A A
B B
DCCC 811/2009
C IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE C
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
D CRIMINAL CASE NO. 811 OF 2009 D
____________
E HKSAR E
v
F F
YUEN Kam-fung
G ____________ G
H Before : Deputy District Judge Dufton H
Date : 27 January 2011
I Present: Mr Gavin Shiu, Senior Assistant Director of Public I
Prosecution, for HKSAR
J Mr Robert Andrews instructed by Messrs Haldanes assigned J
by the Director of Legal Aid, for the defendant
K Offence: Dealing with property known or reasonably believed to K
represent proceeds of an indictable offence (處理已知道或合
L 理相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產) L
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
M M
N
1. The defendant stands convicted after trial of one charge that she N
between the 21st January 1997 and the 31st May 1997 dealt with property
O O
having reasonable grounds to believe in whole or in part, directly or
P
indirectly represented the proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to P
section 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance,
Q Q
Chapter 455. This was charge 5.
R R
2. The offence related to the purchase by the defendant of Flat 6D,
S S
6th Floor, Block 1, Site 10 of Whampoa Garden (“Flat 6D”). The
T defendant’s husband, Ng Hang-chung (“Ng”) was at the material time the T
manager of the Deposit Services Support Department of the Hang Seng
U U
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2
A A
B B
Bank Limited (“Hang Seng Bank”). Over a period of about two years
C commencing in 1996 Ng misappropriated funds from two Thai clients of C
Hang Seng Bank, one of whom was Chavarat Charnvirakul (“Chavarat”).
D D
3. In January 1997 the defendant entered into a Provisional
E E
Agreement for Sale and Purchase to purchase Flat 6D for the sum of
F $7,620,000. The deposit of $762,000 was paid in two instalments. The F
initial deposit in the sum of $250,000 was paid on signing the agreement
G G
by cheque. There was no evidence before the court whose bank account
H this was. The balance of the deposit in the sum of $512,000 was paid on H
signing the Agreement for Sub-sale and Purchase by cheque drawn on the
I I
account of Ng. The balance of the purchase price was paid by
J transferring the sum of $2,286,000 from the account of Chavarat and by J
securing a mortgage in the sum of $4,572,000 with the Citibank.
K K
L 4. I was satisfied so I was sure that there were reasonable grounds to L
believe that Flat 6D in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented
M M
any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence. In summary the family
N had insufficient means to buy Flat 6D and pay for the mortgage and the N
defendant herself had no income to support the payment of a mortgage of
O O
$46,373.00 per month. Full particulars are set out in my verdict delivered
P on the 30th December 2010. P
Q 5. Money laundering is a serious offence for which deterrent Q
sentences are required (see HKSAR v XU Xia-li & another [2004]
R R
4 HKC 16). In HKSAR v Javid Kamran CACC 400/2004 the court,
S stressing the need for deterrent sentences, said that it was not possible to S
lay down guidelines, as there is a very wide range of culpability. The
T T
court identified a number of factors relevant in determining the
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A A
B B
culpability of a defendant, including the nature of the offence that
C generated the laundered money, the extent to which the offence assisted C
the crime or hindered its detection, the degree of sophistication of the
D D
offence and perhaps the defendant's participation, including the length of
E time the offence lasted and the benefit derived from the offence. E
F F
6. In Secretary for Justice v Jerome Yuval Arnold Herzberg [2010]
G 1 HKLRD 502 the Court of Appeal said that other relevant factors are the G
amount of money involved; the degree of sophistication of the operation;
H H
the defendant’s knowledge of the underlying offence and whether there
I was an international element to the commission of the offence. I
J J
7. In HKSAR v HSU Yu-yi CACC 159/2009 the Court of Appeal
K reviewed a number of cases, including XU Xia-li and Javid Kamran. K
The court at paragraph 13 highlighted five factors to be considered in
L L
determining sentence:
M (1) It is the amount of money involved that is a major consideration and not M
the amount of benefit received by a defendant in the transaction.
N N
(2) The culpability of the offence lies in the assistance, support and
O encouragement offered to the commission of an indictable offence. So a defendant's O
level of participation and the number of occasions on which he is involved in the
‘money laundering' activities are relevant factors to be considered.
P P
(3) The offence of dealing with the proceeds from an indictable offence does
Q
not necessarily have any direct correlation with the indictable offence in question. Q
However if the relevant indictable offence can be identified, the court may take into
account the sentence imposed on the indictable offence pre se when determining the
R sentence of the dealing offence. R
(4) If the case has an international element involving activities carried out
S S
across different regions, the court may impose a more severe sentence. This is to
protect Hong Kong's reputation as an international finance and banking hub from
T being tarnished. T
(5) The length of time the offence lasted.
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A A
B B
8. I accept there was no evidence that the defendant knew of her
C husband’s theft of money from clients of Hang Seng Bank and that such C
funds had been used to purchase Flat 6D. I accept the defendant agreed
D D
to purchase Flat 6D in her name at the request of her husband and would
E not otherwise have been involved. The defendant stands to be sentenced E
for assisting her husband by refusing to accept the reality of where the
F F
money had come from to purchase Flat 6D. I also accept that there is no
G evidence of any direct benefit to the defendant in assisting her husband by G
purchasing the property in her name.
H H
I 9. Whether or not the defendant benefited is insignificant as a I
sentencing factor for the reality is the offence of money laundering is
J J
very serious (see HKSAR v CHEN Szu-ming CACC 270/2005). As seen
K in the recent cases of HSU Yu-yi and HOU Shun-hsiung K
CACC 472/2009 the amount of money involved is a major consideration
L L
and not the amount of benefit received by a defendant.
M M
10. In passing sentence I take into account everything said on behalf
N N
of the defendant by Mr Andrews together with all the letters submitted by
O her children, family members and long standing friends, all of which O
speak very highly of the defendant and variously describe her as a loving
P P
and devoted mother; a caring daughter to her parents; kind-hearted,
Q patient and helpful; kind and caring. I take into account the defendant has Q
no previous convictions. I have carefully considered all the reports
R R
submitted by Mr Andrews together with the update psychological and
S psychiatric reports called by the court, which Mr Andrews submits show S
for the first time remorse on the part of the defendant for her wrong doing,
T T
as does her letter to the court asking for forgiveness.
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A A
B B
11. In passing sentence I have borne in mind all that said by the
C Court of Appeal in HKSAR v LEUNG Pui-shan CACC 317/2007 of the C
need for individual justice.
D D
E Starting point E
F F
12. The cases reviewed in HSU Yu-yi show that a starting point of
G between 3 and 5 years imprisonment has been applied to amounts ranging G
between $1 and $15 million. None of the cases are however factually
H H
similar to the present case, highlighting each case is to be decided on its
I own facts and circumstances. I
J J
13. I have also considered the case of HKSAR v LAI Kam-yee,
K Teresa CACC 120/2009, a case where the defendant over a period of 28 K
months laundered $4,205,925.30 through her three bank accounts for her
L L
ex-husband. The court in passing sentence accepted that because of her
M relationship with her ex-husband, the defendant agreed to deal with the M
monies, so as to protect the interests of her 12 year old son. The court
N N
further accepted that although the defendant used a small portion of the
O money she did not deal with the money with the intention of making a O
profit and that this was an isolated incident. The Court of Appeal held
P P
that 12 months imprisonment after trial was appropriate, in particular
Q where the evidence that the prosecution adduced came mostly from the Q
information given by the defendant to the police, which information also
R R
formed the basis for the court’s determination on her mens rea.
S S
T T
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A A
B B
14. Taking into account that Flat 6D was purchased for the sum of
C $7,620,000 of which $2,286,000 was paid by transfer from the account of C
Chavarat; and the role of the defendant in that she acted only on the
D D
request of her husband, I am satisfied the proper starting point after trial
E is one of 1 year and 6 months imprisonment, which I reduce by 3 months E
on account of the defendant’s clear record.
F F
Suspended sentence
G G
H 15. Mr Andrews accepting a prison sentence is inevitable submits H
there are exceptional circumstances to either suspend the sentence or
I I
alternatively impose a community service order. In support Mr Andrews
J submits two main grounds, delay and ill health. J
K K
Delay
L L
16. Delay in bringing an offender to justice is a mitigating factor
M M
which can be taken into account in sentence but is not a mitigating factor
N N
per se. All the circumstances must be looked at including whether the
O
offender has acknowledged guilt; where the delay has given the offender O
the opportunity to rehabilitate himself; whether restitution has been made;
P P
whether there was a legitimate expectation the matter will not be further
Q pursued; the size of the investigation and whether the time taken to bring Q
the case to court was longer than necessary (see HKSAR v CHEUNG
R R
Suet-ting CACC 226/2009). I have also considered the cases on delay
S submitted by Mr Andrews, HKSAR v LAU Kin-yu HCMA 391/2002 and S
The Queen v William Hung [1994] 1 HKCLR 47.
T T
U U
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A A
B B
17. The offence dates back to 1997. In January 1998 Ng was arrested
C and admitted to bail to appear in court on the 11th March 1998. Ng C
absconded. In the meantime the defendant left Hong Kong for the United
D D
Kingdom on the 11th February 1998. At the time the defendant left she
E had not been interviewed by the police or warned of such an eventuality. E
F F
Extradition
G G
18. Mr Shiu and Mr Andrews have both provided to the court a
H H
chronology of events from 1996 up to the commencement of the trial in
I September last year. I have also been supplied by Mr Andrews the I
rulings of the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on the application by the
J J
Government to extradite the defendant back to Hong Kong; the
K subsequent appeal against the decision to extradite; and the judicial K
review of the decision of the Secretary of State to make the Extradition
L L
Order. I have read all these decisions, which are very helpful in
M understanding why this case has taken over 12 years to come to trial, in M
particular the judgment of the High Court in March 2009 upholding the
N N
decision of the Secretary of State to make the Extradition Order.
O O
19. In summary the defendant was arrested in England in October
P P
2000 pursuant to a provisional request issued in February 1999. I note
Q Mr Andrews criticism that the Hong Kong police were slow in acting as Q
they had suspected the defendant prior to her leaving Hong Kong but did
R R
not issue the arrest warrant until a year later and that the United Kingdom
S police were also slow in acting by taking over 18 months to arrest the S
defendant, when all along they knew her address in Earls Court.
T T
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A A
B B
20. Soon after arrest extradition proceedings were commenced. On
C the 17th April 2001 the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court concluded there C
was insufficient evidence to raise a prima facie case in respect of any of
D D
the proposed charges of furnishing false information on which the
E defendant’s extradition was sought and accordingly discharged the E
defendant (see the ruling of District Judge Nicholas Evans).
F F
G 21. A month later a fresh request was issued in respect of eight G
charges of money laundering (charge 5 relating to Flat 6D). On the
H H
10th January 2002 the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court concluded there
I was a prima facie case in respect of all eight charges and ordered the I
committal of the defendant to Hong Kong (see the ruling of C. L. Pratt).
J J
The defendant appealed the Committal Order, which appeal was
K dismissed by the Divisional Court on the 14th June 2002 (see the K
summary of the judgment of the Divisional Court).
L L
22. Representations were then made to the Home Office, largely
M M
based on the defendant’s mental health, seeking to persuade the Secretary
N N
of State not to make the Extradition Order. The Secretary of State signed
O
the Order on the 6th September 2007 but permitted further O
representations to be made.
P P
Q 23. On the 24th January 2008 the Secretary of State confirmed the Q
Order for return of the defendant to Hong Kong. The defendant applied
R R
for judicial review of this decision. On the 25th March 2009 in Yuen v
S The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 573 S
(Case No: CO/2728/2008) the High Court dismissed the application
T T
(see the judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley).
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A A
B B
24. The defendant was extradited from the United Kingdom on the
C 23rd April 2009, some 12 years since the commission of the offence, and C
over 8 years since the defendant was arrested and extradition proceedings
D D
commenced. Mr Andrews prays in aid of this as amounting to delay.
E E
25. In HKSAR v LUI Kin-hong CACC 378/1998 the defendant spent
F F
17 months in custody pending extradition having fled Hong Kong
G knowing full well that an investigation was underway. The judge in G
passing sentence reduced the sentence by 10 months to give the defendant
H H
some credit for the time spent in custody. The Court of Appeal in finding
I this generous said at paragraph 29, “…..He fought the extradition largely on the I
basis that he could not obtain a fair trial in Hong Kong, and whilst he is not to be
J J
penalised for adopting that fashionable line, neither should he be permitted to pray in
aid the period of custody which he thereby brought upon himself.”
K K
L
26. Similarly in HKSAR v Michael Wang CACC 184/2006 the L
defendant spent 32 months in custody pending extradition having left
M M
Hong Kong after stealing about HK$9 million from his company. The
N Court of Appeal described as generous the deduction of a period of N
4 months where the defendant had fought every inch of the way the
O O
extradition proceedings.
P P
27. Although on the 14th June 2002 the appeal against the Committal
Q Q
Order was dismissed by the Divisional Court, as seen, the defendant was
R not extradited until April 2009. In the intervening 7 years the defendant R
made various representations to the Secretary of State and when those
S S
failed applied to judicially review the decision of the Secretary of State.
T T
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A A
B B
28. Much of the argument put before the Secretary of State related to
C the defendant’s mental health and whether she was fit to plead and able to C
participate effectively in the trial. Many of the medical reports submitted
D D
to the Secretary of State and in the judicial review have been shown to the
E court by Mr Andrews. I have read all the reports. The conclusion of the E
Secretary of State was that it would not be unfair to return the defendant
F F
to Hong Kong. I note no application was made in this trial that the
G defendant was not fit to be tried. G
H H
29. Related to this was the argument that due to the passage of time it
I would be unjust and oppressive to extradite the defendant. The defence I
contended that by the passage of time the defendant would be prejudiced
J J
in the conduct of her trial. The High Court concluded no error of legal
K approach was made by the Secretary of State (see in particular paragraphs K
34-53 of the judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley). Again no application was
L L
made in this trial arising from the passage of time that the defendant
M could not receive a fair trial. M
N N
30. Mr Andrews relies on an apparent delay between July 2004 and
O November 2006, when there was seemingly no active consideration of the O
file by the Secretary of State, which delay Mr Andrews submits could not
P P
be regarded as the fault of the defendant. This is referred to in the
Q judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley, in particular at paragraphs 23, 32, 33, 51 Q
and 61. I note in the correspondence submitted by Mr Shui the Home
R R
Office assured that the case was under consideration. Mr Justice Ouseley
S however concluded at paragraph 51 that in reality the case was allowed to S
become dormant but pertinently observed the defendant appeared not to
T T
have chased the Secretary of State either.
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A A
B B
31. Perhaps not surprisingly the defendant fighting extradition did not
C chase the Secretary of State to decide whether to make the Extradition C
Order. The defendant continued to fight the extradition and only after the
D D
judicial review was dismissed in March 2009 was she extradited.
E E
32. Although the defendant did not leave Hong Kong knowing she
F F
was being investigated, and save for one day has not spent time in
G custody pending extradition, I am satisfied the principles established in G
the decided cases are applicable to the present case. In my view, save and
H H
except the initial extradition proceedings, which were dismissed, and to
I some degree the period between July 2004 and November 2006, the time I
taken to extradite the defendant is entirely attributable to the exercising of
J J
her right to challenge every step of her extradition to Hong Kong.
K K
33. In my view whilst the defendant is not to be penalised for
L exercising her rights, I am satisfied she cannot pray in aid of the time L
taken to extradite her to Hong Kong as amounting to exceptional
M M
circumstances to suspend the sentence.
N N
O
Hong Kong O
P P
34. Mr Andrews submits there has also been delay in the proceedings
Q once the defendant arrived in Hong Kong. The defendant was first taken Q
to court on the 24th April 2009, the day after arriving in Hong Kong.
R R
Proceedings were transferred to the District Court on the 24th July 2009
S with plea day in the District Court set for the 14th August. A pre-trial S
review was fixed for the 15th October when at the request of the defence,
T T
the trial was fixed for the 29th January 2010.
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35. The trial did not proceed and was re-fixed to the 26th April. The
C trial was again adjourned and a new trial date set for the 27th September C
with the trial eventually starting on the 29th September 2010. The reason
D D
for the first adjournment was the late service by the defence of the expert
E report of Mr Shum Lau, which was only served by the defence on the E
27th January, two days before the trial was due to start.
F F
G 36. Mr Andrews sought to attribute this delay to the prosecution by G
saying the prosecution only thought fit to deploy their own expert after
H H
service of the expert report of Mr Shum Lau, when the prosecution full
I well knew that forgery of the signatures was in issue. The fact however I
was that at no time prior to trial did the defence, as is their right, disclose
J J
the defence. The fact expert evidence may be called was neither
K mentioned at the pre-trial review in October nor in the pre-trial K
questionnaire completed by Mr Andrews. Nor was any mention made in
L L
a further pre-trial review held on the 8th January 2010, by which time the
M defence had instructed Mr Shum. M
N N
37. When asked if there was anything he wished to say as to why the
O court was not told in advance of trial that expert evidence may be called O
Mr Andrews was unable to explain. I allowed Mr Finch, the solicitor
P P
instructing Mr Andrews, to explain. Mr Finch sought to blame the
Q prosecution by the late service of documents between November and Q
December 2009; in particular Mr Finch said the account opening
R R
documents of the three bank accounts were not in the transfer bundle and
S that he anticipated/expected the prosecution would instruct their own S
expert. When the defence had received all the documentation was the
T T
defence, Mr Finch said, in a position to instruct their expert. Mr Shiu on
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A A
B B
the other hand says he believed all banking documentation was included
C in the extradition bundle. Mr Finch could not however remember what C
was included in the extradition bundle.
D D
38. Whilst I have not seen the content of either the extradition bundle
E E
or the transfer bundle to determine what documents were in fact served
F and when, it is clear the defence have known for a very long time the F
substance of the case they had to meet together with the documentary
G G
evidence (see paragraph 37 of Mr Justice Ouseley’s judgment). The late
H instruction of an expert witness is therefore most surprising, in particular H
considering throughout the extradition proceedings reference is made to
I I
the possibility of someone forging the defendant’s signatures and the
J need for expert evidence (see paragraph 38 of Mr Justice Ouseley’s J
judgment).
K K
L 39. Further I find hard to accept the defence were waiting to see if the L
prosecution were going to call an expert. The defence case being many
M M
signatures were forgeries, the question of calling an expert witness would
N N
have been considered independent of whether or not the prosecution were
O
to call expert evidence. O
P P
40. Albeit the solicitors in the United Kingdom are different to the
Q Hong Kong solicitors, the question of obtaining expert evidence must Q
have been at the forefront of their consideration. Mr Finch said the
R R
defendant was on legal aid and therefore leave of the Legal Aid
S Department is required before instructing experts. That may well be but S
in such situation surely one tells the court they are not ready for trial
T T
rather than asking for a trial date to be fixed in October.
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41. Further even if some documents were served for the first time in
C November or December 2009, this does not explain why the decision to C
call expert evidence was not made until the very last moment resulting in
D D
the adjournment of the first trial date. If by reason of the late service of
E documents the defence were not ready then again surely one tells the E
court they are not ready for trial at the pre-trial review on the 8th January.
F F
Clearly for whatever reasons the defence chose not to tell the court.
G G
42. One simply cannot say as Mr Andrews submits that in reality
H H
there would have been no difference in the terms of delay if expert
I reports had been obtained earlier. As Mr Shui pointed out Mr Shum in I
fact only considered a few documents in addition to the questioned
J J
cheques subject of the charges and not the majority of documents served
K in November and December. K
L L
43. In February through no fault of the defence Mr Shum withdrew
M acting on behalf of the defence (apparently over payment of fees by the M
Legal Aid Department). This necessitated a new expert to be instructed.
N N
The defence instructed Dr Strach from Australia, whose summary report
O was served on the prosecution on the 31st March. This ultimately led to O
a further adjournment of the trial, which eventually started on the
P P
29th September 2010.
Q Q
44. Although the adjournment of the trial in April cannot be said to
R R
be the fault of the defence or the prosecution, the adjournment of the first
S trial clearly was as a result of the late service of the defence expert report. S
The delay caused by this cannot in my view be in anyway attributable to
T T
the prosecution. Mr Finch submits that if criticism can be levelled for the
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A A
B B
late instruction of the expert this is not the fault of the defendant. Whilst
C this may not be the fault of the defendant as opposed to the defence, I am C
nevertheless satisfied the defendant cannot pray in aid of this fact as
D D
amounting to exceptional circumstances to suspend the sentence.
E E
Ill Health
F F
G 45. Mr Andrews submits by reason of the delay in bringing the case G
to trial the defendant’s mental health has suffered, including attempts to
H H
take her own life, whereby the defendant has suffered more than in the
I ‘ordinary case’. There can be no doubt that the proceedings will have I
been very distressing.
J J
K 46. The defendant’s mental health since arriving in the United K
Kingdom is detailed in the many reports submitted by Mr Andrews, all of
L L
which I have read, and a summary of which can be found in paragraphs
M 16-26 of the judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley. M
N N
47. The medical reports show that the defendant likely started taking
O anti-depressants when she first went to the United Kingdom at which O
time she made an attempt on her life and those of her children (see the
P P
report of Dr Sarah J Lack dated 31st March 2003).
Q Q
48. The defendant was first seen by a psychiatrist Dr Clare Smith in
R R
February 2001 who diagnosed the defendant as suffering from moderate
S to severe Depressive Disorder with clear features of depression (see the S
reports of Dr Smith dated the 8th May 2003; the 1st August 2003 and the
T T
17th January 2007).
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B B
49. In 2003 Dr Lack also diagnosed the defendant as suffering from
C depressive illness of moderate severity, showing symptoms of depressed C
mood, reduced sleep and appetite, suicidal thoughts, weight loss and poor
D D
concentration/ memory. Dr Lack believed that it was of significance that
E the defendant first started experiencing these symptoms shortly after the E
arrest of her husband (see page 12 of Dr Lack’s report).
F F
G 50. As Mr Justice Ouseley states the problems of the defendant arise G
from her mental health rather than the passage of time and that what has
H H
exacerbated her condition is the taking of further steps in the decision
I making process, and that her condition has then calmed down to a degree, I
as the step proves ineffectual (see paragraphs 41 and 50 of the judgment).
J J
K 51. When the defendant first appeared in the Magistrates’ Court in K
April 2009 she was remanded in custody for the preparation of
L L
psychiatric reports. Dr Ho was of the opinion that the defendant suffered
M from depression which has been in remission for a few years but did not M
suffer from any active psychiatric problem at that time. Dr Yuen was of
N N
the opinion that the defendant did not have any active mental problem
O and that her condition seemed quite stable without suicidal thoughts in O
the last few years.
P P
Q 52. In his latest report, prepared for sentencing, Dr Yuen states the Q
defendant’s mood was mildly depressed and noted that the defendant
R R
denied the presence of any psychotic or morbid depressive symptom,
S including suicidal thought. The defendant was said to regard herself as S
mentally stable in the past 18 months. Dr Yuen concludes that the
T T
defendant’s depression is, to a great extent, understandable in nature and
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B B
he is sure that her mood will further improve after the trial is over.
C Psychiatric treatment is required for at least 9 months from the time of C
full remission. In patient treatment is not required and the defendant can
D D
continue to attend Kowloon Hospital for psychiatric treatment no matter
E how she is sentenced. E
F F
53. In the report of psychologist Yvonne Lee assessment shows some
G depressed mood with no obvious psychotic signs. As the defendant’s G
mental state was being taken care of by psychiatric service the
H H
psychologist concludes there is no need for immediate psychological
I intervention. I
J J
54. Whilst one has sympathy with anyone suffering from mental
K illness, by exercising her rights to challenge every step of the extradition K
this has at times exacerbated the defendant’s mental condition.
L L
Fortunately that condition appears to have improved whilst in Hong Kong.
M I am satisfied the mental health of the defendant over the past 12 years M
does not amount to exceptional circumstances to suspend the sentence.
N N
O 55. I have carefully considered all matters put forward by O
Mr Andrews. I am satisfied individually and collectively they do not
P P
amount to exceptional circumstances to suspend the sentence or for the
Q imposition of a community service order. I do however take into account Q
the passage of time in bringing this case to trial and the health of the
R R
defendant and further reduce the sentence by a period of 3 months. The
S defendant is sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. S
T T
(D. J. DUFTON)
Deputy District Judge
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A A
B B
DCCC 811/2009
C IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE C
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
D CRIMINAL CASE NO. 811 OF 2009 D
____________
E HKSAR E
v
F F
YUEN Kam-fung
G ____________ G
H Before : Deputy District Judge Dufton H
Date : 27 January 2011
I Present: Mr Gavin Shiu, Senior Assistant Director of Public I
Prosecution, for HKSAR
J Mr Robert Andrews instructed by Messrs Haldanes assigned J
by the Director of Legal Aid, for the defendant
K Offence: Dealing with property known or reasonably believed to K
represent proceeds of an indictable offence (處理已知道或合
L 理相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產) L
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
M M
N
1. The defendant stands convicted after trial of one charge that she N
between the 21st January 1997 and the 31st May 1997 dealt with property
O O
having reasonable grounds to believe in whole or in part, directly or
P
indirectly represented the proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to P
section 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance,
Q Q
Chapter 455. This was charge 5.
R R
2. The offence related to the purchase by the defendant of Flat 6D,
S S
6th Floor, Block 1, Site 10 of Whampoa Garden (“Flat 6D”). The
T defendant’s husband, Ng Hang-chung (“Ng”) was at the material time the T
manager of the Deposit Services Support Department of the Hang Seng
U U
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2
A A
B B
Bank Limited (“Hang Seng Bank”). Over a period of about two years
C commencing in 1996 Ng misappropriated funds from two Thai clients of C
Hang Seng Bank, one of whom was Chavarat Charnvirakul (“Chavarat”).
D D
3. In January 1997 the defendant entered into a Provisional
E E
Agreement for Sale and Purchase to purchase Flat 6D for the sum of
F $7,620,000. The deposit of $762,000 was paid in two instalments. The F
initial deposit in the sum of $250,000 was paid on signing the agreement
G G
by cheque. There was no evidence before the court whose bank account
H this was. The balance of the deposit in the sum of $512,000 was paid on H
signing the Agreement for Sub-sale and Purchase by cheque drawn on the
I I
account of Ng. The balance of the purchase price was paid by
J transferring the sum of $2,286,000 from the account of Chavarat and by J
securing a mortgage in the sum of $4,572,000 with the Citibank.
K K
L 4. I was satisfied so I was sure that there were reasonable grounds to L
believe that Flat 6D in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented
M M
any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence. In summary the family
N had insufficient means to buy Flat 6D and pay for the mortgage and the N
defendant herself had no income to support the payment of a mortgage of
O O
$46,373.00 per month. Full particulars are set out in my verdict delivered
P on the 30th December 2010. P
Q 5. Money laundering is a serious offence for which deterrent Q
sentences are required (see HKSAR v XU Xia-li & another [2004]
R R
4 HKC 16). In HKSAR v Javid Kamran CACC 400/2004 the court,
S stressing the need for deterrent sentences, said that it was not possible to S
lay down guidelines, as there is a very wide range of culpability. The
T T
court identified a number of factors relevant in determining the
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3
A A
B B
culpability of a defendant, including the nature of the offence that
C generated the laundered money, the extent to which the offence assisted C
the crime or hindered its detection, the degree of sophistication of the
D D
offence and perhaps the defendant's participation, including the length of
E time the offence lasted and the benefit derived from the offence. E
F F
6. In Secretary for Justice v Jerome Yuval Arnold Herzberg [2010]
G 1 HKLRD 502 the Court of Appeal said that other relevant factors are the G
amount of money involved; the degree of sophistication of the operation;
H H
the defendant’s knowledge of the underlying offence and whether there
I was an international element to the commission of the offence. I
J J
7. In HKSAR v HSU Yu-yi CACC 159/2009 the Court of Appeal
K reviewed a number of cases, including XU Xia-li and Javid Kamran. K
The court at paragraph 13 highlighted five factors to be considered in
L L
determining sentence:
M (1) It is the amount of money involved that is a major consideration and not M
the amount of benefit received by a defendant in the transaction.
N N
(2) The culpability of the offence lies in the assistance, support and
O encouragement offered to the commission of an indictable offence. So a defendant's O
level of participation and the number of occasions on which he is involved in the
‘money laundering' activities are relevant factors to be considered.
P P
(3) The offence of dealing with the proceeds from an indictable offence does
Q
not necessarily have any direct correlation with the indictable offence in question. Q
However if the relevant indictable offence can be identified, the court may take into
account the sentence imposed on the indictable offence pre se when determining the
R sentence of the dealing offence. R
(4) If the case has an international element involving activities carried out
S S
across different regions, the court may impose a more severe sentence. This is to
protect Hong Kong's reputation as an international finance and banking hub from
T being tarnished. T
(5) The length of time the offence lasted.
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A A
B B
8. I accept there was no evidence that the defendant knew of her
C husband’s theft of money from clients of Hang Seng Bank and that such C
funds had been used to purchase Flat 6D. I accept the defendant agreed
D D
to purchase Flat 6D in her name at the request of her husband and would
E not otherwise have been involved. The defendant stands to be sentenced E
for assisting her husband by refusing to accept the reality of where the
F F
money had come from to purchase Flat 6D. I also accept that there is no
G evidence of any direct benefit to the defendant in assisting her husband by G
purchasing the property in her name.
H H
I 9. Whether or not the defendant benefited is insignificant as a I
sentencing factor for the reality is the offence of money laundering is
J J
very serious (see HKSAR v CHEN Szu-ming CACC 270/2005). As seen
K in the recent cases of HSU Yu-yi and HOU Shun-hsiung K
CACC 472/2009 the amount of money involved is a major consideration
L L
and not the amount of benefit received by a defendant.
M M
10. In passing sentence I take into account everything said on behalf
N N
of the defendant by Mr Andrews together with all the letters submitted by
O her children, family members and long standing friends, all of which O
speak very highly of the defendant and variously describe her as a loving
P P
and devoted mother; a caring daughter to her parents; kind-hearted,
Q patient and helpful; kind and caring. I take into account the defendant has Q
no previous convictions. I have carefully considered all the reports
R R
submitted by Mr Andrews together with the update psychological and
S psychiatric reports called by the court, which Mr Andrews submits show S
for the first time remorse on the part of the defendant for her wrong doing,
T T
as does her letter to the court asking for forgiveness.
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A A
B B
11. In passing sentence I have borne in mind all that said by the
C Court of Appeal in HKSAR v LEUNG Pui-shan CACC 317/2007 of the C
need for individual justice.
D D
E Starting point E
F F
12. The cases reviewed in HSU Yu-yi show that a starting point of
G between 3 and 5 years imprisonment has been applied to amounts ranging G
between $1 and $15 million. None of the cases are however factually
H H
similar to the present case, highlighting each case is to be decided on its
I own facts and circumstances. I
J J
13. I have also considered the case of HKSAR v LAI Kam-yee,
K Teresa CACC 120/2009, a case where the defendant over a period of 28 K
months laundered $4,205,925.30 through her three bank accounts for her
L L
ex-husband. The court in passing sentence accepted that because of her
M relationship with her ex-husband, the defendant agreed to deal with the M
monies, so as to protect the interests of her 12 year old son. The court
N N
further accepted that although the defendant used a small portion of the
O money she did not deal with the money with the intention of making a O
profit and that this was an isolated incident. The Court of Appeal held
P P
that 12 months imprisonment after trial was appropriate, in particular
Q where the evidence that the prosecution adduced came mostly from the Q
information given by the defendant to the police, which information also
R R
formed the basis for the court’s determination on her mens rea.
S S
T T
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A A
B B
14. Taking into account that Flat 6D was purchased for the sum of
C $7,620,000 of which $2,286,000 was paid by transfer from the account of C
Chavarat; and the role of the defendant in that she acted only on the
D D
request of her husband, I am satisfied the proper starting point after trial
E is one of 1 year and 6 months imprisonment, which I reduce by 3 months E
on account of the defendant’s clear record.
F F
Suspended sentence
G G
H 15. Mr Andrews accepting a prison sentence is inevitable submits H
there are exceptional circumstances to either suspend the sentence or
I I
alternatively impose a community service order. In support Mr Andrews
J submits two main grounds, delay and ill health. J
K K
Delay
L L
16. Delay in bringing an offender to justice is a mitigating factor
M M
which can be taken into account in sentence but is not a mitigating factor
N N
per se. All the circumstances must be looked at including whether the
O
offender has acknowledged guilt; where the delay has given the offender O
the opportunity to rehabilitate himself; whether restitution has been made;
P P
whether there was a legitimate expectation the matter will not be further
Q pursued; the size of the investigation and whether the time taken to bring Q
the case to court was longer than necessary (see HKSAR v CHEUNG
R R
Suet-ting CACC 226/2009). I have also considered the cases on delay
S submitted by Mr Andrews, HKSAR v LAU Kin-yu HCMA 391/2002 and S
The Queen v William Hung [1994] 1 HKCLR 47.
T T
U U
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A A
B B
17. The offence dates back to 1997. In January 1998 Ng was arrested
C and admitted to bail to appear in court on the 11th March 1998. Ng C
absconded. In the meantime the defendant left Hong Kong for the United
D D
Kingdom on the 11th February 1998. At the time the defendant left she
E had not been interviewed by the police or warned of such an eventuality. E
F F
Extradition
G G
18. Mr Shiu and Mr Andrews have both provided to the court a
H H
chronology of events from 1996 up to the commencement of the trial in
I September last year. I have also been supplied by Mr Andrews the I
rulings of the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on the application by the
J J
Government to extradite the defendant back to Hong Kong; the
K subsequent appeal against the decision to extradite; and the judicial K
review of the decision of the Secretary of State to make the Extradition
L L
Order. I have read all these decisions, which are very helpful in
M understanding why this case has taken over 12 years to come to trial, in M
particular the judgment of the High Court in March 2009 upholding the
N N
decision of the Secretary of State to make the Extradition Order.
O O
19. In summary the defendant was arrested in England in October
P P
2000 pursuant to a provisional request issued in February 1999. I note
Q Mr Andrews criticism that the Hong Kong police were slow in acting as Q
they had suspected the defendant prior to her leaving Hong Kong but did
R R
not issue the arrest warrant until a year later and that the United Kingdom
S police were also slow in acting by taking over 18 months to arrest the S
defendant, when all along they knew her address in Earls Court.
T T
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A A
B B
20. Soon after arrest extradition proceedings were commenced. On
C the 17th April 2001 the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court concluded there C
was insufficient evidence to raise a prima facie case in respect of any of
D D
the proposed charges of furnishing false information on which the
E defendant’s extradition was sought and accordingly discharged the E
defendant (see the ruling of District Judge Nicholas Evans).
F F
G 21. A month later a fresh request was issued in respect of eight G
charges of money laundering (charge 5 relating to Flat 6D). On the
H H
10th January 2002 the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court concluded there
I was a prima facie case in respect of all eight charges and ordered the I
committal of the defendant to Hong Kong (see the ruling of C. L. Pratt).
J J
The defendant appealed the Committal Order, which appeal was
K dismissed by the Divisional Court on the 14th June 2002 (see the K
summary of the judgment of the Divisional Court).
L L
22. Representations were then made to the Home Office, largely
M M
based on the defendant’s mental health, seeking to persuade the Secretary
N N
of State not to make the Extradition Order. The Secretary of State signed
O
the Order on the 6th September 2007 but permitted further O
representations to be made.
P P
Q 23. On the 24th January 2008 the Secretary of State confirmed the Q
Order for return of the defendant to Hong Kong. The defendant applied
R R
for judicial review of this decision. On the 25th March 2009 in Yuen v
S The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 573 S
(Case No: CO/2728/2008) the High Court dismissed the application
T T
(see the judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley).
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A A
B B
24. The defendant was extradited from the United Kingdom on the
C 23rd April 2009, some 12 years since the commission of the offence, and C
over 8 years since the defendant was arrested and extradition proceedings
D D
commenced. Mr Andrews prays in aid of this as amounting to delay.
E E
25. In HKSAR v LUI Kin-hong CACC 378/1998 the defendant spent
F F
17 months in custody pending extradition having fled Hong Kong
G knowing full well that an investigation was underway. The judge in G
passing sentence reduced the sentence by 10 months to give the defendant
H H
some credit for the time spent in custody. The Court of Appeal in finding
I this generous said at paragraph 29, “…..He fought the extradition largely on the I
basis that he could not obtain a fair trial in Hong Kong, and whilst he is not to be
J J
penalised for adopting that fashionable line, neither should he be permitted to pray in
aid the period of custody which he thereby brought upon himself.”
K K
L
26. Similarly in HKSAR v Michael Wang CACC 184/2006 the L
defendant spent 32 months in custody pending extradition having left
M M
Hong Kong after stealing about HK$9 million from his company. The
N Court of Appeal described as generous the deduction of a period of N
4 months where the defendant had fought every inch of the way the
O O
extradition proceedings.
P P
27. Although on the 14th June 2002 the appeal against the Committal
Q Q
Order was dismissed by the Divisional Court, as seen, the defendant was
R not extradited until April 2009. In the intervening 7 years the defendant R
made various representations to the Secretary of State and when those
S S
failed applied to judicially review the decision of the Secretary of State.
T T
U U
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10
A A
B B
28. Much of the argument put before the Secretary of State related to
C the defendant’s mental health and whether she was fit to plead and able to C
participate effectively in the trial. Many of the medical reports submitted
D D
to the Secretary of State and in the judicial review have been shown to the
E court by Mr Andrews. I have read all the reports. The conclusion of the E
Secretary of State was that it would not be unfair to return the defendant
F F
to Hong Kong. I note no application was made in this trial that the
G defendant was not fit to be tried. G
H H
29. Related to this was the argument that due to the passage of time it
I would be unjust and oppressive to extradite the defendant. The defence I
contended that by the passage of time the defendant would be prejudiced
J J
in the conduct of her trial. The High Court concluded no error of legal
K approach was made by the Secretary of State (see in particular paragraphs K
34-53 of the judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley). Again no application was
L L
made in this trial arising from the passage of time that the defendant
M could not receive a fair trial. M
N N
30. Mr Andrews relies on an apparent delay between July 2004 and
O November 2006, when there was seemingly no active consideration of the O
file by the Secretary of State, which delay Mr Andrews submits could not
P P
be regarded as the fault of the defendant. This is referred to in the
Q judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley, in particular at paragraphs 23, 32, 33, 51 Q
and 61. I note in the correspondence submitted by Mr Shui the Home
R R
Office assured that the case was under consideration. Mr Justice Ouseley
S however concluded at paragraph 51 that in reality the case was allowed to S
become dormant but pertinently observed the defendant appeared not to
T T
have chased the Secretary of State either.
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A A
B B
31. Perhaps not surprisingly the defendant fighting extradition did not
C chase the Secretary of State to decide whether to make the Extradition C
Order. The defendant continued to fight the extradition and only after the
D D
judicial review was dismissed in March 2009 was she extradited.
E E
32. Although the defendant did not leave Hong Kong knowing she
F F
was being investigated, and save for one day has not spent time in
G custody pending extradition, I am satisfied the principles established in G
the decided cases are applicable to the present case. In my view, save and
H H
except the initial extradition proceedings, which were dismissed, and to
I some degree the period between July 2004 and November 2006, the time I
taken to extradite the defendant is entirely attributable to the exercising of
J J
her right to challenge every step of her extradition to Hong Kong.
K K
33. In my view whilst the defendant is not to be penalised for
L exercising her rights, I am satisfied she cannot pray in aid of the time L
taken to extradite her to Hong Kong as amounting to exceptional
M M
circumstances to suspend the sentence.
N N
O
Hong Kong O
P P
34. Mr Andrews submits there has also been delay in the proceedings
Q once the defendant arrived in Hong Kong. The defendant was first taken Q
to court on the 24th April 2009, the day after arriving in Hong Kong.
R R
Proceedings were transferred to the District Court on the 24th July 2009
S with plea day in the District Court set for the 14th August. A pre-trial S
review was fixed for the 15th October when at the request of the defence,
T T
the trial was fixed for the 29th January 2010.
U U
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A A
B B
35. The trial did not proceed and was re-fixed to the 26th April. The
C trial was again adjourned and a new trial date set for the 27th September C
with the trial eventually starting on the 29th September 2010. The reason
D D
for the first adjournment was the late service by the defence of the expert
E report of Mr Shum Lau, which was only served by the defence on the E
27th January, two days before the trial was due to start.
F F
G 36. Mr Andrews sought to attribute this delay to the prosecution by G
saying the prosecution only thought fit to deploy their own expert after
H H
service of the expert report of Mr Shum Lau, when the prosecution full
I well knew that forgery of the signatures was in issue. The fact however I
was that at no time prior to trial did the defence, as is their right, disclose
J J
the defence. The fact expert evidence may be called was neither
K mentioned at the pre-trial review in October nor in the pre-trial K
questionnaire completed by Mr Andrews. Nor was any mention made in
L L
a further pre-trial review held on the 8th January 2010, by which time the
M defence had instructed Mr Shum. M
N N
37. When asked if there was anything he wished to say as to why the
O court was not told in advance of trial that expert evidence may be called O
Mr Andrews was unable to explain. I allowed Mr Finch, the solicitor
P P
instructing Mr Andrews, to explain. Mr Finch sought to blame the
Q prosecution by the late service of documents between November and Q
December 2009; in particular Mr Finch said the account opening
R R
documents of the three bank accounts were not in the transfer bundle and
S that he anticipated/expected the prosecution would instruct their own S
expert. When the defence had received all the documentation was the
T T
defence, Mr Finch said, in a position to instruct their expert. Mr Shiu on
U U
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13
A A
B B
the other hand says he believed all banking documentation was included
C in the extradition bundle. Mr Finch could not however remember what C
was included in the extradition bundle.
D D
38. Whilst I have not seen the content of either the extradition bundle
E E
or the transfer bundle to determine what documents were in fact served
F and when, it is clear the defence have known for a very long time the F
substance of the case they had to meet together with the documentary
G G
evidence (see paragraph 37 of Mr Justice Ouseley’s judgment). The late
H instruction of an expert witness is therefore most surprising, in particular H
considering throughout the extradition proceedings reference is made to
I I
the possibility of someone forging the defendant’s signatures and the
J need for expert evidence (see paragraph 38 of Mr Justice Ouseley’s J
judgment).
K K
L 39. Further I find hard to accept the defence were waiting to see if the L
prosecution were going to call an expert. The defence case being many
M M
signatures were forgeries, the question of calling an expert witness would
N N
have been considered independent of whether or not the prosecution were
O
to call expert evidence. O
P P
40. Albeit the solicitors in the United Kingdom are different to the
Q Hong Kong solicitors, the question of obtaining expert evidence must Q
have been at the forefront of their consideration. Mr Finch said the
R R
defendant was on legal aid and therefore leave of the Legal Aid
S Department is required before instructing experts. That may well be but S
in such situation surely one tells the court they are not ready for trial
T T
rather than asking for a trial date to be fixed in October.
U U
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A A
B B
41. Further even if some documents were served for the first time in
C November or December 2009, this does not explain why the decision to C
call expert evidence was not made until the very last moment resulting in
D D
the adjournment of the first trial date. If by reason of the late service of
E documents the defence were not ready then again surely one tells the E
court they are not ready for trial at the pre-trial review on the 8th January.
F F
Clearly for whatever reasons the defence chose not to tell the court.
G G
42. One simply cannot say as Mr Andrews submits that in reality
H H
there would have been no difference in the terms of delay if expert
I reports had been obtained earlier. As Mr Shui pointed out Mr Shum in I
fact only considered a few documents in addition to the questioned
J J
cheques subject of the charges and not the majority of documents served
K in November and December. K
L L
43. In February through no fault of the defence Mr Shum withdrew
M acting on behalf of the defence (apparently over payment of fees by the M
Legal Aid Department). This necessitated a new expert to be instructed.
N N
The defence instructed Dr Strach from Australia, whose summary report
O was served on the prosecution on the 31st March. This ultimately led to O
a further adjournment of the trial, which eventually started on the
P P
29th September 2010.
Q Q
44. Although the adjournment of the trial in April cannot be said to
R R
be the fault of the defence or the prosecution, the adjournment of the first
S trial clearly was as a result of the late service of the defence expert report. S
The delay caused by this cannot in my view be in anyway attributable to
T T
the prosecution. Mr Finch submits that if criticism can be levelled for the
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15
A A
B B
late instruction of the expert this is not the fault of the defendant. Whilst
C this may not be the fault of the defendant as opposed to the defence, I am C
nevertheless satisfied the defendant cannot pray in aid of this fact as
D D
amounting to exceptional circumstances to suspend the sentence.
E E
Ill Health
F F
G 45. Mr Andrews submits by reason of the delay in bringing the case G
to trial the defendant’s mental health has suffered, including attempts to
H H
take her own life, whereby the defendant has suffered more than in the
I ‘ordinary case’. There can be no doubt that the proceedings will have I
been very distressing.
J J
K 46. The defendant’s mental health since arriving in the United K
Kingdom is detailed in the many reports submitted by Mr Andrews, all of
L L
which I have read, and a summary of which can be found in paragraphs
M 16-26 of the judgment of Mr Justice Ouseley. M
N N
47. The medical reports show that the defendant likely started taking
O anti-depressants when she first went to the United Kingdom at which O
time she made an attempt on her life and those of her children (see the
P P
report of Dr Sarah J Lack dated 31st March 2003).
Q Q
48. The defendant was first seen by a psychiatrist Dr Clare Smith in
R R
February 2001 who diagnosed the defendant as suffering from moderate
S to severe Depressive Disorder with clear features of depression (see the S
reports of Dr Smith dated the 8th May 2003; the 1st August 2003 and the
T T
17th January 2007).
U U
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16
A A
B B
49. In 2003 Dr Lack also diagnosed the defendant as suffering from
C depressive illness of moderate severity, showing symptoms of depressed C
mood, reduced sleep and appetite, suicidal thoughts, weight loss and poor
D D
concentration/ memory. Dr Lack believed that it was of significance that
E the defendant first started experiencing these symptoms shortly after the E
arrest of her husband (see page 12 of Dr Lack’s report).
F F
G 50. As Mr Justice Ouseley states the problems of the defendant arise G
from her mental health rather than the passage of time and that what has
H H
exacerbated her condition is the taking of further steps in the decision
I making process, and that her condition has then calmed down to a degree, I
as the step proves ineffectual (see paragraphs 41 and 50 of the judgment).
J J
K 51. When the defendant first appeared in the Magistrates’ Court in K
April 2009 she was remanded in custody for the preparation of
L L
psychiatric reports. Dr Ho was of the opinion that the defendant suffered
M from depression which has been in remission for a few years but did not M
suffer from any active psychiatric problem at that time. Dr Yuen was of
N N
the opinion that the defendant did not have any active mental problem
O and that her condition seemed quite stable without suicidal thoughts in O
the last few years.
P P
Q 52. In his latest report, prepared for sentencing, Dr Yuen states the Q
defendant’s mood was mildly depressed and noted that the defendant
R R
denied the presence of any psychotic or morbid depressive symptom,
S including suicidal thought. The defendant was said to regard herself as S
mentally stable in the past 18 months. Dr Yuen concludes that the
T T
defendant’s depression is, to a great extent, understandable in nature and
U U
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17
A A
B B
he is sure that her mood will further improve after the trial is over.
C Psychiatric treatment is required for at least 9 months from the time of C
full remission. In patient treatment is not required and the defendant can
D D
continue to attend Kowloon Hospital for psychiatric treatment no matter
E how she is sentenced. E
F F
53. In the report of psychologist Yvonne Lee assessment shows some
G depressed mood with no obvious psychotic signs. As the defendant’s G
mental state was being taken care of by psychiatric service the
H H
psychologist concludes there is no need for immediate psychological
I intervention. I
J J
54. Whilst one has sympathy with anyone suffering from mental
K illness, by exercising her rights to challenge every step of the extradition K
this has at times exacerbated the defendant’s mental condition.
L L
Fortunately that condition appears to have improved whilst in Hong Kong.
M I am satisfied the mental health of the defendant over the past 12 years M
does not amount to exceptional circumstances to suspend the sentence.
N N
O 55. I have carefully considered all matters put forward by O
Mr Andrews. I am satisfied individually and collectively they do not
P P
amount to exceptional circumstances to suspend the sentence or for the
Q imposition of a community service order. I do however take into account Q
the passage of time in bringing this case to trial and the health of the
R R
defendant and further reduce the sentence by a period of 3 months. The
S defendant is sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. S
T T
(D. J. DUFTON)
Deputy District Judge
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