每項控罪適當的量刑基準為3年半監禁（即每項控罪的量刑基準為42個月監禁）。
減刑因素
18. 被告人適時認罪，可獲三分一的扣減，每項控罪的刑期減為28個月監禁。
19. 大律師指被告人因好賭，誤交損友及為了賺取6千元報酬而犯案。經濟壓力並非求情因素：R v Kwok Yau Fat (CACC 537/1996, 1997年2月28日，未經𢑥編）、Attorney General v Yau Chun Fong [1993] 1 HKCLR 42, 45、HKSAR v Lee Man Wai [2006] HKCU 106 (CACC 386/2005，2006年1月13日，未經𢑥編）。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出：
“[30-145] That the accused committed the offence because he owed money to loan sharks due to gambling losses will not avail him: R v Ying Lai-Chau [1990] 1 HKC 218 …. Neither will the fact that the motive for the offence was to raise money for his family: Attorney General v Shek Sui-tai [1989] 1 HKLR 178 … Financial difficulty and personal circumstances are not relevant as mitigation in serious cases, no matter how desperate or tragic the situation of the accused: Secretary for Justice v Nones Carmelita Galay [2023] 1 HKC 139 …”
20. 大律師續指，被告人的父親身體欠佳，明天及3月17日需接受手術，切除骨瘤及建造人工肛門。眾所周知，判刑對被告人家人的影響並非減刑因素：HKSAR v Li Kwok Ching [2005] HKCU 1702 (HCMA 1132/2005，2005年11月30日，未經𢑥編）、HKSAR v Chan Kin Chung [2002] 4 HKC 314, 321、HKSAR v To Yiu Cho [2009] 5 HKLRD 309, 311、R v Shipra [1988] HKC 412、HKSAR v Chan Tung Hing, Band [2010] 3 HKC 304, 307及HKSAR v Shum Chung Wai [2002] 2 HKLRD 81, 82。於HKSAR v Thapa Kishan [2013] 4 HKC 524, 527，上訴法庭指出，如被告人家人真的遇到困難，可隨時向社署求助。
21. 法庭是於極特殊的情況，才會考慮判刑對被告人家人的影響。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出：
“[30-133] In ‘certain exceptional circumstances’, the hardship associated with a family tragedy ‘may be an irrelevant factor’: HKSAR v Gurung Hemani [2006] HKCU 672 … In Attorney General v Ling Kar-fai [1997] 2 HKC 631, account was taken by the court of the deterioration in the health of the wife during the long period in which her husband faced criminal procedures, and the impact of this upon the accused (see also R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471, 477 … In HKSAR v SM Kawsar Ahammed [2014] HKCU 2843 … a small reduction (three months) was granted to an accused who received an otherwise appropriate sentence (24 months) for two immigration offences as a ‘humanitarian gesture’, as his wife had died, subsequent to sentencing, leaving his ten-year-old daughter without anyone to care for her. But the fact that the accused has an aged mother in the Mainland who is in poor health is not ‘a strong humanitarian consideration for the court to reduce the sentence’: HKSAR v Feng Chun-han (HCMA 1049/2001, 16 April 2002, unreported). The death of an accused’s parents is ‘a situation most of us have to face at some stage’, and ‘does not make imprisonment disproportionately severe’: R v Jackson [2017] NZCA 33, [27].
[30-134] In HKSAR v Lau Pang [2004] 3 HKLRD 565 … the accused had received appropriate sentences for the offences of burglary and remaining in Hong Kong without authority after having landed unlawfully. He had a wife, elderly parents and an eight-year-old son in Hunan province. Subsequent to sentencing, his son had drowned in floodwaters. In deciding that the scale of the tragedy for the accused, and the family was such as to justify an adjustment in sentence, Woo V-P said at 569:
With the drowning of the child in the floodwaters, the whole family has been overwhelmed with grief, and his wife has fallen ill and lost a significant amount of weight. She has become too weak to look after herself, or to work, let alone look after the agent couple. The health of the appellant’s mother has also taken a very bad turn, missing both her son and grandson. In the exceptional circumstances, we consider that this is a proper case for the Court to show mercy.
[30-135] The effect of the sentencing of a parent or parents upon the children of the family is sometimes advanced as mitigation … If one parent is unable to care for the children because of the actions of the other, a court is not likely to be influenced by this: Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan-fun [2007] 1 HKC 423 … In HKSAR v Pham Thi Tam [1998] HKCU 2504 …, it was noted that ‘young children per se do not operate as humanitarian grounds’, and that that needs to be ‘something more’.”
22. 於HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231，上訴法庭已指出，認罪後所獲扣減已是最高分水線 （high watermark）；除非有極特殊的求情因素，法庭不應予以額外扣減。被告人的父親現居於醫院，可獲醫護人員的照顧。被告人母親患有糖尿病，並非特殊的求情因素。如有需要的話，被告人家人可向社署求助。
23. 本案中，除了適時認罪外，沒有其他求情因素。每項控罪的初步量刑為28個月監禁。
加刑申請
24. 控方根據香港法例第455章《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第27(2)條申請加刑。根據李總督察的證人供詞，雖然「洗錢傀儡」案件有回落趨勢，由2024年的7,883宗（即每月超過656宗）減至2025年的5,355宗（即每月超過446宗）。可是，這類案件仍然普遍。辯方不反對加刑申請，只要求加刑幅度為百分之二十計算。控方亦接受一般而言，加刑由百分之二十至三十不等。
25. 考慮到這類案件數目回落的趨勢，本席下令每項控罪加刑百分之二十，即每項控罪的刑期為33個月監禁。
總刑期
26. 兩項控罪涉及兩個不同的銀行帳戶、不同的時段及不同的金錢，刑期理應完全分期執行。另外，控罪2亦令案情更嚴重：見HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching [2011] 6 HKC 238。考慮到本案案情及被告人的角色，本席認為適當的總刑期為3年9個月監禁。本席遂下令每項控罪判處被告人33個月監禁，控罪2的其中12個月與控罪1分期執行（即共3年9個月監禁）。
（謝沈智慧）
區域法院法官