DCCC25/2025 香港特別行政區 訴 吳俊豪
DCCC 25/2025
[2026] HKDC 414
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2025年第25號
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香港特別行政區
訴
吳俊豪
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主審法官:
區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期:
2026年3月5日
出席人士:
黃燕儀女士，律政司署理高級檢控官，代表香港特別行政區
李健志先生，由法律援助署委派的董氏律師事務所延聘，代表被告人
控罪:
[1] 偽造文件（Forgery of documents）
[2] 無牌管有槍械（Possession of arms without a licence）
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判刑理由書
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1. 被告人承認2項控罪：
(i) 偽造文件，違反香港法例第374章《道路交通條例》第111(1)(a)條（控罪1）；及
(ii) 無牌管有槍械，違反香港法例第238章《火器及彈藥條例》第13條（控罪2）。
案情撮要
2. 被告人承認的「經修訂之案情撮要」內容如下：
事件
(i) 2024年5月4日約1022時，警務人員包括警員25427（控方第一證人）巡邏時看見一輛底盤號碼為WAUZZZ8T2DA074906的私家車（私家車）停泊在香港九龍油麻地砵蘭街108號外6309B號咪錶泊車位；私家車車頭及車身有明顯損毁。當時私家車內沒有人。經檢查，控方第一證人留意到一對分別掛在私家車車頭及車尾的登記號碼為ZA6174（ZA6174）的號碼字牌底下，有另一對登記號碼為YZ5961（YZ5961）的號碼字牌。貼在私家車擋風玻璃上的車輛牌照顯示，私家車的登記字牌號碼為YZ5961。
(ii) 車輛查核顯示，ZA6174並無登記在任何車輛名下。
(iii) 車輛查核顯示，私家車的真正登記字牌號碼為YZ5961，而YZ5961的登記車主是被告人。控方第一證人致電被告人，以交通管制為由要求被告人返回私家車。
拘捕和警誡
(iv) 約1115時，控方第一證人看見被告人返回私家車並打開司機門，於是截停被告人。經搜身，控方第一證人在被告人身上搜出私家車的車匙。經查問，被告人表示私家車屬他所有。私家車的車輛牌照上所顯示的YZ5961是私家車的登記字牌。被告人購買虛假的ZA6174登記字牌是為社團做事。他們打人後會貼上虛假字牌以逃避警方追查。被告人為「勝和」做事。
(v) 約1125時，控方第一證人拘捕被告人，罪名是「管有偽造文書」。被告人在現場警誡下說出一些事情，當中包括：「個假牌ZA6174係我嘅。上述承認事項補錄在控方第一證人的記事冊內，並由被告人簽署。
(vi) 經搜查私家車，控方第一證人發現司機門的儲物空間內有一支電槍（電槍）。當控方第一證人嘗試打開電槍電源時，被告人隨即表示：「電槍嚟㗎」。
(vii) 約1147時，控方第一證人拘捕被告人，罪名是「管有火器」。被告人在現場警誡下說出一些事情，當中包括：「嗰支電槍我喺大陸用百零蚊買返嚟，我諗住自衛用但我冇用過」。上述承認事項補錄在會面紀錄內，並由被告人簽署。
檢驗電槍
(viii) 香港警務處通訊科檢驗涉案電槍，發現該電槍能夠產生21,367伏特的峰至峰脈動電壓，並能夠在持續3秒內產生368次的高電壓脈衝。
(ix) 根據警方的檢驗結果，生物醫學工程專家潘頌欣Carmen博士認為，涉案電槍能夠產生的峰至峰脈動電壓，較可導致人類皮膚破裂的電壓高出35倍，並較可導致人體受到電擊的電壓高出200倍。若在額頭、胸部、頸動脈或脊柱等敏感部位使用涉案電槍，可令心律改變、造成嚴重痛楚、阻礙血液流向腦部及/或刺激運動神經元，效果可引致受襲者昏暈及不能動彈。涉案電槍是經設計或改裝的便攜式器件，在有或沒有直接接觸人體的情況下，藉施加電擊使人昏暈或不能動彈。
其他
(x) 被告人是於兩宗案件（報案編號分別為MRN 22000061及TKO RN 22024237）警方給予保釋期間干犯本案。
罪行
(xi) 案發時，被告人在香港，意圖欺詐而在私家車上使用一對登記號碼為ZA6174的號碼字牌（控罪一）。
(xii) 案發時，被告人在香港九龍油麻地砵蘭街108號外6309B號咪錶泊車位的私家車上，無牌管有槍械，即一支電槍（控罪二）。
判刑原則
控罪1
3. 控罪1最高的刑期為第3級罰款及監禁3年。雖然沒有量刑指引，但法庭一般考慮監禁式刑罰。
4. 於香港特別行政區 訴 黃威洪[2022] HKCFI 486:
(i) 被告人承認共7項控罪，包括一項「行使偽造文件」（控罪6）及一項「管有偽造文件」（控罪7）；
(ii) 案情指2021年5月3日早上，一名男子將車輛停泊在葵涌新葵街，下午返回車輛時，發現其車尾防撞欄有損毁。於是他翻看車尾攝錄儀，發現一輛金色私家車（涉案車輛）與其車輛發生碰撞，於是報案。警方到場後發現上訴人沿新葵街走向涉案車輛，於是將上訴人截停，並在他身上搜出涉案車輛的車匙。警方在涉案車輛的不同隱蔽位置，包括車廂內、司機位下方、前座乘客位的地氈、前座乘客位後方的儲物位置和前座乘客及司機位車門的隔間內搜獲以下物品：
(a) 一支氣槍，內藏六粒6毫米膠彈珠，以壓縮二氧化碳發射，槍口能量（muzzle energy）低於2焦耳（控罪一）；
(b) 四把約70厘米的開山刀及四支各長60厘米的金屬管，所有手柄均包裹着（控罪二）；
(c) 非法用途工具，包括五對手套、四頂棒球帽、一個頭套，一把士巴拿及一套六角匙（控罪三）；
(d) 一個偽造的車輛登記號碼牌，該車牌號碼從沒有在運輸署登記過（控罪七）。
(iii) 上訴人並無有效的駕駛執照及第三者保險（控罪四及五）。涉案車輛的車輛牌照、車頭和車尾的登記號碼牌都是偽造的（控罪六）；
(iv) 上訴人過往有11次共14項刑事定罪紀錄，即1次「入屋犯法」、1次「刑事毁壞」、8次和毒品有關的罪行、3次與暴力有關的罪行、1次「刑事毁壞」及1次「阻礙警務人員正當執行職務」；
(v) 裁判官指上訴人管有的開山刀和金屬管全部均為具高殺傷力的武器。氣槍對人有震懾功效，而且已安裝彈珠，可隨時備用發射。車輛中的一批犯案工具，數量足以供多人同時使用。涉案車輛上顯示了一張虛假的車輛牌照，車頭和車尾也掛上一對虛假的登記號碼牌；車廂內再發現另一個偽造的車輛登記號碼牌PU8242，用作掩飾身份，顯示上訴人圖謀干犯嚴重罪行。因此，就每項控罪，裁判官作出以下判刑：
(a) 控罪一，8個月監禁（量刑基準為12個月監禁）；
(b) 控罪二：14個月監禁（量刑基準為21個月監禁）；
(c) 控罪三，8個月監禁（量刑基準為12個月監禁）；
(d) 控罪四，罰款1,000元；
(e) 控罪五，罰款3,000元；
(f) 控罪六，6個月監禁（量刑基準為9個月監禁）；
(g) 控罪7，6個月監禁（量刑基準為9個月監禁）。
(vi) 顧及了整體量刑原則，裁判官認為30個月監禁才足以反映上訴人的整體刑責，下令控罪一的8個月刑期與控罪二的14個月刑期、控罪三的其中4個月刑期、控罪六的其中2個月刑期及控罪七的其中2個月刑期分期執行。
(vii) 原訟法庭指：
「22. 就控罪 (六) 及 (七) 的罪行而言，嚴重程度按個別案件的整體情況而定。在本案，裁判官指出，上訴人使用和管有虛假車輛登記牌照和號碼牌，可支持使人有意圖用該車輛干犯嚴重罪行，以偽造證件掩飾身份，令警方難以追查犯案者的推論，故此於判刑前已邀請辯方就著情況作出陳詞，不過，辯方放棄陳詞，沒有向法庭提出任何清白解釋。在這情況下，裁判官判處監禁，無可詬病。本席認同裁判官的觀察，也認為判處監禁是恰當的，兩項控罪各自採用9個月作為量刑基準，以本案情節而言，也在合理範圍之內。」
控罪2
5. 一經循公訴程序定罪，控罪2的最高刑罰為第6級罰款及監禁14年。
6. 眾所周知，每件案件的案情有別，法庭須根據個別案件的案情考慮量刑基準，包括電槍的電力和管有電槍的目的或用途。
7. 於HKSAR v Lai Chi Fai Cr App 480 of 1995：
(i) 申請人承認一項「無牌管有槍械」罪名成立，被判處3年6個月監禁。申請人不服判刑，提出上訴；
(ii) 申請人和其朋友一同於街上被警方截停。警方在申請人朋友身上找到一支仿真槍械；於申請人身上發現一支4,800伏特的電槍。上訴人解釋被截停的4小時前，其朋友將電槍交給他保管。原審法官以4年半作為量刑基準。因申請人承認控罪，刑期減為3年6個月監禁。申請人的朋友認罪後則被另一位法官判處1年監禁；
(iii) 上訴法庭指：
“As to the merits, it was urged upon us that in R. v. Cheng Yu Cheung (Unreported, 1990 No. 57) the applicant had received a sentence of 2 years after a starting point of 2½ years upon a plea of guilty. That was reduced to 12 months on appeal when the starting point was described as being not unduly high in the circumstances. Those circumstances were very different from those in this case. In that case a genuine reason for possession had been given namely self-defence and the applicant had not been in physical possession for a very long time, he having left it with a friend. The decision is not to be taken as laying down a starting point in cases of possession of a firearm of this type.
It was also urged upon us that the friend, who also pleaded guilty to the same charge, was given a sentence of only 12 months and that the applicant suffers from a justified sense of grievance. We do not know the details of the friend's plea in mitigation nor do we know if his sentence was appropriate. The correct approach in circumstances such as these is to consider what the proper sentence should have been for this applicant for this offence although a sentence imposed on a co-defendant may sometimes be taken into consideration. In the case of this applicant he had been convicted for robbery and was on bail when he committed the present offence. While he was on bail for the present offence he committed other offences of burglary. His apparent remorse has been described, rightfully, as being superficial.
Having regard to the circumstances of this applicant in this offence we think that the starting point used by the Judge below was slightly too high and would substitute for the 4½ years used by him a starting point of 4 years. Having regard to his early plea of guilty there should be a discount of 1/3, which leaves a sentence of 2 years and 8 months.”
8. 於R v Wong Chuen Pong [1997] HKCU 756（CACC 579/1996, 1997年3月26日，未經𢑥編）：
(i) 上訴人承認2項控罪，分別是管有一支能夠產生60,000伏特的峰至峰脈動電壓的電槍（60,000 volts and 60 amperes）（控罪1）及管有一支已攻裝的0.22口徑手槍、98發子彈（控罪2）；
(ii) 案情顯示凌晨時分，兩名警務人員於尖東的一個休憩公園內截停上訴人，並從其身上檢獲一支電槍。上訴人承認電槍叉電器放在其屯門的住所內，更表示另有一支手槍，用作射擊鳥類及鼠類。後來警方於上訴人的住所檢獲電槍的叉電器及手槍；
(iii) 原審法官接受涉案電槍並非用作干犯刑事控罪，就控罪1判處上訴人2年監禁；
(iv) 上訴人不服判刑，提出上訴。上訴法庭駁回上訴，指：
“In his grounds of appeal - as before Gall J - emphasis is made of the applicant's claimed ignorance of the law and his innocent use of the firearms. He also refers to his difficult family circumstances and the hardship which arises out of his being in prison for a protracted period of time.
The judge cannot be faulted for taking a serious view of these offences. He gave a generous discount for the police and the applicant’s co-operation.”
9. 於HKSAR v Yung Ting Chun（CACC 164/1999，1999年8月3日，未經𢑥編）：
(i) 上訴人（第2被告）與另一人（第1被告）一同被控一項「無牌管有槍械」。第1被告承認控罪，被判處1年5個月監禁。上訴人則經審訊後被定罪，被判處2年6個月監禁。他不服定罪及判刑，提出上訴；
(ii) 案情指警務人員看見上訴人及第1被告形跡可疑，因此將兩人截停，並於第1被告的背囊內發現一支75,000伏特的電槍。上訴人承認該支電槍屬他所有。他解釋他與第 1 被告來港旅遊，第1被告借用了上訴人的背囊；到達香港酒店後，上訴人才發現電槍在背囊內；
(iii) 上訴法庭駁回就定罪的上訴。就判刑，上訴法庭指：
“The possession of such arms, this Court has said in previous cases is a serious offence. Varying sentences have been imposed, in one (R v Lai Chi-fai CrApp 480 of 1995) a starting point of four years was adopted by this Court in respect of a stun gun that was nowhere as powerful as this one was, i.e. only capable of producing 4,800 volts as opposed to the 75,000 volts here, the highest in the several cases brought to our attention. Plainly the sentence was in order. We accordingly refuse leave to appeal against sentence.”
10. 於HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan [2003] 1 HKLRD 204：
(i) 申請人承認兩項控罪：一項「無牌管有槍械」（控罪1）及「非法留港」（控罪2）；
(ii) 警方於大嶼山的一個建築地盤拘捕申請人。申請人承認三星期前非法入境後來到建築地盤尋找工作。警方在申請人的腰包內發現一支貌似電筒35,000伏特的電槍。申請人解釋他4天前於一堆垃圾內發現該電槍；並表示從沒使用該電槍；
(iii) 控方專家指電槍用於人類身體時可產生12,000伏特的電壓：
“6. … PW4 concluded that although the peak output voltage produced by this kind of device could be very high, the amount generated by the battery-powered device is small.”
(iv) 就控罪1，原審法官以4年監禁作為量刑基準；認罪後減為32個月監禁。上訴法庭指：
“7. In our view, the learned judge had not ignored what the expert said. The expert was merely contrasting the 35,000 volts when the stun gun was operated in the air and the 12,000 volts generated by it when it was applied to the equivalent of a human body with the above statement. In our view, nothing turns on this ground.
8. The stun gun was in the shape of a torch. The prosecution described it as a torch light object. This Court had seen a similar device in the past which was indeed made in the shape of a torch. It could also be used as a torch. Although the learned judge described the object as being disguised as a torch, we do not consider this to have a bearing on the sentence actually imposed in this case.
9. This appeal turns on the purpose for which the applicant intended to use the stun gun.
10. In the recent case of 香港特別行政區 訴 黃永煌 (HKSAR v. Wong Wing Wong) CACC No. 214 of 2002, this Court reviewed a number of previous decisions concerning stun gun. In that case the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of possession of a stun gun which has a voltage of 20,000 volts. He was arrested at the border checkpoint when the stun gun was found. The sentencing judge used two and half years' imprisonment as the starting point. Because of the guilty plea one third discount was given, reducing the sentence to 20 months' imprisonment. On appeal, this Court reduced the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment. The appellant claimed that he bought the gun in the Mainland which was freely available and was publicized in advertisements. The purpose for which he bought the gun was for self protection because he had been robbed in the Mainland before. The court regarded the starting point of two and half years as being too high because there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant would use the gun for illegal purpose in Hong Kong.
11. In R v. Cheng Yu Cheung CACC No. 57 of 1995, the appellant possessed a stun gun which could discharge 5,200 voltage. Two and half years' imprisonment was used as a starting point. Because of the guilty plea the sentence that was finally imposed was reduced to two years. The appellant had asked a co-defendant to keep the stun gun for him when he left Hong Kong. He had not handled the stun gun for two and half years. He claimed that he bought the gun for self protection because he had been attacked by loan sharks. This Court reduced the sentence to one year imprisonment.
12. In R v. Lai Chi Fai CACC No. 480 of 1995, the appellant possessed a stun gun which could discharge 4,800 volts. At the time of his arrest, he was with another man who was in possession of another imitation firearm. The appellant committed the offence while he was on bail in relation to another offence. He committed further offence later on. This Court used four years as the starting point. One third reduction was given for the guilty plea and the sentence imposed was two years and eight months' imprisonment.
13. In R v. Wong Chuen Pong CACC No. 579 of 1996, the stun gun could discharge 60,000 volts. The appellant pleaded guilty and claimed that the stun gun was used for self defence. A sentence of two years' imprisonment was affirmed.
14. In R v. Lau Kwok Hung CACC No. 551 of 1998, the appellant claimed that he possessed the stun gun for self defence. A sentence of one year's imprisonment on the guilty plea was affirmed by this Court.
15. In HKSAR v. Hung Chun Kit CACC No. 579 of 1998, the appellant was sentenced to two years' imprisonment after trial for possession of the stun gun. Appeal on sentence was dismissed.
16. In HKSAR v. Yung Ting Chun CACC No. 164 of 1999, the appellant was in possession of a stun gun which could discharge 75,000 volts. He was imprisoned for two and half years after trial. Appeal on sentence was dismissed.
17. In Wong Wing Wong this Court was of the opinion that, as a deterrence, an immediate custodial sentence is required for offence of this type. However, the starting point to be adopted has to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. There is no tariff imposed for this offence.
18. In this case the voltage capable of being discharged by the stun gun can be described as in the middle-lower range. While this stun gun is capable of being used for unlawful purposes, there is no evidence that the applicant had used it for unlawful purposes. Although the applicant had not explained what he intended to do with the stun gun, on the facts disclosed, the starting point of four and half years' imprisonment is manifestly excessive and was not in line with the many previous decisions. R v. Lai Chi Fai was a far more serious case. In R v. Wong Chuen Pong, the appellant was also charged with an offence of possession of a converted .22 calibre starting pistol and 98 rounds of ammunition (96 of which were usable), hence the sentence of two years' imprisonment for the stun gun could be justified on the basis that the stun gun was intended to be used for some illegal purpose, although it was accepted that at the time of his arrest with the stun gun, the appellant was not engaged in criminal activity.
19. Unless there was an inquiry, the court had to proceed on the basis that the applicant picked up the stun gun on the construction site. Even if the applicant had not disclosed the purpose he intended to do with the stun gun, in the absence of evidence which may suggest that it will be used for some illegal purpose, we are of the view that the starting point should be 20 months' imprisonment. This will be reduced by one third because of the guilty plea. The sentence will be one year imprisonment.”
11. 於HKSAR v Zhen Futing（甄浮艇） [2004] HKCU 805 CACC 509/2003，2004年6月30日，未經𢑥編：
(i) 經審訊後，申請人被裁定5項控罪罪名成立，即2項「無牌管有槍械」、2項「管有攻擊性武器」及1項「抗拒在正當執行職務的警務人員」；
(ii) 2名警務人員（控方第一及第二證人）於深水埗基隆街359號外進行埋伏，看見申請人從上址大廈步出，東張西望，神情緊張，於是警務人員尾隨作觀察。後來申請人突然轉身步入上址大廈。警務人員於觀察期間發現申請人腰間有硬物突出；他們於上址的一樓梯間截停申請人。申請人掙扎及嘗試逃走，但不果。警務人員於申請人的腰間發現一支鐵通，鐵通的其中一端用布包裹。於是警員以「管有攻擊性武器」拘捕申請人。申請人繼續掙扎，但被警員制服及鎖上手銬。經搜身後，警員從上訴人的後褲袋檢獲一支貌似手提電話的電槍。警員於是作出拘捕及警誡。上訴人表示居於上址的6樓。經搜屋後，警方於被告人的居所檢獲另一支用紙袋包裹及放在雪櫃的電槍。屋內床褥下藏有五支鐵通，其中兩支尾端被切割至鋒利；
(iii) 警誡會面中，申請人表示2003年6月16日與妻子從內地來港尋找工作；他是一名癮君子，於是在港購買毒品。他與另外兩人為了賺取金錢，本打算販運危險藥物。後來放棄販運危險藥物，決定行劫。2003年6月16日申請人返回內地，並於6月21日與3名的其中一名同謀帶著2支電槍來港。申請人按指示去到醫局街一間投注站進行觀察，準備行劫。6月24日另外一名男子將鐵通帶到申請人租用的單位。申請人表示不知道是誰人將鐵通切割至鋒利。被捕前，他下樓作觀察，帶備其中一支電槍作自衞；
(iv) 就每項「無牌管有槍械」（控罪1及4），原審法官判處申請人共5年6個月監禁，同期執行；
(v) 上訴法庭指：
“7. It is clear, therefore, that the applicant came to Hong Kong with others, and armed with these various weapons, with a view to committing a robbery or robberies. …
10. … As for the hypothetical criminal activities to which reference was made, the judge was fully entitled, indeed duty bound, to view the offences in their proper context, which was quite obviously a context in which robbery was intended to be committed. …
13. In the event, it falls for us to consider whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. It is suggested that no regard, or insufficient regard, was paid to sentencing guidelines which Mr Haynes, for the applicant, has extracted from two cases, in particular HKSAR v WONG Wing Wong CACC 214 of 2002 and HKSAR v LI Hung Kwan [2003] 1 HKLRD 204.
14. There are no guidelines set down by these cases. The case of LI Hung Kwan did no more than make reference to a series of decisions in which the appellants had been convicted or pleaded guilty to possession of a stun gun. So all we can discern from that case is the type of sentence which has, according to a variety of facts, been imposed in the past.
15. The closest is R v LAI Chi Fai, (Cr App No. 480 of 1995, unreported) where the applicant was in possession of a stun gun capable of discharging 4,800 volts and at the time of the arrest, he was with another man who was in possession of another imitation firearm. The applicant committed that particular offence whilst on bail in relation to another crime. A starting point of four years' imprisonment was taken.
16. In the round, the offences with which we are here dealing are more serious than those illustrated by the examples to which we have been taken. Here we find a gang planning a robbery with a series of weapons. Not only was there more than one stun gun, but there were no fewer than six other offensive weapons which we have been shown, each an iron rod deliberately prepared with cloth handles for use in assault, and two of which it should be noted had their ends sharpened. The gang had come from across the border in order to commit an offence or offences of this seriousness. The stun guns were in good working order each capable of producing more than 15,000 volts and of generating high voltage pulses continuously in three seconds duration. It was an admitted fact that they were capable of causing pain, muscular contractions, temporary incapacitation or disablement on human victims.
17. We see that the judge at first purportedly sentenced the applicant to five and a half years' imprisonment for each offence but, realising that the maximum for possession of offensive weapons did not permit her to do so, she changed those sentences to terms of two years' imprisonment leaving the five and a half years term intact in relation to the stun gun offences. We think that, in isolation, the five and a half year sentences imposed in relation to Charges 1 and 4, namely the stun gun offences, were manifestly excessive, but that the totality reached for all the offences is correct. …
18. … Accordingly, we shall grant the applicant leave to appeal, treating this application as the appeal. We shall allow the appeal in relation to Charges 1 and 4 substituting for the terms of five and a half years' imprisonment in relation to each a term of four years and nine months' imprisonment. We have indicated that, in our opinion, the totality of five years and seven months' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. …”
12. 於HKSAR v Mohamed P Shafik（Unrep, CACC 224/2014, 5 March 2015）：
(i) 申請人承認共4項控罪，控罪1、2及4均與毒品有關，控罪3是「無牌管有槍械」，即一支電槍，被判處共36個月監禁，而控罪3的判刑為20個月監禁，他不服判刑，提出上訴。
(ii) 案情指2013年11月30日，警方在灣仔一間遊戲機中心進行查牌行動時截停申請人。搜身下，於申請人身上找到一支玻璃管及一支塑膠管。警誡下，申請人承認用作吸食毒品（控罪1）。申請人被帶返警署作調查。經再搜身下，警方在被告人身上找到五包毒品（控罪2）及一支電槍（控罪3）。警誡下，申請人承認早前購買毒品作自用；電槍是由一名美軍送贈，被告人任職「睇場」，用作自衞。之後申請人獲得保釋候查；
(iii) 檢查證實涉案的電槍可發出145,325伏特的電壓；
(iv) 2014年2月13日，申請人從灣仔一個住所步出時再被警方截停。經搜身，警方從申請人身上檢獲5包毒品及一粒藥丸（控罪4）。警誡下，申請人聲稱毒品用作自用，藥丸則用作治療牙痛；
(v) 申請人過往有一次「無牌管有槍械」的刑事定罪紀錄，涉及一支玩具槍；另有2次「管有危險藥物」及1次「管有第一部毒藥」的刑事定罪紀錄；
(vi) 原審法官認為申請人是「睇場」，可能會使用電槍作自衞，考慮到涉案電槍的用途及電壓，以30個月監禁作為量刑基準。就該控罪的判刑，上訴法庭指：
“29. In respect of Charge 3, the following general principles derived from the Court of Appeal’s judgments in HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan [2003] 1 HKLRD 204 and HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, CACC 264/2005, unreported, 10 October 2005, provide useful guidance.
30. First, as deterrence, an immediate custodial sentence is required for offences of this type. See HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan, at §17.
31. Second, the starting point to be adopted has to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. There is no tariff for the offence. See HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan, at §17; HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, at §8.
32. Third, while the court will take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, important considerations which often arise are, firstly, the power of the weapon in terms of the voltage that it is capable of discharging; and secondly, whether there is evidence that the offender or some other person has used or may use the weapon for an unlawful purpose or to facilitate an unlawful activity. Even though there may be no present intent established on the part of the offender to use the weapon in any such unlawful way, where there is a real risk in the circumstances that the weapon will fall into the hands of someone who will use it for such purpose, that is also a factor which will result in a higher starting point of sentence. See HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, at §9.
33. The facts in the two cases also provide some practical clues as to how the court should determine the appropriate starting point.
34. In HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan, the stun gun generated 35,000.00 volts when operated in the air and 12,000.00 volts if applied to a human body. The Court of Appeal noted that such a voltage was in the middle-lower range. In the absence of evidence that suggest that the defendant intended to use the stun gun for an illegal purpose, the starting point was 20 months.
35. In HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, the defendant possessed 3 stun guns which were capable of producing charges of 20,403.00 volts, 10,000.00 volts and 13,623.00 volts. The Court of Appeal noted that it was a medium range of voltage for weapons of this sort. The Court of Appeal took into account the appellant’s triad connections and concluded that there was obviously a real risk that the 3 stun guns would be used for an unlawful purpose or fall into the wrong hands. His possession of the three stun guns in those circumstances was in the upper range of seriousness of the offence. The Court of Appeal went on to note that although there were 3 stun guns, they were kept in the defendant’s domestic premises and there was no evidence of any immediate intent by the defendant to use the weapons. The Court of Appeal held that an appropriate starting point is 3 years.
36. Turning to the present case, Mr Bullett submitted that a starting point of 18 months should have been adopted in the circumstances of this case, namely, a single stun gun, never used, kept for self defence and with no evidence of any unlawful purpose. That would be consistent with the Court of Appeal’s approach in HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan. Ms Mok submitted that the Judge was duty bound to consider Charge 3 in its proper context. As the applicant explicitly admitted that he worked as a bouncer and had the stun gun for self-defence, the Judge was entitled to infer that the applicant would be ready to use the stun gun when necessary. Thus, the starting point of 30 months was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
37. As rightly noted by the Judge, the power of the stun gun in question is undoubtedly much higher than any of the stun guns featuring in the earlier cases. However, that is not the end of the matter. Placed before the Judge was a forensic medical report prepared by a senior forensic pathologist dated 27 February 2014 in which the forensic medical aspect of the seized stun gun was discussed…
Thus, although the voltage that the stun gun can discharge is considerably higher than those found in other cases, it is not clear if it would cause greater harm to the human body correspondingly.
38. When the applicant was arrested, the stun gun was found being secured by the belt around his waist. He was carrying the stun gun on his person. The risk of him using the stun gun when necessary is real. In the circumstances, the Judge was correct in drawing the inference as he did.
39. But we do not think the applicant’s case in the overall circumstances is so serious that it warrants a starting point of 30 months. We think the starting point should have been 24 months instead.”
被告人的背景
13. 現年29歲，未婚，與分別61歲、59歲的父母及長姊住。大律師指被告人曾接受至中四程度教育，但被告人於經歷供詞中向警方表示曾接受至高中程度教育。大律師指被捕前被告人任職地盤工人，月入約18,000元，為家中其中一名經濟支柱。可是被告人於經歷供詞中向警方表示他無業。
14. 被告人過往有3次刑事定罪紀錄，涉及6項控罪，與本案並不相同，但其中1項與暴力有關（2019年）。另外2次（即WK4295/24及WK5427/24）是於本案被捕後干犯（犯案日期為2024年6月12日及2024年6月16日）。換言之，被告人在本案保釋期間干犯上述兩宗案件。他於2025年8月20日被定罪及判處2個月監禁，於同日刑滿出獄。
15. 另外，被告人亦涉及其他3件案件，全部均與不誠實有關，包括「經修訂案情撮要」所述的MRN 22000061及TKO RN 22024237。被告人承認於上述2案的保釋期間干犯本案。
討論
量刑基準
控罪1
16. 就控罪1，除了黃威洪案外，大律師要求本席參考同級法院的判刑，包括 香港特別行政區 訴 鄺瑋鈉[2024] HKDC 527、香港特別行政區 訴 陳家強 [2025] HKDC 435，並稱之為「典據」。
17. 本席已於上文敘述黃威洪案的案情及判決原因，現不再重複。鄺瑋鈉和陳家強均為同級法院的判刑。大律師承認同級法院的判刑對本席並無約束力，但指可用作參考。
18. 於香港特別行政區 對 唐健帮及另二人[2023] HKCA 896（CAAR 13/2022，2023年7月18日），上訴法庭已指出：
「35. 第一，雙方於本案存檔了多份區域法院的判刑理由書，希望藉此支持己方立場。本庭在 律政司司長 訴 溫達揚 一案第 27 段已指出：
「… 因為這些判刑，從來就沒有經過上訴而被肯定，也沒有什麼量刑原則可言，對量刑既沒有約束力也沒有參考價值，根本起不了任何指導作用，根本不應稱之為『案例』 …」
況且，「有意圖而傷人」及「暴動/非法集結」罪的案情，以及某被告人的背景、犯案動機、於該案所扮演的角色等事項，可謂千變萬化，任何單純對案件判刑作出比較的做法，都不能協助本庭處理原審判刑是否恰當這個議題。歸根究底，控罪要旨(gravamen of the offence)及適用的量刑因素才是重點所在，而非個別案件的判刑。」
19. 於香港特別行政區 對 Lau Chun Yuk（劉晉旭）及其他人 [2023] HKCA 1098，上訴法庭又再次特別重申，指：
「51. 在完結前特別一提。申請方曾在他們的書面陳詞援引區域法院另一宗二號橋暴動案的原審判刑（香港特別行政區 訴 陳起行 [2021] HKDC 874），作為適用蔡家輝 案的支點以支持本案量刑基準過高的主張，結果終被勸退。本庭已在過往指出過多次，在今年的律政司司長對唐健帮及另二人 [2023] HKCA 896（判案理由書日期：2023年8月25日）又再重申：未經上訴的原審判刑對同級法院沒有約束力，對上訴法庭也沒有任何參考價值，不應被業界用作上訴時的依據。」
20. 於陳家強案中，法庭提及兩宗上訴案件的判決，包括HKSAR v Tsang Kwun Wing（曾冠榮）[2004] HKEC 1150 CACC 89/2004及HKSAR v Yeung Chi Wa（楊志華）[2018] HKCA 73。
21. 於曾冠榮案中：
(i) 申請人承認共七項控罪，包括一項盜竊（控罪一）、4項「偽造文件」（控罪二至五）。案情指41歲的申請人於2002年11月16偷竊一輛的士後，購買兩套車牌（KB1913及JU1311）及於內地叫人製作2個偽造行車證，令他可駕駛涉案的士。申請人於2003年10月16日才被捕。申請人承認於約1前盜竊的士，更一直駕駛該的士為生；
(ii) 就該5項控罪，原審法官以3年監禁作為量刑基礎；因申請人承認控罪，減為2年監禁。就另外的2項控罪，即1項沒有第三者保險（控罪六）及一項駕駛未領牌照車輛（控罪七），原審法官以最高刑罰，即12個月及3個月監禁，作為量刑基準，該兩項控罪的刑期與首5項控罪的刑期分期執行，即總刑期為2年8個月；
(iii) 申請人對首5項控罪的判刑並無異議，但不服控罪六及控罪七的判刑，提出上訴。
(iv) 首先，於該案中，就「偽造文件」控罪，原審法官以3年監禁作為量刑基準，而非2年監禁。
(v) 該案的上訴與「偽造文件」控罪全無關係。可是，就「偽造文件」的判刑，上訴法庭指：
“4. In respect of these five offences, the judge took a starting point of three years’ imprisonment which was reduced to two years to reflect the pleas of guilty.
5. Very properly, Mr. Kelly, on the applicant’s behalf, made no complaint in respect of these sentences.”
(vi) 換言之，上訴法庭認同就「偽造文件」的判刑。
22. 於楊志華案中：
(i) 申請人承認共九項控罪包括兩項盜竊，即盜竊的士（控罪一）及盜竊行車證（控罪五）、6項偽造文件（控罪二、三、四、六至八）、一項沒有第三者保險（控罪九），被判處共2年8個月監禁及停牌4年；控罪二、三、四、六至八的量刑起點為3個月監禁；
(ii) 案情指申請人分別於2016年11月11日及11月24日盜竊2輛的士（控罪一及五）。2023年12月23日警方發現申請人坐在其中一輛被盜的士的駕駛座內；當時該的士掛上虛假車牌KX8483（控罪六），擋風玻璃上的行車證及偽造「禁區紙」，行車證及禁區紙上的車牌均為HA9072（控罪七及八）。司機座位的地氈下有另一個KG1609偽造車牌（控罪四）。涉案的士的原有車牌（PZ963）則放在的士的尾箱；尾箱內亦有另外兩對HA9072及RM9641的車牌（控罪二及三）。拘捕及警誡下，申請人承認盜竊的士以賺取生活所需；之後再製造偽造車牌，並放在被盜的士上；他亦更改禁區紙，寫上HA9072的車牌；
(iii) 申請人不服判刑，提出上訴。他指出總刑期過分嚴苛，但主要是針對盜竊的士的判刑；對偽造文件的判刑根本隻字不提； 上訴法庭亦沒有指出「偽造文件」的判刑是否合適。因此對本案中的「偽造文件」的判刑並無參考價值。
23. 除上述之外，本席不打算處理大律師提及的同級法院判刑。
24. 本案中，被告人承認是因為黑社會「勝和」做事而「偽造文件」，即作出襲擊後使用涉案虛假車牌逃避警方追查。本案中「偽造文件」的目的比曾冠榮案更嚴重。可是於曾冠榮案中，申請人使用涉案的虛假車牌約1年之久；本案中，被告人「偽造文件」的時段則不得而知。於黃威洪案中，原訟法庭指出該類控罪的嚴重程度按個別案件的整體情況而定。於該案中，上訴人使用和管有虛假車輛登記牌照和號碼牌，可支持使人有意圖用該車輛干犯嚴重罪行，以偽造證件掩飾身份，令警方難以追查犯案者的推論。於本案中，被告人承認使用虛假車牌干犯其他嚴重控罪。虛假的車牌已經貼在涉案車輛上。換言之，涉案車輛已用作犯案或準備就緒用作犯案。考慮到整體案請，本席認為適當的初步量刑基準為2年監禁。
控罪2
25. 就控罪2，除了Mohamed P Shafik之外，大律師亦要求本席參考兩宗區域法院的判刑案件：香港特別行政區 訴 譚浩斌 [2023] HKDC 1623及香港特別行政區 訴 Pham Luong Truong（DCCC 618/2016）。
26. 首先，如上文所述，同級法院的判刑對本席既無約束力，亦無參考價值，不可稱之為「典據」。況且，大律師提及譚浩斌案的第27段只是法官對Mohamed P Shafik案判決第30至32段的譯文。再者，大律師指法官援引Li Hung Kwun案，但事實上Li Hung Kwun的案情與本案截然不同。於Li Hung Kwan及Pham Luong Truong案中沒有任何證供顯示申請人或被告人打算使用電槍作非法用途。於本案中，涉案電槍放在被告人的車上，而被告人承認該車輛用作為黑社會作出襲擊，而涉案車輛已準備隨時用作犯案。因此，電槍用作干犯其他嚴重控罪的風險極高。
27. 於Pham Luong Truong案中，原審法官援引的香港特別行政區 訴 黃永煌案中亦沒有證供顯示上訴人打算在港使用涉案電槍作非法用途。
28. 雖然本案的電槍只能夠產生21,367伏特的峰至峰脈動電壓，但能於持續3秒內產生368次的高電壓脈衝。被告人承認本案電槍較可導致人類皮膚破裂的電壓高出35倍，並較可導致人體受到電壓的電壓高出200倍，若在額頭、胸部、頸動脈或脊柱等敏感部位使用，可令心率改變、造成嚴重痛楚、阻礙血液流向腦部及 / 或刺激運動神經元，效果可引致受襲者昏暈及不能動彈。換言之，該電槍可造成嚴重傷害。
29. 考慮到整體案情，本席認為控罪2適當的初步量刑基準為4年監禁。
加刑因素
30. 沒有爭議的是被告人於另外兩宗案件（即M RN 22000061及TKO RN 22024237保䆁期間干犯本案，但當時的保䆁只是警方給予的保䆁。眾所周知，此乃加刑因素。被告人於本案獲得保釋後，又相繼再干犯另外兩宗案件。該兩宗案件已完結，本席不打算再加刑。
減刑因素
31. 除了適時認罪外，本案並無任何其他減刑因素。於Lai Chi Fai案中類同情況表示，原審法官指被告人的悔意流於片面（superficial），因此拒絕給予三份一的認罪扣減。可是根據HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231，認罪的扣減是按認罪的時間而定，如被告人於訂定審期前已表明會認罪，無論被告人的指稱悔意是否真誠，也可獲三份一的折扣。該折扣涵蓋悔意及其他所有求情因素；除非有極特殊的求情因素（例如向警方提供其他的調查的資料），不可獲額外的減刑。
32. 因此，兩項控罪的刑期減為：
(i) 控罪1：16個月監禁；
(ii) 控罪2：32個月監禁。
總刑期
33. 大律師要求法庭就本案2項控罪考慮刑期同期執行。
34. 於HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching（倪耀偵）[2011] 5 HKLRD 690，上訴法庭指：
“13. When a judge is faced with the task of sentencing for multiple offences he is required as an initial step to identify the appropriate sentence for each offence and as the final step to achieve a total sentence appropriate to the culpability of the offender. The issue with which this appeal is concerned is the decision that the judge faced whether to order any of the sentences for the offences to run concurrently with each other or to be served consecutively.
14. The question whether to order concurrent or consecutive sentences can arise in many different scenarios. An offender may be charged in respect of a number of different, or similar, offences committed on wholly separate occasions over a period of time or with a number of different offences committed in the course of one episode of criminal activity. This case is concerned with the latter situation.
15. In the case of several offences committed in the course of a single episode, the prosecuting authorities might choose to proffer only one charge, where one charge embraces all the criminal conduct reflected by the evidence or, as in the present instance, separate charges for each criminal act.
16. If it chooses the former course, the instances of proved conduct embraced by the single charge but which could have been the subject of separate charges are taken into account in deciding what penalty reflects the true overall criminality.
17. But when the prosecuting authority elects the latter course, namely, to charge two or more offences arising from an episode of criminal activity, the objective is still the same; that is to say, the ultimate overall sentence must still reflect the overall and true culpability, although the sentencing judge must take care, first, to pass a sentence for each individual offence that is appropriate to that offence and the circumstances of its commission and, second, not to punish the offender twice for the same conduct.
18. It was in an attempt to safeguard fairness to the offender by ensuring that he was not punished twice for the same conduct that the courts developed the "one transaction" rule. In essence, this rule said that if the number of offences have been charged arising from the one transaction or course of criminal conduct, then concurrent sentences should be imposed.
19. The one transaction rule was not developed as an inflexible rule of law. It was never intended as anything more than a practical rule of thumb to guide judges in the exercise of the power to impose consecutive sentences so that the final sentence was not one that was unfair to an offender.
20. However, once stated, this practical working rule tended to develop a life of its own and has led to some difficulty in its application. Judicial dicta explained what was meant by "one course of criminal conduct" and exceptions to the rule developed. … All of this, understandably enough, became material for advocates who sought to argue that the multiple offences of which their client had been convicted were part of one transaction and that it inevitably followed that the correct sentence was one where all the sentences were concurrent.
21. There are several problems associated with this line of reasoning. First it runs the risk of elevating a practical working rule to a rule of law, thereby providing an opportunity to argue that departure from it inevitably meant that the sentence imposed on the client was excessive. Secondly, it tends to obscure the real point which is not whether two or more offences are committed at about the same time, but whether the second or other further offences add to the culpability or criminality of the first. Thirdly, it ignores the reality that whatever sentence is arrived at after application of the rule is still subject to the totality principle.
22. The importance of the totality principle cannot be overstated. It is there to ensure not only fairness to the offender, in the sense that he is not punished twice for the same offence and, further, that the sentence is not an unduly crushing punishment but it is also a tool by which to ensure that “the overall effect of the sentences is sufficient having regard to the usual principles of deterrence, rehabilitation and denunciation.”: R v K M [2004] NSWCCA 65 at paragraph 55.
23. The emphasis therefore should be on a reflection in the sentence of true culpability disclosed by the offences of which the accused has been convicted. This is an approach which this court has consistently adopted in recent times, for example in HKSAR v Kwok Shiu To [2006] 2 HKLRD 272 and HKSAR v Iu Wai Shun [2008] 1 HKC 79. It is likely to be a more effective approach in reflecting an offender’s overall culpability than one which becomes overly concerned with the one transaction rule, although in the case of more than one offence, the court must guard carefully against punishing twice for the same act. If the second offence which takes place in the course of the suggested single episode adds to the culpability of the first offence, it will normally follow that the sentence for the second offence will run wholly or partially consecutive to that for the first; to what extent, if at all, will depend upon an assessment of the totality appropriate for the conduct as a whole. As with most sentencing exercises, the approach is an art, sensitive to the individual circumstances of the case and the offender. …
26. Finally there is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Cahyadi v The Queen 168 A Crim R 41. At page 47, paragraph 27 Howie J summarized the legal position in a way which we would adopt:
… there is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both.
27. For the sake of completeness we should refer to the multiple offence scenario that involves offences, different in nature or the same, committed on quite separate occasions. In that situation the court will invariably have concluded that, in principle, it may impose consecutive sentences. But the court still needs to assess the overall culpability of the criminal conduct for the purpose of applying the totality principle. Only by doing so will it be able to arrive at a sentence that is fair to the offender yet also properly reflects the culpability of his conduct.”
35. 事實上，於大律師引用的黃威洪案中，原訟法庭亦援引倪耀偵案：
「26. 就如何判處一名被裁定多於一項罪行有罪的被控人，上訴法庭於HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching (倪耀偵) 案有詳細論述，重點是首先要就每一項控罪判處恰當的刑罰，然後要決定一個與整體實質刑責相稱的總刑罰，而非拘泥於罪行是否在同時同地干犯。法庭須考慮的，是每多干犯一項罪行是否實質上增加了刑責，並須防止雙重處罰，及使判刑整體不致過份嚴苛。為達致公平和合適的總刑期，不同罪行的刑期可以全部同期執行或合適幅度的分期執行。在案件涉及多項罪行而刑期分期執行是合適的情況，如何分期的計算方程式並非評估判處是否有誤的關鍵，關鍵是總刑期是否符合上述的原則和目的，是否過重。 …
29. 涉案罪行既有不同類別，性質不同，命令刑期同期執行是不當的，裁判官命令各項刑期部份分期執行，是恰當的處理方向。如上所述，關鍵是總刑期是否合符上文第26段所述的判處原則。」
36. 本案的兩項控罪類別及性質完全不同，而且控罪2令案情及刑責更嚴重，兩項控罪的刑期理應分期執行。可是本席須考慮總刑期原則。本席認為42個月的總刑期才可適當反映被告人的罪責，遂下令，就控罪1，判處被告人16個月監禁，控罪2判處被告人32個月，控罪1的其中10個月與控罪2分期執行，即總刑期為42個月（3年6個月）監禁。
（謝沈智慧）
區域法院法官
DCCC25/2025 香港特別行政區 訴 吳俊豪
DCCC 25/2025
[2026] HKDC 414
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2025年第25號
________________________
香港特別行政區
訴
吳俊豪
________________________
主審法官:
區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期:
2026年3月5日
出席人士:
黃燕儀女士，律政司署理高級檢控官，代表香港特別行政區
李健志先生，由法律援助署委派的董氏律師事務所延聘，代表被告人
控罪:
[1] 偽造文件（Forgery of documents）
[2] 無牌管有槍械（Possession of arms without a licence）
________________________
判刑理由書
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1. 被告人承認2項控罪：
(i) 偽造文件，違反香港法例第374章《道路交通條例》第111(1)(a)條（控罪1）；及
(ii) 無牌管有槍械，違反香港法例第238章《火器及彈藥條例》第13條（控罪2）。
案情撮要
2. 被告人承認的「經修訂之案情撮要」內容如下：
事件
(i) 2024年5月4日約1022時，警務人員包括警員25427（控方第一證人）巡邏時看見一輛底盤號碼為WAUZZZ8T2DA074906的私家車（私家車）停泊在香港九龍油麻地砵蘭街108號外6309B號咪錶泊車位；私家車車頭及車身有明顯損毁。當時私家車內沒有人。經檢查，控方第一證人留意到一對分別掛在私家車車頭及車尾的登記號碼為ZA6174（ZA6174）的號碼字牌底下，有另一對登記號碼為YZ5961（YZ5961）的號碼字牌。貼在私家車擋風玻璃上的車輛牌照顯示，私家車的登記字牌號碼為YZ5961。
(ii) 車輛查核顯示，ZA6174並無登記在任何車輛名下。
(iii) 車輛查核顯示，私家車的真正登記字牌號碼為YZ5961，而YZ5961的登記車主是被告人。控方第一證人致電被告人，以交通管制為由要求被告人返回私家車。
拘捕和警誡
(iv) 約1115時，控方第一證人看見被告人返回私家車並打開司機門，於是截停被告人。經搜身，控方第一證人在被告人身上搜出私家車的車匙。經查問，被告人表示私家車屬他所有。私家車的車輛牌照上所顯示的YZ5961是私家車的登記字牌。被告人購買虛假的ZA6174登記字牌是為社團做事。他們打人後會貼上虛假字牌以逃避警方追查。被告人為「勝和」做事。
(v) 約1125時，控方第一證人拘捕被告人，罪名是「管有偽造文書」。被告人在現場警誡下說出一些事情，當中包括：「個假牌ZA6174係我嘅。上述承認事項補錄在控方第一證人的記事冊內，並由被告人簽署。
(vi) 經搜查私家車，控方第一證人發現司機門的儲物空間內有一支電槍（電槍）。當控方第一證人嘗試打開電槍電源時，被告人隨即表示：「電槍嚟㗎」。
(vii) 約1147時，控方第一證人拘捕被告人，罪名是「管有火器」。被告人在現場警誡下說出一些事情，當中包括：「嗰支電槍我喺大陸用百零蚊買返嚟，我諗住自衛用但我冇用過」。上述承認事項補錄在會面紀錄內，並由被告人簽署。
檢驗電槍
(viii) 香港警務處通訊科檢驗涉案電槍，發現該電槍能夠產生21,367伏特的峰至峰脈動電壓，並能夠在持續3秒內產生368次的高電壓脈衝。
(ix) 根據警方的檢驗結果，生物醫學工程專家潘頌欣Carmen博士認為，涉案電槍能夠產生的峰至峰脈動電壓，較可導致人類皮膚破裂的電壓高出35倍，並較可導致人體受到電擊的電壓高出200倍。若在額頭、胸部、頸動脈或脊柱等敏感部位使用涉案電槍，可令心律改變、造成嚴重痛楚、阻礙血液流向腦部及/或刺激運動神經元，效果可引致受襲者昏暈及不能動彈。涉案電槍是經設計或改裝的便攜式器件，在有或沒有直接接觸人體的情況下，藉施加電擊使人昏暈或不能動彈。
其他
(x) 被告人是於兩宗案件（報案編號分別為MRN 22000061及TKO RN 22024237）警方給予保釋期間干犯本案。
罪行
(xi) 案發時，被告人在香港，意圖欺詐而在私家車上使用一對登記號碼為ZA6174的號碼字牌（控罪一）。
(xii) 案發時，被告人在香港九龍油麻地砵蘭街108號外6309B號咪錶泊車位的私家車上，無牌管有槍械，即一支電槍（控罪二）。
判刑原則
控罪1
3. 控罪1最高的刑期為第3級罰款及監禁3年。雖然沒有量刑指引，但法庭一般考慮監禁式刑罰。
4. 於香港特別行政區 訴 黃威洪[2022] HKCFI 486:
(i) 被告人承認共7項控罪，包括一項「行使偽造文件」（控罪6）及一項「管有偽造文件」（控罪7）；
(ii) 案情指2021年5月3日早上，一名男子將車輛停泊在葵涌新葵街，下午返回車輛時，發現其車尾防撞欄有損毁。於是他翻看車尾攝錄儀，發現一輛金色私家車（涉案車輛）與其車輛發生碰撞，於是報案。警方到場後發現上訴人沿新葵街走向涉案車輛，於是將上訴人截停，並在他身上搜出涉案車輛的車匙。警方在涉案車輛的不同隱蔽位置，包括車廂內、司機位下方、前座乘客位的地氈、前座乘客位後方的儲物位置和前座乘客及司機位車門的隔間內搜獲以下物品：
(a) 一支氣槍，內藏六粒6毫米膠彈珠，以壓縮二氧化碳發射，槍口能量（muzzle energy）低於2焦耳（控罪一）；
(b) 四把約70厘米的開山刀及四支各長60厘米的金屬管，所有手柄均包裹着（控罪二）；
(c) 非法用途工具，包括五對手套、四頂棒球帽、一個頭套，一把士巴拿及一套六角匙（控罪三）；
(d) 一個偽造的車輛登記號碼牌，該車牌號碼從沒有在運輸署登記過（控罪七）。
(iii) 上訴人並無有效的駕駛執照及第三者保險（控罪四及五）。涉案車輛的車輛牌照、車頭和車尾的登記號碼牌都是偽造的（控罪六）；
(iv) 上訴人過往有11次共14項刑事定罪紀錄，即1次「入屋犯法」、1次「刑事毁壞」、8次和毒品有關的罪行、3次與暴力有關的罪行、1次「刑事毁壞」及1次「阻礙警務人員正當執行職務」；
(v) 裁判官指上訴人管有的開山刀和金屬管全部均為具高殺傷力的武器。氣槍對人有震懾功效，而且已安裝彈珠，可隨時備用發射。車輛中的一批犯案工具，數量足以供多人同時使用。涉案車輛上顯示了一張虛假的車輛牌照，車頭和車尾也掛上一對虛假的登記號碼牌；車廂內再發現另一個偽造的車輛登記號碼牌PU8242，用作掩飾身份，顯示上訴人圖謀干犯嚴重罪行。因此，就每項控罪，裁判官作出以下判刑：
(a) 控罪一，8個月監禁（量刑基準為12個月監禁）；
(b) 控罪二：14個月監禁（量刑基準為21個月監禁）；
(c) 控罪三，8個月監禁（量刑基準為12個月監禁）；
(d) 控罪四，罰款1,000元；
(e) 控罪五，罰款3,000元；
(f) 控罪六，6個月監禁（量刑基準為9個月監禁）；
(g) 控罪7，6個月監禁（量刑基準為9個月監禁）。
(vi) 顧及了整體量刑原則，裁判官認為30個月監禁才足以反映上訴人的整體刑責，下令控罪一的8個月刑期與控罪二的14個月刑期、控罪三的其中4個月刑期、控罪六的其中2個月刑期及控罪七的其中2個月刑期分期執行。
(vii) 原訟法庭指：
「22. 就控罪 (六) 及 (七) 的罪行而言，嚴重程度按個別案件的整體情況而定。在本案，裁判官指出，上訴人使用和管有虛假車輛登記牌照和號碼牌，可支持使人有意圖用該車輛干犯嚴重罪行，以偽造證件掩飾身份，令警方難以追查犯案者的推論，故此於判刑前已邀請辯方就著情況作出陳詞，不過，辯方放棄陳詞，沒有向法庭提出任何清白解釋。在這情況下，裁判官判處監禁，無可詬病。本席認同裁判官的觀察，也認為判處監禁是恰當的，兩項控罪各自採用9個月作為量刑基準，以本案情節而言，也在合理範圍之內。」
控罪2
5. 一經循公訴程序定罪，控罪2的最高刑罰為第6級罰款及監禁14年。
6. 眾所周知，每件案件的案情有別，法庭須根據個別案件的案情考慮量刑基準，包括電槍的電力和管有電槍的目的或用途。
7. 於HKSAR v Lai Chi Fai Cr App 480 of 1995：
(i) 申請人承認一項「無牌管有槍械」罪名成立，被判處3年6個月監禁。申請人不服判刑，提出上訴；
(ii) 申請人和其朋友一同於街上被警方截停。警方在申請人朋友身上找到一支仿真槍械；於申請人身上發現一支4,800伏特的電槍。上訴人解釋被截停的4小時前，其朋友將電槍交給他保管。原審法官以4年半作為量刑基準。因申請人承認控罪，刑期減為3年6個月監禁。申請人的朋友認罪後則被另一位法官判處1年監禁；
(iii) 上訴法庭指：
“As to the merits, it was urged upon us that in R. v. Cheng Yu Cheung (Unreported, 1990 No. 57) the applicant had received a sentence of 2 years after a starting point of 2½ years upon a plea of guilty. That was reduced to 12 months on appeal when the starting point was described as being not unduly high in the circumstances. Those circumstances were very different from those in this case. In that case a genuine reason for possession had been given namely self-defence and the applicant had not been in physical possession for a very long time, he having left it with a friend. The decision is not to be taken as laying down a starting point in cases of possession of a firearm of this type.
It was also urged upon us that the friend, who also pleaded guilty to the same charge, was given a sentence of only 12 months and that the applicant suffers from a justified sense of grievance. We do not know the details of the friend's plea in mitigation nor do we know if his sentence was appropriate. The correct approach in circumstances such as these is to consider what the proper sentence should have been for this applicant for this offence although a sentence imposed on a co-defendant may sometimes be taken into consideration. In the case of this applicant he had been convicted for robbery and was on bail when he committed the present offence. While he was on bail for the present offence he committed other offences of burglary. His apparent remorse has been described, rightfully, as being superficial.
Having regard to the circumstances of this applicant in this offence we think that the starting point used by the Judge below was slightly too high and would substitute for the 4½ years used by him a starting point of 4 years. Having regard to his early plea of guilty there should be a discount of 1/3, which leaves a sentence of 2 years and 8 months.”
8. 於R v Wong Chuen Pong [1997] HKCU 756（CACC 579/1996, 1997年3月26日，未經𢑥編）：
(i) 上訴人承認2項控罪，分別是管有一支能夠產生60,000伏特的峰至峰脈動電壓的電槍（60,000 volts and 60 amperes）（控罪1）及管有一支已攻裝的0.22口徑手槍、98發子彈（控罪2）；
(ii) 案情顯示凌晨時分，兩名警務人員於尖東的一個休憩公園內截停上訴人，並從其身上檢獲一支電槍。上訴人承認電槍叉電器放在其屯門的住所內，更表示另有一支手槍，用作射擊鳥類及鼠類。後來警方於上訴人的住所檢獲電槍的叉電器及手槍；
(iii) 原審法官接受涉案電槍並非用作干犯刑事控罪，就控罪1判處上訴人2年監禁；
(iv) 上訴人不服判刑，提出上訴。上訴法庭駁回上訴，指：
“In his grounds of appeal - as before Gall J - emphasis is made of the applicant's claimed ignorance of the law and his innocent use of the firearms. He also refers to his difficult family circumstances and the hardship which arises out of his being in prison for a protracted period of time.
The judge cannot be faulted for taking a serious view of these offences. He gave a generous discount for the police and the applicant’s co-operation.”
9. 於HKSAR v Yung Ting Chun（CACC 164/1999，1999年8月3日，未經𢑥編）：
(i) 上訴人（第2被告）與另一人（第1被告）一同被控一項「無牌管有槍械」。第1被告承認控罪，被判處1年5個月監禁。上訴人則經審訊後被定罪，被判處2年6個月監禁。他不服定罪及判刑，提出上訴；
(ii) 案情指警務人員看見上訴人及第1被告形跡可疑，因此將兩人截停，並於第1被告的背囊內發現一支75,000伏特的電槍。上訴人承認該支電槍屬他所有。他解釋他與第 1 被告來港旅遊，第1被告借用了上訴人的背囊；到達香港酒店後，上訴人才發現電槍在背囊內；
(iii) 上訴法庭駁回就定罪的上訴。就判刑，上訴法庭指：
“The possession of such arms, this Court has said in previous cases is a serious offence. Varying sentences have been imposed, in one (R v Lai Chi-fai CrApp 480 of 1995) a starting point of four years was adopted by this Court in respect of a stun gun that was nowhere as powerful as this one was, i.e. only capable of producing 4,800 volts as opposed to the 75,000 volts here, the highest in the several cases brought to our attention. Plainly the sentence was in order. We accordingly refuse leave to appeal against sentence.”
10. 於HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan [2003] 1 HKLRD 204：
(i) 申請人承認兩項控罪：一項「無牌管有槍械」（控罪1）及「非法留港」（控罪2）；
(ii) 警方於大嶼山的一個建築地盤拘捕申請人。申請人承認三星期前非法入境後來到建築地盤尋找工作。警方在申請人的腰包內發現一支貌似電筒35,000伏特的電槍。申請人解釋他4天前於一堆垃圾內發現該電槍；並表示從沒使用該電槍；
(iii) 控方專家指電槍用於人類身體時可產生12,000伏特的電壓：
“6. … PW4 concluded that although the peak output voltage produced by this kind of device could be very high, the amount generated by the battery-powered device is small.”
(iv) 就控罪1，原審法官以4年監禁作為量刑基準；認罪後減為32個月監禁。上訴法庭指：
“7. In our view, the learned judge had not ignored what the expert said. The expert was merely contrasting the 35,000 volts when the stun gun was operated in the air and the 12,000 volts generated by it when it was applied to the equivalent of a human body with the above statement. In our view, nothing turns on this ground.
8. The stun gun was in the shape of a torch. The prosecution described it as a torch light object. This Court had seen a similar device in the past which was indeed made in the shape of a torch. It could also be used as a torch. Although the learned judge described the object as being disguised as a torch, we do not consider this to have a bearing on the sentence actually imposed in this case.
9. This appeal turns on the purpose for which the applicant intended to use the stun gun.
10. In the recent case of 香港特別行政區 訴 黃永煌 (HKSAR v. Wong Wing Wong) CACC No. 214 of 2002, this Court reviewed a number of previous decisions concerning stun gun. In that case the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of possession of a stun gun which has a voltage of 20,000 volts. He was arrested at the border checkpoint when the stun gun was found. The sentencing judge used two and half years' imprisonment as the starting point. Because of the guilty plea one third discount was given, reducing the sentence to 20 months' imprisonment. On appeal, this Court reduced the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment. The appellant claimed that he bought the gun in the Mainland which was freely available and was publicized in advertisements. The purpose for which he bought the gun was for self protection because he had been robbed in the Mainland before. The court regarded the starting point of two and half years as being too high because there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant would use the gun for illegal purpose in Hong Kong.
11. In R v. Cheng Yu Cheung CACC No. 57 of 1995, the appellant possessed a stun gun which could discharge 5,200 voltage. Two and half years' imprisonment was used as a starting point. Because of the guilty plea the sentence that was finally imposed was reduced to two years. The appellant had asked a co-defendant to keep the stun gun for him when he left Hong Kong. He had not handled the stun gun for two and half years. He claimed that he bought the gun for self protection because he had been attacked by loan sharks. This Court reduced the sentence to one year imprisonment.
12. In R v. Lai Chi Fai CACC No. 480 of 1995, the appellant possessed a stun gun which could discharge 4,800 volts. At the time of his arrest, he was with another man who was in possession of another imitation firearm. The appellant committed the offence while he was on bail in relation to another offence. He committed further offence later on. This Court used four years as the starting point. One third reduction was given for the guilty plea and the sentence imposed was two years and eight months' imprisonment.
13. In R v. Wong Chuen Pong CACC No. 579 of 1996, the stun gun could discharge 60,000 volts. The appellant pleaded guilty and claimed that the stun gun was used for self defence. A sentence of two years' imprisonment was affirmed.
14. In R v. Lau Kwok Hung CACC No. 551 of 1998, the appellant claimed that he possessed the stun gun for self defence. A sentence of one year's imprisonment on the guilty plea was affirmed by this Court.
15. In HKSAR v. Hung Chun Kit CACC No. 579 of 1998, the appellant was sentenced to two years' imprisonment after trial for possession of the stun gun. Appeal on sentence was dismissed.
16. In HKSAR v. Yung Ting Chun CACC No. 164 of 1999, the appellant was in possession of a stun gun which could discharge 75,000 volts. He was imprisoned for two and half years after trial. Appeal on sentence was dismissed.
17. In Wong Wing Wong this Court was of the opinion that, as a deterrence, an immediate custodial sentence is required for offence of this type. However, the starting point to be adopted has to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. There is no tariff imposed for this offence.
18. In this case the voltage capable of being discharged by the stun gun can be described as in the middle-lower range. While this stun gun is capable of being used for unlawful purposes, there is no evidence that the applicant had used it for unlawful purposes. Although the applicant had not explained what he intended to do with the stun gun, on the facts disclosed, the starting point of four and half years' imprisonment is manifestly excessive and was not in line with the many previous decisions. R v. Lai Chi Fai was a far more serious case. In R v. Wong Chuen Pong, the appellant was also charged with an offence of possession of a converted .22 calibre starting pistol and 98 rounds of ammunition (96 of which were usable), hence the sentence of two years' imprisonment for the stun gun could be justified on the basis that the stun gun was intended to be used for some illegal purpose, although it was accepted that at the time of his arrest with the stun gun, the appellant was not engaged in criminal activity.
19. Unless there was an inquiry, the court had to proceed on the basis that the applicant picked up the stun gun on the construction site. Even if the applicant had not disclosed the purpose he intended to do with the stun gun, in the absence of evidence which may suggest that it will be used for some illegal purpose, we are of the view that the starting point should be 20 months' imprisonment. This will be reduced by one third because of the guilty plea. The sentence will be one year imprisonment.”
11. 於HKSAR v Zhen Futing（甄浮艇） [2004] HKCU 805 CACC 509/2003，2004年6月30日，未經𢑥編：
(i) 經審訊後，申請人被裁定5項控罪罪名成立，即2項「無牌管有槍械」、2項「管有攻擊性武器」及1項「抗拒在正當執行職務的警務人員」；
(ii) 2名警務人員（控方第一及第二證人）於深水埗基隆街359號外進行埋伏，看見申請人從上址大廈步出，東張西望，神情緊張，於是警務人員尾隨作觀察。後來申請人突然轉身步入上址大廈。警務人員於觀察期間發現申請人腰間有硬物突出；他們於上址的一樓梯間截停申請人。申請人掙扎及嘗試逃走，但不果。警務人員於申請人的腰間發現一支鐵通，鐵通的其中一端用布包裹。於是警員以「管有攻擊性武器」拘捕申請人。申請人繼續掙扎，但被警員制服及鎖上手銬。經搜身後，警員從上訴人的後褲袋檢獲一支貌似手提電話的電槍。警員於是作出拘捕及警誡。上訴人表示居於上址的6樓。經搜屋後，警方於被告人的居所檢獲另一支用紙袋包裹及放在雪櫃的電槍。屋內床褥下藏有五支鐵通，其中兩支尾端被切割至鋒利；
(iii) 警誡會面中，申請人表示2003年6月16日與妻子從內地來港尋找工作；他是一名癮君子，於是在港購買毒品。他與另外兩人為了賺取金錢，本打算販運危險藥物。後來放棄販運危險藥物，決定行劫。2003年6月16日申請人返回內地，並於6月21日與3名的其中一名同謀帶著2支電槍來港。申請人按指示去到醫局街一間投注站進行觀察，準備行劫。6月24日另外一名男子將鐵通帶到申請人租用的單位。申請人表示不知道是誰人將鐵通切割至鋒利。被捕前，他下樓作觀察，帶備其中一支電槍作自衞；
(iv) 就每項「無牌管有槍械」（控罪1及4），原審法官判處申請人共5年6個月監禁，同期執行；
(v) 上訴法庭指：
“7. It is clear, therefore, that the applicant came to Hong Kong with others, and armed with these various weapons, with a view to committing a robbery or robberies. …
10. … As for the hypothetical criminal activities to which reference was made, the judge was fully entitled, indeed duty bound, to view the offences in their proper context, which was quite obviously a context in which robbery was intended to be committed. …
13. In the event, it falls for us to consider whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. It is suggested that no regard, or insufficient regard, was paid to sentencing guidelines which Mr Haynes, for the applicant, has extracted from two cases, in particular HKSAR v WONG Wing Wong CACC 214 of 2002 and HKSAR v LI Hung Kwan [2003] 1 HKLRD 204.
14. There are no guidelines set down by these cases. The case of LI Hung Kwan did no more than make reference to a series of decisions in which the appellants had been convicted or pleaded guilty to possession of a stun gun. So all we can discern from that case is the type of sentence which has, according to a variety of facts, been imposed in the past.
15. The closest is R v LAI Chi Fai, (Cr App No. 480 of 1995, unreported) where the applicant was in possession of a stun gun capable of discharging 4,800 volts and at the time of the arrest, he was with another man who was in possession of another imitation firearm. The applicant committed that particular offence whilst on bail in relation to another crime. A starting point of four years' imprisonment was taken.
16. In the round, the offences with which we are here dealing are more serious than those illustrated by the examples to which we have been taken. Here we find a gang planning a robbery with a series of weapons. Not only was there more than one stun gun, but there were no fewer than six other offensive weapons which we have been shown, each an iron rod deliberately prepared with cloth handles for use in assault, and two of which it should be noted had their ends sharpened. The gang had come from across the border in order to commit an offence or offences of this seriousness. The stun guns were in good working order each capable of producing more than 15,000 volts and of generating high voltage pulses continuously in three seconds duration. It was an admitted fact that they were capable of causing pain, muscular contractions, temporary incapacitation or disablement on human victims.
17. We see that the judge at first purportedly sentenced the applicant to five and a half years' imprisonment for each offence but, realising that the maximum for possession of offensive weapons did not permit her to do so, she changed those sentences to terms of two years' imprisonment leaving the five and a half years term intact in relation to the stun gun offences. We think that, in isolation, the five and a half year sentences imposed in relation to Charges 1 and 4, namely the stun gun offences, were manifestly excessive, but that the totality reached for all the offences is correct. …
18. … Accordingly, we shall grant the applicant leave to appeal, treating this application as the appeal. We shall allow the appeal in relation to Charges 1 and 4 substituting for the terms of five and a half years' imprisonment in relation to each a term of four years and nine months' imprisonment. We have indicated that, in our opinion, the totality of five years and seven months' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. …”
12. 於HKSAR v Mohamed P Shafik（Unrep, CACC 224/2014, 5 March 2015）：
(i) 申請人承認共4項控罪，控罪1、2及4均與毒品有關，控罪3是「無牌管有槍械」，即一支電槍，被判處共36個月監禁，而控罪3的判刑為20個月監禁，他不服判刑，提出上訴。
(ii) 案情指2013年11月30日，警方在灣仔一間遊戲機中心進行查牌行動時截停申請人。搜身下，於申請人身上找到一支玻璃管及一支塑膠管。警誡下，申請人承認用作吸食毒品（控罪1）。申請人被帶返警署作調查。經再搜身下，警方在被告人身上找到五包毒品（控罪2）及一支電槍（控罪3）。警誡下，申請人承認早前購買毒品作自用；電槍是由一名美軍送贈，被告人任職「睇場」，用作自衞。之後申請人獲得保釋候查；
(iii) 檢查證實涉案的電槍可發出145,325伏特的電壓；
(iv) 2014年2月13日，申請人從灣仔一個住所步出時再被警方截停。經搜身，警方從申請人身上檢獲5包毒品及一粒藥丸（控罪4）。警誡下，申請人聲稱毒品用作自用，藥丸則用作治療牙痛；
(v) 申請人過往有一次「無牌管有槍械」的刑事定罪紀錄，涉及一支玩具槍；另有2次「管有危險藥物」及1次「管有第一部毒藥」的刑事定罪紀錄；
(vi) 原審法官認為申請人是「睇場」，可能會使用電槍作自衞，考慮到涉案電槍的用途及電壓，以30個月監禁作為量刑基準。就該控罪的判刑，上訴法庭指：
“29. In respect of Charge 3, the following general principles derived from the Court of Appeal’s judgments in HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan [2003] 1 HKLRD 204 and HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, CACC 264/2005, unreported, 10 October 2005, provide useful guidance.
30. First, as deterrence, an immediate custodial sentence is required for offences of this type. See HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan, at §17.
31. Second, the starting point to be adopted has to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. There is no tariff for the offence. See HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan, at §17; HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, at §8.
32. Third, while the court will take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, important considerations which often arise are, firstly, the power of the weapon in terms of the voltage that it is capable of discharging; and secondly, whether there is evidence that the offender or some other person has used or may use the weapon for an unlawful purpose or to facilitate an unlawful activity. Even though there may be no present intent established on the part of the offender to use the weapon in any such unlawful way, where there is a real risk in the circumstances that the weapon will fall into the hands of someone who will use it for such purpose, that is also a factor which will result in a higher starting point of sentence. See HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, at §9.
33. The facts in the two cases also provide some practical clues as to how the court should determine the appropriate starting point.
34. In HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan, the stun gun generated 35,000.00 volts when operated in the air and 12,000.00 volts if applied to a human body. The Court of Appeal noted that such a voltage was in the middle-lower range. In the absence of evidence that suggest that the defendant intended to use the stun gun for an illegal purpose, the starting point was 20 months.
35. In HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai, the defendant possessed 3 stun guns which were capable of producing charges of 20,403.00 volts, 10,000.00 volts and 13,623.00 volts. The Court of Appeal noted that it was a medium range of voltage for weapons of this sort. The Court of Appeal took into account the appellant’s triad connections and concluded that there was obviously a real risk that the 3 stun guns would be used for an unlawful purpose or fall into the wrong hands. His possession of the three stun guns in those circumstances was in the upper range of seriousness of the offence. The Court of Appeal went on to note that although there were 3 stun guns, they were kept in the defendant’s domestic premises and there was no evidence of any immediate intent by the defendant to use the weapons. The Court of Appeal held that an appropriate starting point is 3 years.
36. Turning to the present case, Mr Bullett submitted that a starting point of 18 months should have been adopted in the circumstances of this case, namely, a single stun gun, never used, kept for self defence and with no evidence of any unlawful purpose. That would be consistent with the Court of Appeal’s approach in HKSAR v Li Hung Kwan. Ms Mok submitted that the Judge was duty bound to consider Charge 3 in its proper context. As the applicant explicitly admitted that he worked as a bouncer and had the stun gun for self-defence, the Judge was entitled to infer that the applicant would be ready to use the stun gun when necessary. Thus, the starting point of 30 months was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
37. As rightly noted by the Judge, the power of the stun gun in question is undoubtedly much higher than any of the stun guns featuring in the earlier cases. However, that is not the end of the matter. Placed before the Judge was a forensic medical report prepared by a senior forensic pathologist dated 27 February 2014 in which the forensic medical aspect of the seized stun gun was discussed…
Thus, although the voltage that the stun gun can discharge is considerably higher than those found in other cases, it is not clear if it would cause greater harm to the human body correspondingly.
38. When the applicant was arrested, the stun gun was found being secured by the belt around his waist. He was carrying the stun gun on his person. The risk of him using the stun gun when necessary is real. In the circumstances, the Judge was correct in drawing the inference as he did.
39. But we do not think the applicant’s case in the overall circumstances is so serious that it warrants a starting point of 30 months. We think the starting point should have been 24 months instead.”
被告人的背景
13. 現年29歲，未婚，與分別61歲、59歲的父母及長姊住。大律師指被告人曾接受至中四程度教育，但被告人於經歷供詞中向警方表示曾接受至高中程度教育。大律師指被捕前被告人任職地盤工人，月入約18,000元，為家中其中一名經濟支柱。可是被告人於經歷供詞中向警方表示他無業。
14. 被告人過往有3次刑事定罪紀錄，涉及6項控罪，與本案並不相同，但其中1項與暴力有關（2019年）。另外2次（即WK4295/24及WK5427/24）是於本案被捕後干犯（犯案日期為2024年6月12日及2024年6月16日）。換言之，被告人在本案保釋期間干犯上述兩宗案件。他於2025年8月20日被定罪及判處2個月監禁，於同日刑滿出獄。
15. 另外，被告人亦涉及其他3件案件，全部均與不誠實有關，包括「經修訂案情撮要」所述的MRN 22000061及TKO RN 22024237。被告人承認於上述2案的保釋期間干犯本案。
討論
量刑基準
控罪1
16. 就控罪1，除了黃威洪案外，大律師要求本席參考同級法院的判刑，包括 香港特別行政區 訴 鄺瑋鈉[2024] HKDC 527、香港特別行政區 訴 陳家強 [2025] HKDC 435，並稱之為「典據」。
17. 本席已於上文敘述黃威洪案的案情及判決原因，現不再重複。鄺瑋鈉和陳家強均為同級法院的判刑。大律師承認同級法院的判刑對本席並無約束力，但指可用作參考。
18. 於香港特別行政區 對 唐健帮及另二人[2023] HKCA 896（CAAR 13/2022，2023年7月18日），上訴法庭已指出：
「35. 第一，雙方於本案存檔了多份區域法院的判刑理由書，希望藉此支持己方立場。本庭在 律政司司長 訴 溫達揚 一案第 27 段已指出：
「… 因為這些判刑，從來就沒有經過上訴而被肯定，也沒有什麼量刑原則可言，對量刑既沒有約束力也沒有參考價值，根本起不了任何指導作用，根本不應稱之為『案例』 …」
況且，「有意圖而傷人」及「暴動/非法集結」罪的案情，以及某被告人的背景、犯案動機、於該案所扮演的角色等事項，可謂千變萬化，任何單純對案件判刑作出比較的做法，都不能協助本庭處理原審判刑是否恰當這個議題。歸根究底，控罪要旨(gravamen of the offence)及適用的量刑因素才是重點所在，而非個別案件的判刑。」
19. 於香港特別行政區 對 Lau Chun Yuk（劉晉旭）及其他人 [2023] HKCA 1098，上訴法庭又再次特別重申，指：
「51. 在完結前特別一提。申請方曾在他們的書面陳詞援引區域法院另一宗二號橋暴動案的原審判刑（香港特別行政區 訴 陳起行 [2021] HKDC 874），作為適用蔡家輝 案的支點以支持本案量刑基準過高的主張，結果終被勸退。本庭已在過往指出過多次，在今年的律政司司長對唐健帮及另二人 [2023] HKCA 896（判案理由書日期：2023年8月25日）又再重申：未經上訴的原審判刑對同級法院沒有約束力，對上訴法庭也沒有任何參考價值，不應被業界用作上訴時的依據。」
20. 於陳家強案中，法庭提及兩宗上訴案件的判決，包括HKSAR v Tsang Kwun Wing（曾冠榮）[2004] HKEC 1150 CACC 89/2004及HKSAR v Yeung Chi Wa（楊志華）[2018] HKCA 73。
21. 於曾冠榮案中：
(i) 申請人承認共七項控罪，包括一項盜竊（控罪一）、4項「偽造文件」（控罪二至五）。案情指41歲的申請人於2002年11月16偷竊一輛的士後，購買兩套車牌（KB1913及JU1311）及於內地叫人製作2個偽造行車證，令他可駕駛涉案的士。申請人於2003年10月16日才被捕。申請人承認於約1前盜竊的士，更一直駕駛該的士為生；
(ii) 就該5項控罪，原審法官以3年監禁作為量刑基礎；因申請人承認控罪，減為2年監禁。就另外的2項控罪，即1項沒有第三者保險（控罪六）及一項駕駛未領牌照車輛（控罪七），原審法官以最高刑罰，即12個月及3個月監禁，作為量刑基準，該兩項控罪的刑期與首5項控罪的刑期分期執行，即總刑期為2年8個月；
(iii) 申請人對首5項控罪的判刑並無異議，但不服控罪六及控罪七的判刑，提出上訴。
(iv) 首先，於該案中，就「偽造文件」控罪，原審法官以3年監禁作為量刑基準，而非2年監禁。
(v) 該案的上訴與「偽造文件」控罪全無關係。可是，就「偽造文件」的判刑，上訴法庭指：
“4. In respect of these five offences, the judge took a starting point of three years’ imprisonment which was reduced to two years to reflect the pleas of guilty.
5. Very properly, Mr. Kelly, on the applicant’s behalf, made no complaint in respect of these sentences.”
(vi) 換言之，上訴法庭認同就「偽造文件」的判刑。
22. 於楊志華案中：
(i) 申請人承認共九項控罪包括兩項盜竊，即盜竊的士（控罪一）及盜竊行車證（控罪五）、6項偽造文件（控罪二、三、四、六至八）、一項沒有第三者保險（控罪九），被判處共2年8個月監禁及停牌4年；控罪二、三、四、六至八的量刑起點為3個月監禁；
(ii) 案情指申請人分別於2016年11月11日及11月24日盜竊2輛的士（控罪一及五）。2023年12月23日警方發現申請人坐在其中一輛被盜的士的駕駛座內；當時該的士掛上虛假車牌KX8483（控罪六），擋風玻璃上的行車證及偽造「禁區紙」，行車證及禁區紙上的車牌均為HA9072（控罪七及八）。司機座位的地氈下有另一個KG1609偽造車牌（控罪四）。涉案的士的原有車牌（PZ963）則放在的士的尾箱；尾箱內亦有另外兩對HA9072及RM9641的車牌（控罪二及三）。拘捕及警誡下，申請人承認盜竊的士以賺取生活所需；之後再製造偽造車牌，並放在被盜的士上；他亦更改禁區紙，寫上HA9072的車牌；
(iii) 申請人不服判刑，提出上訴。他指出總刑期過分嚴苛，但主要是針對盜竊的士的判刑；對偽造文件的判刑根本隻字不提； 上訴法庭亦沒有指出「偽造文件」的判刑是否合適。因此對本案中的「偽造文件」的判刑並無參考價值。
23. 除上述之外，本席不打算處理大律師提及的同級法院判刑。
24. 本案中，被告人承認是因為黑社會「勝和」做事而「偽造文件」，即作出襲擊後使用涉案虛假車牌逃避警方追查。本案中「偽造文件」的目的比曾冠榮案更嚴重。可是於曾冠榮案中，申請人使用涉案的虛假車牌約1年之久；本案中，被告人「偽造文件」的時段則不得而知。於黃威洪案中，原訟法庭指出該類控罪的嚴重程度按個別案件的整體情況而定。於該案中，上訴人使用和管有虛假車輛登記牌照和號碼牌，可支持使人有意圖用該車輛干犯嚴重罪行，以偽造證件掩飾身份，令警方難以追查犯案者的推論。於本案中，被告人承認使用虛假車牌干犯其他嚴重控罪。虛假的車牌已經貼在涉案車輛上。換言之，涉案車輛已用作犯案或準備就緒用作犯案。考慮到整體案請，本席認為適當的初步量刑基準為2年監禁。
控罪2
25. 就控罪2，除了Mohamed P Shafik之外，大律師亦要求本席參考兩宗區域法院的判刑案件：香港特別行政區 訴 譚浩斌 [2023] HKDC 1623及香港特別行政區 訴 Pham Luong Truong（DCCC 618/2016）。
26. 首先，如上文所述，同級法院的判刑對本席既無約束力，亦無參考價值，不可稱之為「典據」。況且，大律師提及譚浩斌案的第27段只是法官對Mohamed P Shafik案判決第30至32段的譯文。再者，大律師指法官援引Li Hung Kwun案，但事實上Li Hung Kwun的案情與本案截然不同。於Li Hung Kwan及Pham Luong Truong案中沒有任何證供顯示申請人或被告人打算使用電槍作非法用途。於本案中，涉案電槍放在被告人的車上，而被告人承認該車輛用作為黑社會作出襲擊，而涉案車輛已準備隨時用作犯案。因此，電槍用作干犯其他嚴重控罪的風險極高。
27. 於Pham Luong Truong案中，原審法官援引的香港特別行政區 訴 黃永煌案中亦沒有證供顯示上訴人打算在港使用涉案電槍作非法用途。
28. 雖然本案的電槍只能夠產生21,367伏特的峰至峰脈動電壓，但能於持續3秒內產生368次的高電壓脈衝。被告人承認本案電槍較可導致人類皮膚破裂的電壓高出35倍，並較可導致人體受到電壓的電壓高出200倍，若在額頭、胸部、頸動脈或脊柱等敏感部位使用，可令心率改變、造成嚴重痛楚、阻礙血液流向腦部及 / 或刺激運動神經元，效果可引致受襲者昏暈及不能動彈。換言之，該電槍可造成嚴重傷害。
29. 考慮到整體案情，本席認為控罪2適當的初步量刑基準為4年監禁。
加刑因素
30. 沒有爭議的是被告人於另外兩宗案件（即M RN 22000061及TKO RN 22024237保䆁期間干犯本案，但當時的保䆁只是警方給予的保䆁。眾所周知，此乃加刑因素。被告人於本案獲得保釋後，又相繼再干犯另外兩宗案件。該兩宗案件已完結，本席不打算再加刑。
減刑因素
31. 除了適時認罪外，本案並無任何其他減刑因素。於Lai Chi Fai案中類同情況表示，原審法官指被告人的悔意流於片面（superficial），因此拒絕給予三份一的認罪扣減。可是根據HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231，認罪的扣減是按認罪的時間而定，如被告人於訂定審期前已表明會認罪，無論被告人的指稱悔意是否真誠，也可獲三份一的折扣。該折扣涵蓋悔意及其他所有求情因素；除非有極特殊的求情因素（例如向警方提供其他的調查的資料），不可獲額外的減刑。
32. 因此，兩項控罪的刑期減為：
(i) 控罪1：16個月監禁；
(ii) 控罪2：32個月監禁。
總刑期
33. 大律師要求法庭就本案2項控罪考慮刑期同期執行。
34. 於HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching（倪耀偵）[2011] 5 HKLRD 690，上訴法庭指：
“13. When a judge is faced with the task of sentencing for multiple offences he is required as an initial step to identify the appropriate sentence for each offence and as the final step to achieve a total sentence appropriate to the culpability of the offender. The issue with which this appeal is concerned is the decision that the judge faced whether to order any of the sentences for the offences to run concurrently with each other or to be served consecutively.
14. The question whether to order concurrent or consecutive sentences can arise in many different scenarios. An offender may be charged in respect of a number of different, or similar, offences committed on wholly separate occasions over a period of time or with a number of different offences committed in the course of one episode of criminal activity. This case is concerned with the latter situation.
15. In the case of several offences committed in the course of a single episode, the prosecuting authorities might choose to proffer only one charge, where one charge embraces all the criminal conduct reflected by the evidence or, as in the present instance, separate charges for each criminal act.
16. If it chooses the former course, the instances of proved conduct embraced by the single charge but which could have been the subject of separate charges are taken into account in deciding what penalty reflects the true overall criminality.
17. But when the prosecuting authority elects the latter course, namely, to charge two or more offences arising from an episode of criminal activity, the objective is still the same; that is to say, the ultimate overall sentence must still reflect the overall and true culpability, although the sentencing judge must take care, first, to pass a sentence for each individual offence that is appropriate to that offence and the circumstances of its commission and, second, not to punish the offender twice for the same conduct.
18. It was in an attempt to safeguard fairness to the offender by ensuring that he was not punished twice for the same conduct that the courts developed the "one transaction" rule. In essence, this rule said that if the number of offences have been charged arising from the one transaction or course of criminal conduct, then concurrent sentences should be imposed.
19. The one transaction rule was not developed as an inflexible rule of law. It was never intended as anything more than a practical rule of thumb to guide judges in the exercise of the power to impose consecutive sentences so that the final sentence was not one that was unfair to an offender.
20. However, once stated, this practical working rule tended to develop a life of its own and has led to some difficulty in its application. Judicial dicta explained what was meant by "one course of criminal conduct" and exceptions to the rule developed. … All of this, understandably enough, became material for advocates who sought to argue that the multiple offences of which their client had been convicted were part of one transaction and that it inevitably followed that the correct sentence was one where all the sentences were concurrent.
21. There are several problems associated with this line of reasoning. First it runs the risk of elevating a practical working rule to a rule of law, thereby providing an opportunity to argue that departure from it inevitably meant that the sentence imposed on the client was excessive. Secondly, it tends to obscure the real point which is not whether two or more offences are committed at about the same time, but whether the second or other further offences add to the culpability or criminality of the first. Thirdly, it ignores the reality that whatever sentence is arrived at after application of the rule is still subject to the totality principle.
22. The importance of the totality principle cannot be overstated. It is there to ensure not only fairness to the offender, in the sense that he is not punished twice for the same offence and, further, that the sentence is not an unduly crushing punishment but it is also a tool by which to ensure that “the overall effect of the sentences is sufficient having regard to the usual principles of deterrence, rehabilitation and denunciation.”: R v K M [2004] NSWCCA 65 at paragraph 55.
23. The emphasis therefore should be on a reflection in the sentence of true culpability disclosed by the offences of which the accused has been convicted. This is an approach which this court has consistently adopted in recent times, for example in HKSAR v Kwok Shiu To [2006] 2 HKLRD 272 and HKSAR v Iu Wai Shun [2008] 1 HKC 79. It is likely to be a more effective approach in reflecting an offender’s overall culpability than one which becomes overly concerned with the one transaction rule, although in the case of more than one offence, the court must guard carefully against punishing twice for the same act. If the second offence which takes place in the course of the suggested single episode adds to the culpability of the first offence, it will normally follow that the sentence for the second offence will run wholly or partially consecutive to that for the first; to what extent, if at all, will depend upon an assessment of the totality appropriate for the conduct as a whole. As with most sentencing exercises, the approach is an art, sensitive to the individual circumstances of the case and the offender. …
26. Finally there is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Cahyadi v The Queen 168 A Crim R 41. At page 47, paragraph 27 Howie J summarized the legal position in a way which we would adopt:
… there is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both.
27. For the sake of completeness we should refer to the multiple offence scenario that involves offences, different in nature or the same, committed on quite separate occasions. In that situation the court will invariably have concluded that, in principle, it may impose consecutive sentences. But the court still needs to assess the overall culpability of the criminal conduct for the purpose of applying the totality principle. Only by doing so will it be able to arrive at a sentence that is fair to the offender yet also properly reflects the culpability of his conduct.”
35. 事實上，於大律師引用的黃威洪案中，原訟法庭亦援引倪耀偵案：
「26. 就如何判處一名被裁定多於一項罪行有罪的被控人，上訴法庭於HKSAR v Ngai Yiu Ching (倪耀偵) 案有詳細論述，重點是首先要就每一項控罪判處恰當的刑罰，然後要決定一個與整體實質刑責相稱的總刑罰，而非拘泥於罪行是否在同時同地干犯。法庭須考慮的，是每多干犯一項罪行是否實質上增加了刑責，並須防止雙重處罰，及使判刑整體不致過份嚴苛。為達致公平和合適的總刑期，不同罪行的刑期可以全部同期執行或合適幅度的分期執行。在案件涉及多項罪行而刑期分期執行是合適的情況，如何分期的計算方程式並非評估判處是否有誤的關鍵，關鍵是總刑期是否符合上述的原則和目的，是否過重。 …
29. 涉案罪行既有不同類別，性質不同，命令刑期同期執行是不當的，裁判官命令各項刑期部份分期執行，是恰當的處理方向。如上所述，關鍵是總刑期是否合符上文第26段所述的判處原則。」
36. 本案的兩項控罪類別及性質完全不同，而且控罪2令案情及刑責更嚴重，兩項控罪的刑期理應分期執行。可是本席須考慮總刑期原則。本席認為42個月的總刑期才可適當反映被告人的罪責，遂下令，就控罪1，判處被告人16個月監禁，控罪2判處被告人32個月，控罪1的其中10個月與控罪2分期執行，即總刑期為42個月（3年6個月）監禁。
（謝沈智慧）
區域法院法官